




ENGLAND AND THE NEAR EAST

THE CRIMEA

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*National Portrait Gallery*

VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

*From a drawing by G. Richmond, R.A., in 1853.*

1240  
ENGLAND AND THE NEAR EAST

# THE CRIMEA

BY

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PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE  
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# DEDICATION

TO

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PÈRE DELAHAYE (BELGIUM)  
BRONISLAV DEMBINSKI (POLAND)  
A. DOMANOVSKY (HUNGARY)  
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FERDINAND ŠIŠIĆ (JUGOSLAVIA)  
DRAGUTIN SUBOTIĆ (JUGOSLAVIA)  
VINCENZO USSANI (ITALY)

---

*Neque est ullum certius amicitiae uinculum—quam  
consensus et societas consiliorum et uoluntatum.*

CICERO.



# FOREWORD

My aim is to narrate the history of England's relations with the Near East from the death of Canning until the day when Disraeli brought back 'peace with honour' from Berlin. The period begins with the British fleet's destruction of Turkish sea-power at Navarino and ends with its protection of the Turkish capital against Russia. The aim, however, is not a study of diplomatic or naval history, but a general narrative in which these special features are found side by side with a study of Oriental institutions and of Balkan nationalities. Principles of selection must be adopted if the tale of a half-century is to be crowded even into the compass of three volumes, and on these a word may be permitted.

Constantinople commands the finest strategic position in the world and, as such, remains the centre of the picture. But the real question of the period was whether a spark of life could remain in the old Turkish Empire. Could the 'sick man,' who lay behind the walls of Stambul, recover his strength? The health of the Turkish Empire depended on three factors : on the ability of the Turks to reform ; on the willingness of their Christian subjects to acquiesce in the process ; and on the readiness of the Great Powers to help or hinder this evolution. No one of these factors sufficed by itself. Thus during the period of this volume the intervention of the Great Powers, and notably of England, was able to destroy the power of a rebellious pasha, and to check the advance of the Russian Czar. But the Great Powers could not save Turkey. She alone could save herself, and reconcile her Christian subjects to her by reform. As will be seen, the Turks in fact waxed weaker and weaker, and the Christians stronger and stronger. Yet these three factors—the Great Powers, the Turkish governing class, and the subject races—were intimately connected, and the Eastern question can only be understood if we know how Orientals intrigue, how Western diplomats negotiate, and what Balkan peasants think about.

This volume begins with the elevation of Sultan Mahmud to

the throne by the janizzaries, and explains how his subsequent destruction of these king-makers meant a new era for Turkey. It enabled him to assert an increased control over his provinces, and to inaugurate a successful attempt at reform on the western model. His effort was interrupted by the tremendous episode during which Mehemet Ali struggled for mastery against him. I have drawn only the broad lines of the diplomatic crisis of 1840 for two reasons. I do not wish to interfere with the full-length portrait that Professor Webster is constructing from Palmerston's private papers, and I wish also to emphasise the Eastern not the Western aspect of that crisis. Thus the success of reform in Turkey, and the revolt of obscure tribes in the Lebanon, contributed to Ibrahim's defeat in Syria, just as England's sea-power, dramatically employed at Acre, brought Ibrahim, like Napoleon, to defeat in Asia. I have also dwelt on the settlement of Syria under Turkish rule by the Great Powers, as this not only includes much picturesque Oriental detail, but is a neglected episode in international control. The Straits Convention in 1841 is treated fully, especially in its after effects, as these are vital to all study of the Turkish Empire and of Europe's interest in it.

This volume has the sub-title of the Crimea, because every episode of the period leads up to that war. The narrative attempts to connect this international catastrophe with the failure of the Reform movement in Turkey, with rebellion in the obscure province of Bosnia, and with the war against the tiny state of Montenegro. So fragile was the Turkish Empire that even slight shocks loosened its structure and capacity for resistance. The tragic blunder of the Crimean war is often assigned to more obvious causes, *e.g.* the conversational indiscretions of the Czar, and the disputes of Greek and Latin monks as to the possession of a key, the replacement of a star, the repair of a cupola. But there were other elements at work. There was the disturbance caused by the formation of a new cabinet in London, and the revolution caused by the formation of a new Napoleonic empire in France. The religious feeling of Paris is known to have excited religious fanaticism at St. Petersburg, but the frenzy of religious fervour awakened at Stambul is often forgotten. The web of this vast tragedy was in fact woven from various and many-coloured strands.

During this period the Turkish internal problem has been surveyed by Jorga, and the Egyptian by Dodwell, Hoskins and Sabry. The history of Balkan nations has been illuminated by Miller, Seton-Watson and Šišić, and the diplomacy by

Goriainov, Martens, Guichen, Driault, Douin, Hall, Mosely, and a host of others. Yet the ground is nowhere fully covered. *Et superest ager.* And the origins of the Crimean war are not even yet wholly revealed. The great work of Zaiončovskii covers most aspects of Russian policy, but is little known to British readers. Kinglake's rhetoric still influences British historians, and the fact has encouraged me to use certain new sources, which disclose the realities of British policy.

By His late Majesty's gracious permission the Royal archives have been studied for 1840-1 and for 1852-3. The official British records used are those of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, the latter being unusually ample for 1840. For the same periods the diplomatic records of Vienna and Paris have been consulted. Throughout the period the Dutch records at The Hague have been useful. They fully illustrate Ranke's dictum that the best contemporary comment on the action of Great Powers usually comes from the diplomats of a small neutral state.

Historians, and particularly foreign historians, are apt to derive their ideas of our public policy and of our public men from the Blue Books of the periods. But there is no publication, as Alfred Marshall used to say, into which the human element enters more often, and by which posterity is as likely to be misled. Accordingly I have thought it right to delve deeply into the omissions of Blue Books and to bring suppressed passages to light. The results will be found in the text, and the details have been summarised for the use of scholars in the notes. It is hoped that the labour, which was no light one, will have been useful.

The test of a man's character, says Lord Acton, is to compare his private papers with his public utterances. He adds that there are few who survive such a test. In this period, at least, the public will be in a position to judge, for the test has been rigidly applied. During 1839-40 and 1850-3 the private papers of Lord John Russell have yielded a good deal, despite the previous selection published by my friend Dr. Gooch. The private papers of Lord Granville contain a number of letters of Palmerston during 1839-40, as do those of Lord Blomfield for 1848-9. The present Lord Clarendon has thrown open to me the invaluable private papers of his ancestor. During the period 1852-3 these comprise scores of letters from the chief characters like Aberdeen, Russell, Palmerston, Cowley and Graham. Though many of these have already been published, the remainder are necessary to fill the gaps



and to disclose the secrets. If we add to them the papers of Stratford de Redcliffe we possess at last full knowledge of the private views of the ambassador at Constantinople and of the Foreign Secretary in London during the year of crisis. What is more, we at last know the extent of influence brought to bear on Clarendon by Palmerston and Russell at critical moments. On the whole, I am inclined to credit Stratford de Redcliffe with less responsibility for the war, and the London cabinet with more of it, than has usually been admitted. In the crucial matter of moving the fleet it was Stratford who counselled delay and the cabinet who insisted on advance.

The rhetoric of Kinglake is largely responsible for the denunciation of Stratford. His other victim was Napoleon III and, as Mr. Guedalla has amusingly pointed out, the French Emperor suffered for having given personal offence to an historian. The private letters of Cowley to Clarendon, which are quoted in the text, make it difficult to cast Napoleon for the part of Machiavelli. On the other hand, Aberdeen's weakness had very serious results. His private papers during 1841-5 and 1852-3, and particularly his correspondence with his Russian friend Brunnow, reveal the truth. They have already been partly used by Mr. Kingsley Martin in his masterly study of the press and public opinion on the eve of the Crimean war. But a comparison of them with Russian sources shows how deep was the Czar's misunderstanding of the tendencies of British politics, and how mistaken was his trust in the weak but amiable British premier. I ought to acknowledge here the kindness of the late Lord Gladstone and of Major Coningsby Disraeli in throwing open to me the private papers of their distinguished relatives. These will yield nearly all their harvest at a later stage.

Goethe said that 'a man who has been among the palms, is never the same again.' No one, who wandered through the East before the war, will contest the dictum. Constantinople was then still a network of cosmopolitan intrigue, and areas like Anatolia, Albania, Macedonia retained much of their primitive barbarity and exotic colouring. The war destroyed the old Orient. The fez and the *yashmak* are unknown in Stambul; the Albanian chief stalks through the streets of Tirana without either weapons or bodyguard. The black and white garb of the Druse has disappeared from the Lebanon, the motor is expelling both camel and bandit from the Syrian desert. Even in Bosnia the national costume is vanishing; the last of the *comitajis* have disappeared from

Herzegovina and will soon be hunted to death in Macedonia. Certain pre-war pictures remain in my mind : a group of gaily-dressed *comitajis* swaggering through the streets of a Balkan town after a successful raid ; a smuggling of weapons across the Albanian frontier by night for use against the Turks ; a Sultan going to the Selamlık with his wives in a closed carriage, a tall black eunuch behind him and blue-uniformed guards on white Arab horses in front ; Turkish troops burning the house of a Slav who had refused to pay taxes ; Macedonian peasants ploughing the furrow with their guns slung across their backs. Such artless incidents are inconceivable to-day.

Testimonies to the past from those who knew it came from such men as G. H. Fitzmaurice, the famous chief dragoman of Constantinople ; Sir Valentine Chirol, the *doyen* of Oriental journalists in his day ; and Arminius Vambéry, who contrived to be at one time the confidant of Abdul Hamid and at another of Lord Salisbury and King Edward. There are precious materials in the literature of the Balkans, but they are not always accessible. Of three indispensable books one had to be sought in Zagreb, another at Constantinople, a third at Beyrouth. Then there are the noble folksongs which minstrels (*Guslars*) have recited to me in Herzegovina and Montenegro. Lazar Sočista has pointed out to me the spot where the Montenegrins slew Čengić Aga, and where his father's band routed the Turks in the last of the hundred battles of the Muratovizza pass. The struggles of Bosnia and Montenegro (which these sagas illustrate) are touched on in this volume. The next will tell of Servia, of Greece, of Rumania, and of Bulgaria.

A tale is more warmly coloured if it takes shape among the scenes which it describes. And this aim has been partly achieved. Napier's victory over Ibrahim on the Ardali heights and Stopford's capture of Beyrouth are seen to be a combined operation, when both harbour and height are visible from a point in the Lebanon. The lovely hills of Bosnia and the blue lake of Jezero frame the scene in which Omer pasha destroyed the last feudal army in Europe. A fortress on the extreme edge of Lebanon marks the place to which Ibrahim fled after his first defeat in Asia. Ponsonby's undying hatred of Russia can be grasped if you look at the bay once crowded with Russian ships, and at the hills once dotted with Russian tents. Northward stretches the dark line of the Bosphorus along which Stratford de Redcliffe watched the British and French ships sailing to the Black Sea and to the Crimea.

HAROLD TEMPERLEY.



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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

## OFFICIAL RECORDS

- A.E.F.* Affaires Étrangères, Paris, France.  
*F.O.* Foreign Office Papers } Public Record Office, London.  
*Ady.* Admiralty Papers }  
*N.R.A.* Nederlands Rijks Archief, The Hague, Netherlands.  
*W.S.A.* Wiener Staats Archiv, Vienna, Austria.

## ROYAL ARCHIVES

- Roy. Arch.* Royal Archives at Windsor in the possession of His Majesty the King.

## PRIVATE PAPERS

- Pte. Aber. MSS.* Aberdeen Papers } British Museum (Add[itional] MSS.).  
*Pte. Lay. MSS.* Layard Papers }  
*Bey. MSS.* A collection of private letters and official papers mostly of Colonel Rose and Richard Wood in the British Consulate at Beyrouth. When the paper quoted is a private one *pte.* is added.  
*Pte. Clar. MSS.* Papers of Earl of Clarendon, including many letters of Aberdeen, Palmerston, Cowley and Russell, in the possession of the present Earl of Clarendon.  
*Pte. Dis. MSS.* Papers of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, in the possession of Major Coningsby Disraeli.  
*Pte. Glad. MSS.* Papers of W. E. Gladstone in the possession of the late Lord Gladstone.  
*Pte. Gr. MSS.* Papers of 2nd Earl Granville } Now in Public Record  
*Pte. Russ. MSS.* Papers of Lord John (Earl) } Office G[ifts] &  
Russell. } D[eposits].  
*Pte. Strat. MSS.* Papers of Sir Stratford Canning, afterwards Viscount de Redcliffe, now in Public Record Office.  
*Grev. unpublished Journ.* Unpublished parts of Greville Journal from the British Museum Add. MSS.

## BLUE BOOKS

- Accounts & Papers.* These are the annual parliamentary publications referred to under date of year, number of volume, number of paper, number of document *or* page. E.g., Accounts & Papers [1845], LI [662], encl. 1 to No. 33 *or* p. 665. In certain cases both number *and* page are given.

- E.P.* I-VI. } These abbreviations are not used in the text, but in  
*Hung. Ref.* I, II. } the notes for certain special collections. Explanations will be found at p. 398 preceding the notes.  
*Lev.* I II, III. }

## PERIODICALS

*Am. Hist. Rev.* American Historical Review.

*Camb. Hist. Journ.* Cambridge Historical Journal.

*E.H.R.* English Historical Review.

*Journ. Mod. Hist.* Journal of Modern History, Chicago.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND TECHNICAL NOTE

THE pleasantest duty of the historian is to render thanks for help given. He can do it the more readily, for he attaches to his advisers no responsibility for his views as here expressed. For Chapters I and II I must acknowledge helpful suggestion and comment from Miss Lillian Penson and Mr. C. W. Crawley. For the Turkish parts of these chapters as well as for Chapters VI and IX I have had the advantage of the expert supervision and advice of Mr. R. Levy, whose extensive knowledge of Oriental languages and sociology has always been at my disposal, and I have gained by the expert advice of Sir George Young, the editor of the *Corps de Droit Ottomane*. For the Mehemet Ali chapters (III-IV) I have been helped by Miss Marjorie Harrison, Professors Renouvin, Rodkey, Hoskyns and Mr. G. H. Bolsover. In matters purely Egyptian I have gone to my former pupils Professor S. Ghorbal and M. Kassim. As regards the perplexing problems connected with the Lebanon, and particularly the Druses and Maronites, I have relied on the counsel of Professor R. A. Nicholson of my own University and of Professor A. J. Rustum of Beyrouth University. As regards the Arabs I have learned much from G. Antonius of Jerusalem, and have had hints as to their character and history from Bertram Thomas and from T. E. Lawrence himself. The manner in which the latter dealt with Orientals is singularly interesting as it forms a contrast (to which I have drawn attention, pp. 242-3) with the method of Stratford de Redcliffe. As for Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro, the theme of Chapter VIII, Lazar Sočista, the present Ban of the Zetska district, has been my chief authority. As regards matters Croatian I have gone to Professor Šišić, and for all matters Rumanian to Professor Jorga, both of them friends of old standing. On the connexion between Nicholas and England during 1840-1 Professors Webster and Rodkey have been useful, and Dr. G. B. Henderson has helped me greatly on the important question of the Czar's conversations with British statesmen both in 1844 and 1853, as have Miss Malcolm Smith, and Mr. H. E. Howard for the outbreak of the Crimean War. For British

public opinion Mr. Kingsley Martin's study is still of much value, and Archdeacon Stewart of Jerusalem has kindly advised me on the Holy Places Dispute.

In general I have always been indebted to the views of Professor Seton-Watson and Mr. William Miller on Balkan affairs, as to Professor Dodwell's for Egypt. A knowledge of naval matters, from the technical standpoint, is essential for some aspects of the crisis of 1840 and 1841, as for the outbreak of the Crimean War. I have obtained this from the expert advice of Admiral Richmond and Mr. H. Brindley, and thus been enabled to venture along paths I should otherwise have shunned. I have benefited from research in naval matters of Miss E. M. Keate and more generally of Miss Isabel Johnston, and also from that of M. Doysié in the French Archives. The help of Sir Stephen Gaslee of the Foreign Office, of Mr. A. E. Stamp and Mr. Flower of the Record Office, of Drs. Bittner and Gross of the Vienna Haus- und Hof-Archiv, of the late M. Fruin of The Hague Rijks Archief, and of M. Rigault of the Quai d'Orsay, has been invaluable. In conclusion I wish to acknowledge help and encouragement received at every stage from my wife.

A technical note is necessary on certain points. The spelling of Turkish and Arabic words and names has to be determined roughly by popular, or rather diplomatic, usage. Otherwise Aali and Ali Rudha and Ali the Lion of Janina, to take examples, would appear in forms unrecognisable to the historian. I have explained the empirical system adopted on pp. 387-8. Another technical matter demands explanation. The punctuation and sometimes the spelling of Victorians is very extraordinary to us. Palmerston's use of capitals and stops is very trying and does not seem due to his unconventional character, for Clarendon is equally astonishing to us. I have therefore ventured to modernise and regularise both punctuation and spelling. In a few cases, where it seemed worth doing so, I have retained both. This method is applied to French as well as to English quotations.

The narrative is intended for the general reader and the text is a contribution towards the art of history. The notes support the statements in the text, and give indications for the aid of future historians, not only as to any new conclusions reached, but as to the places where statements are open to question, and in what directions investigation may profitably be carried further by some future seekers after truth.

H. T.

BOOK I  
SULTAN MAHMUD

PROLOGUE  
THE SWORD AND SHIELD OF CONSTANTINOPLE

CHAPTER I  
THE REFORMS OF MAHMUD II

CHAPTER II  
THE GREAT POWERS AND MAHMUD



# ENGLAND AND THE NEAR EAST

## PROLOGUE

### THE SWORD AND SHIELD OF CONSTANTINOPLE

THE Eastern question would have puzzled our fathers and grandfathers less if they had gone to Seraglio point, and surveyed Constantinople from beneath the column where the old Sultans so often sat. Behind you is the Golden Horn, in front are the sparkling waters which divide Europe from Asia. To the left the light throws up the bright palace of Dolma Bagtche, strikes on the white cupola of a mosque beyond and makes it gleam like a pearl. Above are hills and stately woods which seem to link Europe to Asia. There is just a hint of a gap in the hills where the Bosphorus severs one shore from the other. Its line is curved and shaped like a scimitar of blue steel. To the right, that is to the south, lies the Sea of Marmara, a round shield of blue enamel, with islands showing like dark bosses on its surface. Farther south again, but invisible to the eye, stretch the Dardanelles.

Now the secret of the Straits is this. One power must grasp both sword and shield. He who holds the Bosphorus repels all attacks from the north, he who holds Marmara and the Dardanelles repels all attacks from the south. For over four centuries the Grand Turk held both weapons in his hands. But his strength lessened and with its lessening his dangers increased. The Great Powers threatened him with war. In the first decade of the nineteenth century a British fleet passed the Dardanelles ; in the third Russian fleets entered both ends of the Straits ; in the fifth French and British fleets passed through them to attack Russians in the Black Sea. The Straits were violated by the Great Powers in order to protect the safety of Egypt, of Anatolia, of Jerusalem. The pretexts were different, but the objects were the same.



Constantinople was the first strategic position in the world, and no Great Power could allow another to possess it. If the sword and shield dropped from the nerveless hands of the Sultan, someone must pick them up. Russia reached for the sword, England and France for the shield. Here was the cause of strife and the origin of the Eastern question in its modern form.

## CHAPTER I

### THE REFORMS OF MAHMUD II

#### I

*Sic tanquam pilam rapiunt inter se reipublicae statum, tyranni ab regibus.*—So tyrants snatch the government from kings as if playing at ball.—CICERO, *De Republica*, I, 44.

MAHMUD II came to power at one of the gravest crises in Turkish history, and amid scenes of carnage and terror rarely equalled even in Constantinople. He was the third Sultan to reign within fourteen months. The first had already suffered death, the second was soon to do so. Reform had been fatal to Selim, reaction doomed his successor. Their fates showed the gravity of the crisis, for it was rare for Sultans to be murdered as well as deposed. Selim had been too far in advance of his time. He was a reformer, and reformers in the East then trod a path of fire. He ended by quarrelling with the turbulent military caste of janizzaries, for he wished to supplant them by a new professional army of regulars trained on a western model. But the janizzaries were deeply rooted in the Turkish polity, and used the plea of religious prejudice and foreign danger to discredit their reforming Sultan. They revolted, took him captive, and set up his nephew with the title of Mustapha IV (May 1807). The feeble young man could inspire no enthusiasm on the throne; Selim in his fetters inspired pity. A revolt against the janizzaries burst out in the provinces. Mustapha the Bairactar, pasha of Rustchuk, swore that he would release Selim and destroy the janizzaries. He marched on Constantinople with an army, easily swept the janizzaries aside and occupied the city.

Great events were at hand. After arriving in the capital the Bairactar interviewed the new Sultan and deposed the chief *ulemas*, but he did not reveal his plans. 'The ministers themselves did not know what was going on.' On July 28, 1808, he appeared with a strong force at the Seraglio gate, behind which the trembling Mustapha held Selim in fetters. A herald announced that the Bairactar had arrived. 'He demanded to see the Grand Vizier, promptly took away the

Imperial seal, his distinguishing mark, and arrested him. . . . He shut the doors, expecting he would penetrate into the interior without resistance. To his great surprise he encountered opposition.' While a few loyal officers made a desperate resistance, some servants in the palace remembered ex-Sultan Selim. They brought him out and butchered him. 'Mustapha himself witnessed his death and tried to save him.' Meanwhile the Bairactar overcame all resistance, only to find the corpse of Selim weltering in his blood. He was much 'touched and confused. They say he shed tears.' For a time he thought of keeping Mustapha on the throne. But the Capudan Pasha (Admiral) 'showed him the danger if they allowed Mustapha to live.'<sup>1</sup> The Bairactar thought it impossible to kill two Sultans in one day, but deposed the wretched Mustapha and sent him away to prison. The Bairactar looked round for a successor, and found him hiding beneath a pile of carpets, or (as some say) on the roof of the palace. It was Mahmud, a youth of twenty-two who had shared Selim's captivity, and had now been saved by the black eunuchs. He was of great importance, for he was almost the last living representative of the House of Osman. The Bairactar was not of the stuff of Kemal, nor was it yet the time to abolish either Padishah or Caliph. He had deposed the Sheikh-ul-Islam as well as eight other *ulemas*, and he found the new ones ready enough to confirm the new Sultan. The young man was proclaimed Padishah as Mahmud II.

The Bairactar does not seem to have been a great politician or a disinterested one. 'No one could ever think he had come with the idea of putting Selim back on the throne.'<sup>2</sup> This was what he said to the Dutch Minister at the only audience he gave to a diplomat.\* His aims therefore were personal, he wished to be a mayor of the palace, and he hastened to profit by Selim's death. He buried the corpse with honours and slew a dozen of the chief partisans of Mustapha IV as a sacrifice to Selim's injured spirit. He became Grand Vizier and announced his intention of restoring the reforms of Selim, and of pursuing the janizzaries with implacable hatred. Since he was foolish enough to disperse his army he only retained power for a few months. The janizzaries again revolted and the capital was once more the scene of desperate fighting. The Bairactar blew himself up or perished in an explosion, and the triumphant janizzaries dictated their terms to Mahmud. The young Sultan received them with apparent calmness, for he had provided against any restoration of the captive Mustapha

\* The two Dutch representatives van Dedem and Testa are far the best authorities for 1807-9; cp. nn. 1-5. The word Bairactar means standard-bearer.

by strangling him a few days before. He submitted to his ferocious Praetorians, and repealed all the reforms of Selim. By the end of the year the Turkish Empire seemed as unchanging, and the janizzaries as powerful, as ever.<sup>3</sup>

But in Mahmud the House of Osman had found a head and a leader, such as it had not produced for two centuries. In appearance he was as yet unimpressive, in reality he was a youth of great character. What was more important, and indeed unique for a Sultan, he had received an education in western ideas. His mother, a French Creole whom Barbary pirates had brought to the Seraglio at Constantinople, may have turned him in the direction of progress.

The Sultana Valide (Queen Mother) always enjoyed a position of peculiar advantage, because her apartments adjoined the Sultan's and made her the only person in continual touch with him. But the most potent influence on Mahmud came not from the palace but from the tomb. The new Sultan was 'plunged in grief at the loss of his friend Selim.' He 'would allow no firing of guns nor the rejoicings usual on such an accession.' He had shared Selim's captivity and drunk in his counsels. 'It is known he [Selim] instructed him [Mahmud] as much in the literature as in the politics of Europe, on the situation of the Ottoman Empire, its relations with France, in a word he seems even to have given him his idea of it all.'<sup>4</sup> Mahmud became convinced that the Ottoman Empire must change or perish and that the janizzaries were the enemies at once of progress and of the Padishah. Even at this early stage he refused to appoint a new Grand Vizier at their dictation, and 'appeared to care very little for their threats.' Early in 1809 one pay-day 'His Majesty, who is himself a janizzary, went to the barracks *incognito* to receive his pay.'<sup>5</sup> He exhorted them to obedience, found out some disloyal leaders by this means and disgraced them. His purpose was fixed, though he had to endure the dictation, and even the insults, of the janizzaries for years. But he bided his time, remembering the Turkish proverb, 'Do not take a man by the beard, unless you can cut off his head.'

## II

*The Turk cannot govern Egypt, Arabia and Kurdistan, as he governs Thrace ; nor has he the same dominion in Crimea and Algiers that he has in Brusa and Smyrna.—*  
BURKE, *Conciliation with America*, 1775.

The year 1812, which saw peace concluded with Russia, was climacteric. Mahmud had saved his prestige and was at

last able to develop those designs on which he had reflected while in captivity with Selim himself. He could not win back much of the territory his predecessors had lost. He could not destroy the independence of the Servians, who had twice successfully revolted ; he could only suppress the independence of the Pasha of Widdin. At first he left unscathed the feudal beys of Bosnia and of Albania ; and even Ali Pasha in Epirus and Mehemet Ali in Egypt, both rulers as able as himself. He concentrated on Asia Minor and set himself to restrict independence and trample on rebellion. There he might hope to win back the outlying provinces of the Empire.

The Sultan could hardly be said either to reign or to govern in Syria, in Armenia, in Iraq, or in Mosul. At the beginning of the century the pashas of Damascus, of Acre, and of Bagdad were rebels : those of Antioch and of Aleppo were ' monsters of cruelty.' ' In those days putting a wealthy man to death and seizing all his property was an everyday occurrence.' <sup>6</sup> Mahmud decided to end this reign of anarchy and rebellion. He worked by every means subtle and open, fair and foul. He was not of course in any way disinterested. His objects were political, to increase his own power, and financial, to increase his own revenues. Nor did his efforts always have the results that were intended. The increase of centralised control did not necessarily produce more revenue, though it certainly introduced more oppression. Local notabilities were interested to keep taxes low, while officials from the centre wished to make them high. In this way they secured substantial profit to themselves though more money did not always flow into the Treasury. Mahmud sought to apply a rigid control in every direction. Thus the penalty of death, which any pasha of old could inflict within his district, was now reserved. Mahmud forbade a death sentence to be executed until it had been referred to Constantinople and confirmed there. The ingenuity of local pashas indeed devised substitutes for a formal execution. The victim was sometimes shot on the pretext of having resisted arrest or of having attempted to escape. Sometimes he died, with suspicious rapidity, in gaol. While the victim did not always benefit, the powers of local governors underwent the greatest limitation to which they could have been subjected. They could no longer indulge in those open and avowed displays of violence which were so much in accord with old Turkish ideas. It had been common for pashas ' to establish their authority in a new government ' on arrival by cutting off a few heads. Thus Abdallah Pasha of Acre had killed several of his creditors in the past for



demanding repayment. After the abolition of the death penalty he astonished everyone by paying back his debts to some merchants of Latakia. This action was 'well authenticated' as well as 'extremely rare in the annals of Turkish governors.' <sup>7</sup> It was ascribed purely to fear of Mahmud II, and to that limitation of power which he had imposed on the pashas.

Mahmud aimed at restriction of provincial power in every direction. In most of the great cities the government had allowed notables (*ayan*) to be elected by the people. Mahmud substituted local officials chosen under the supervision of the pasha at the direction of the central government. He took equally strong measures to limit the independence of all local rulers, whether they were pashas or the old feudal nobles and proprietors of great landed estates. Thus the feudal lords (*derebeys*) in Asia Minor, as at Scala Nuova, lost their privileges. One of the great Smyrna notables was lured onto a boat and poisoned by Mahmud's agents. The chiefs of other families were brought to Constantinople and kept in a gilded captivity while Mahmud's officials drew their revenues and ruled their lands. Sometimes, as at Angora, an agent of Mahmud's went off with a *firman* and a bowstring, and returned to Constantinople with a head in a net.

Mahmud's activities soon reached to the remoter parts of Asia Minor. He caused a serious revolt in 1816 by 'cornering' the wheat in Asia Minor and only suppressed it with difficulty. He failed altogether to crush the rebellion of Georgia which resulted in its annexation by Russia. But he mastered the Kurdish *derebeys* in Armenia. It was time for the pride of these old feudal barons to be brought low.<sup>8</sup> The last of the *derebeys* of Erzerum never entered a large town without a train of five hundred horse. Dancing and juggling boys preceded him, cutting capers in honour of his greatness. He sat on his horse with a regal air, allowing the enormous sleeves of his coat almost to sweep the ground. At a word from such a magnate his followers would cut a bystander to pieces or carry off a pretty girl to his harem. At Angora, at Sivas, at Erzerum these hereditary chieftains or princes were gradually subdued, and pashas set up in their places. The result was not wholly or immediately to the good. These Kurdish chieftains, though often tyrannical enough themselves, had kept their followers in order, or at least in some sort of order. When their heavy hands were removed, their followers could not be restrained from their favourite pastime of plundering and massacring Armenians. Mahmud, in the interests of order not of mercy, put a stop to this, and intervened with such effect that

the Armenians enjoyed, for the first time in centuries, a generation of comparative security.

In 1834 Mahmud sent Reschid Mehemet as pasha to Sivas, endowing him with very large powers, including the title of *Seraskier*, or Commander-in-Chief. The appointment was extraordinary. Reschid Mehemet had been Grand Vizier and served with distinction in Greece. He had also gratified Mahmud by massacring treacherously a number of Bosnian and Albanian chiefs. But less than two years before he and his army had been defeated and captured in Ibrahim's colossal victory at Konieh. Yet, for once, the old Turkish practice of reappointing defeated generals to high office proved right. Reschid Mehemet did not strive after speedy or spectacular success; he was not deterred by busy intrigues against him in Constantinople. He framed a plan and proceeded to apply it in a cool and methodical way. At Sivas itself he had no difficulty in uprooting the reviving power of the old feudatories. He then proceeded to build a carriage road from Sivas to Diarbekir and thence to Bitlis. Along such a road he could bring up his heavy artillery which, then as always, meant ruin to feudal castles and death to feudal chiefs. In 1835 he moved on Diarbekir, where the local chiefs submitted. He then moved forward to Mardin, where his cannon terrified the local barons. To secure his conquest he permanently detached that area from the Iraq province and annexed it to Diarbekir. Farther on the city of Mosul had already been cowed by an iron-handed lieutenant of the governor of Iraq. In 1836, with aid from the governor of Iraq, Reschid Mehemet moved his army east of Tigris against the boldest and most turbulent of all the old Kurd chiefs. He was again successful and penetrated to Rowanduz, the hitherto impregnable fortress of the greatest of all of them, Mohammed the Blind.<sup>9</sup> This chief, who in fact had one eye, was taken to Constantinople and never saw Kurdistan again. Perhaps it was as well. He had cut off the lips of all trespassers on his domains, whether cattle or men, and had recently butchered seven hundred persons.<sup>10</sup> Their only offence was that of devil-worshipping, and that religion had a respectable tradition in that area.

Reschid Mehemet had overwhelmed the old feudal chiefs of Kurdistan and Mosul as easily as a player scatters chessmen on a board. His detractors, of course, said that his success was incomplete. Feudalism indeed cannot be stamped out by a blow. Some petty chiefs still held out on inaccessible crags, others degenerated into leaders of bands of brigands. But the work of Reschid Mehemet had succeeded and all knew it.<sup>11</sup>

Palmerston himself was greatly struck by this pacification of Kurdistan. The Kurds, he wrote, were 'one of the most active causes in converting into desert wastes those fertile districts which under the vigorous police[sic] of the Roman Empire were full of Cities and of fixed Inhabitants.'<sup>12</sup> Mahmud was not a Trajan nor Reschid Mehemet a Heraclius, but their achievements secured life and property in areas where both had for centuries been unsafe. Only Reschid's death in 1836 prevented still further conquests or, as Ponsonby thought, his development into a potential rebel like Mehemet Ali.<sup>13</sup>

In the Mesopotamian lands the Sultan's authority had already been asserted before Reschid Mehemet's triumphant march from Sivas to the Tigris. Iraq, i.e. the Pashalic of Bagdad, had for long been practically independent. Tribute had been habitually refused by pashas, backed or coerced by their hereditary caste of janizzaries. Mahmud began by sending Halaat, one of his most trusted agents, to demand tribute of the pasha of Bagdad in 1810. Halaat, getting no satisfaction from the pasha, raised the Bedouin tribes against him, defeated and slew him. After setting up a nominee dependent on the Sultan he departed. Within two years the local mamelukes and janizzaries again deposed the Sultan's nominee and compelled Mahmud to acquiesce for a time in the successor they appointed. In 1817 Mahmud again sent an army which deposed the local nominee and set up his own official as pasha. In 1830 this official was deposed by an order from Constantinople, but the still turbulent janizzaries and mamelukes reinstated him and murdered his successor. This time Mahmud showed an unyielding front, and the fact marks a decisive stage in the growth of his power. He replied haughtily, outlawing Daud, the old pasha, and commanding Ali Rudha, pasha of Aleppo, to march on Bagdad and to reduce Iraq and Daud to submission. The new pasha was aided by a flood which ruined Bagdad and a plague which decimated the mamelukes. His lieutenant with the advance guard received the submission of Daud, but was himself slain by the treacherous mamelukes. Ali Rudha finally arrived and blockaded the city. He was in great difficulty and on the eve of retreat when dissensions from within opened the gates of Bagdad. He captured Daud and, a week later, exterminated the mamelukes and janizzaries to the very last man (1831). The prologue was bloody but the play itself developed more peacefully. Daud's life was spared and he gained high honours elsewhere. Ali Rudha, genial and tolerant, ruled peacefully for a decade at Bagdad.<sup>14</sup>



Mahmud's firmness had won the day and perhaps even saved his empire. For Iraq was only just subdued in time. Its continued independence would probably have caused rebellion in Armenia and Kurdistan, when Egyptian armies marched against the Sultan in 1832. In that case the Turkish Empire might well have perished. But by 1835 the authority of the Padishah was more secure in Armenia, in Sivas, in Angora, in Diarbekir, in Mosul and in Iraq, than it had been for centuries. So good a judge as Chesney thought it vital to hold on to Diarbekir, as that wedge of territory separated the Egyptians in Syria from the Russians in the Caucasus.<sup>15</sup> Palmerston confirmed this view, and the command of this strategic position was maintained even under the terrible assaults of Mehemet Ali during the last years of Mahmud's reign.

### III

*Segnem ac desidem et circo et theatris corruptum militem.*—A slothful and listless soldiery debauched by games and pageants.—TACITUS, *Hist.*, III, 21.

At Constantinople the Padishah was outwardly submissive to the janizzaries. But their existence was intolerable to him, and he had decided to destroy them as soon as he found a good opportunity. As Stratford wrote, 'They had become the masters of their government, the butchers of their sovereigns, and a source of terror to all but the enemies of their country.' Mahmud formed a small force of regular soldiers attached to his person, and no longer made janizzaries the governors of the castles on the Bosphorus. So early as 1809 the Dutch representative remarked on his 'determination and perseverance' and hostility to the janizzaries. The young Sultan was feared and suspected by them, said a British officer in 1812.<sup>16</sup> They showed their hatred of him on several occasions in characteristic fashion. In 1818 the commotions in Sivas produced fires and riots in Constantinople, both due to the janizzaries. Demands were made for the dismissal of various officers, including Halaat. Mahmud refused to sacrifice his favourite, but replaced the Capudan Pasha. He issued a *firman* threatening disturbers of the peace and, though he accepted the excuses of the leaders of the janizzaries, executed one of their supporters. He conciliated the public by banishing elephants from the capital, as they were considered to be beasts of ill-omen. On August 20 he appeared publicly in a splendid fête, given in honour of his being admitted to the company of

those archers who could hit a mark at a great distance. This public appearance showed that he despised the threats of the janizzaries and felt secure among his other subjects.<sup>17</sup> He showed similar firmness when another insurrection of janizzaries took place in 1819. The Grand Admiral was strangled and the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and three of his ministers, were dismissed for their weakness in the face of danger. The janizzaries were beginning to see that Mahmud meant to be obeyed, and would soon be strong enough to resent their overbearing tyranny.

Mahmud would probably have taken steps against the janizzaries in 1820 had not his attention been diverted by serious troubles elsewhere. The octogenarian Ali Pasha of Janina had built up a strong power in Albania and Epirus. He was the friend of Byron, and the model for Alp and Lara. Half hero, half villain, he was as brave as he was evil. His lake palace at Janina had been transformed into an almost impregnable fortress, and was filled with ample supplies of treasure. The Sultan envied his power and his gold, and had long suspected him of instigating the Greeks to revolt. But Ali himself, by a rash act, precipitated his own fall. He sent some Albanians to assassinate an enemy of his in Constantinople itself. One of the assassins, who was arrested, confessed his crime, and was hung from the Seraglio gate. Enraged at so daring an act, Mahmud deposed and outlawed Ali, and sent an army to destroy him. Ali, who was not called 'the Lion' in vain, made a desperate resistance, called the rebel Greeks to his aid, and triumphed over several Turkish armies. But he was at length overthrown and slain (apparently by treachery) in his own lake palace at Janina. A Tartar bore his head to Constantinople, exhibiting the grim token at every town at which he stopped on the way. At Constantinople it was placed on a pillar by the Seraglio gate. There, on a silver platter for all the world to see, was the head of Ali with its long grey beard and stony eyes. Beside it were the heads of his three sons and of a grandson, and a document setting forth his crimes. Mahmud's arm was long and his vengeance certain, yet he could not wreak vengeance on the dead. One day a pious dervish took down the five heads and buried them in five tombs by the gate of Selybria, and neither Mahmud nor any man dared hinder him.\*

The exposure of Ali's head did not mean that Mahmud had

\* The tombstone of Ali bore this inscription: 'Here has been buried the severed head of the famous Ali Pasha who for thirty years distinguished himself in Albania and was Governor of Janina.' The tombs have now been removed to a museum.

destroyed all his enemies. On the contrary, the effort exhausted Mahmud's strength and led to the greatest disaster of his reign. Troops were called up from all quarters against Janina and the garrisons in the Morea were denuded just at the moment when the Greeks were preparing to revolt. The Greek war of independence began nearly a year before Ali lost his life. Mahmud attempted to cow the Greeks by the most brutal savagery. He hung the Greek patriarch in his robes before his Metropolitan church, and strung up a number of bishops in and around Constantinople to keep him company. Hundreds of pairs of human ears were nailed to the Seraglio gate ; a fighting priest was impaled at Thermopylae. But in ferocity the Greeks were a match for the Turks, and atrocities only incited them to further resistance. Mahmud was equally savage towards his own subjects and dismissed and finally executed his old favourite Halaat. Things went from bad to worse. At last he saw that he could not suppress the Greek rebels until he could repress rebels nearer home. He summoned Mehemet Ali from Egypt to subdue the Greeks in the Morea while he turned against the enemy from within.

By 1826 Mahmud was in the full vigour of manhood, very different from the frightened stripling whom the Bairactar had set on the throne eighteen years before. Unlike his predecessors he often rode through the streets of Stambul, and attracted the attention of the crowd. They admired his superb seat on horseback, the proud arch of his breast, the sweep of his black beard, the pale oval of his face. His expression was mild in repose but, when stirred, his 'saturnine' eyes gleamed, and his gaze became such as few could bear 'without trembling.' His physical gifts extorted admiration. He loved manly sports and, when he shot at archery, it was found that no one had strength to bend his bow. He had moral as well as physical courage, and possessed that persistence in aim which is obstinacy in the stupid man and genius in the clever one. He was still temperate in life, for it was not until the thirties that his indulgence in the darker oriental vices unbalanced his judgment and shortened his life. Avarice at this time was his besetting sin, a sin tempting him to attack individuals to secure their money. He had murdered his nephew and his uncle Mustapha IV, along with four or five wives. He had authorised many executions, and he was even now planning one of the great massacres of history. Yet it may be doubted if any of these actions were due to deliberate cruelty.

Like Richelieu he had no enemies save those of the state. The murder of his predecessor's family was sanctioned by precedent and even by public opinion ; his executions, and even his planned massacre, were ' acts of policy.' His pride or sense of power sometimes led him to commit arbitrary acts, but he often repented of them. He had some fineness in his nature. He loved his children dearly, he was moved to tears by a sad story or a beautiful verse. He excelled in the art of calligraphy and was himself something of a poet as well as a discriminating patron of literature. His reign had begun in weakness but was proceeding from strength to strength. His executions were milestones on his road to power, and the great massacre was to mark its culmination.

The janizzaries, once the bulwark of the Ottoman Empire, were now its greatest danger. They were formidable in peace and useless in war. They were no longer the flower of the Christian youth of the empire, torn from their homes, converted to Mohammedanism and inured to strict discipline and absolute dependence on the Sultan. Some were Mohammedan and hereditary, others were recruited from all races, including Greeks, Slavs, Jews, and the vilest criminals of Constantinople. They were a lawless caste, and quite inefficient as soldiers, preferring the gun with a hexagonal barrel to the more modern musket and bayonet. Their once famous drill and discipline had wholly disappeared. An enemy satirist said that some of them burst their muskets because they put in the bullets first and the powder atop ; and that their cavalry could not flourish their swords without injuring their horses. They behaved as chartered libertines and military bullies throughout the provinces. Two thousand janizzaries ' half ruined ' the Troad during 1823 and 1824. Six hundred of them raided a village one evening, ' turned us out of our beds and tormented us all night,' says a traveller. ' The next day they asked us what we were prepared to give them for tooth-money. We asked what they demanded. They said they would accept six thousand piasters ; we offered a thousand, and at last got rid of them for three thousand. No man's life or property was then safe for half an hour.' <sup>18</sup> It was nearly the same in the capital, where ruffians strode through the streets robbing or insulting, even murdering the men, and sometimes even lifting the veils of women. Their methods of distressing the government by protests were as lawless as they were objectionable, and as objectionable as



they were characteristic. They always began by setting fire to some part of Stambul. The houses were of timber and, since the gild of water-carriers were their accomplices, the flames usually raged until their grievances were met. As has been shown both in 1818 and 1819 they had protested not only by flames but by actual insurrections. They had become more lawless than ever and were lax even in their religious observances. They were called 'The Flowers of Begtash's garden,' but they no longer represented the tradition of their founder.

The Court chronicler of Mahmud has written an account of the destruction of the janizzaries, which probably represents the views of the Sultan on his own political masterpiece. The flowery sentences of the Court scribe for once correspond literally to the facts. The janizzaries had for long been of 'very little service to the state'; this 'fearless corps had for long been breaking the staff of obedience'; 'time and again the Sultan had passed the pen of pardon over the page of their wrong-doing.' 'Water sleeps,' says a Turkish proverb, 'but envy never does.' Mahmud's certainly had not. 'The Sultan could not abide 'their headstrong character any more.' 'He that is born a wolf remains a wolf, and nothing more.' 'A drastic disease needs a drastic remedy.' The failure of the janizzaries against the Greeks had undermined their credit with the people of Stambul, and had placed Mahmud in grave danger. But the danger gave him an advantage. Russia was threatening war in 1826, and war with Russia threatened believers with the destruction of their religion. As the janizzaries had proved quite unable to defend Islam, even the religious body, the *ulemas*, thought that religion could not be harmed and might be saved by substituting new Turkish soldiers for them.

Mahmud had already increased the number of artillerymen to fourteen thousand and trained them on European methods. As already noted he had secured the commanders of the castles of the Bosphorus. He had selected a former Aga of janizzaries, Hussein the Black, as the instrument of their destruction. He was a man of savage courage and complete unscrupulousness, and now commanded the Asiatic troops in Brusa and Nicomedia, troops who had never been very friendly to the janizzaries. Hussein had used his authority, while Aga, to put officers devoted to Mahmud in the higher commands of the janizzaries' corps. On May 29, 1826, the Sultan held an extraordinary *Divan* in the palace of the Aga of janizzaries, to which he summoned the Grand Vizier and

his civil ministers, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the *ulemas*, and the higher officers of the janizzaries. In a long speech Mahmud declared his throne and faith to be endangered by an antiquated military system. 'Fight your enemies with the arms which he uses against you,' cried the *ulemas*. Mahmud then unfolded his plan. It was to select a hundred and fifty men from each janizzary battalion to be formed into regiments and to be trained according to the new western methods. The new force was to receive a uniform and better pay. Care was taken to describe them as 'the practised hand,' a name used for light troops in the time of Suleiman the Great. Mahmud deliberately avoided new names, which had brought Selim's military reforms and life to a sudden close. The officers of the janizzaries present swore to obey the new system, and the *ulemas* blessed it. Mahmud thus crossed the Rubicon, comforting himself with a proverb, this time a Persian one: 'If you try a thousand times you can in no way change what is determined.'

Mahmud had tried to recall the janizzaries to the spirit of Begtash, and addressed 'brilliant and coloured words' to them. They replied with 'deceitful and ornamented trumpery,' and 'hewed up the wood of them, that addressed them, with an axe.' Such is the tale of the Court chronicler. The inferior officers and janizzaries, who had been incorporated into the new troops, soon showed traces of insubordination and stirred up a ferment among their still independent comrades. On June 4 a solemn dedication ceremony and a *Divan* were held in the palace of the Sheikh-ul-Islam. It was apparently at this meeting that Mahmud spoke 'pertinent and silencing words.' He delivered a *firman* 'sealed by himself,' and ordered the selected janizzaries to assemble for drill under the new conditions on the morrow 'since they will not obey.' On the 5th the Grand Vizier appeared at the parade in the new uniform and tight trousers of an European. The janizzaries had either to submit or to revolt.

The janizzary corps was denuded by the withdrawal of the superior officers and the best soldiers. In the 'rump' insolence passed for courage, prejudice for policy, and licence for strength. The 'rump' counted on the support of the public which had seldom failed them in the past. The first formal review of the new troops was to take place on June 18, and the news provoked the insurrection. It began on the night of June 13/14,\*

\* The date of most authorities, but the Court chronicler (who ought to know) speaks of the 'fatal Thursday,' which would be June 15, as does Stratford de Redcliffe. Perhaps the revolt lasted from the 13th to the 15th.

when janizzaries gathered at the Et-Meidan, or Hippodrome, their old place of assembly. The junior officers of five battalions led the meeting, which demanded the recall of all the new military reforms. The soup-kettles were overturned, the old signal of revolt for the janizzaries. A furious crowd attacked the palaces of the Grand Vizier, of the janizzary Aga, and of the Egyptian resident (who was regarded as the inventor of the new drill). None of them were at home, but the janizzaries injured the servants and property of all, violating the women and slaying the son of their Aga. Their best chance was to march on the Seraglio Palace at once, but they feared to attack the Padishah and wasted time in drawing up a petition to him.

'The knife has reached the bone at last.' Thus spoke Mahmud 'on the terrible Thursday' at dawn while in his palace at Beshik-tash on the Bosphorus. He decided to erase 'all name and token' of the janizzaries. 'If I do not do so, may I lose my crown and throne.' He kissed his three-year-old son, bade farewell to his weeping wives, and left at once for the Seraglio, disguised and in a private boat. The palace was defended by a stout wall, though at first the troops were few. Mahmud summoned a council and then entered the chamber where were the sacred relics of the Prophet and his banner, which was only unfurled in the time of danger. He prayed for a time in silence. He emerged and met his ministers and *ulemas* and discussed action against the janizzaries. All agreed that their 'pride must be quenched.' While the council was sitting, Hussein the Black arrived from the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus with a large body of troops and artillerymen. Twenty-five pieces were planted outside the Seraglio gate, and the Sultan in his new military uniform reviewed the troops. He wished to lead them in person, but was finally persuaded not to endanger his life, but to proceed to his palace of Dolma Bagtche and there await the decision. The relics were then brought out and the banner unfurled as a signal of danger. Criers had already been sent out with proclamations to summon all believers to the aid of the Padishah and of the true faith. The Sultan's criers and those of the janizzaries met each other in the narrow streets. Yet no collision, save of words, took place.<sup>19</sup> A last summons to surrender addressed to the mutineers produced an answer from them in their oldest and haughtiest style. They demanded the repeal of the new regulations and the heads of the Sultan's chief officers. The Sultan would take the heads of the janizzaries rather than give those of his ministers. This was the answer delivered

by Hussein to the delegates of the janizzaries with savage glee. These men withdrew; they were 'already meat for dogs.'

The janizzaries had neither leaders nor plan. Their appeal to the populace had been a failure, while thousands of the population had rallied to the Et-Meidan to defend the Padishah. Indeed the menaces of the crowd were such that, as Hussein sallied out from the Seraglio, the janizzaries retired on the Et-Meidan and sought refuge in their barracks. They were ready to defend themselves but had no cannon and were too weak to attack. They may have mustered twenty thousand, but Hussein with his disciplined force and heavy guns had every advantage. The Sultan's gunners hesitated to fire, but a bold officer appropriately termed Black Hell (Kara-Djehennum) discharged his pistol into the priming of the first gun and thus began the fusillade. The roar of cannon silenced the cries of 'Allah, Allah,' and 'in almost half-an-hour the terrible disease of these brigands was cured by the pulse-discerning physician of fate. In their despair they repented, but the pitiless sword swept over them. The butcher of fate made the Et-Meidan a slaughter-house. The flame of their pride was blown out and they were flung on the dung-heap of misfortune.' All janizzaries were destroyed save their chief. 'I am that chief and I offer thee my head,' said Hussein in his report to the Sultan. Mahmud embraced him and named him Aga Pasha, making him superior to all pashas.

The Sultan cut down the flowers of Begtash so mercilessly that the garden never bloomed again. Whether the slain numbered two or three thousand only, or 'thirty thousand without the least exaggeration,' as the Court chronicler protests, matters little. Thirty minutes of grape-shot destroyed an institution which had lasted five centuries. A day or two later the proudest of the surviving janizzaries were humbly supplicating Christians for bread and imploring them not to betray them to the Sultan. These events befell on 'the fatal Thursday.' On Friday, as usual, Mahmud proceeded solemnly to the Selamlık to pray. He was guarded by six hundred artillerymen, who derisively trailed in the dust the old emblems of the janizzaries, their soup-kettles, their flags, and their curious sleeve-shaped caps. A proclamation, issued the same day, abolished the name and existence of janizzaries for the future, though it did justice to their services in the past. No one ever dared call himself a janizzary again, and even a generation later the word itself was only mentioned in a whisper.



The new army was to be called *Askeri Muhammediye*, the victorious soldiers of Mahomet; Hussein was to be *Seraskier*, or War Minister. The *Imams* were to proclaim the news to the people, all were to resume their peaceful avocations and 'to pray to the All-Highest, the Almighty for the welfare of the powerful and terrible Padishah, the refuge of all the world, our All-gracious ruler.' Of the power of Mahmud and the terror he inspired there was no longer any question. All sorts of persons suspected of furthering the janizzaries were imprisoned or shot. A tribunal consisting of the Grand Vizier, the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the chief *ulemas*, decided cases without appeal. The condemned were led away and shot at once. 'The entrance to the Seraglio, the shore under the Sultan's windows, and the sea itself are crowded with dead bodies, many of them torn and in part devoured by the dogs.' The barracks of the janizzaries, their shops and their mosque were all destroyed. Even their women were not spared and, by a vengeance very rare in the East, the marble tombstones of the dead, bearing models of the sleeve-shaped caps, were uprooted and broken.

The janizzaries were almost everywhere dissolved with ridiculous ease. The 'flowers of Begtash's garden' simply faded out of existence both in Europe and Asia. Only in the still quasi-independent province of Iraq they remained for a time, and there they were ultimately exterminated to the very last man. The Albanians revolted in 1830; Ibrahim marched triumphantly through Syria in 1831. Yet neither attempted to revive the janizzary system, although in the provinces at least all but the ringleaders had survived. It seems clear that the system was universally condemned. Public opinion had supported the Sultan in his work of blood, whether in the capital or in the provinces. In 1807 the guardians of the castles of the Bosphorus had supported the janizzaries; in 1826 they aided the Sultan. The new soldiers, who were then so helplessly slaughtered, easily overcame the janizzaries twenty years later. The janizzaries were aided by the population in 1807; in 1826 they received help from but two gilds, the porters and the boatmen. The only other aid they got was from the Kurds—a foreign and disorderly element in the capital. Some gilds like the cutlers refused to fight for them, while others like the tailors mustered to the aid of the Padishah along with the vast mass of the population and with the *ulemas* in a body. Stratford Canning was shocked at the horrors, but said 'there is no denying that the opinions of respectable men, so far as they can be ascertained, were in favour of the change. . . .

The loyalty and devotion of the people were roused by the peril to which their sovereign was exposed.' <sup>20</sup> Mahmud appealed to public opinion by publishing a book, ridiculing the janizzaries, and attempting to give a popular exposition of the case for suppressing them. This was in reality a repetition of a work by a disciple of Sultan Selim. It had been circulated in manuscript in 1807, but had been promptly suppressed, and its author (Chelib Effendi) had narrowly escaped death. The new and enlarged work was issued by a printing press (in itself an innovation and a shock to the faithful) under the title of the 'Basis of Victory.' As the new work was not popularly written and few of the people could read, its effect on public opinion was slight.<sup>21</sup> But the public approved Mahmud's action if they did not appreciate his book, and their support encouraged him to proceed with his other reforms.

#### IV

*The Sultan considers that the interest of the future is superior to every other consideration.*—PROCLAMATION OF MAHMUD, April 27, 1833.

Mahmud now proceeded to modernise his subjects by changing their habits. He made war on their flowing robes, on their slippers, on their turbans. He put western uniforms on his soldiers, frock-coats on his civil servants, and fezes and black boots upon both. He terrified the populace into imitating their example. 'Very few years more,' wrote an observer in 1829, 'and not a turban will exist. . . . No gold embroidery, no jewels, no pelisses. . . . The Sultan himself occasionally appears *incognito* at the capital, with scarce any attendant, goes to the Mosque in the dress I have described, and although some of the populace have occasionally betrayed their discontent by abuse, he has apparently taken not the slightest notice of it.' <sup>22</sup> In 1832 Mahmud received Stratford as ambassador without any of the old degrading formulas. He was in a position such as no other Ottoman sovereign had ever enjoyed, at once convinced of the necessity of reforms, and strong enough to enforce them. During the Russian war in 1828-9, when the faithful were murmuring about Turkish defeats, there were no murmurs against the Sultan. He rode about Stambul almost unguarded and picnicked beside the Bosphorus within sound of Russian guns. He deposed a Sheikh-ul-Islam who resisted the abolition of turbans. He mercilessly bastinadoed a mad religious votary who accused

him of subverting the old religion ; and the saint's inability to avoid punishment impressed the faithful. He had taken to himself the title of Ghazi after the fall of the janizzaries.<sup>23</sup> He had best be obeyed, for he represented a new, a terrible daemonic power. 'Mahmud,' said the Court poet, 'is another Alexander. At his frown a hundred thousand giants would be stopped as by a wall.'

Mahmud inaugurated a much more liberal policy towards his own Christian subjects and towards Europeans in Turkey. He encouraged the construction of churches and, by abolishing the Court of Confiscations, greatly facilitated the conduct of business by Mussulmans. He extended partial rights to the *rayas* (non-Mussulman subjects) and did something to assert their equality before the law. This assertion may seem strange in view of his undoubted cruelties towards some Christians. One Armenian was so terrified to hear that Mahmud had admired his house that he took to his bed and died, some say of fear and others of poison, but in either case from seeing Mahmud. The Sultan had a second Armenian, a banker, decapitated in order to sequester his estates. In both cases the persecution was purely financial. Similarly, when Mahmud hung the Greek patriarch and several bishops to deter the Greeks of Constantinople from supporting their rebellious brethren in the Morea, his action was in no way religious. There was no difference between this execution and that of some scores of Mussulmans whom he slaughtered on the charge of being in league with the Russians in 1829. He was anxious to support the position of Christian bishops. In 1838 he issued a decree to ensure purity of election for the patriarch and to prevent Turkish officials from using 'means of seduction.'<sup>24</sup>

The most criticised of all Mahmud's religious actions was his deportation from Constantinople of twenty thousand Catholic Armenians in 1828. The poor victims were forced to march into Asia Minor on foot and distributed into distant villages. Many fell in death by the wayside, hundreds were deprived of all their property, and subjected to cruel sufferings. Yet the act was simply one of precaution in view of the approaching war with Russia. After long meditation Mahmud had approved a report by his favourite Pertev on the Armenian problem some years before.<sup>25</sup> This had stated that the Catholic Armenians were dangerous because of their great wealth and of their sympathies with the Austrians or French. Their deportation to remote villages in Armenia rendered them harmless, and the sequestration of their wealth assisted

the progress of the war. There was here cruelty and political miscalculation, but not religious intolerance as such. Indeed Mahmud publicly avowed that the decree of exile was due purely to political expediency. Turks seldom persecute for religious reasons alone, and Mahmud was the last Turk to do so. 'Homage to God,' said he, 'in whatever form rendered, has constantly obtained liberty and security from the masters of [this] country.'<sup>26</sup> He had done more than any other master. Nor do his arbitrary acts, like the murder of individual Greeks or Armenians for their money, impair the general merits of his policy. The Armenians were better protected from the Kurds and the Bulgars from the Turks than they had ever been. At the beginning of Mahmud's reign it was dangerous for a Christian to enter St. Sophia alone, to have a dispute with a Turk or to wear the same clothes as a believer ; by 1830 Mahmud had altered all that. His Mussulman subjects were much less tolerant than he and gave him the name of the Giaour Padishah (the infidel Sultan).

## V

*No strength to bear those cruel tyrannies of thine !  
I, Perteu, seeking for my friendless heart a friend to gain,  
(I won but endless bane).*

POEM BY PERTEV.

*Should disappointment track my fondest wish—  
Then let this morrow's universal wheel  
Into perdition's gulf chaotic reel.*

POEM BY AKIF.

The revolutions of the palace are of great interest under Mahmud, for they are not mainly due to the caprices of women or to the intrigues of courtiers, but to the determination of a despot to overcome all opposition. In this respect no episode is more instructive than the struggle between Akif and Perteu for power. It was the culmination of a period of experiment by Mahmud. In his early years he had changed his Grand Viziers frequently as if to warn them of the insecurity of their tenure. Then he took to endowing favourites with special powers and using them as a check on the actual Grand Vizier. Halaat was the first of these and one of the most useful, for he brought him the head of a pasha of Bagdad and the heads of several Asiatic *derebeys*. Halaat fell and was murdered, because of the Greek insurrection. Before and after the destruction of the janizzaries Mahmud made much use of Hussein

the Black. He ultimately made Reschid Mehemet Grand Vizier, used him to break the clan chiefs in Albania, and then to destroy the Kurdish feudatories in Asia. During this period Husrev as *Seraskier* (War Minister) 'held the reins of government,'<sup>27</sup> and the Grand Vizier was a dummy. Then Mahmud turned his eyes on Akif and made him *Reis Effendi*, (the Turkish title for Foreign Minister), the last to be called by that name. Akif made the mistake of quarrelling with Ponsonby and was dismissed by the Sultan in March 1836. Mahmud then remodelled his ministry and made Pertev the chief man. There were two elements at work. Mahmud was resolved to break the power of his ministers and to inaugurate a new system ; and a crowd of intriguers was trying to profit by the rise and fall of individual ministers. Mahmud replaced Akif by Pertev and gave him the new western title of Foreign Minister. Pertev had had a hand in Akif's disgrace. His supporter Ahmed, the Sultan's son-in-law, likewise intrigued for power and became Minister of the Palace.<sup>28</sup> Pertev received a new office and was intended to inaugurate a new policy. Mahmud soon after abolished the Grand Vizierate and appointed Pertev as Prime Minister. He had a short ministerial life. In April 1837 the Dutch Minister reported him as the 'Factotum to-day of the Empire, and enjoying all the confidence of his sovereign.'<sup>29</sup> But in September the British Minister was horrified to find him disgraced with peculiar circumstances of ignominy and exiled to Asia Minor. 'There an attempt to administer poison to him failed, and finally a *firman* condemning him to death was laid before him. 'Give me time to say my prayers and I will make a sign when I am ready,' said Pertev with true oriental stoicism. He performed his devotions and then calmly stretched out his neck to the executioner.

Pertev composed a verse of poetry while preparing for death, which Mahmud is said to have subsequently recited and wept over. His official announcement (which nobody believed) was that Pertev 'suddenly fell dead.' Mahmud's subsequent execution of Pertev's brother and son-in-law showed a savagery which shocked even the experienced Dutch Minister. But here again Mahmud was acting from calculation rather than from cruelty. Pertev had committed enough imprudences to alienate a suspicious despot like Mahmud. He appears to have criticized the Sultan for having his portrait taken and for distributing it. An article in a German paper eulogising Pertev as responsible for the reforms was shown to Mahmud by the minister himself. 'They say the



Sultan was very shocked, seeing that by this article Pertev was elevated to the pitch of perfection,' while he himself 'received little credit.'<sup>30</sup> A conspiracy broke out in Constantinople while Mahmud was absent and Pertev, as vice-regent, was blamed for not suppressing it in the bud. By the artful suggestions of his enemies Pertev was finally induced to criticise Mahmud's darling creation the army and to suggest a reduction of its numbers. These opinions were repeated to Mahmud. The Sultan sent an emissary of his own, who talked with Pertev and found him unable to deny that he had suggested the reduction of the army. Now a minister under Mahmud who failed to detect a conspiracy, who extolled his own services, who deprecated an action of his master, who recommended reduction of the army, was likely to lose his head. Even if he was an 'honest' and admirable minister, the 'doom' of such a man was 'dight.' The execution of Pertev and the disgrace of Akif were both due to Mahmud's consistent policy of striking terror into his ministers. The abolition of the Grand Vizierate showed clearly that no single individual could represent the Sultan. He wanted a council of ministers who would carry out his orders like a staff of clerks.

In the East reality seldom corresponds to appearances. Even Mahmud could not wholly escape from the intrigues of the palace or from the cajolery of his daughters and their husbands. The darker side to this intrigue was the plot against the life of Pertev, of which the Sultan knew little or nothing. Pertev's doom had been decided on by his enemy Akif. The two men had always been rivals and had struggled for supremacy in other fields than those of material power. Both were men of letters as well as statesmen. Akif wrote better verses, Pertev was a more copious poet. Akif laid the foundation of modern Turkish prose at the same time as he sapped Pertev's political position. He was jealous of his rival's literary and political fame, and left no stone unturned to discredit him. It was Akif who got Halil to fill the Sultan's ears with suspicions of Pertev, and thus brought him to an untimely doom. But no minister was safe in the grim reign of Mahmud. Neither Akif nor Halil gained by their treachery. They in turn were plotted against by Reschid Pasha, the rising reformer, who had remained loyal to Pertev's memory and resolved to avenge his death.<sup>31</sup> In March 1838 Halil was suddenly disgraced; Akif was also dismissed and accused of corruption. He retired into private life and wrote, appropriately, a poem on vanity and 'nothingness.' Reschid as the reformer and westerniser became Foreign Minister; old Husrev

returned to power along with Said, a stupid son-in-law of Mahmud.<sup>32</sup> Reschid, after accomplishing some reforms, was sent as Ambassador to England at the end of 1838. The office of Grand Vizier was formally abolished and a cabinet formed on the western model. The aim of this new ministry was to express the views and policy of the Sultan alone, and that policy certainly looked towards the West.

These revolutions of the palace in Mahmud's later years seem to have been connected with his last and most determined attempts at reform. As he grew older he became at once more liberal, more impatient of opposition, and more anxious to galvanise his capital and empire into life. He did not neglect to appeal to public opinion for support. He instituted the first newspaper in May 1832 as a means to that end.<sup>33</sup> The *Moniteur Ottomane*, though an official journal, is a valuable index to Mahmud's character and aims. It was issued under his influence and sometimes contained contributions from his pen. It represents him as a steady friend to enlightenment and western ideas and as particularly desirous of introducing the study of foreign languages to his civil servants. In one passage Mahmud publicly stated that he considered the office of Turkish ambassador to a foreign power as more honourable than that of Foreign Minister to himself. The building of naval and military schools, of a hospital, and of a medical college, all upon western models, was represented as a result of his enlightenment. Public opinion was thus cultivated in order to counteract the *mollahs*, who denounced the outrages to religion involved by students tracing characters from left to right, wearing western uniforms, sitting on benches, or dissecting dead bodies. It was hard to get western instructors or text-books for his schools, it was harder to induce the students to learn from either. Yet even Ponsonby wrote in 1836 that 'organization is advancing in every branch of the Sultan's service, and information spreading in a surprising manner among the younger men.'<sup>34</sup> But youth could still be reactionary. In the medical college the students, speculating on the rumour of Mahmud's death, demonstrated while at meals. They were 'annoyed at finding themselves served with European forks, and returned to their fingers,'<sup>35</sup> in patriotic reversion to the customs of their forefathers.

Even in his most material improvements Mahmud met with opposition. The faithful looked with disapproval on his allowing the Russians to open up the Danube to steamer



navigation, on his building lighthouses on the Black Sea, and throwing an iron bridge over the Golden Horn. This last salutary innovation provoked the indignation not only of the ten thousand boatmen of Constantinople but of Turkish patriots who preferred to journey by water. As regards other forms of communication Mahmud improved the water service of the Bosphorus, but did little in regard to the rest of his empire. A great road was built by Reschid Mehemet from Sivas to Diarbekir, but for this Mahmud seems not to have been specially responsible. Yet he emerged victorious from a severe struggle about enforcing sanitary precautions, particularly against the plague. To interfere with this natural affliction was in the eyes of the *ulemas* to oppose God, by seeking to avert his fury from man. During a plague epidemic in 1837 Mahmud tried to clean the streets of Constantinople and to take precautions against infection, and the Dutch Minister thought he attained some success.<sup>36</sup> A plague hospital was founded by two Frenchmen in this year and supported by Mahmud at the request of a Prussian prince. Opposition to it only strengthened the Sultan's will. No sooner had he reorganised his ministry in May 1838, than he announced that a general sanitary reform was to be applied throughout his empire, and particularly when epidemics occurred.<sup>37</sup> And, in order to commend it, he announced that he had obtained a *fetva*, or religious decree, from the Sheikh-ul-Islam to testify to the legality of such measures. 'When a town has the plague it is permitted to avert from it the wrath of God and take refuge in the bosom of his mercy.' Disinfectants and quarantine were 'the surest refuge from God's wrath and the greatest means of his grace.' A quarantine station was erected in Constantinople, plague sufferers were brought to it, and the health of the capital improved before the end of the year.<sup>38</sup> 'If men are so blinded by erroneous ideas as to permit the least infraction of the orders issued from supreme authority in accordance with the legal *fetva*, exemplary chastisement will be inflicted.'<sup>39</sup>

Mahmud's changes in 1838 were accompanied by an attempt to repress corruption by instituting more regular salaries for the civil service, and by a public denunciation of 'venality' as 'most contemptible and fertile in all kinds of disorder.' This was the last of several very genuine attempts to check corruption and to punish extortion and bribery. One method had been to impose an oath upon persons assuming office that they would never take a bribe. Paradoxically this is supposed to have increased corruption. For legitimate

salaries were so small that pashas or clerks had to take a few perquisites to live. And once they had perjured themselves in a detailed particular, they felt released from any further obligation in general. It is interesting to note, however, that Mahmud made at least one attempt to check corruption in the provinces, where the system was even worse than in the capital. 'As soon as a man becomes a minister or a governor, all his relations, all the relations of his relations, all the idlers from his native village, crowd to solicit his patronage. "Be calm," he answers, "wait a bit and, Inshallah, I may do something for you." In the meantime they carry his slippers, they fill his pipes, they follow him, they loiter about his house, they form the bulk of his retinue. They are unpaid *attachés*. He gives them no wages, but they get scraps from his kitchen and "*backshish*" from his visitors and suitors. As opportunities offer, he provides for them, he makes them *cadis* or policemen, or governors of villages, or takes them into his paid service as vacancies occur. . . . A man once in the service of a great man, whether hired or purchased, a servant or a slave, gets from thence into the service of the public, and then robs and bribes his way up.' <sup>40</sup> This was in 1837, and the system was even worse at an earlier day. Mahmud tried to meet the evil by a decree in 1836. He attempted to take 'from pashas in the provinces generally all civil authority and the administration and control and collection of the revenues of their governments.' <sup>41</sup> The idea was evidently to control pashas by an unbribable civil service at Constantinople. But it failed, like all other attempts to check venality.

## VI

*Diu apparandum est bellum, ut uincas celerius.*—Prepare for war long beforehand, so as to conquer more quickly.

The creation of a powerful army to replace the janizzaries was the dearest object of Mahmud's life. He wore the new uniform, pored over drill-books, and 'directed the manœuvres in person.' But the difficulties in the way of creating a new force were enormous. There had never been conscription before and its introduction was practically difficult. A census was taken only every thirty years and, when Mahmud speeded up the taking of a new one, it was due 'solely' to 'a wish to increase the military force of the empire.' <sup>42</sup> Statistics have never been the strong point of Turkey, but the census revealed

that the Mussulman population was on the wane, and even Mahmud hesitated to enrol Christians. But the organisation of a proper system was difficult where evasion was a fine art and corruption habitual. It was very soon found too that certain areas were prepared to resist. The governor of Janina had to be recalled in 1837 and his successor directed 'not to attempt at the present moment to *force* upon the Albanians the system of conscription.'<sup>43</sup> In fact Albanians successfully resisted it throughout the century. It was only by a very slow and patient policy that conscription could be applied even to a small percentage of the population, and the results were not obvious in Mahmud's lifetime. During the last decade of his reign the recruiting areas of Adana, Syria and Palestine were closed to him and more drastic methods were used by his Egyptian enemy. 'I am the only man to manage the Arabs,' said Ibrahim roughly. 'I could and did cut off their heads, which the Turks never will do.'<sup>44</sup>

Turkish officers, said Ibrahim, 'smoke all day and have people to wash their hands.' 'Their apartments are generally filled with idlers and very often with spies,' added Colonel Rose. One pasha complained naively, 'formerly we used to write a letter once a month, now we are obliged to do so sometimes twice a day.' The consequence of this aversion from business was that 'any attempt at strategy or a combined movement' was 'most precarious.' The rank and file of the Turkish force were, as always, good, 'sober, hardy and brave.' But they had no commissariat or medical stores worth the name. Prussian and French officers had been used, but they had all been incontinently dismissed in 1836. It was difficult to employ either Russians or English as substitutes, since the manual of drill was in French. Battalion drill was not very well performed, and brigade movements seem to have been non-existent.

It was also difficult to create an officer class, where there was an 'entire want of education.' Sometimes even divisional commanders could only sign their names. Rose gravely suggested that officers ought to be made to learn reading, writing and arithmetic, 'and perhaps a book of Euclid.' In 1841 Captain Williams declared that engineers and artillery were alike useless without schools of instruction for the officers. Adjutants and quartermasters did not exist. An absurd refusal to devolve authority complicated matters. Even Omer pasha at the height of his power interfered in every detail, regulating the amount of wood which companies were to cut, and supervising the quality of the soup issued to battalions.

The commander-in-chief undertook duties which a modern quartermaster would devolve on subordinates.

Despite all these defects a certain amount of progress was made. In 1837, according to General Chrzanovski, whom Palmerston thought a good authority, there were twenty-five regular regiments of four battalions each, or about 40,000 men ; six regiments of cavalry, three of artillery and one of engineers.<sup>45</sup> He reckoned that on an active footing some 77,000 troops could be produced. These were fairly well clothed, had reasonably good horses, and were sufficiently accustomed to tactics. The artillery was at fault, because the guns had nine different calibres. The new creation due to Mahmud was the *Rediffs* or reserves. By 1837 there were forty battalions and eighty squadrons, but their pay and organisation was bad and their value, like their numbers, very problematical. Chrzanovski put them at 13,000, but this was a low estimate.<sup>46</sup> The creation of the *Rediffs* was indeed a great improvement on the old system. Hitherto volunteers had been called for on the outbreak of war, and worthless irregulars or criminals drafted into the ranks to fill up the gaps, without discipline, training or organisation. Now a partially disciplined force had been created as an organisation for emergencies, which was steadily to increase as years went on. It also had important effects in preventing revolt in the provinces. Mahmud's military reforms were real and important, but they were incomplete. 'In order to have a good army it is not enough to collect together a certain number of men and to divide them into regiments and divisions.'<sup>47</sup> Mahmud paid no attention to Palmerston's dictum. He seems never to have favoured a General Staff, and thus was without plans or objective when war broke out.<sup>48</sup> The 'victorious soldiers of Mahmud' twice went down in utter rout before the Egyptians.

Mahmud in fact seldom selected a good commander. Palmerston, as usual, hit the nail on the head when he said promotion in the Turkish army was due to 'influence and favour' and in the Egyptian 'to merit and bravery.'<sup>49</sup> The general Mahmud trusted most endured one of the greatest defeats of Turkish history. Had Mahmud been able to find a general as loyal to his master and as militarily able as Ibrahim pasha he might have chased the Egyptians from Syria. Mahmud's naval policy was even more unfortunate. He showed a praiseworthy zeal in building ships and in erecting a naval Academy. He had as many ships of the line in the Bosphorus and Aegean as Russia had in the Black Sea. He had useful foreign instructors like Slade and had made a good



resistance to Russia in the war of 1828-9. But the admiral he selected to command against the Egyptians a decade later handed over the Turkish fleet intact to the enemy without striking a blow, immediately after Mahmud's death.<sup>50</sup> It may be true that it would not have been surrendered had he been alive. None the less, the great Sultan failed alike in selecting good leaders in war, and in inspiring them with his own energy or enthusiasm.

## VII

*From growing Commerce loose her latest rein  
And let the fair white-winged Peace-maker fly.*

TENNYSON.

Mahmud's financial policy was vigorous if not always wise. He signalled the month in which he destroyed the janizzaries by abolishing the Court of Confiscations. This measure prevented the future confiscation of the property of executed persons, whether Turks or Christians. It was directed principally against the informers who denounced persons to the government, and prevented them from gaining by the denunciation. Also if an Armenian banker or Greek merchant had lent money to the victim, his claims would now be met even if his customer were decapitated. The financial gains of the *mollahs* or *ulemas* were reduced. They had previously received a commission of 10 per cent. in every judgment they pronounced; they now had their profits reduced to 2½. Mahmud followed up this reform by an attack on the *Wakufs*. These were the revenues drawn from Turkish property or endowments for religious purposes, such as the construction and upkeep of mosques and schools. Previously such property had been inalienate, and 'according to Holy Law neither the regnant prince nor any can meddle with these goods.'<sup>51</sup> Mahmud was not deterred by religious scruples, which he deemed to be absurd, and attempted to bring the whole of the *Wakufs* under state control. He began by depriving his chief eunuch of the *Wakufs* of Mecca and Medina, and tried to divert some of these profits to his own pocket. In the end he was unsuccessful so far as the *Wakufs* were concerned, and indeed seems to have found it necessary to pay an allowance of over £100,000 to them every year.<sup>52</sup> But he had immensely increased his income by getting under his direct control the military fiefs of the *derebeys*, and by forcing them to pay a

regular revenue for the first time. In addition his imposts were much more regularly collected than before.<sup>53</sup>

After the Treaty of Adrianople Mahmud had special, and not entirely selfish, reasons for increasing the revenue. He wished to get the Russians to evacuate the fortress of Silistria and the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. He could only do this by paying them the indemnity due by the treaty of 1829. To that object all sound finance was sacrificed, but he did eventually raise about eight hundred thousand pounds, and obtained the evacuation in 1836. Turkey was still without a debt, though even good judges could not decide whether Mahmud's revenue was six or eight million pounds. It was agreed that some twelve hundred thousand pounds was for the court and the Seraglio expenses. Mahmud reduced his court establishments somewhat, but this economy was offset by his construction of new palaces, the older ones being in a most tumble-down condition. He also indulged in the traditional extravagance on the marriage of his daughters. His chief expedient for raising money, however, was to sell monopolies on articles of commerce. This system benefited the foreigner to some extent but, since it raised the price of the articles to the native consumer, was unfortunate and oppressive in its results. It produced a rebellion in Asia Minor during 1816-18, and was held by good observers to have rendered fertile districts desolate by 1830.<sup>54</sup> The system was radically vicious, and Palmerston ordered 'a strong remonstrance against monopolies' <sup>55</sup> as early as 1833. One of the chief objections to monopolies, or any such complicated artificiality, is that they act in unexpected ways, and they did so peculiarly in Turkey. Monopolies were both local and general, and in each case created a class of privileged extortioners, against whom the native producer was helpless, being 'not master of his own produce.' It made no difference what were the previous rights under treaty to the foreign merchant; he had to submit to any terms the monopolist extortioner imposed before he could sell his goods. And the last thing the monopolist was likely to allow, especially if he was a local monopolist, was a small or reasonable price. The system was more favourable to the foreigner than to the native, but undoubtedly restrictive, and in some cases prohibitive, of trade. Ponsonby declared that by its means the Porte 'has evaded or broken through a large part of our commercial rights.' This information at once roused the British lion in Palmerston, who asked for the fullest information and demanded immediate redress. Even before that Palmerston was prepared to go to extreme lengths

to revise the whole system. Two days before (*i.e.* April 14, 1838) he had repeated the ingenious argument that, as Mehemet Ali was the 'universal monopolist' in Egypt, the abolition of monopolies would hit him much more than it would the Sultan. And he added that, if the Sultan abolished them in his empire, the British government would 'expect and require' similar abolition in Egypt and Syria. These were strong words for even Palmerston to use.<sup>56</sup>

But Palmerston, strong in commercial support, knew what he was about. Not only the British, but the French and the Dutch merchants and their governments, wanted the abolition of monopolies. And they wanted far more than this: they wanted a general revision and modernisation of the whole system, financial, economic and commercial, that their traders might buy and sell in peace and without being robbed or injured by corruption and prejudice. Even if a foreigner had received any benefit by monopolies it was of no advantage in view of the enormous difficulties presented to him in other directions. The foreigner could own no land and, if he bought it through a Turkish 'man of straw,' was liable to have it confiscated without redress. The methods by which goods were introduced into the country were of immemorial antiquity and of inconceivable futility. Let us describe the process by which a British ship passed through the Bosphorus to trade in the Black Sea. The sea-captain first made application to the Dragoman at the British Embassy for a permit, or *firman* of the Sultan. The Dragoman sent the application to the *Reis Effendi* (the Foreign Minister), who passed it on to the Grand Customer. The Grand Customer signified his assent to the *Reis Effendi*. The *Kiatib*, or Clerk of the *Divan*, was called in to record the assent of both officials in writing. The *Mourneyz*, or corrector, was then called upon to read it. The *Beylikdje*, or Vice-Clerk of Chancery, was next called on to sanction the utterance of the words 'This is my Imperial command.' The *Reis Effendi* then signed the *firman*, his secretary solemnly registered it. Then the *Tourahchi* traced upon the document the *Tourha*, or imperial sign manual.\* The British Dragoman carried it to the Chancery to be registered there, and the sea-captain finally received a document which had passed through no fewer than twelve different processes and hands. It was a good way of ensuring the authenticity of the permit and the stagnation of the trade. For even with the

\* F.O. 78/191. From Sir R. Gordon, No. 90 of November 11, 1830. He records the procedure without a smile or a frown. The officials are, more correctly, the *Mummeyiz*, the *Beylikji*, and the *Tura-kash*.



best will in the world the process could not be rapid. If an official needed bribing or desired to obstruct, the delay could be endless. This hopelessly medieval and obsolete procedure well illustrates the obstructions to trade inherent in an old-fashioned oriental despotism.

The Capitulations signed between England and Turkey, along with other agreements, guaranteed freedom of commerce, navigation and trade. This was subject to a duty of 3 per cent. on entry and to a similar duty on export. These privileges dated from a very early period, had been signed in 1675 and reconfirmed on subsequent occasions, notably in 1809. The same or similar privileges were granted to most other Western Powers. They were not, however, enjoyed by any of them. For, apart from monopolies, a crowd of other obstructions existed. In addition to the 3 per cent. duty on entry a further 3 per cent. was charged if goods were sold to *rayas*. Interior duties were also levied before goods could be exported, and silk and wool were, in this manner, almost prohibited from export. What appeared to be free trade was, in reality, the highest protection. As usual the subjects of Turkey suffered even more than the foreign merchants, the burden on British imports being estimated at from 40 to 60 per cent., and that on Turkish exports at from 60 to 100 per cent. The interests of the Turkish officials, of the middlemen, were bound up with the continuance of this iniquitous system. Ponsonby reported the Minister of Commerce to be opposed by 'underlings acting for private ends.' Reschid Pasha, the Foreign Minister and chief negotiator, declared that while he favoured the abolition of monopolies himself, he found them supported by 'the great men of the country,' himself opposed by other ministers and 'bien plus haut encore' <sup>57</sup> (*i.e.* by Mahmud himself). But the time had at last come when no opposition would be allowed to stand in the way.

Urquhart, that strange observer of the East, had aired the idea of a commercial treaty as early as 1834. But Mahmud had noticed the evils of monopolies in 1831. Palmerston had pressed for a strict revision of the tariff ever since 1836. But in that year a serious incident caused the suspension of diplomatic relations for a time between England and Turkey. And when pressed to demand the removal of the prohibition on free export of corn, the Sultan replied: 'I dare not do it at the present moment.' <sup>58</sup> Palmerston wrote early in 1837 regretting that there had 'been so little progress in a commercial Treaty' and pressing for more vigorous measures. By the middle of

the year a new Secretary of Embassy arrived who was to be a useful instrument for the purpose: Henry Lytton Bulwer, brother of the novelist. He was to do more at his brilliant first appearance at Constantinople than in later days when he was ambassador there. At this stage he was capable of hard work and adroit and resourceful in methods. He claimed later that he alone was responsible for the Convention, but the facts are against him. The minister, Lord Ponsonby, was indeed an indolent aristocrat who had incurred Palmerston's displeasure, because he transmitted whole columns of statistics or paragraphs from the *Moniteur Ottomane* without troubling to criticize or examine them. In the actual negotiation he relied chiefly on the industry of Bulwer, but, by Bulwer's own admission, he could have obtained his facts just as easily from the Consul-General or the leading merchants of the British Colony. And, though Bulwer did not admit it, he owed much to the spadework of Urquhart.

What no one except Ponsonby could have done was to convince the Sultan. The energetic despot had a curious liking for the leisurely nobleman; he had sent him baskets of fruit and flowers, and these were extraordinary marks of favour. He had given him more solid tokens of regard, and usually agreed when Ponsonby asked that a minister should be dismissed or retained. Bulwer, in his lively account of the negotiation, ascribes his success to his having pitched his summer tent in one of the woody valleys by the Bosphorus, which happened to be within sight of the summer residence of the Minister of Commerce. It would be more just to ascribe success to the other accident that 'Mahmud professed greater regard [for Lord Ponsonby] than had ever been shown by an Ottoman Monarch to any Christian representative.'<sup>59</sup> At a later stage Ponsonby calmly admitted to Palmerston that Bulwer was 'much abler than myself.' But Ponsonby was the man, and indeed the only man, whom 'the royal Tiger' loved and trusted. And even he was stirred up to exercise his full influence in a cause so important as that of changing the commercial policy of the empire. With a true oriental despot such personal influence won the day.

Even in 1833 Mahmud had condescended to praise Adam Smith in the *Moniteur Ottomane*. On July 11, 1837, a passage appeared, officially admitting the advantages of free export of grain from Turkey which Ponsonby had long urged. On August 1 the Sultan welcomed Ponsonby's announcement of the accession of Queen Victoria by expressing to him the hope

that not only 'relations of friendship will increase' but others, like those 'of commerce,' might do so.<sup>60</sup> These concessions were openly made to Ponsonby before Bulwer had time to influence events. Bulwer deserves a good deal of credit for his adroitness and industry as regards details. So early as May 1838 Ponsonby had pressed home the argument that a revision of the whole commercial system would be adverse to Mehemet Ali, and urged that, if a convention or treaty was signed, 'the British Government will be entitled to demand its execution in Egypt, as well as elsewhere.'<sup>61</sup> This seems to have been the final and convincing argument. Mahmud was fearing a new attack from Mehemet Ali and thought commercial agreement would spell political alliance with England. The end came suddenly. On August 16 Reschid, who had all along favoured the treaty, summoned Bulwer and announced the Sultan's readiness to sign the Convention that day. The Dragoman was hurriedly sent for and a long day was spent in copying and transcribing. At 10 P.M. Lord Ponsonby dropped down the Bosphorus in his caïque, and before midnight the Convention was signed at Balta Liman.<sup>62</sup>

The terms of the Convention were almost all that even Palmerston had hoped or desired. It was only over the question of a transit duty that success was not attained. Monopolies of agricultural produce or of any other articles were definitely to be abolished and the abolition was to be extended to Egypt. All foreign goods were to be admitted on payment of 3 per cent. duty and an *ad valorem* interior duty of 9 per cent. The duty levied on foreigners for exporting Turkish goods was to be 3 per cent. plus an interior duty of 2 per cent.\* The incredibly slow arrangements for granting *firmans* to British ships entering the Dardanelles or Bosphorus were to be accelerated. The Capitulations giving property and security to British subjects were reaffirmed. The agreement did not, and was not intended to, benefit England alone. The Dutch Minister had said, even before its conclusion, 'it offers no difficulties and will extend to all.'<sup>63</sup> But the gratitude of other powers was not conspicuous. Bulwer says he confided to the Secretary of the French Embassy the terms he intended to propose, and that his 'gay and intelligent' colleague declared that his project was impossible. Immediately he heard of Bulwer's success the French Secretary came to see him.

\* Characteristically, however, Turkish subjects had to pay an interior duty of 9 per cent. for goods they exported. This was to supply the revenue lost by monopolies.

FRENCH SECRETARY : ' Est-il possible, mon cher, que vous avez joué ce tour-là ? '

BULWER : ' Quel tour ? Seulement nous avons trouvé possible ce que vous avez cru impossible. '

FRENCH SECRETARY : ' Mais que faire ? '

BULWER : ' Nothing more easy, my dear fellow ; here is a copy of our treaty ; do you have another copy made, and sign it to-day, and then let the journal at Smyrna [a journal in the French pay] say that this happy result was entirely brought about by Admiral Roussin's [the French Ambassador's] influence and your great knowledge of commercial affairs. ' <sup>64</sup> He adds that the French Secretary laughed heartily, shook his hand, and took his advice.

Bulwer's story is too good to be true. It was not till late in October that the *Echo de l'Orient* (the Smyrna journal ' in French pay ') hinted that M. Roussin had signed a treaty like Ponsonby's. Even then it was ' not quite true. ' The negotiations took time and it was not till November 25 that a French treaty was signed. <sup>65</sup> The Russian Minister took the matter badly because he had been absent while the British Convention was signed, and bitterly, but acutely, suggested that the Convention was the result of a political intrigue. <sup>66</sup> The Dutch, who were singularly good judges of commercial transactions, regarded the whole matter with some suspicion, as much depended on working out the details of the tariff subsequently to the Convention. It was not until nearly two years later that they finally signed a commercial treaty with Turkey on their own account (March 31, 1840). Ponsonby said the credit was due to Reschid and the Sultan ' more than to any other. ' Mahmud seems to have hesitated for a considerable time, though he finally consented. The Sultan claims ' according to the ideas of the East all the lands of the Empire as his property. He possesses, therefore, the right to give his tenants at will such orders in respect to the sale of his produce as he thinks proper. ' <sup>67</sup> Mahmud knew well enough that the Anglo-Turkish Convention would deprive him of most of this power for the future. He felt, of course, that this Convention would deal a blow at Mehemet Ali, but this was by no means his only motive for signing. His official newspaper during this year abounds in references to the benefits of intercourse with the West, and this object he could best secure through the Convention. He overruled four-fifths of his officials and gave up personal advantages for the benefit of the majority of his subjects. His intentions were at the height of their benevolence and his despotism at the summit of enlightenment.



The benefits of the Anglo-Turkish commercial Convention were evident and real. Ponsonby characteristically did not 'pretend to offer any remarks' upon the subject. But he was ultimately compelled by Palmerston to obtain detailed reports from his consuls. He took about six months to transmit them after he had received them, and was then ordered to produce some more. The Convention came into force on March 1, 1839. The Governor of Smyrna, 'a most venal public functionary and the most rapacious extortioner by whom it was ever ruled,' though acting in collusion with the Grand Customer at Constantinople, could only delay its application for four months. At Constantinople and Smyrna 'all monopolies of Turkish produce' were soon 'entirely abolished.' And the results were astounding. The monopolists had forced the producers of articles to sell to them at ridiculously low prices, in order to make a profit by reselling them at extremely high ones. Now the producer was able to obtain the market price, and it was much lower than the one at which the monopolists had sold. The producer of sheep's wool got twice his old price, the producer of valonia three times the value, and these instances are typical of a hundred others. 'Exactions and irregularities' could not be removed at once. In Samos the Greek prince retained every monopoly and in 'Scio's rocky isle' the Greek people adhered for a year to their one monopoly of gum mastic. The corrupt pasha at Smyrna revived the lead monopoly. At Salonica, owing it was believed to the demands of some formidable Albanian chiefs, monopolies continued on leeches, salt, timber and snuff. Even in a place like Brusa monopolies and local imports were suppressed. In other places political or personal causes sometimes hindered the working of the system. At Mosul the pasha contrived to turn the situation to his advantage. He imposed the import duty of 12 per cent. fixed by the tariff, and added a 7 per cent. extra which he pocketed himself. At Tripoli and Tunis the semi-independent *beys* refused for a time to accept the Convention. But it is extraordinary there were not more of these exceptions, for the abolition of monopolies was a most drastic reform.

As Cartwright the Consul-General wrote, the Convention gave 'British Merchandise a privilege in its own right which could not have been asserted under the Capitulations.' Now it was also true, as a merchant unctuously averred, that British trade was 'the most extensive in the Levant and has always maintained a great ascendancy.' But other nations who had signed similar agreements, like the French and Dutch, also

benefited greatly. One exception may be noted and it formed a stern criticism of the Convention, of Palmerston and of British policy in the East, owing to the vendetta waged by the ingenious David Urquhart.<sup>68</sup> Curiously enough, the Russians, who had refused to sign a similar Convention for political reasons, seem to have made the best of it by a later separate treaty. Turkish subjects did not benefit so much. They had to pay a 9 per cent. duty on goods exported as well as the normal 3 per cent. export duty, and this sum was needed to make up for the money lost by the abolition of monopolies. There was still a distinction between *Beratti*, or privileged traders, and unprivileged ones, the former usually being Mussulmans and the latter *rayas*, or non-Mussulman subjects. But the latter, being Greeks and Armenians, were not easy to beat in commercial affairs. Some years before Palmerston had remarked on their artfulness. 'It seems to me that the Greeks living in Turkey want to be Greeks when the collector comes round to receive *haratch*, and to be *rayas* for the purposes of retail trade and handicrafts. But they cannot have the advantages of both and the disadvantages of neither. If they claim exemption from the *haratch* which is payable by *rayas* and not by foreigners, they cannot pretend to exercise those trades which can be exercised only by *rayas* and to which foreigners are not admissible.' \* But Palmerston underrated the capacity of Greek *rayas*. They soon turned to their own profit the increased importing facilities given by the new system to foreigners. They used the cover of foreign names and protection to import goods from abroad, while retaining all their own retail trade and privileges as against the foreigner. They evaded in the same way the duty of 9 per cent. on the exported goods of Turkish subjects. In this, as in other cases, the Christian inhabitants of Turkey found they could best improve their lot by secret relations with foreigners from without. In fact every improvement, or opening of Turkey to the West, was bound to loosen her hold on her own subjects, unless and until Christian and Mussulman stood on perfect equality inside the realm.

\* F.O. 96/18. Minute by Palmerston on Ponsonby, No. 128 of August 7, 1835. *Haratch* was the tribute paid to exempt Christian subjects of the Turk from military service. By 'Greeks' Palmerston means foreigners of the Greek kingdom, as distinguished from Turkish *rayas* of Greek race.

## VIII

*Evidence of fear (shown by rayas) should not exist under a monarch whose sweetest joy is to know that they are happy.* PROCLAMATION OF MAHMUD, 1833.

That the improvement of the lot of the *rayas*, the non-Mussulman subjects of Turkey, was the supreme and last object of Mahmud seems clear.<sup>69</sup> He had always declared himself in favour of toleration. He announced that he was 'accessible to all,' and he took care to show that he meant *rayas* as well as Mussulmans. At a review in 1826 'when *rayas* were driven away, he had them recalled and distributed largess.' In the same year 'passing by a Greek village he called all the inhabitants and gave money to them.'<sup>70</sup> In 1830 he released all Greeks who had become slaves to Turks during the insurrection, and compelled their masters to bear the expense of repatriating them to Greece. In 1831 during a tour through European Turkey he built Christian villages and distributed one hundred thousand piasters to schools, including those of Greeks and of Armenian Catholics. He recorded that the misery he had seen 'touched his paternal heart.' 'The *Moniteur Ottomane* abounds in striking and naive proofs of Mahmud's desire to better the lot of the *rayas*. 'The Sultan encourages in all classes of subjects intelligence and talent.' 'At the time His Highness shall visit the mosques . . . the *rayas* are not to be seized with fear but on the contrary to continue their walks.' 'The constant aim of the Sultan's thought is that the inhabitants of his country, whether Mussulmans or *rayas*, are sheltered from all oppression.'<sup>71</sup> He went even further in the provincial tour which he undertook in 1837. Just before he left he had been stopped by a bold dervish on the bridge of Galata and cursed with the title of 'Giaour Padishah.' The dervish had been arrested and put to death. His friends, who had obtained his body, averred that a brilliant light shone nightly over his tomb. But Mahmud, as if to prove his contempt for these rumours, set out on his journey. He was received everywhere with the greatest submissiveness by his Christian subjects, many of them prostrating themselves before him, though this was a form of welcome he deprecated. His progress was unprecedented in that he declined presents and paid strictly all the expenses of himself and of his train. He was 'so touched by the state of misery' at Varna that he freed the town from taxation for seven years; elsewhere he ordered the construction of new



houses to relieve over-population, at his own expense. In every place that he visited he called the Turkish notables together, urged them to keep good order and 'to treat Turks and *rayas* alike without distinction.'<sup>72</sup> He summoned the *raya* notables and encouraged them to prefer 'requests,' among others for the 'repair or construction of churches.' The mere reception of *rayas* was an unprecedented honour, and this last utterance is peculiarly significant, for the older Turks disliked the erection, as distinguished from the repair, of churches. When Mahmud gave office to Said, his fanatical son-in-law, in 1838, he added 'positive orders to behave well towards the Franks' and to respect the Christian religion.<sup>73</sup> His other measures of this year show the same resolve to overcome Mussulman religious prejudice. He would certainly have done more, had not the Egyptian danger turned him elsewhere.

Towards the end of 1838 Mahmud began to have fits of nervous excitement. His excesses, which had increased of late years, had exhausted his frame. His illness developed rapidly after war had begun between him and Mehemet Ali, and by the middle of 1839 his death was expected. To calm opinion at this crisis he forced himself to appear at the Selamlık every Friday in spite of great weakness, and caused festivals to be actually held in his gardens while he was dying in his palace. Mahmud died on July 1, 1839, just before the news came that his army had been totally routed by Ibrahim, and that his admiral had surrendered his fleet to Mehemet Ali.

The profound impression Mahmud made on his subjects is the best proof of his greatness and power. Even Stratford, a not wholly friendly critic, allows him a certain 'liberality,' and says that his virtues were his own and his faults due to others. The Dutch Minister described him as 'great and enlightened.' Without advisers or friends, he confronted the most formidable dangers alone. He failed to reconquer the Serbs, or to suppress the revolt of the Greeks. He was beaten in war by the Russians and by his revolted Egyptian pasha. Yet he destroyed the janizzaries, he recovered Epirus, Albania, Sivas, Diarbekir, Mosul, Bagdad. What he lost on the outskirts of the empire he gained by asserting his control within it. He found his empire ruled by a set of turbulent feudatories, permanent in the case of the *derebeys*, temporary in the case of the pashas. In each case the rulers of provinces and of tribes had the right of inflicting death, and all those rights of private war, of private justice, of private revenue, which were

so dear to medieval barons of the West. Mahmud deprived *derebays* and pashas of their independent gibbets, of their independent armies, of their independent incomes. He reasserted the active rule of the Sultan and made a modern unified state for the first time possible in Turkey. He improved the system of government and of taxation, he promoted toleration, he developed commercial intercourse. He built up a new army and a new fleet, he sowed the seeds of many later reforms. He breathed a new spirit into the Turkish Empire, as the epitaph on his tomb shows :

The great King, judicious and wise, the sun to his Empire,  
He opened the gate of the East to new light.

## CHAPTER II

### THE GREAT POWERS AND MAHMUD (1808-39)

#### I

*As Pitt (the elder) truly pointed out to the vizier Ragib, unity of interest was the only real bond between states. Pitt's son laid down the principle that the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire was a vital interest to England.*—A. C. WOOD.

So far as England and Turkey are concerned the Eastern question practically begins with the nineteenth century. There had been trade relations since the day when Shakspeare spoke of the 'rump-fed ronyon's' husband making a voyage to Aleppo as Master of 'the Tiger.' Almost till the end of the eighteenth century the main interest remained commercial. The British Levant Company had its own consuls, the British Ambassador slept in his palace on the Bosphorus, the Grand Turk did not deign to send a representative to the Thames. England generally favoured the Muscovite at the expense of the Turk; for Russia offered timber, naval stores, and a valuable diplomatic alliance.<sup>74</sup> In 1770 England carefully avoided offending Russia. She actually helped Russian ships to enter the Mediterranean and facilitated their naval attack on Turkey from the south in the war that ended at the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774). By that treaty Russia firmly planted herself on the Black Sea and obtained certain rights of protection over the Christian subjects of Turkey.\* But England still remained friendly and avoided an open breach with Russia even during the War of American Independence. When Austria and Russia united in the eighties to partition and despoil Turkey, England looked on without protest. But after three years of war the younger Pitt suddenly took a stand. He declared that the Russian advance to the southern shores of the Black Sea was a menace and that she should not be allowed to retain the fort of Oczakov. Here for the first time the Eastern question appears in its modern form. 'In the aggrandizement of Russia and depression of Turkey,' said Pitt, 'our commercial and political interests were both concerned' (March 29, 1791).

\* For text of Article VII of Kutchuk Kainardji and the various interpretations of it, *vide infra*, ch. xii, n., pp. 467-9.

Here, as elsewhere, Pitt laid down new principles and originated a new policy, as the debates in Parliament on the Oczakov question made clear.<sup>76</sup> Fox, like the superb debater he was, dwelt more on the practical side of the question and declared that a war should not be waged for a small town on the Black Sea which was not marked on most maps. Fox also objected to the Turks in principle and desired their exclusion from Europe, and Burke expressed the same view with his usual vehemence. England's commerce did not need to be defended in the Black Sea, nor was England's policy endangered by Russia at Constantinople. 'The Turkish Empire [was not] any part of the balance of power in Europe. I very much dislike this anti-Crusade. Any Christian power was to be preferred to these destructive savages.' The Turks were outside the pale, and the ruin of their 'wasteful and disgusting empire' was to be desired. So far Burke in his wrath. Parliament clearly sided with these anti-Turkish views, and Pitt's majority went down. Deserted first by his followers and finally by his colleagues, he was forced to retreat from his position. The Russians retained Oczakov, and the British public was unmoved by the danger to the Turk.

Napoleon's attack on Egypt, the British victory of the Nile, and the Turco-British defence of Acre changed the diplomatic scene. The British public saw the merits of the Turk for the first time. British, Turks and Russians united against a common enemy. Pitt concluded a treaty with Turkey guaranteeing her dominions and integrity for eight years (1799).<sup>76</sup> It was the most extensive pledge England ever gave to her. Pitt had thus turned the tables on his opponents and reversed the decision about Oczakov, though he took care to keep the treaty secret. At a later time Peel gave an authoritative exposition of his motive. Pitt 'did not take that step because he admired the Government of Turkey but because he thought the dismemberment of Turkey would be attended with disastrous consequences.'<sup>77</sup> Fox was still anti-Turk at the time of Napoleon's success in Egypt. England might be injured by it, but 'one great general benefit would follow from that success, the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.' Fox spoke thus in opposition. A few years later he reconsidered the question when in office. After her defeat at Austerlitz Russia proposed to compensate herself at Turkey's expense for losses in the West. She proposed to England to erect Greek and Slavic states out of the ruins of the Turkish Empire and to control them herself (1806). Fox had become Foreign Secretary in the 'Ministry of all the Talents.' He made no direct reply

to Russia's overture, which proposed what he had hitherto advocated. But he was pro-Turk now that he was in office. England would do all she could to maintain the integrity of Turkey, for he feared that, if Russia took territory from her in the north, France would take something in the south. England could not allow France to conquer Egypt, for that conquest endangered the route to India. Hence his policy was first to preserve Turkey intact. If Turkey's integrity could not be preserved, or if she was attacked, England herself would occupy the island of Crete and the harbour of Alexandria in Egypt. This was Fox's answer to Russia. A few months later he was negotiating with Napoleon, who stated that 'the integrity and absolute independence of the Ottoman Empire form not only the sincerest desire of the [French] Emperor but constitute also the undeviating object of his policy.'<sup>78</sup> Fox suspected French professions and deemed Napoleon's pledge insufficient. He was wise, for the writer of the despatch was Talleyrand and the date was the first of April.

The evolution of British policy could hardly be better shown than in Fox. He passed in a few years from an attitude of pure sentimentality and hatred of the Turk to a position as realistic as that of Palmerston or Disraeli. He proposed that England should occupy Crete and Egypt in the case of Turkey's dissolution, just as Czar Nicholas proposed she should do so forty and fifty years later. Napoleon's attitude and the threat to India is of course the explanation. Events developed. Fox broke off his peace negotiations because Napoleon wanted Sicily, and Sicily was on the way to Egypt. Russia went to war with Napoleon and invaded Turkey towards the end of 1806. In a desperate attempt to retain Russia in her alliance, England attempted to coerce Turkey by arms. A British force landed in Egypt at Alexandria, a British fleet sailed up the Dardanelles. Admiral Duckworth anchored off Prince's Island and demanded the surrender of the Turkish fleet. Both expeditions were a failure and each commander was glad to evacuate his forces on somewhat humiliating terms. Each withdrew in safety, but left his honour behind. The failures drove even Castlereagh into humour. He twitted the government later with having sent a fleet to Constantinople 'not to support the Russians but to bring away the Turkish fleet, whilst the troops which were necessary for the success of the expedition had been sent not to Constantinople, but Alexandria.' Canning delivered an attack for once devoid of humour. 'An intervention to procure by pacific means the arrangement desired by Russia he did not condemn; but to interfere first



by menaces and afterwards by violence, violence inadequate and unsuccessful, was what he did condemn.' Turkey was still an ally, but the forcing of the Dardanelles and the demand for the fleet was bound to make her an enemy. Milder coercive measures might have been successfully used, the forts at Sestos and Abydos might have been seized and held. In this way, Canning thought, the Turks might not have been estranged and humiliations in any case avoided.<sup>79</sup> This criticism is only too just, for in actual result the Turks were flung into the arms of Napoleon who designed the destruction of their empire, and alienated from the British who desired its integrity.

## II

*Your Turk is a Mahommedan it seems, and therefore an ally not fit for a Christian . . . but an alliance with a Mahommedan may be as good as a peace with an Atheist.*—GEORGE CANNING, December 11, 1798.

The 'Ministry of all the Talents' fell, and a new cabinet came into power. The Foreign Secretary was Canning, who, so far back as 1798, had advocated an alliance with Turkey when Napoleon had invaded Egypt. He did so on lines of cool common-sense, very different from the rhetoric of Burke. The Grand Seigneur was as good a judge of his interests as anyone else, and was not to be rejected as an ally 'because he wears a long beard and a long gown.' Pitt, as we know, actually took this advice, and gave a guarantee to Turkey in 1799. Canning advocated a similar policy now. He was willing to swallow the 'inglorious' mishaps at Alexandria and Constantinople. Russia must make peace with Turkey and England must join with her. Then all three could resist Napoleon. He sent off at once a special mission to make peace between Turkey and England. His instructions said that, even if the ruin of Turkey were imminent, 'it was neither the wish nor the interest of His Majesty to be instrumental in precipitating its fall.'<sup>80</sup> England was once again the best friend of Turkey and would restrain the aggression of Russia on the one hand and of France on the other. The Turks were hostile and suspicious, and the mission was made a failure by Russia's defeat by Napoleon at Friedland. For that defeat induced the Czar suddenly to desert his allies and become the friend of Napoleon. Some terms of the Treaty of Tilsit were published in August, and it was known that Russia and France were allies. It was suspected (and with truth) that the two powers had secretly arranged to partition the Turkish Empire.



Canning, who had definitely formulated the policy of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, was not dismayed by the defection of Russia. He provided for all eventualities by telling Paget, whom he had sent on a special mission to Turkey, to 'make us friends with the pashas of Smyrna and Janina and any other pasha who has power and goodwill.' <sup>81</sup> If the Sultan surrendered Constantinople to Russia, Canning would support independent and pro-British pashas elsewhere by British sea-power and enable them to make headway against Russia or France. Canning considered that it might be necessary for England to 'make use of the sea,' or of 'local advantages' offered by Turkey to resist this aggression. He did not want Egypt, which we had just abandoned, since it would need a large military force or garrison and because its retention would cause international jealousies. But, anticipating Disraeli, he advocated 'possession or temporary occupation of one of the islands or a Port at least in some island in the Archipelago.' <sup>82</sup> He considered alternatives. 'Scio's rocky isle' and Melos were 'highly important, at least with a view to the defence of Constantinople and possibly to operations against Russia.' If it were necessary to transfer the Sultan and his court to Asia, such places on its coast as, for example, the harbour of Marmorice might be considered. But he seemed on the whole to think possession of the island of Crete 'the most effectual check . . . to any combination of the maritime forces of France and Russia,' whether directed against Constantinople or Egypt. Canning's was certainly a much better solution of the problem than Disraeli found in Cyprus.

The main thing, however, was to make peace, and to make peace quickly, with Turkey. 'His Majesty has nothing to ask of the Porte; and having already relinquished the possession of Alexandria, he has nothing to restore.' <sup>83</sup> Sir Robert Adair was thus instructed in June 1808 to make peace. Ali Pasha was to be maintained in Janina and supplied with arms and stores. The Sultan was to give a formal engagement to prevent French forces from marching through his dominions on the way to attack British India. Full commercial intercourse was to be resumed and relations of friendship were once more to be established. Adair had no easy task, for the whole of Constantinople was in uproar. His first conference with the *Reis Effendi* (Foreign Minister) must have been unique in the history of diplomacy. 'Before we entered upon business,' writes Adair serenely, 'I learned from him that Mustapha [the] Bairactar and his party had been put to death by the janizzaries, that the deposed Sultan Mustapha had been

strangled, and that tranquillity had been restored in the capital.' <sup>84</sup> By January 5, 1809, the Treaty was signed. Peace was announced and various technical details settled in the earlier articles. The sixth article renewed the customs tariff on the old 3 per cent. basis. But Article XI is so important that it is worth reproducing in full. 'As ships of war have always been forbidden to enter the channel of Constantinople [*i.e.* the straits of the Dardanelles at one end and of the Black Sea at the other] and as this old rule of the Ottoman Empire ought to be observed from henceforth in time of peace by every power whatsoever, the British Court agrees to conform to this principle.' <sup>85</sup> Article XI is directed against Russia as well as other powers, for Turkish waters are closed to warships at the end of the Bosphorus as well as at the Dardanelles. It is at least interesting that the Turks did not originally propose to insert it in the Treaty. Napoleon had threatened them with war if they made peace with England, and this closing of the straits might have caused him to make good his threat.

A point of even greater importance is that Canning's instructions contemplated peace and possibly an alliance with Turkey. He would have agreed to a peace between Russia and Turkey with England as a third party, if the basis of the peace was resistance to France. But by alliance Canning did not mean a guarantee, and the distinction is of great importance. The 'agreement here spoken of is not intended to comprehend a precise and formal guarantee of the dominions of the Porte.' <sup>86</sup> This policy was not confined to Canning, for, after he resigned office in October 1809, his successors reiterated his warning. 'You will however take care, not to hold out the expectation [to the Turk], that Great Britain will enter into any formal guarantee of the Turkish Dominions; an engagement which events might not enable us to fulfil.' <sup>87</sup> In 1799 Pitt had given a formal guarantee of all the Sultan's dominions. Canning refused to do this a decade later. We know that he had felt that he could not guarantee Egypt. Still less could he guarantee Moldavia and Wallachia which the Russians occupied, or Bosnia which the French threatened. Asia alone could be defended by British sea-power. And when the power of Napoleon loomed so terrific and menacing it was well to be cautious in promises.

The danger to Turkey from the combined menace of Russia and France was very real. The Treaty of Tilsit contained a secret article whereby Alexander and Napoleon had designed the destruction of Turkey.<sup>88</sup> They agreed to make common cause to deprive Turkey of all her European possessions

except Macedonia, Bulgaria and Constantinople itself. Turkey seemed doomed, but she was saved, as so often, by the dissensions of her enemies. They could not agree as to the division of the spoils. Alexander wanted Moldavia and Wallachia, and Napoleon, who had already received the harbour of Cattaro and the island of Corfu, agreed. But he never consented to Russia's fleet entering the Mediterranean, still less to her securing a harbour there. He would only allow Russia to have Constantinople if France was to occupy and fortify the Dardanelles and thus close the Straits at will to a Russian fleet. The two Emperors could not agree as to partitioning Turkey and they ultimately could not agree as to anything else. Turkey, cajoled by Canning, began to suspect their designs. But she naturally had suspicions of England and had the gravest internal difficulties. Just after the British fleet left the Sea of Marmara the janizzaries deposed and murdered Selim and set up Mustapha in his place. After an interval Mustapha was deposed and ultimately strangled and Mahmud ascended the 'Siege Perilous.' But he had to compromise, and yield again to the fury of the janizzaries. On the outskirts of his empire the Servians had successfully revolted. Ali Pasha was practically independent in Albania and Epirus, and the Ionian Isles were first held by Napoleon and then by England. It was difficult to have a foreign policy at all when your own janizzaries were more dangerous than rebels or enemies and when every great power had recently been at war with you. The fact that Mahmud made peace with England so early in 1809 is on the whole creditable to his foresight.

### III

*His army each day growing bolder and finer  
With the Turcoman tribes he subdues Asia Minor.  
With Bucharians and Afghans and Persians and Tartars  
Chokes the wretched Mogul in his grandmother's garters.*

GEORGE CANNING, *Progress of Bonaparte*, 1798.

*The Emperor of Russia congratulates M. de Stratford Canning for his share in making peace with Turkey, cet évènement si important par les conséquences qu'il devait avoir.*—MESSAGE FROM CZAR ALEXANDER TO LORD CASTLEREAGH, 1812.

In the year 1809, Russia, encouraged by Napoleon and by the Servian revolt, resumed her war with Turkey. But the war had not prospered. Canning, now Russia's enemy as

well as Napoleon's, had renewed both friendly and commercial relations with Turkey. This step was important, for Napoleon's continental blockade was thus broken and British goods were imported into mid-Europe on routes from Constantinople. Canning fell from power, but his cousin Stratford Canning played a most important part in a crisis of supreme importance at Constantinople. Though only twenty-four years old he had charge of the British Embassy at Constantinople for some years up to the first half of 1812. Russia was still fighting Turkey at the beginning of 1812, but the European kaleidoscope had changed. Russia was ominously moving away from Napoleon. The situation was almost that envisaged by George Canning in 1807. Russia was likely to fight Napoleon. So she must make peace with Turkey, co-operate with England on the sea, and concentrate all her military forces against Napoleon on land. Peace, too, was in the interests of both Turkey and Russia, for Napoleon, while marching to Moscow, did not mean to stop there. He carried in his baggage, it was said, a crown, a sceptre, an orb and a purple robe, and proposed to assume them at some eastern capital, at Constantinople, at Persepolis, or even at Samarkand or Delhi. At any rate Napoleon was as dangerous to Turkey as to Russia, more dangerous to both than to England. War between them was suicidal.

It was not easy for a Turkish Sultan to treat with Russia. Mahmud regarded her as an insulting and insidious enemy. But her deeds now pleaded for her. In anticipation of a conflict with the French the Russians began evacuating various fortresses and retiring northwards towards the end of 1811. The Turks, flushed with victory, were pursuing them. Rather fortunately the Russians won a rearguard action, which led to terms of peace being really discussed. Mahmud demanded that the river Pruth should be the boundary for the future, *i.e.* that Moldavia and Wallachia should be restored to Turkey. The Czar replied by an angry refusal, and demanded the Sereth for a future boundary in Europe (thus acquiring all Moldavia) and the Phasis for Asia. Mahmud was enraged at these suggestions. At this dangerous moment Napoleon offered him advantages, hardly concealing his intention of fighting Russia. Austria likewise informed Turkey that she was the ally of France and would join with Napoleon in attacking Russia and in guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey (April 1812).

Stratford's problem was to convince Turkey that France and Austria were her enemies, England and Russia her



friends. He produced a copy of a secret Franco-Austrian scheme for attacking Turkey drawn up in 1810. He sent it and other letters to the Sultan, arguing that Turkey would never get better terms from Russia than at the moment. For the conflict with France had not begun and its result was still uncertain. But Stratford was at the same time pressing the Russians to moderate their terms to Turkey. The *Reis Effendi* became so suspicious that he actually demanded that Stratford should show him the originals of the letters he had received from Russia. Not only were the Turks suspicious but their habitual method of diplomacy was procrastination and evasion. It was difficult to convince them that any other method was or could be good. But something or somebody did convince them, and a treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey was signed at Bucharest on May 28, 1812. It gave Turkey almost everything she wanted. It gave her back Moldavia and Wallachia, it gave her back Servia, it restored almost all recent Russian conquests in Asia. And it restored to Russia a fine army which hastened the retreat of Napoleon and almost captured him at the bridge of the Beresina.

Stratford always claimed that this success, with which he began his diplomatic career, was the greatest of his life. His boast would be justified if he alone induced the Turks to make peace.<sup>89</sup> But of this fact neither he nor anyone can be sure, since the springs of oriental policy are seldom traced to their source. One thing, however, is certain. Only nine days before the signature of the treaty Stratford had been seriously suspected of unduly favouring Russia. The decision to sign was therefore very sudden and was certainly due to Mahmud himself. He had other advisers than Stratford. One of them was his Creole mother, who, though French in origin, is said to have been anti-Napoleonist, and she may have persuaded him at this moment of crisis. If so it was one of the few times in Turkish history when the harem influenced the Sultan for good. Whatever the explanation it was the wisest diplomatic decision of Mahmud's life, and the first definite sign that he was master in his own house and director of his own policy.

A period of relative quiet ensued. In the Congress and Treaty of Vienna the Turks had practically no share. An attempt by Castlereagh to clear up difficulties between Russia and Turkey failed. The Czar Alexander declined to include Turkey in the guarantee of territorial integrity made by the

Great Powers. He wished therefore to retain the liberty of attacking Turkey or of supporting a revolted province against her. And, in this very year 1815, the Servians again revolted and this time they made good their *de facto* independence. But the Servians were tucked away in a corner of the empire and their achievement of freedom did not greatly disturb Mahmud. Still less did it agitate the Great Powers. Nor did even the revolt of Ali Pasha of Janina in 1820. It was the Greek revolt which poured forth like a crater, shook the earth and carried flames to heaven. Every Great Power, though for different reasons, was disturbed by it. Russia felt sympathy with the Greek Church and feared for her own trade in the Black Sea. Austria, long passive in the Eastern question, feared now to see Russia take Constantinople. France, though still weak, could not look with indifference on disturbances in the Eastern Mediterranean. England, with her grip on the Ionian Islands, was directly interested. Her trade was developing with Turkey and the Black Sea and both were endangered if Russia seized Constantinople or forced her way into the Mediterranean.

Castlereagh only lived to see the early stages of the Greek revolt. But his ideas on Turkey are of some interest. He had adopted Canning's formula of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and was suspicious of Russian intrigues. Alexander had played with the idea of an international navy and shown some desire to acquire the Ionian Isles. Castlereagh had defeated both designs, for he held the master key in sea-power. His task became less easy as the Greek revolt developed, for Russia's feeling became intense and her provocation extreme. Russians found it dangerous to walk the streets of Constantinople where the patriarch had been hung in his robes, and the Greek religion and her worshippers were insulted. Castlereagh was much alarmed by the provocation thus given and exhausted his arts of cajolery to prevent the Czar from intervening. He also remonstrated indignantly with the Turks for their massacre at Scio, saying that 'no human offences could justify such actions.' <sup>90</sup>

#### IV

*It was the two Cannings who gave freedom to Greece.*—TURKISH SAYING.

Canning became Foreign Secretary again in 1822, and was once more called upon to lay down a policy for the East.



In 1807 he had refused a guarantee, but had formulated the doctrine of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. That integrity was visibly dissolving owing to the Greek revolt. A new policy had therefore to be devised. Mahmud was so incapable of suppressing the Greek revolt that finally he called on Mehemet Ali, his ambitious viceroy in Egypt, to send him troops. Mehemet Ali sent his son, the famous Ibrahim Pasha, with an army trained on European lines. Ibrahim landed in the Morea and caused as much alarm by defeating the Greeks as the Sultan had done by failing to do so. Russia's patience, under numerous provocations, was not eternal. She was unlikely to permit the complete subjugation of the Greeks and might thus be drawn into war. Canning thought that, if Russia once declared war, she would 'gobble up Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at the next.' By the year 1826 he had come to believe that there was no way of preventing Russia's intervention. He therefore proposed to avert evil consequences by acting with her. He associated England with her in order to put pressure on Turkey, to stop fighting and to make some arrangement with Greece. The first Anglo-Russian agreement was the Protocol of 1826. This was much strengthened by the Treaty of July 6, 1827, which was negotiated during the last days of Canning's life. Not only England and Russia but France also agreed to put pressure on Turkey and Egypt to stop hostilities against the Greeks and grant them a *de facto* autonomy or independence. An Anglo-Franco-Russian fleet was sent into the Mediterranean to enforce these terms. Canning, who had made the plan, did not live to see the result. But Admiral Codrington settled the question by annihilating the Egyptian and Turkish fleets at Navarino in October 1827. The sea-power of Turkey was destroyed and the further intervention of Europe was certain. The attempt to suppress revolt in Greece was hopeless, for the Great Powers could not avoid having a hand in it. Everything Mahmud granted to Greece would have to be granted in the light of day and on terms laid down by all the Great Powers. But the terms of an enraged Sultan would not be the terms of cool European diplomats.

Canning here, as elsewhere, left a legacy and a tradition.<sup>91</sup> The policy followed by Canning's successors was declared by Metternich to be dangerous and 'more dangerous, because less bold than that of Canning.' This was a penetrating criticism. The policy of acting with Russia, in order to restrain her from attacking Turkey, was one which none but a great statesman could conceive or execute. Wellington and

Aberdeen, who succeeded Canning, made no attempt to do so. They could not conceive that support of Russia might really be a benefit to Turkey. Their policy was temporising and feeble. The young Czar Nicholas was of sterner stuff than Alexander and was not to be satisfied with anything but realities. Aberdeen and Wellington did not induce Mahmud to make concessions and they did not prevent Nicholas from going to war. Mahmud blundered in his impetuous rage. He addressed a circular to his provincial governors in which he displayed his hatred of Russia and his resentment at his defeat at Navarino. He explained to them that the Convention of Akerman, which he had signed with Russia in 1826, had been a mere device to gain time. He declared that he wished to inaugurate a Holy War on behalf of Islam against the Infidels, of whom the 'followers of our Great Prophet' had slain hundreds of thousands in the past. This frantic utterance was too much for Russia, and war began in April 1828.

The parliamentary debates on Turkey once more brought to light the different British policies.<sup>92</sup> Lord Holland revived Burke's old hatred of the Turks and tried, though unsuccessfully, to claim Fox as a consistent champion of the policy of excluding them from Europe. He was dreaming of the days of Oczakov when public opinion had frowned on Pitt's support of Turkey against Russia. Pitt had given Turkey an alliance and a territorial guarantee in 1799. Fox had considered the policy of defending the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Canning had definitely formulated it. The Wellington government now returned to this first policy of Canning, though with an important modification. Aberdeen declared (July 16, 1828): 'The existence of Turkey as a European power was essential to the preservation of that [the] balance of power [in Europe].' But Canning, while refusing to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, had been prepared to ally with it and support it by arms in 1808. Peel on behalf of the Wellington government repudiated any such claim. 'Were they [we] on every occasion to act with Quixotic feeling and immediately to proceed to war?'<sup>93</sup> 'When Turkey gave Russia a fair justification for hostilities on what account could we interfere?' He later admitted that the cabinet had refused aid to the Porte in the event of her defeat by Russia. Even Palmerston (who was in opposition) only advocated a modified form of Canning's second policy. He said we should have forced the Turks to make timely concessions and so avoided war. But even he agreed that it would have been out of the

question for England to go to war with Russia over Turkey. Thus we have a policy of defending Turkey's integrity so far as possible by diplomatic means, but stopping short of military ones.

Czar Nicholas waged war unchecked by Europe, but met a stout resistance from Turkey. Wellington looked impotently on while the French landed troops to deliver the Morea from Ibrahim. He could no more check the French in the Mediterranean than the Russians on the Danube. He would not use force against either. Mahmud, against whom England had used force at Navarino, was astonished by hearing Wellington describe him as 'our ancient ally,' though declining all his requests for aid. But Wellington, if blind to the future, was not blind to the present. Being a soldier he was a man of realities, and at length perceived the trend of events. The Russian armies, which had already penetrated deep into Armenia, completed Wellington's education by threatening Constantinople. In 1829 Diebitsch and the Russian army passed the Balkans and advanced on Adrianople. His enterprise was not without danger, but boldness usually impresses orientals. The news that the Russians were in Adrianople was a great shock to Mahmud and his advisers. Diebitsch assumed the airs of a conqueror, and offered a peace while trembling for the safety of his army. It was a most critical decision for Mahmud to accept the peace. Was he terrified by a Russian army in Adrianople, did he feel that his own resources were inadequate and make a panic peace? A dozen years later Stratford, who was there at the time, delicately poised his conclusion. The Treaty was 'rather the result of moral impression produced by the dazzling effect of a hazardous manœuvre, than a necessity imposed by the irresistible advantages of military position.'<sup>94</sup> This is quite a possible view, but there is a good deal to be said against it.

The evidence of a German military expert, who was on the spot, is that Diebitsch was in a dangerous position and fully aware of the fact. The Russian army was threatened by Mustapha Pasha with a new force of something like 40,000 Albanians. But the Sultan was also threatened by this force. The Albanians were notoriously turbulent and Mustapha was believed to dream of restoring the janizzaries, and of uniting with the Russians for an advance on Constantinople. The best way of preventing that unhallowed conjuncture was to make peace with Diebitsch direct. As it was, Mustapha remained in Rumelia feeding his army at the expense of the inhabitants, and disregarding the Sultan's order to withdraw.

Next year Mahmud showed what he thought by sending an army into Albania, capturing Mustapha and massacring his principal chiefs. Mahmud seems to have feared revolt in Constantinople also, to judge from his repressive measures. Diebitsch with his Russian handful was less dangerous than Mustapha's Albanians and a capital in revolution. So Mahmud had small choice, and agreed to the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829). Turkey surrendered Anapa and Poti, the keys of Circassia, thus giving Russia important advantages in Asia. In Europe Russia obtained command of the Delta or mouth of the Danube and prohibited the Turks from fortifying its left bank. The Treaty increased still further Russia's control over the Christian subjects of the Porte. It gave her opportunities for interference in Moldavia and Wallachia. It enabled her to claim advantages for Greece and for Servia and to pose as the champion of Christian *rayas* generally. All these were concessions full of import for the future.

Far more important than the terms of the Treaty were the ultimate designs and policy of Russia towards Turkey. Under Catherine the Great they had been frankly and openly aggressive and had aimed at Constantinople. Alexander had shown milder but, none the less, dangerous tendencies. He had proposed to Pitt a joint Anglo-Russian guarantee on condition that Turkey should be forced to better the lot of her Greek and Slav subjects. 'Humanity and policy equally command it, for in acting otherwise we should lose for ever all influence over these people and forfeit their confidence.' He had proposed to Fox to break up the Turkish Empire and erect Greek and Slav states on its ruins. He had proposed to all Europe in 1824 that Servia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and three provinces formed out of rebel Greece, were to enjoy a quasi-independent existence guaranteed by the Five Great Powers. Six small states on the fringes of Turkey were to act as satellites of the Russian planet. But no other Great Power looked with favour on his plan, and Alexander died in 1825. Nicholas, who succeeded him, was as determined as his brother had been irresolute, with ideas as clear as Alexander's had been mystical. His policy was not cosmopolitan, it was purely Russian, and was conceived and applied with great energy and resolution. A few days after the Treaty of Adrianople was signed (but before the news was known in St. Petersburg) Nicholas had taken a most important decision as to the future policy of Russia towards Turkey.



## V

*The more one thinks about the immense question of the fall of the Turkish Empire the more one plunges into a labyrinth of difficulty and complications.*—NESSELRODE TO DIEBITSCH, September 19, 1829.

Late in the month of September 1829 Nicholas adopted the conclusions of a committee of seven on his future policy towards Turkey. It had held several meetings in September and presented a unanimous report.<sup>95</sup> The two members, whose views have been preserved, were Daschkov and Nesselrode. Daschkov's memoir, which had been written in 1828, showed that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe would fling them back into Asia, renovate their power, and cause grave dangers to Russia in the Caucasus. If European Turkey was partitioned, Austria would get Bosnia, Albania and Montenegro; England would demand the Aegean Isles and Crete; France would get Egypt. Russia would then be confronted with three strong neighbours instead of one weak one. It would never do to have Constantinople as a free city and port, for, in that case, France and England would get access into the Black Sea. Nesselrode expressed his views well at the committee and still better in a letter to Lieven. 'We have to decide on what is national policy . . . what is national is what conforms to the true and permanent interests of a state. . . . Is the preservation of the Ottoman government hurtful or useful to Russia? . . . The idea of hunting the Turks out of Europe and re-establishing the worship of the true God in Saint Sophia is certainly very fine and, if realized, would make us all live in history. But what will Russia gain by it? Glory undoubtedly, but at the same time she would lose all the real advantages offered by being a neighbour to a state weakened by a fortunate series of wars, and [she would have] inevitable struggles with the chief Powers of Europe.'<sup>96</sup> The final recommendation was that the fall of the Turkish Empire was against Russia's true interests, and in consequence prudence would seek to avoid it. In short, Russia desired to maintain the *status quo* in Turkey and not to aim at bringing it down by any sudden or violent catastrophe.

That the policy was really new was admitted by Daschkov. He had argued that the partition of Turkey had once entered into Russia's designs, that such an aim now involved incalculable dangers. In the days of Catherine France and England were not concerned in the partition of Turkey, in the days of Nicholas they were actively interested. As the new policy

had been adopted, the Treaty of Adrianople was to be worked out in the spirit of Nicholas' decision. Russia might slowly increase her influence over Serbia and in Moldavia and Wallachia, perhaps also over Greece; she might slowly advance in Asia. But there was to be no precipitation; in Palmerston's phrase it was better to take the place 'by sap than by storm.' Russia would not favour frontal attacks or violent impacts upon Turkey in her own case or in any other. A sudden collapse might involve Turkey in ruin and Russia in war, bring Austria into the Danube and French and British fleets into the Black Sea. As Russia favoured no sudden blow against Turkey, the result of an attack by Mehemet Ali, the militarily efficient and ambitious pasha of Egypt, filled the Czar with dismay. Not only would it involve European complications, but it might erect a new vigorous Eastern power at Constantinople. How could Russia prefer that to the feeble and decaying power of Mahmud? So Russia was for the *status quo*.

## VI

*Opinions are stronger than armies.* PALMERSTON.

Wellington saw nothing but evil in the Treaty of Adrianople, but then he did not know the real views of Nicholas. He thought that the Treaty gave a push to an already tottering wall, and presaged the speedy ruin of Turkey. 'We are certainly in a bad position,' he wrote after reading it. But, like a true soldier, if one position was taken, he would defend another. Hitherto in his zeal for Turkey he had done everything to make the new state of Greece as small and as weak as possible. He now saw an argument for making her strong. For, if she had more power and territory, she would be the more able to resist Russia's influence. To this pro-Greek view, so tardily perceived, Aberdeen also became a convert. But both were entangled by pro-Turkish proclivities and commitments and had little time to frame a new policy before they fell from power. Indeed Aberdeen, as always, was a little timorous. Even ten years later, on resuming office, he looked back on the pro-Greek policy with some hesitation. He felt it necessary to say that 'the creation of the Greek state was not really at variance with the principles of this policy'<sup>97</sup> (*i.e.* the integrity and independence of Turkey). But it was better to have a new policy inaugurated by men who really believed in it.



Grey became Prime Minister with Palmerston as Foreign Secretary. Both had been at one with Stratford Canning in the desire to strengthen Greece and extend the boundaries of the new state northwards to Arta and Volo. Palmerston had wished to go further and extend them over the sea. The island of Crete would, he argued on February 16, 1830, be a commercial and naval support to Greece, and the consequences of its cession would have been important. Grey in private at least wished to expel the Turks altogether from Europe, in the old manner of Burke and Fox. But neither Grey nor Palmerston could indulge these fancies when in office.<sup>98</sup> They had to be satisfied with making Greece independent, giving her a king, and pushing her boundaries as far north as Arta and Volo. And they had done all this by 1832.

The advent of Palmerston to the Foreign Office was an event of enormous importance. With one short interval he remained in power for a dozen years and during that period had to face every aspect of the Turkish problem. He was himself the greatest personality in British foreign policy between Canning and Disraeli, and was a disciple of the one and a model for the other. But though he retained a reverence for Canning, he exaggerated or departed from his policy. Canning is most remarkable for a profound intellectual conception of foreign policy. The principles he laid down, such as non-intervention or guarantee, were always most carefully thought out, and their fullest consequences perceived. It is this fact which lends such interest to his original policy of defending Turkey by holding strong points but of refusing to guarantee her integrity. His later abandonment of this principle for a conjoint intervention with Russia against Turkey is even more important. Now Palmerston started his career as Foreign Secretary by proclaiming his belief in the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and also condoning Wellington's action in not having maintained it against Russia by arms. Canning had stated the principle of Turkey's integrity in 1807. He had avoided announcing it in public as a principle, for he was not prepared to enforce it. Here we have the essential difference between Canning and Palmerston. The one took no step without weighing its consequences in relation to the whole, the other proclaimed a principle at the same time as he condoned the breach of it. The one pursued a system until the system broke down or had to be changed, the other was a man of expedients and of the moment. The one adjusted thought to action, the other tended to adjust action to impulse. Both believed in public opinion, but Canning usually controlled

what Palmerston sometimes had to follow. Canning had not believed in using threats of war which England was not prepared to enforce. Palmerston did, and here was the greatest difference of all. 'Your old women, who are always preaching and proclaiming peace, are sure to draw on by their imbecility the necessities of war.'\* That sort of utterance was typical at least of his influence. He was too daring in uttering threats of war, too ready sometimes to abandon them, too fond of lecturing foreign powers and of provoking applause from English audiences. Yet his incorrigible gaiety disguises the seriousness and solidarity of his character. He was a man of great courage and of boundless energy and vivacity. His experience too ultimately became unique. He was indeed not a man of principle or system, yet he was a superb opportunist. He excelled in calling 'bluffs' and in making them. It was not the highest statesmanship but it often served. He seldom went too far with a foreign government that was not amenable to pressure from sea-power. He often terrified one by an appeal to British public opinion. And one great method of enlisting public sympathy was to push the commercial interests of Great Britain.

Palmerston, like all men of his generation, was impressed by general principles. He believed that Europe was convulsed by a struggle between despotic and constitutional principles, and that this war of opinion was the great fact of the moment. The opposed forces were the despotic military monarchies, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Turkey; and the constitutional states, England and France. 'There are two great parties in Europe, one which endeavours to bear sway by the force of public opinion, another which endeavours to bear sway by the force of physical control. . . . There is in nature no moving power but mind . . . in human affairs this power is opinion, in political affairs, it is political opinion; and he who can grasp the power with it will subdue the fleshly arm of physical strength and compel it to work out his purpose.'<sup>99</sup> So far Canning would have agreed with him. But Palmerston went further than the master. Canning proposed to mediate or hold the balance between the conflicting principles of despotism and democracy. Palmerston definitely sided with constitutionalism in a way Canning had never done. 'Constitutional states I consider to be the natural allies of this country and . . . no English ministry will perform its duty if it be inattentive to the interests of such states.'<sup>100</sup> † He sent a

\* *Morning Chronicle* of August 21, 1849, probably inspired.

† A great contrast; *vide my Foreign policy of Canning* [1925], 457-9.

British fleet to permit constitutional government to be erected in Belgium, he sent arms and supplies and naval power to help the constitutionalists against the absolutists in Spain and Portugal. In this way, and not entirely without 'the fleshly arm,' he extended the power of the constitutional *bloc* against the despotic one. He was thus, though he did not know it, dropping the balance he should have held between two principles, and weighting the scale in favour of one.

Palmerston sought to exercise influence everywhere. His preoccupations with Belgium and Portugal not only annoyed Russia and Austria but diverted the naval forces of England to the defence of the Scheldt and the Tagus and thus weakened the British fleet and influence in the Near East at more than one important moment. Again his stand against despotic monarchies brought him into conflict with Russia, which was crushing a rebellion in Poland. Palmerston expressed sympathy with the Poles but refused to intervene in their favour, thus alienating Russia and not benefiting Poland. His attitude towards Austria was also unfortunate, for he could not disguise his contempt for the autocratic torpor which Metternich declared to be the essence of good government. Now for the settlement of the Eastern question Russia was essential and Austria was important. Palmerston had preferred to co-operate with France, at once a constitutional state and a first-rate naval power. He held it essential to keep Russia and France apart, and trusted that his support of the constitutional principle would do so. And his hatred and suspicion of Russia seems to have been partly due to the fact that she had a despotic government.

Palmerston had not framed his policy with direct reference to the Eastern question. He ultimately came to think it the most important in all European diplomacy, as it involved crucial decisions for Egypt, Turkey, France and Russia. While he did not look to the future he saw beneath the surface of the present. Having been at the War Office a score of years, he knew the British army was small, but that it could be used as a sword in the hand of the fleet at certain points such as Constantinople. To Syria or Africa, Austrian, French or Russian soldiers could go only by permission of England's fleet. Palmerston's Eastern policy was based on sea-power and began by being Mediterranean rather than Turkish. For to England both the east and west of the Mediterranean was important and France had to be held in check at both ends.

Palmerston came into office just after the Wellington Ministry had allowed a French fleet and army to capture

Algiers. Now Algeria, like Egypt, Tunis, Tripoli and Morocco, was juridically a part of the Turkish Empire. Wellington had failed to get a formal pledge out of France not to annex Algiers. Palmerston evidently deeply resented that inability. One of his maxims was, 'It is sometimes easy to prevent that which it is difficult to undo,' and he actually practised this policy in the thirties when in power. He prevented the extension of France's coast-line east and west of Algiers, just as he prevented the extension of her coast-line to Belgium. In both cases it was a naval question and therefore crucial to England. The French extension to Morocco and Tunis was a matter about which he was prepared to fight and one in which he knew the navy would be effective and public opinion would be in his support.<sup>101</sup> In this case it was in British interests to resist a further disintegration of Turkey.

In the second year of his ministry he was confronted by an exactly similar issue in Syria and decided for peace. Mehemet Ali, the ambitious pasha of Egypt, and his warlike son Ibrahim had aided the Sultan against Greece and had kept Crete in pledge ever since. Palmerston, after taking office, found some utterances of both father and son threatening war against their Turkish master. 'What have I or any of you ever benefited by the Sultan?' said Ibrahim. 'Should the Sultan attack me,' said Mehemet Ali, 'you [Franks] must not take it amiss if I then turn my arms into Syria.'<sup>102</sup> He added that he much preferred England to France. None the less Aberdeen had caused the French Government to admit after repeated denials . . . that the Pasha (Mehemet Ali) has actually offered . . . the co-operation of his [Egyptian] army' to aid the French against the Dey of Algiers.<sup>103</sup> Mehemet Ali admitted that he had threatened 'to take' Tripoli, the French obviously had designs of extending beyond Algiers. If Egypt attacked Syria and Tripoli, if France added Tunis and Morocco to Algiers, six provinces would fall from the Sultan's grasp at a blow. Franco-Egyptian fleets would control the coasts of Africa from Agadir to Port Said, and of Asia from Jaffa to Alexandretta. In a few months half the Mediterranean coast would become French or Egyptian. The whole Aegean would be lost in addition if the arms of Mehemet Ali reached to Constantinople. The British route to India would be endangered and the independence as well as the integrity of Turkey destroyed. Yet though there is every sign that Palmerston would have fought to keep the French within the ring fence of Algeria he did not fight to keep the Egyptians out of Syria.



## VII

*His (Mehemet Ali's) right to retain possession either of Syria or of Egypt without the Sultan's consent can only be by right of force.*—STRATFORD CANNING.

*What other has the Sultan?*—PALMERSTON.\*

Why then did Palmerston not go to war with Mehemet Ali over Syria in 1832? It was not because he feared to fight Mehemet Ali, for he fought him seven years later. The cabinet was indeed more timorous than he, but at this very moment they were taking a strong line against France over Belgium, Portugal and Tunis. They had time but perhaps not stomach for a firm policy towards Mehemet Ali. In October 1831 his valourous son Ibrahim advanced against Palestine. But it was not until eight months later that he captured Acre, nor until July 1832 that he defeated the Turks at Homs, entered Aleppo and conquered Syria. Thereafter there was a pause. On November 3, 1832, a despatch reached London in which Sultan Mahmud definitely asked England for armed naval help against his rebel pasha. In December the total rout of the Turkish forces and the capture of the Grand Vizier by Ibrahim at Konieh was reported. Ibrahim was now in possession of Adana and Cilicia and able to make an advance on Constantinople. Palmerston was not prepared to do more than stop a further advance. In response to an ardent appeal from Stratford Canning he declined to act alone and expressed disbelief in the regeneration of Turkey. Even in January 1833 he was still discussing 'armed mediation' with France but still refusing to send naval aid.

It was not until the middle of February that Palmerston even decided to lend diplomatic support to the Sultan. That meant, of course, that he preferred the Sultan to Mehemet Ali. Before that even this preference had been doubtful. On March 7, 1833, a formal reply was sent to the Sultan's appeal for the aid requested so long before as November 1832. It contained a polite refusal of the 'naval assistance' asked, but a definite pledge to support Mahmud in the diplomatic sense. It was not until April 3 that the use of force was contemplated by Palmerston. Instructions were then sent to the Lords of the Admiralty to order Sir Charles Hotham to be ready, under certain circumstances, to blockade Alexandria. But it was

\* Stratford's memo of December 1832 annotated by Palmerston, quoted in C. W. Crawley, *Greek Independence* [1930], 241.



not until May that Palmerston arranged to send a naval squadron to wait outside the Dardanelles along with the French one, for possible despatch to Constantinople at need. It was too late. A Russian naval squadron had been inside the Bosphorus since February.

Palmerston had been outmanœuvred by Russia, he had repudiated the pledges and advice of Stratford Canning. So curious an attitude demands explanations which it is not easy to give. Would it have been better to recognise Mehemet Ali as a new military power enthroned in Asia Minor and Constantinople, and therefore formidable to Russia? Palmerston seems to have considered the possibility, but he ultimately rejected it. One cause patently is that Ibrahim was a mere soldier, and that the Egyptian power might end with the life of the aged Mehemet Ali. Another was that Mehemet Ali had been threatening the Persian Gulf, which the Sultan could not do, and might impose a high tariff which the Sultan was bound by treaty not to do. But these arguments do not explain why Palmerston did not send the fleet to Constantinople. It was asked for and would have been useful whether Mahmud or Mehemet Ali was to reign on the Bosphorus, and its despatch was quite in the Palmerstonian style. Professor Webster may be able to solve the mystery from Palmerston's private papers, but till then a few suggestions must suffice. One explanation is that public opinion in England was not yet prepared for hostility to Russia. Another is almost too simple to be believed. The British navy was fully occupied elsewhere, as Palmerston ingenuously confessed in the Commons. 'We were embarking in naval operations in the North Sea, and on the coast of Holland, and were under the necessity of keeping up another naval force on the coast of Portugal, it would have been impossible to have sent to the Mediterranean such a squadron as would have suited the purpose of the Porte, and at the same time have comported with the naval dignity of this country' (August 28, 1833).

In spite of her great naval superiority over all other nations England would have had no superiority at the decisive point if she wished either to take Ibrahim in the rear by sea-power or to protect Constantinople against Mehemet Ali by ships. So England deserted Turkey.

Sultan Mahmud now took a momentous step. France he suspected of sympathy with Egypt. Even on March 7 England only promised diplomatic support while refusing naval assistance. Long before that the Sultan had been forced to act. 'A drowning man in his despair clings to a serpent,'

said one of his advisers. Early in January Russia had offered him her aid. Mahmud clung to the 'serpent' and accepted the aid of Russia on February 2, 1833. The end of February witnessed a remarkable event in history, for Russian troops arrived on the Bosphorus and camped on the shores of Asia in order to defend the Sultan against his Egyptian rebel. The presence of Russian sailors and soldiers in the Straits was viewed with even more horror by France than by England. Admiral Roussin, the French Ambassador, got Mahmud to promise concessions to Mehemet Ali before the Russian fleet reached Constantinople. But the first squadron of the Russian fleet had arrived and in fact refused to retire. Palmerston, acting with France, threatened Mehemet Ali with a blockade of Alexandria in April. But France, though very anti-Russian, played with the idea of making Mehemet Ali independent, to which Palmerston was wholly opposed. In May Mahmud ended the crisis by giving way. He was ready to allow Mehemet Ali to hold the pashalics of Egypt, Tarsus and Syria. He still refused the pashalic of Adana. At last a legal fiction was designed to save his pride. Mahmud granted Ibrahim (and not Mehemet Ali) the right to occupy it.\* In June British and French naval squadrons arrived outside the Dardanelles, too late once more, and relieved Russia from great anxiety by not entering the Straits.

France wished to make Mehemet Ali independent and a French ally. Palmerston had defeated that scheme and had also deprived Russia of all pretext for remaining in the Bosphorus. But he had done this at a price. The three provinces Adana, Syria and Tarsus would indeed be detached only during the life of the already aged Mehemet Ali. But it could not be certain that the Sultan would recover them, though he remained 'in principle as much sovereign of Syria as he was before.' Palmerston, in response to inquiry, informed the French that he concurred with them in thinking that 'the share which Great Britain and France had in bringing about the pacification between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali in 1833 so far from giving the Sultan any right to expect that those two powers should sanction any attempts of his to recommence hostilities, gives on the contrary to Great Britain and France a right to require from the Sultan that he should not by any unprovoked aggression against Mehemet Ali, renew a contest which those powers laboured so anxiously and so successfully to terminate.'<sup>104</sup> In brief,

\* The settlement of Kutaya (May 5) was published in the *Moniteur Ottomane*, May 25.

Palmerston's principle was to sacrifice the part temporarily to preserve the whole permanently. Yet, by refusing to fight, England once more dismembered the Turkish Empire. Aberdeen had left Algiers to be annexed by the French in 1830. Palmerston had made Greece both strong and independent and given her a generous boundary to the north in 1832. In the next year he allowed a much larger slice to be cut off Turkey. He looked on while Adana, Syria and Tarsus underwent a long-period occupation by the pasha of Egypt. But he retained the sovereignty of the Sultan intact over Egypt.

Palmerston knew what he was doing. He found compensations even if he had acquiesced in the surrender of these large areas. Damascus and Aleppo were indeed occupied by Mehemet Ali, but Iraq and Mosul remained Turkish. Turkey was a 'good occupier of the road to India.' The alternative route to India was via the Euphrates, up which British commerce went. All this was preserved to Turkey anyhow. Had it not been, Palmerston would doubtless have fought. England was ready to fight for the route to India, just as she was when her naval interests were endangered by French threats to Tunis, Morocco or Belgium. 'The integrity of the Ottoman Empire' was thus not an abstract principle, but was something for which Palmerston might or might not desire to fight. He was not ready to fight for a part of the Ottoman Empire. He would only fight if France, Russia or Mehemet Ali cut off so large a part of Turkey as to affect the whole balance of power and thus touch a vital interest of England's.\*

## VIII

*I have no confidence in this old body preserving life.* CÆsar NICHOLAS ON THE TURKISH EMPIRE, February 18, 1833.

The year 1833 was memorable since it saw Russia for the first and last time in armed control of Constantinople. As a matter of fact Palmerston's delay had been fatal. During December 1832 and the first six weeks of 1833 he had hesitated and raised objections. By February it was too late; Mahmud asked and received Russia's aid. At the end of February Russian ships were going down the Bosphorus and fifteen thousand Russian troops were encamped on the shores of Asia. Russia had won the race by a short head and the consequences

\* *Vide infra*, ch. iv, pp. 106-10.

were momentous. The danger from Mehemet Ali was passed in May 1833, but the danger from Russia remained. She was not going to loosen her grip on Turkey and her soldiers were so near Constantinople that she could impose her own terms. That is how Palmerston viewed the matter, but he jumped too quickly to the conclusion. Russia's attitude was still governed by the decision of the Czar at the Council held at the time of the Treaty of Adrianople. She was, however, in a far more favourable situation to develop its principle in 1833 than in 1829. But she was still anxious to avoid interference by other Great Powers, and to have a weak neighbour, not a strong one, at Constantinople. Russia seems to have been willing to encourage the Christian elements in European Turkey and to use her own vested rights of interference in Servia and Moldo-Wallachia, to pursue a slow economic and political penetration of the outlying provinces of Turkey ; but she meant to do nothing suddenly or by way of partition with other powers. In Asia her ideas are less certain, and, to judge by 1839, she would not have been sorry to see Mahmud weakened by some border warfare with Ibrahim. Yet she was absolutely determined to repel any Egyptian advance beyond Adana or a threat to Constantinople.

The views of Czar Nicholas at the moment of crisis when he rendered aid to Turkey are fortunately known to us. His speech seems that of his authentic thought. On February 18 he met Count de Ficquelmont, the Austrian Ambassador, at a ball and spoke as follows :<sup>105</sup> ' I have received bad news from Turkey. Ibrahim does not arrest his march. The greatest apathy and the greatest disorder reign at Constantinople . . . the Sultan has either no men who can serve him or men who only do it in order to betray him. I avow to you that I foresee the greatest dangers for him. I have done what I could to avert them. I have offered him advice and help, he has refused both. When he accepts them, I fear they will come too late to save him. Despite this I shall give them him if necessity forces him to ask for them ; I have taken the engagement and shall keep my word. I do not conceal from you that it is a sacrifice that I make. It is too opposed to all our old relations with Turkey for Russia to behold it with pleasure ; besides religious principle is opposed to it. However I repeat I shall keep my word. But that is all I can do. I have no power to give life to the dead, and the Turkish empire is dead . . . [even if the crisis is arrested] I have no confidence in this old body preserving life, it is in dissolution from all sides. It will fall a little earlier, or a little later.' He then



suggested that the Emperor of Austria should come to an agreement with himself over such an event as they were the most interested parties. 'I know everything that has been said of the projects of the Empress Catherine [for destroying the Turkish Empire]. Without stopping to examine what was true or exaggerated in what she desired, or what was said of her plans, I shall tell you in one word, that Russia has renounced the goal she had marked out. I wish to maintain the Turkish Empire. I believe I have already proved and am proving it at this present moment. If it falls I do not desire its *débris*, I need nothing. Yet we cannot surrender the future to chance. What are we to do? The idea of partition has always kept the attention of the Powers. I confess to you that I fear all the intrigues. France and England, as we have the misfortune to see to-day, will not fail to set them in motion at Constantinople. The results of that dismemberment will be immense. How are we to prevent them from being dangerous? Here is my thought, and it is one on which we should agree.'

Ficquelmont replied by suggesting that the Turkish Empire was too great to be partitioned. 'Some central mass would always remain, and the question was, what to do with that?' 'I am of your opinion,' answered the Czar, 'but that thought does not give me pause. When the event happens it will be necessary to take a line, and of all lines to take the one I find the simplest, the most natural and the least compromising is the following. The Turkish Empire succeeded to the Greek Empire by means of conquest; its roots do not go deep; the populations of the provinces of the old Greek Empire even on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus are mostly Christian. When the Turkish Empire destroys itself by its own incapacity, why should we not try and re-establish a Greek Empire? There are the beginnings of a Greek state. I do not know King Otho; I do not know if he is able to support such a destiny. I see for my part nothing better to do.' Count Ficquelmont hastily declared that he had no instructions to discuss the matter, and the Czar, seeing that he had perhaps gone too far, dropped the subject for the present. He ended by suggesting that France was egging on Ibrahim, and by saying 'nothing equals the stupidity of the Turks.' On the 24th Ficquelmont saw both the Czar and Nesselrode. But on this occasion the minister had little to say, and the Czar merely informed him that the Sultan had now accepted the offer of Russian aid, and that it was being sent. But it might be too late to protect Constantinople from the army of Ibrahim.



## IX

*Here is the end of this great affair. Sire, you have saved the Turkish Empire.*—  
ORLOV TO CZAR NICHOLAS, June 29, 1833.

The ideas of Nicholas at this crisis correspond accurately to those of his Council of September 1829. He is far from wishing a sudden or immediate catastrophe to Turkey.\* He prefers the weak neighbour as before. He is opposed to partition, to European conferences, and, above all, to Franco-British interference. If any such interference takes place he wants it to be Austro-Russian and strictly limited. On the other hand, in facing the question of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, which he thinks may occur, he puts forward the idea of a Greek Empire extending presumably from the small kingdom of Greece to Macedonia, to Thrace and to both shores of the Bosphorus. This looks suspiciously like the old Russian plan of making a vassal state of Greece, though it is made dependent on Austrian consent. But it is clearly too vague to be of much immediate importance. It is quite certain that Nicholas is sending his naval squadron and his troops only for a temporary occupation of the Bosphorus, and to avert an immediate disaster from Ibrahim. There is no question of annexation or permanent occupation. Russia comes as a friend or as an ally, not as an enemy. Even when he sent his favourite Count Alexis Orlov to Constantinople as special representative at the end of April his instructions were to obtain the retreat of Ibrahim's army from Asia Minor, and to withdraw the Russian forces as soon as that retreat took place. It seems to be the case that Orlov carried with him to Constantinople some sort of a sketch of a defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey. But he was not the first to propose the scheme.<sup>106</sup>

Nothing would be more untrue than to say that Count Orlov wrung the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi from the Sultan by force of arms. He was a man of dignity and charm, and was courteous and conciliatory, even caressing in his manner. He 'rubbed himself in the dust before the Sultan,' says the Turkish chronicler. He distributed 24,000 medals with the Czar's portrait to Turkish soldiers in recognition of their bravery. He declared the Russian sailors and soldiers to be their brothers, and took care to withdraw them at the very earliest moment from the Bosphorus, as soon as it was known

\* *Vide* also his later ideas in ch. x.

that Ibrahim had retreated behind the Taurus. He was skilful in flattering, perhaps in bribing, the Sultan's ministers. They were one and all in his favour. His tactics were the perfection of diplomatic art. Mahmud showed him extraordinary marks of condescension. He took two steps towards him in the audience chamber and accompanied him to the door. He caused him to be seated in his presence, and presented his two sons to him. The request for an alliance seems to have come first from Mahmud himself, not from Orlov. The Czar stated 'on his honour' that the Turkish courier asking for an alliance crossed Orlov on his way to Constantinople. But the idea could have been due to Orlov's indirect influence. It is needless to seek for subtleties with a passionate yet resolute man like Mahmud. He suspected France of helping Ibrahim, and resented England's refusal of naval aid. The Czar had acted promptly as a generous patron and friend, and Mahmud could not be blamed for thinking him the only person on whose help or alliance he could rely.

The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed on July 8, 1833. Its terms were as follows. Eternal peace and alliance were to exist in future between Russia and Turkey. The mutual defence of each other's dominions was to be arranged and aid given by each to the other in case of aggression from without. The Treaty of Adrianople and all the arrangements relating to Greece were confirmed. Russia agreed to maintain the independence of Turkey should the Porte call on her again for naval and military aid (against Mehemet Ali). The Treaty was to last for eight years. By a secret article Russia declared that in case of war she would not ask Turkey for armed aid. She would only require that Turkey should close the Dardanelles to armed vessels, that is to say, 'not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein on any pretext whatever.\*' This article contained in itself the quintessence of danger for the future.

The secret article was merely an affirmation of the old rule of closing the Straits to armed vessels, reiterated in Article XI of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1809. It could only be legitimately said to be directed against England and France if Turkey opened the Bosphorus to Russia and closed the Dardanelles to all warships except Russian ones. A British fleet entering the Black Sea would have been incomparably more powerful than the Russian. It could have provoked or sustained revolt in Circassia, and destroyed the trade and the warships of Russia. Turkey was therefore conferring

\* No stipulation about closing the Bosphorus! *vide infra*, n. 109.

substantial benefits on Russia by closing the Dardanelles to the warships of all nations. But this provision was an old one against which England could not easily protest. It only became dangerous if Turkey admitted Russian ships into the Bosphorus. In such case Constantinople was open to Russian warships while the Dardanelles were closed to all others. It seems to follow from the very fact of an alliance that the Bosphorus was so open. 'The Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and the Russian troops in the Crimea, are within a few days' sail of the Bosphorus, and may at any time return thither, before the British Squadron could arrive to prevent them, let it be stationed where it may, if not actually within the Dardanelles.'<sup>107</sup> Even Palmerston, however, admitted that 'Russia would not risk the consequences which would follow a reoccupation of the Bosphorus without an invitation from the Sultan.' It seems, therefore, that Palmerston himself did not believe that Unkiar Skelessi specifically granted Russia new rights. He feared, however, that such rights might be matter of understanding.

While there were no specific articles to that effect, there might have been secret arrangements to admit Russian warships not only to the Bosphorus, but also to allow them to pass to the Mediterranean. In that case there would have been a double violation of old treaty rights by Turkey, for Russia would not only have been allowed access for her warships to Constantinople, but would have been enabled to pass the Dardanelles from the north (*i.e.* enter the Mediterranean) while France and England were prevented from entering them from the south. There is some evidence at least that this interpretation was believed both by the British and French governments. Nesselrode formally denied any such suggestion. He told Sir Frederic Lamb in 1838, 'the Treaty did not secure to Russia a right to pass her fleet through the Dardanelles.'<sup>108</sup> The Turks always denied this interpretation, though they characteristically gave grounds for suspicion by re-fortifying the Dardanelles while allowing their fortresses to moulder on the Bosphorus. But this interpretation was denied not only by the Russian government but, more important, by Metternich.<sup>109</sup> Now Metternich's testimony was less suspect than the Russian.

Palmerston was in too much of a hurry nicely to weigh these matters. He desired to prevent the ratification of the Treaty. He could avert all fear of an alliance between Russia and France by supporting the latter. In August 1833 he therefore joined France in a strong remonstrance against Unkiar Skelessi. They jointly attempted to prevent the

ratification of the Treaty. They declared that the Treaty produced a change in the relations of Turkey and Russia. Other 'Powers were entitled to object,' if it resulted in 'the armed interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey.' France and England would act as if the Treaty were not in existence. Russia replied roundly that the Treaty was between two independent powers, was purely defensive, and concerned no one else. The demands to Turkey that she should refuse to ratify the Treaty produced no effect. Ratifications were duly exchanged and even extreme pressure failed to obtain a promise from Turkey to abrogate the Treaty in any particular. Russia had again scored.

Though Palmerston suspected secret articles about the Straits, his real opposition to Unkiar Skelessi was on larger grounds. He believed that the whole agreement had been drawn up in St. Petersburg before Orlov went on his mission, and his belief was entirely unchanged by denials from him, from Nesselrode, and even from the Czar 'on his honour.' He thought that the Treaty was dictated and designed by Russia for the destruction of Turkey. 'Russia then will become the acknowledged umpire between the Sultan and his subjects, will exercise a kind of protectorate over the Turkish empire; and the Sultan will be bound to adopt the quarrels of Russia.'<sup>110</sup> It was not the specific provisions or even a suspected secret understanding, it was the underlying conception to which he was opposed. He interpreted it as an instrument making Turkey the vassal and slave of Russia, giving the Czar the power of destroying or partitioning her at his imperial pleasure. The friendship of Russia was more dangerous than the enmity of Mehemet Ali. Indeed Palmerston admitted that he would rather see the Egyptian pasha at Constantinople than the Russian Czar. When this avowal came to Russian ears, Palmerston explained it away. Yet it was true and characteristic of his realism. If there was to be a military despot in command of the strongest military and naval position in the world, Palmerston preferred one who could be coerced to one who could not. Russia at Constantinople was impregnable, the Dardanelles could not be forced and she could not be attacked in the Baltic. Mehemet Ali if at Constantinople could be attacked in flank in Syria and blockaded at Alexandria. If there was to be an enemy at Constantinople Palmerston preferred a vulnerable one.

The strength of Palmerston's feelings on the subject of Constantinople is not often recognised, even though he avowed them in public. 'If Russian conquest should lead to the



Christianising and civilising of the inhabitants of that country [Turkey], these advantages, and no one can estimate them higher, would be counter-balanced by the consequences that would result to Europe from the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. I say then that undoubtedly [the British] Government would feel it to be their duty to resist to the utmost any attempt on the part of Russia to partition the Turkish Empire; and, if it had been necessary, we should equally have felt it our duty to interfere and prevent the pasha of Egypt from dismembering any portion of the dominions of the Sultan. The integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire are necessary to the maintenance of the tranquillity, the liberty, and the balance of power in the rest of Europe.' Here we have not only an announced resolve to defend Constantinople, but to prevent Russia from annexing any territory. Not only that, but in the interest of the British Empire the Christianising or civilising of the Turks by Russia may have to be prevented. The importance of this speech is even greater than it appears, for it was made on July 11, 1833, three days after Unkiar Skelessi had been actually signed, but before Palmerston knew anything of its contents. So it was not the mere terms of Unkiar Skelessi which inspired Palmerston, but his interpretation of Russia's whole policy. If Palmerston's interpretation of Unkiar Skelessi were right, his anti-Russian policy can be defended even though it led (as it did at long last) to the Crimean war. England could not allow Turkey to be destroyed. If Russia were bent on her destruction, then, as Captain Smollett said, 'It's got to come to blows, sooner or later.' That was Palmerston's point of view. It is a very British one, but it must not be blindly accepted by historians. Russia was sincere not only in protecting Mahmud against Mehemet Ali, she was sincere in restraining the Sultan from attacking the pasha. When Mahmud rashly proposed to attack the Egyptian in 1834 and invoked the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, Russia refused him all countenance or aid. She declared the Treaty was strictly defensive. When war actually broke out in 1839 Russia's conduct was disinterested on Palmerston's own confession. And in that case England was separated from France, making Russia's temptation greater. So the policy of the 'countercheck quarrelsome' may have been a mistake. To act along with Russia in order to restrain her, as Canning did, might have been wise. It might have been attempted before Unkiar Skelessi, since it was actually practised after it.

Unkiar Skelessi is a true turning-point in the attitude of



English statesmen towards Russia. It bred in Palmerston a fatal hostility to Russia, and converted even Whigs to the Tory policy of bolstering up Turkey. The conversion of Stratford Canning had preceded that of Palmerston, and the anti-Russian feeling of these two men was one profound cause of the Crimean War. Yet both had been much under the influence of George Canning, whose legacy was co-operation and friendship with Russia over the Eastern question. Stratford, it is true, was more deeply committed to the Turks than Palmerston; he may have had personal animus against the Czar. He had also wished to accept the Turkish alliance and send the fleet to Constantinople in 1832. But Palmerston had refused to do this, and only became hostile to Russia when her fleet and army reached the Bosphorus. Princess Lieven favoured his appointment as Foreign Secretary because of his friendliness to Russia. He agreed with her policy in respect to Greece; over Poland he was more anxious than any other to deal tenderly with Russia. But his difficulties began when Russia differed from him over Belgium. Palmerston always seems to have tried to prevent an anti-British alliance between Russia and France. He held that he must always act with one and generally against the other. Their union over the Eastern question would have been fatal. If France wanted Egypt, and Russia Constantinople, they might get both by agreement. If England acted with one she could always checkmate the other. Friendship with France meant hostility to Russia and *vice-versa*. Now in 1832 French and British diplomacy were united over Belgium. A French army and a British fleet coerced Antwerp while Russia looked on frowning. So Belgium marked the end of Palmerston's pro-Russian feeling. When Mahmud asked for help, France was more ready to give it than England and as anxious to prevent Russia from entering the Bosphorus or Mediterranean. It is easy, therefore, to understand why Palmerston decided to act with France. But he might have done all this from cold motives of calculation. In fact he acted from a very recent but intense hatred and suspicion of Russia which profoundly influenced the policy of England and of Europe for a generation.

## X

*Mischief, thou art afoot.*—JULIUS CAESAR.

As the year 1834 advanced Palmerston's forebodings became gloomier still. He found all sorts of discrepancies

between the Turkish and Russian versions of the Treaty. He was much preoccupied with a new Turco-Russian Convention of January 29, 1834. The rectification of the Georgian frontier 'would open a free passage for Russian troops in the direction of Bagdad.' This was true, but he saw 'traps and mines' everywhere else. He spoke of the 'general desire we know to exist in the Russian Government to establish a predominant influence in Greece, for the purpose of directing the external relations of Greece in such a manner as to make the policy of that country subservient to Russian objects and for the purpose of preventing such a system of management in the internal administration of Greece, as might prevent any free or liberal institutions in that country, and might assimilate its organization as nearly as possible to that of a despotic country.' When Lord William Russell reported the Russian view that Russia was weak because of her size and desired no further annexations, he poured scorn on the doctrine that the 'means which any empire has had of committing aggressions have been lessened in proportion as its revenue has been increased and its army and navy augmented.' And to Vienna he wrote that Russia should be regarded 'as a power strong enough to be formidable but not too strong to be resisted, still more ambitious than strong and not less wily than ambitious, profiting by the weak compliances of its allies to strengthen itself daily at their expense and to their future detriment.' It would be 'very advantageous to the peace of Europe if the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin were to open their eyes to the real state of things.' <sup>111</sup>

If Palmerston in Downing Street was distrustful of Russia, Lord Ponsonby at Constantinople was still more so. Lord Melbourne, whose cynicism made him view things more coolly than either, spoke of his 'ridiculous Russophobia which leads him to shut his eyes to everything else.' <sup>112</sup> Ponsonby was indeed incorrigible. On arriving at Constantinople he had seen the Russian fleet at anchor in the Bosphorus from the windows of his palace at Bujukdere. For three months he watched it, expecting every hour to hear its guns firing. This impression never left Ponsonby and explains his endless tirades. 'I have always treated as wholly erroneous the belief entertained by some that Russia could act with what people call moderation in these matters or cease for one moment to aim at the subjugation of Turkey.' <sup>113</sup> He even went so far as to suggest that 'it will be necessary to have British ships of War in the Euxine to protect British Trade,' to 'decide the great question of Circassian Independence in our

favour and put an end to the chances of Russian success against it.' <sup>114</sup> In other words Ponsonby proposed a measure which was actually one of war against Russia, *i.e.* that of sending British ships into the Black Sea and aiding the Circassians against her. Yet no one had protested more than Ponsonby himself against Russia's alleged design of sending warships into the Mediterranean. It is only fair to say that Palmerston seems to have lent no countenance to the dangerous suggestion of his ambassador. But there were none the less times at which he vied with him in extravagance. Thus Ponsonby in 1834: 'You [Turkey] may again have recourse to Russia,' if 'beaten by Mehemet Ali.' A year later Palmerston spoke of Mahmud's plans to attack Mehemet Ali as 'rash and fatal designs' probably inspired 'by the insidious policy of Russia, . . . the only party who could be sure to gain by a present rupture between the Sultan and the Pasha, and who so likely therefore as Russia to stimulate the Porte to a rupture?' <sup>115</sup> All this was a misunderstanding of Russia, who had tried to check Mahmud and had no desire to provoke Mehemet Ali. But it was a dangerous misunderstanding and led directly to the famous 'discretionary order.'

On March 10, 1834, Palmerston addressed an instruction to Ponsonby approved by the King, inclosing a secret admiralty order of January 31 to Sir James Rowley, commanding the Mediterranean squadron. This 'discretionary order' authorised him to comply with any request of the 'Turkish government, conveyed through Ponsonby,' <sup>116</sup> 'against any threatened attack of the Russians.' The only restriction was on the admiral himself, 'provided that, in a naval point of view, he should consider his force adequate to the emergency.' The French government had given similar instructions to their admiral, but Ponsonby was not to inform the French ambassador at Constantinople of his own orders or to concert measures with him. Ponsonby at Constantinople held in his hand the power of calling up England's 'winged ministers of vengeance.' Thus a man of extreme views, more anti-Russian than Palmerston himself, could involve England and Russia in war without reference to Downing Street. A decree, issued on the ambassador's responsibility from his palace on the Bosphorus, might set all Europe aflame.

Fortunately a cool and calm intellect now diagnosed and allayed this inflamed condition. Late in 1834 the King turned out the Whigs and, in the absence of Peel, installed the Duke of Wellington as the Secretary of State for all departments. He surveyed the field of foreign policy as well as all others.

He discovered the famous 'discretionary order,' brought it before cabinet and King, pointed out its implications, and got it cancelled. He wrote to Ponsonby in his own hand dryly, 'I have received His Majesty's commands to inform Your Excellency that it does not appear to His Majesty that affairs in the Levant are at this period in such a state as to require that the discretion should be vested in the Ambassador at the Porte and the responsibility reposed upon that officer of placing this country in a state of war with Russia.'<sup>117</sup> Ponsonby received this 'fatal despatch' with dismay, thought of resigning, but decided to wait until Palmerston returned to power. When he did return, however, Palmerston was refreshed and cooled by this shower of cold reason and common-sense and did not at once renew the old order. It was not until May 1836 that he cancelled the 'fatal despatch' and delighted Ponsonby with a new 'discretionary order.' But this time there was more true discretion, and he warned his ardent lieutenant that there was no immediate danger. In the autumn of 1838 when Ponsonby suggested it was 'dangerous to delay ordering the fleet up,' he was promptly rebuked. Next year when Mahmud declared war on Mehemet Ali, Palmerston renewed the power to Ponsonby, but again warned him to be sparing of using it. As a further safeguard he directed him to act in concert with the French Ambassador.

Palmerston, at least, had recovered his balance by 1836, but British public opinion had not. Even without his stimulation, it would have become violently anti-Russian. Palmerston had deliberately set the mischief afoot. He got the King to announce in his speech in August 1833 that 'my attention will be carefully directed to the preservation of the Turkish Empire.' The King enjoyed his task and 'spoke the passage about Turkey with emphasis and looked round at Lieven (the Russian ambassador) to see how he took it.'<sup>118</sup> William IV had further reason for gratification in February 1834, for he made a still more ominous utterance in a new speech. 'The peace of Turkey since the settlement made with Mehemet Ali has been not interrupted ; and will not, I trust, be threatened with any new danger. It will be my object to prevent any change in the relations of that Empire with other Powers, which might affect its stability and independence' (February 4, 1834). The strength of this statement and its introduction into the King's mouth produced a mild remonstrance from Peel. Palmerston declared it was 'of the utmost importance.' In private he wrote, 'with Russia we are just as we were, snarling at each other, hating each other, but neither wishing for war'



(April 21, 1834). But the hounds of public opinion were unleashed and an anti-Russian propaganda had begun. During 1835, when Peel and Wellington temporarily held office, it was quiet, but next year the hunt began again.

The parliamentary hounds bayed loudly in February 1836. Stratford Canning, then in opposition, welcomed the proposal that 'the balance of power' should be declared to be the maintenance of Turkish integrity, described the Turkish army as ruined and advocated (incidentally) the checking of Russian ambition. One speaker, anticipating Disraeli, spoke of the enormous empire striving to force an entry into the North Sea at the Sound, and into the Mediterranean at the Dardanelles. Another alluded to her insidious designs in Moldavia and Wallachia. A third stressed the increase and importance of British trade with Turkey. Sir Edward Codrington, who had destroyed the Turkish sea-power at Navarino, boldly suggested that we should offer our fleet to Turkey as a support against Russia. Palmerston, while deprecating these extremer flights of the imagination, left no doubt as to his condemnation of Unkiar Skelessi. The debate went far beyond the walls of parliament, for it impressed merchants, journalists and the public. The strange, brilliant and restless David Urquhart, by books, pamphlets, speeches and propaganda, spread the doctrine that Russia was an able, treacherous, corrupt, ambitious, and extraordinarily dangerous power. He did not find universal acceptance, for the soberer and more instructed journals did not acquiesce in the panic. But the British public, which likes a sensation and a villain, determined that Russia was the wolf, and Turkey the lamb, of the diplomatic fable. The materials for a war were thus ready-made in public opinion, and henceforth England depended on the discretion of her statesmen to avert it.<sup>110</sup>

## XI

*Metternich is delighted with the Russian Treaty . . . He is easily pleased.*  
PALMERSTON, September 3, 1833.

One statesman of unique experience had judged Unkiar Skelessi with a detachment to which Palmerston could not pretend. Austria and Metternich (for the two were still the same) had strong reasons for distrusting Russia. Though a careful student of the Eastern question, Metternich had stood aside from every crisis between Navarino and Unkiar Skelessi. France and England had used force against Turkey, Russia



had gone to war, Metternich had done neither. Yet he was prepared to use force elsewhere to support conservatism and his motive was not timidity as such. But his two main interests were the support of conservatism in Germany and in Austrian Italy. As Turkey only came third in his list of preferences, he was the less inclined to use force there. But as a matter of fact he was the first to suggest the use of force against Mehemet Ali, and recommended France and England to send naval squadrons to the Levant so early as the autumn of 1832.\* This suggestion, though refused, might have averted disaster.

Metternich had undoubtedly some knowledge of the new Russian policy of 1829, for the Czar Nicholas had outlined it to the Austrian ambassador in February 1833. Yet in this crisis Metternich sought to unite France and England, Prussia, Austria and Russia in a Five-Power Pact to restrain Mehemet Ali, and it was not his fault that he failed again. Perhaps for this very reason he fell a little out of touch with the events leading to Unkiar Skelessi. But he knew of them earlier than anyone else and was still quite ready to make things easy for Russia. She would need his support for conservatism in Europe, and he was prepared to agree with her about maintaining it in Turkey. He could not therefore condemn Unkiar Skelessi. When it was revealed that Prussian Crown Prince, Russian Czar and Austrian Emperor were to meet at München-grätz, Palmerston suspected that it was to discuss the partition of Turkey. He was again mistaken, for Metternich went there with the intention of conserving Turkey's integrity and in the belief that Russia was ready to agree with him.

It was the first time Czar Nicholas had met Metternich, and he sent his wife an account of it. Metternich said he thought there would be war, Nicholas said he was sure there would not. Metternich said, 'Sire, I beg you not to think I will finesse with you.' The Czar answered simply, 'Prince, I know you.'<sup>120</sup> If so, he knew more than most men. Metternich struck an old note. He told Nicholas how important it was for military despots to act together and uphold conservative principles; Austria, Russia and Prussia were bulwarks against revolution. France and England were governed by liberals like Palmerston, whose subversive designs must be resisted. Russia and Austria upheld conservatism in Europe generally and ought to uphold it in Turkey. Nicholas listened and was convinced, and passed on his convictions to his minister.

\* F.O. 7/241. From Lamb, No. 54 of April 13, 1833. The Five-Power Pact tended in fact to become a Four-Power one, as Prussia was not greatly interested in Turkey.

The Czar, having settled the outlines, amused himself by shooting, playing billiards and holding parades with Kaiser Franz. Nesselrode and Orlov settled the details in a Convention signed on September 18, 1833. The preamble stated that Russia and Austria adopted the principle of union between them, which had already guarded Turkey against Egypt. It was to be 'a fundamental rule of their future conduct in the East.' In Articles I and II they engaged mutually to preserve the existing dynasty of Turkey, and to oppose any combination likely to change it or substitute a regency. These articles were published. The first secret article stated that their intention was to oppose Mehemet Ali and prevent him from acquiring direct or indirect authority in any part of European Turkey. The second stated that, should the Turkish Empire break up, the two signatory powers would maintain their union and would act in concert in establishing a new order of things and preserving the balance of power in Europe. It seems plain that the whole aim of the agreement was to produce an Austro-Russian Union in order to protect Turkey against Mehemet Ali and maintain the *status quo*. Anything less like a partition scheme than this it is hard to imagine.<sup>121</sup> It was impossible not to discuss the contingency of a possible break-up of the ramshackle Turkish structure. But Russia deliberately tied her hands in such case, promising to take no steps without preliminary agreement with Austria. Metternich seems to have been satisfied that Russia's designs against Turkey were not subversive and that she would take no new departure in her Eastern policy without Austrian concurrence. He had not been fully informed before the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed, but he was at least fully protected against any unpleasant results from its execution.

Metternich was, however, too old a statesman to trust wholly to the pledges of a single power and a single man. Despite his protests, he could not avoid attempting a 'finesse' even if he had tried. He perfectly understood that Nicholas had made concessions to Austria in order to detach her from England and France. But this was not, in Metternich's view, the way to keep the peace. The best way was for Metternich to act as the umpire and balance the two opposing forces. He meant to use Russia to keep the Anglo-French *entente* from entering the Dardanelles. He meant the Anglo-French *entente* to keep Russia from infringing Turkey's integrity, from shutting to Austrian commerce that 'German river' the Danube, or from acquiring too much influence on the other side of the Hungarian border, in Moldavia and Wallachia.

He therefore began cautious overtures to win over England to his plans. He sent a statement for communication to Palmerston that Austria 'in the year 1833 guaranteed in the face of Europe the conformity of the views of Russia as to the preservation of Turkey with her own.' \* He suggested a Four-Power Pact to keep the peace. Palmerston was amazed, plainly suspected a trick, and sent a cold reply.<sup>122</sup> He complained that the chief danger was 'in the ambition . . . of Russia. Her Majesty's Government believe that the annexation of large and important portions of the Turkish dominions to the Russian Empire would be greatly conducive to the commercial prosperity, to the military strength and to the political power of Russia . . . the active policy of the Russian Government has . . . for years been directed systematically, perseveringly and with no small degree of success to the accomplishment of this annexation.'<sup>123</sup>

Metternich persisted in his proposals in spite of this diatribe. He even suggested, what all Austrian statesmen have always feared to suggest, that Austria might help England in Asia. 'I should regard a Russian encroachment upon the Turkish provinces which approach your Indian possessions as involving the interests of Austria as much as I hope that England would consider an encroachment upon the Turkish provinces bordering upon the Austrian dominions (*i.e.* Moldavia and Wallachia) to involve her own.'<sup>124</sup> Palmerston was prepared to defend Constantinople, but not to help Austria on the Danube, and does not seem to have believed that Austria could help him effectively either on the Bosphorus or in Afghanistan. In the end Metternich had to admit that he had 'in fact' made 'no overture,' that the time was not ripe for making one, and that he was only exploring the ground.

Even after this rebuff Metternich did not lose heart. He turned to Russia again and tried to get her permission to reveal the Convention of Münchengrätz. This was obviously a method of getting Russia to support a further overture to England and to France. Russia refused on the grounds of England's hostility to her, and Metternich's plan had failed. Yet his Four-Power Pact was a statesmanlike idea. It was a kind of 're-insurance' policy, which aimed at mediating between the Anglo-French *bloc* and Russia, and at remaining friendly with both. In the same way Bismarck balanced between Austria-Hungary and Russia in later days. Palmerston ultimately made very much the same proposals

\* F.O. 7/251. Metternich to M. Hummelauer, July 7, 1834, communicated July 29.

himself and got Europe to accept them. But of course Metternich would have been the umpire had the first overture materialised, whereas Palmerston became it when the second did. Yet Metternich, if seconded in his arbitration aims in 1834, might have averted the dangers which threatened Europe five years later.

## XII

*I will no treaties  
With a league-breaker and a rebel ; shall I  
Article with a traitor ?*

BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER, *The Queen of Corinth*, Act IV, Sc. 2.

Had Europe had the ordering of Mahmud's policy, Turkey would have remained at peace. But Mahmud's savage hatred of his Egyptian vassal, his ambition to regain the provinces wrested from him, still remained. Even in 1833 Palmerston had to use pressure to restrain Mahmud from attacking Ibrahim in Syria. Russia had held him back in 1834, France and England again in the next year. Unrest grew in Syria. The conscripts of Asia Minor were not the equal of Ibrahim's old Egyptians, and his brutal methods provoked discontented murmurs and actual rebellion. All acted as inducements to the Sultan to renew the contest. Mahmud's thirst for vengeance grew. In 1836 he sent a secret agent to London. He hoped to make an ally of England and thus be enabled to attack Mehemet Ali once more.<sup>125</sup> Again in 1838 he made unexpected concessions over the commercial treaty, probably in the hope of obtaining England's help against Mehemet Ali. He was specially delighted when Palmerston, in reply to a rumour of Egyptian invasion of Turkey, formally stated, 'The [Egyptian] Pasha must expect to find Great Britain taking part with the Sultan in order to obtain redress for so flagrant a wrong done to the Sultan, and for the purpose of preventing the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.'<sup>126</sup> He seems to have gone on hoping England would support him, and sent Reschid to London at the end of 1838 to secure an alliance. When that hope failed he took his own line. Early in February 1839 Ponsonby reported that war between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali was certain ; though (characteristically) Mahmud's ministers did not know that it had been determined on. In April the alliance with England was rejected because England insisted on making it defensive. By May war had become inevitable, for the Turkish troops had crossed the Euphrates

near Bir, and Ibrahim was not the man to wait to be attacked. By the end of June Mahmud was dead, choked, one might say, in his passion of hatred for Mehemet Ali.

Mahmud thus unloosed the furies. In his view a rebel pasha and a lost province were a perpetual danger inviting and almost compelling all the subjects of the Padishah to revolt. The danger to his mind was always internal rather than external. This is a common oriental view and one which a despot generally takes. A foreigner who helped Mahmud against an internal foe was certainly a friend and possibly an ally. It was a dangerous game to play, but he had no other resource at the time of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. By the end of his reign, when he launched his defiance against Mehemet Ali, his vassalage to Russia was but nominal. For he believed that France and England would send their fleets to Constantinople if he asked for them. His error here was not over external policy, but in believing that he could beat Egyptian troops. No one will claim for Mahmud that he accomplished in foreign policy what he did in internal reform. But his ideas were more intelligible and consistent than an external observer might suppose, and carefully adapted to his peculiar position. At least he had known how to preserve the integrity and independence of his empire amid great perils. Still greater ones were awaiting it when he died.





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# BOOK II

## MEHEMET ALI

### PROLOGUE

#### STATING THE PROBLEM

*Sua cuique cum sit animi cogitatio,  
Colorque prius.*

Each man's fancy is his own, and likewise his way of colouring the piece.

PLAUTUS, *Prolog.* V.

THE character of Mehemet Ali, the system he built up, his triumph and his failure, are equally fascinating. But the theme is too vast for a sketch concerned with the Turkish Empire and with England.

There are few more fascinating pages in diplomatic history than the story of how Palmerston defied Soult, Thiers, Guizot and brought the British cabinet to agree with him. There are few more dramatic episodes in the history of parliaments and of public opinion than the exchanges between London and Paris during these years. Almost equally interesting and important is the history of Brunnow's two missions from St. Petersburg and of the way in which Russia was induced to co-operate with England and with Austria. But to narrate this would be to tell the history of the relations of the Western Powers or of diplomacy in general, and to divert attention from the two centres of Alexandria and Constantinople.

The section opens with a survey of the reasons which decided Palmerston to fight Mehemet Ali, and shows how the defence of India was one of them, and how decision was influenced by the advance of Russia towards Bagdad and by Mehemet Ali's threat to the Red Sea. The personality of Mehemet Ali and the victory of Ibrahim at Nezib and the surrender of the Turkish fleet are then described at length. But the impression made by these events on the relations of England and France is very briefly sketched. The agreement of the Five Powers at Constantinople (July 27, 1839) is fully

narrated, for that directly touched Turkey. The resultant efforts at Paris, Vienna and London are almost wholly omitted. The two missions of the Russian Brunnov to England, the special mission of the Austrian Neumann, and the differences with France, are all passed by.

The decision of the British cabinet confirmed by Austria, Russia and Prussia in the Convention of July 15, 1840, is indeed related. But a hint only is given of the explosion of wrath at Paris because France was left out of the Convention. The narrative turns away from there to the naval and military events which caused the defeat of Mehemet Ali. We see Napier triumphant on the heights of Ardali, Stopford victorious at Acre, Ibrahim in retreat at Gaza, Mehemet Ali in humiliation at Cairo. The Straits Convention of July 1841 is, however, treated at some length as it involves not only the fate of Mehemet Ali but the future of Turkey. That and not the quarrels of the Great Powers is the theme.



## CHAPTER III\*

### THE YEAR OF VICTORY, 1839

#### I

*There is neither East nor West, border, nor breed, nor birth,  
When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth.*

KIPLING.

THE years of Ottoman history between 1838 and 1841 are unique. They witnessed the last attempt of the East against Europe, the last oriental effort to found a power on the shores of the Mediterranean which should be independent of the West. Mehemet Ali sought an empire in Egypt, his war-like son dreamed of one on the Golden Horn. What they dreamed they could have accomplished if unhindered by Europe. They threatened the Turk in the heart of his empire. But they lost as much by their strength as Turkey gained by her weakness. For that weakness brought a strong man to her aid. It is true that the strong man was in some senses a wrong man, and constitutionally incapable of understanding Mehemet Ali. Like a true Victorian Palmerston believed in constitutions, private property, free trade, volunteer armies and free men. Mehemet Ali believed in despotism, monopolies, protection, conscripts and slaves. He also believed in promoting education, sanitation, manufactures, and equality between Christian and Turk. Palmerston, who advocated such reforms in Turkey, deprecated and even obstructed them in Syria. He could see no good in the Viceroy of Egypt. 'For my own part I hate Mehemet Ali, whom I consider as nothing but an ignorant barbarian, who by cunning and boldness and mother-wit, has been successful in rebellion; . . . I look upon his boasted civilization of Egypt as the arrantest humbug; and I believe that he is as great a tyrant and oppressor as ever made a people wretched.'<sup>127</sup>

But what mattered were the might, rather than the rights, of the affair. Palmerston showed his view clearly and cynically. 'Coercion of Mehemet Ali by England, if war broke out might appear partial and unjust; but we are partial;

\* For some bibliographical notes on chs. iii and iv *vide* notes, pp. 415-8.

and the great interests of Europe require that we should be so. 'The maintenance of the Turkish Empire ought to be the basis of our policy ; for its maintenance is essential for the preservation of peace, and for the upholding of the independence of Eastern Europe. A partition of Turkey would be fatal to the independence of Austria and Prussia, when it was accomplished, and it could not be accomplished without a general war. No ideas therefore of fairness towards Mehemet ought to stand in the way of such great and paramount interests.' <sup>128</sup> Mehemet Ali had to be fought to avoid a larger war, independently of whether he or the Sultan was the aggressor.

A duel between Palmerston and Mehemet Ali thus ensued. The barbarian of genius used force and fraud alike and struggled with the energy of despair. The western statesman, cool, wary, resourceful, overawed his divided colleagues, cajoled a timorous Europe, and resolutely pressed onwards to his goal. The climax was long delayed, but in the end he defeated the ablest Eastern general and the ablest Eastern ruler who had yet menaced the Turkish Empire.

Palmerston can never have expected a long peace between Mehemet Ali and Mahmud. 'It seems to the British Government,' he wrote on the outbreak of the conflict, 'that there can be no security for permanent peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, as long as they have both of them an army in Syria ; for neither of them can look upon their present state of occupation as permanently satisfactory. Mehemet Ali has too much, not to wish for more ; and the Sultan has lost too much, to be able to sit down contented with his loss. Each party must therefore consider his present position in Syria as a starting point for an attempt to accomplish the object of his desire ; the one for further encroachment on the Turkish Provinces ; the other for the reconquest of Syria. The two parties might indeed be invited to reduce their respective forces to a Peace establishment ; but no confidence could be placed in such an arrangement, even if for the moment agreed to. Mehemet Ali could not maintain his authority in Syria without a considerable force, and the Sultan would necessarily be obliged to have an equal force at Diarbekir and its neighbourhood. Each party would suspect the other of secretly augmenting his force ; and probably their mutual suspicions would be equally well founded. In a short time the two armies would again be in presence of each other ; and the work of pacification would have to be done over again.' <sup>129</sup>

Nothing could be happier than this illustration. The Sultan and the Pasha were like two robber barons with castles on opposite banks of a stream, in the middle ages. One robber had provoked the other to deadly wrath by filching a piece of territory and threatening his title. Neither baron felt safe for the future, and so each kept fortifying his castle and increasing his gang of rufflers. Sooner or later one man would bite his thumb at the other and a collision would ensue.

In 1838 all the signs indicated that the Sultan and his vassal would soon be at war. Mahmud was burning to avenge his defeat on his rebellious pasha. Mehemet Ali, though seventy years old, was as bold and as able as in the days when he destroyed the mamelukes. He did not fear a new contest with the Sultan as long as it was with the Sultan alone. But it is a sign of his extreme intelligence that he held British power in wholesome respect, though he had once expelled a British army from Egypt. 'The hostility of the British Government paralyses all my efforts . . . with the English for my friends, I can do everything ; without their friendship I can do nothing . . . wherever I turn she is there to baffle me . . . if England be only with me, let all the world be against me.'<sup>130</sup> This was in 1830, and England took no decisive step in 1833. But in 1839 Mehemet Ali forgot his caution and England turned against him.

The key to the situation really lay in British sea-power. Wellington understood its possibilities as well as anybody and expressed his view to Esterházy, the Austrian minister. 'As a soldier the Duke does not think that Ibrahim can march forward seeing that the English squadron will interrupt his communications by sea with Egypt. . . . He has said to me "The operation of the French army in Syria under Buonaparte failed since he did not command the sea. No army can march forward into the heart of Asia Minor when its sea communications are interrupted."'<sup>131</sup> Palmerston had thought out a plan long before he knew Wellington's views. British consuls reported that Mehemet Ali had an abundance of Egyptian commercial ships, which could be stopped or seized by England at will. Palmerston sent out the Pole, General Chrzanovski, to study the military question in Asia Minor. He also made use of the Hanoverian general Jochmus, who afterwards distinguished himself in 1840. He demanded all sorts of reports on Ibrahim's government in Syria, and was delighted to learn that it was unpopular. The 'Mountain' of Lebanon was disaffected, the Maronites retained their arms, and in case of war some fifteen thousand men could and would

revolt. These rebels would sally down from the mountains and cut the coastal communications of Ibrahim's army, if reinforced by a Turkish expedition from the sea. Palmerston saw here a means of paralysing and neutralising an Egyptian attack. 'The Turks will probably act as is here mentioned as the best mode of action. I know they had such a plan.' <sup>132</sup> So ran Palmerston's minute. He was quite clear that Mehemet Ali could be compelled to relinquish his attack on Asia Minor, if a Lebanon revolt were supported by British, or perhaps even by Turkish, sea-power.

In May 1838 Mehemet Ali formally announced his intention of becoming independent of the Sultan. Various attempts at rebuke or remonstrance failed, and finally Palmerston despatched this solemn warning to him: 'The British Government, however, speaks only for itself; but feels itself bound, in return for the frank and unreserved communication which it has received from the Pasha, to declare to him, in a manner equally unreserved and explicit, that, if he should unfortunately proceed to execute his announced intentions; and if hostilities should (as they indisputably would) break out thereupon between the Sultan and the Pasha [Mehemet Ali], the Pasha must expect to find Great Britain taking part with the Sultan in order to obtain redress for so flagrant a wrong done to the Sultan, and for the purpose of preventing the Dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; and the Pasha would fatally deceive himself if he were to suppose that any jealousies among the Powers of Europe would prevent those Powers from affording to the Sultan, under such circumstances, every assistance which might be necessary for the purpose of upholding, enforcing, and vindicating his just and legitimate rights.' <sup>133</sup> So the lion roared under Palmerston.

## II

*Beware the embrace of Adam-za, the Bear that walks like a Man.*

KIPLING.

Palmerston recognised that the Russian attack on Turkey would not be direct. It would be 'by sap and mine,' by detaching outlying provinces, not by assailing Constantinople. His most fixed idea was, as it had been during 1832-3, to prevent 'the avenues of Mesopotamia' from being given to Russia. Thus he took alarm immediately at a Russian hint 'that it is safer to let the Egyptian army go to the East than penetrate into Asia Minor.' Palmerston had long ago studied







‘ the military bearings of the geography of the Levant,’ apparently under the guidance of the Polish general Chrzanovski. Here was the result (July 8, 1839): ‘ Diarbekir, one of the places which Russia proposes to allow Mehemet Ali to occupy, is the central key of the whole of Asia Minor. You will see if you look at the map that an army posted, as that of the Sultan was, at Diarbekir, and extending itself to Malatia, is in a position to defend Constantinople against an attack from Syria over the Taurus ; to repel an invasion from Russia by Gumri, and to protect Bagdad by any movement from the Southern part of Syria. To take Diarbekir from the Sultan and to give it to Mehemet Ali would be to deprive the Sultan of all means of defence and to give to Mehemet Ali means of attack.’ <sup>134</sup>

Palmerston believed, and ultimately proved, that England had the casting vote if she chose to use it. Why did he cast it against Mehemet Ali? There is abundant evidence that the Egyptian Pasha tried to be conciliatory and dangled all sorts of offers in front of him. Egyptian cotton would supply England, in case she had a war with America. Egypt would be a useful ally against Russia. ‘ *The Porte is gone, and England must prepare to raise a force in Asia to meet the Russians : and where can she find it but with me and my son after me?* ’ (1830) <sup>135</sup> These crude arguments were probably sincere. Palmerston’s reasons for rejecting them were based on a careful study of two problems, England’s interest in the East, and the balance of power in the West. If the Turks were to be overthrown, Palmerston preferred to see Mehemet Ali, not Russia, at Constantinople. For he could ultimately coerce the Pasha, whereas he could not coerce the Czar. Then Turkey lay athwart the routes to India. She was weak and would be guided by England. But if Mehemet Ali lay astride those routes he might be strong and bold enough to ally with Russia. Then the two would unite on the Persian Gulf, and England’s hold on India be menaced. Palmerston had decided to uphold the Turk by the middle of 1838.

In Russia’s professions of disinterestedness Palmerston had no belief. She had always been ‘ intently engaged in the prosecution of those schemes of aggrandizement towards the South, which ever since the reign of Catherine have formed a prominent feature of Russian policy. . . . Notwithstanding these declarations, [of non-aggression] . . . the encroachments of Russia have continued to advance on all sides with a steady march, and with a well-directed aim.’ <sup>136</sup> It was no longer for Constantinople that he feared. He said the Cossack and the Sepoy were bound to meet sometime, and proposed they

should meet as far away from our Indian possessions as possible. So he looked northwards from the Persian Gulf. If the line of Russian advance was through Western Turkestan and Khiva, Palmerston could do little but encourage chiefs and tribes to resist, as he had encouraged Circassian tribes in the Caucasus. British sea-power influenced Turkestan not at all and the Caucasus very little. But Russian gold stimulated Persia to attack Afghanistan. The Persians had already had a measure of success and the Shah had besieged Herat (1837). A Russian agent advised as to the attack, and a British officer entered the fortress in disguise and directed the defence. The Russian government eventually disavowed and recalled its troublesome agents, but only after the Shah had proved unable to take the city. British suspicions of Russia were not eradicated by the middle of 1838 after Palmerston declared against Mehemet Ali. The Czar indeed disavowed his agents, but also said, 'The Shah was only seeking to recover what rightfully belonged to him.'<sup>137</sup> This imperial utterance was not likely to make Palmerston believe that Russia had no designs on India.

The great aim must be to prevent direct connexion between Russia and Mehemet Ali. They must not join forces in Iraq, in the land between the rivers. Russian advance might be down the Euphrates through the rich valleys to Basra or Mohammerah. That advance must be resisted at all costs, for it threatened the British flank in India. It was here that the danger of union between Mehemet Ali and Russia arose. Mehemet Ali held the province of Aleppo, abutting on Iraq from the west. He had actually made tentative efforts to approach the interior of Iraq, to add Orfa to Aleppo and to advance to Deir (1834-5). He had only desisted because Palmerston had sternly warned him against sapping the integrity of Iraq.

England had made up her mind to guard the Euphrates route. She could make a commercial advance up the valley from the Persian Gulf. Palmerston regarded the development of this route as the chief means of protecting the Turkish Empire from falling to pieces. When Chesney finally obtained permission to explore the route Palmerston commented, 'we should indeed have been surprised if a plan so advantageous in its intended results both to Great Britain and Turkey had been defeated by the submission of the Porte to the dictates of Russia.'<sup>138</sup> If British commerce sailed up the Euphrates it would find great commercial marts at Bagdad, the city of

Caliphs, and at Basra, the home of Sinbad the sailor. Ultimately they might be linked with a railway to Alexandretta. But, so long as Mehemet Ali was in Aleppo, that part of the route would depend on his good favour. Now, as Mehemet Ali had incurred suspicion by all kinds of secret attempts to hinder the developments in Iraq, Palmerston suspected his more public actions in the areas he directly controlled. Palmerston did not mean to expel him at once from provinces like Adana or Aleppo, but his possession of them was not to become permanent. 'It is undeniable that if Mehemet Ali were to die, or from any other circumstance whatever were to cease to be able to govern Syria, the Sultan would have to appoint some other pasha to administer that Province.'<sup>139</sup> So it was not to go to Ibrahim. When occasion arose Syria could revert to Turkey, and steam communication by rail and water would link England to India and Alexandretta to the Persian Gulf. Here was another argument for preferring Mahmud to Mehemet Ali.

A fresh route to India supplied a fresh argument. It was in fact the route of the future, though not the route of the present. Strangely enough the route from Suez to Bombay did not impress either Palmerston or the East India Company as vitally important for the future. They did not believe that a canal would one day pierce the isthmus. Since the early thirties the French had run steam services to Alexandria; the East India Company had run steam packets from Suez to Bombay. First letters, then goods, followed this latter route, till it began to challenge the route by the Cape. By 1837 the Suez route was fairly established.<sup>140</sup> Its importance, like that of the Euphrates service, was as yet commercial. It soon became strategic. Neither Red Sea nor Persian Gulf was properly buoyed or lighted; both swarmed with pirates. So problems of navigation soon involved those of policy, and the strategic importance of islands and ports became manifest. Basra, Bahrein, Perim, Aden, Muscat, Mocha, all attracted attention. Over none of these did the Turks exercise any sovereignty except in name. In the East boundaries are, and have always been, elastic until the West takes charge. Then boundaries are fixed and *de facto* control becomes the test of sovereignty. This control the East India Company was determined to exercise by preventing the local rulers from refusing facilities to British shipping. They pursued (without knowing it) the policy of Albuquerque, the famous Portuguese Viceroy at Goa. He had tried and failed to control the

navigation of Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The East India Company did not mean to fail. If its steamboats were interfered with, it intended to occupy the required strategic posts. The local rulers might continue to reign, but they would not continue to molest British shipping.

Mehemet Ali had established a power on both sides of the Red Sea and therefore had an active interest in all these questions. He had reconquered from the Wahhabis the cities of Mecca and Medina, and had attempted to control some of the adjoining ports. His troops hovered in the hinterland of areas like Yemen and of ports like Mocha and Aden and tended to force their way to the sea. His ingenious mind formed the idea of an Egyptian navy. Mehemet Ali's aggressive advance towards Iraq combined with these possibly innocent movements in Arabia to awaken the jealousy and suspicion of England. In the end the plundering and ill-treatment of an Indian armed vessel in 1837 settled the matter. It made the East India Company resolve to seize and control the port of Aden. At the moment the Sultan of Aden was being threatened by Mehemet Ali on the land. In return for a substantial bribe of dollars and a promise of protection he agreed to transfer the port of Aden to the British. Even before the transaction was completed Palmerston informed Mehemet Ali that Aden was 'a British possession' and 'a hostile attack . . . will be dealt with accordingly.'<sup>141</sup>

There is unusual sharpness in this despatch of Palmerston. But his old fear was awakened by the revived Arabian schemes of Mehemet Ali. 'His [Mehemet Ali's] real design is to establish an Arabian Kingdom, including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing itself; but as it would necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be.'<sup>142</sup> It is certain that Mehemet Ali never meant to be a Pan-Arab, but Palmerston was right in thinking that he meant to increase his power. It would never do to allow Turkey to be crushed between an Egyptian Empire advancing from the south and a Russian Empire advancing from the north. It was easier to fight the Pasha than the Czar, so there must be no hesitation in confining Mehemet Ali to his own dominions and in resisting his attack on the Turkish Empire.



## III

*I have too grieved a heart  
To take a tedious leave, thus losers part.*

MERCHANT OF VENICE.

During the year 1839 Palmerston lost one ally and found another. Not unnaturally this change provoked criticism. Early in the year he seemed the enemy of Russia and the friend of France ; at its end friend and enemy had changed parts. The charge of double-dealing, made so lightly by the French press at the time, has been more seriously repeated by later historians. It cannot be sustained in its extreme form. Great parliamentarians like Palmerston are not embarrassed by a desire for consistency. They change their ground when there is advantage in doing so. But, apart from this, there were strong reasons for Palmerston's action. The French breeze had filled his sails at the beginning of the year and a Russian did the like service for him at the end. A good navigator trims his sails to the favouring wind.

Palmerston had been annoyed at Russia's refusal of a conference in 1838, and had made matters worse by informing her that he proposed to increase the British fleet in 1839. But Russia began to prove her good faith as the year 1839 advanced. Her agents in Persia were disavowed or recalled, the chief one blew out his brains in despair, and the gesture was convincing. The Czarevitch visited England and was well received, and Russia, if not anxious for European conferences, showed at least that she was not friendly to Mehemet Ali. Palmerston was just beginning to see that Russia might be a possible ally or at any rate sanction the use of force against Egypt. Brunnow came from Russia on two missions in 1839 with friendly offers from the Czar. France would not sanction the use of force against Mehemet Ali ; Russia would. So Palmerston changed sides. That is the case of his defenders. His detractors argue that he hated Mehemet Ali and wished to expel him from Syria. He was, therefore, anxious for the Sultan to attack him and for the British fleet to aid in his destruction. Therefore, while professing in public to dissuade the Sultan from war, he was secretly stimulating him to make it. Ponsonby at Constantinople, it is alleged, was the agent in this dark piece of treachery. Ponsonby was indeed granted unusual latitude, and Palmerston had no love for Mehemet Ali.

But Ponsonby was a pronounced enemy of Russia and believed that she had an understanding with Persia and with Mehemet Ali. Hence he feared a war would be disastrous. Early in 1839 he therefore warned the Sultan against 'any false step'<sup>143</sup> and urged him to await the result of negotiations then pending in England. Now these were in the hands of Palmerston.

The touchstone of Palmerston's sincerity is therefore to be found in the Turkish negotiation for an alliance with England which took place at the end of 1838 and beginning of 1839. Sultan Mahmud had been delighted with Palmerston's intimation to Mehemet Ali that England would defend Turkey against him, even if she had to defend him alone (July 1838). Sultan Mahmud jumped to the conclusion that the defensive alliance here suggested might be made into an offensive one. So he sent Reschid over to London to propose an alliance for the purpose of a mutual attack on Mehemet Ali.

Reschid arrived in London at the end of November 1838. His mission involved those comic incidents inseparable from Turkish diplomacy. He left his copper kettles and tobacco behind him at Dover and had to ask Palmerston to recover them, and to help him to import six hundred bottles of French wine into England free of duty. For this most modern of Turks liked the liquors forbidden by the Prophet. He offered decorations to Backhouse, the permanent Under-Secretary, and to Palmerston himself. The offers were courteously declined, for official England was still ruled by Elizabeth's principle, that 'my dogs shall wear only my collars.' Yet in refusing the decoration Palmerston had spoken of his desire for the 'maintenance and improvement of the alliance.' This was a friendly beginning, but it did not suggest a concerted offensive against Mehemet Ali.

The whole negotiation is a somewhat mysterious one, and the only extant text of the draft Treaty came back to England from Constantinople. The preamble is obviously due to Reschid, for it begins by speaking of the 'insensate designs' of Mehemet Ali against the Sultan. But the substance is due to Palmerston. The Treaty was to come into force if the Pasha or, on his death, his sons show acts of disobedience to the Sultan. In such case Article I provides for the British fleet stopping Egyptian merchant vessels and searching neutral vessels thought to be carrying contraband of war to Egypt. The combined action of an Anglo-Turkish fleet is provided for in Article II.<sup>144</sup> The whole is purely defensive in character. The hand seems to be that of Reschid, the voice that of Palmerston.<sup>145</sup>

Ponsonby, who had been cautioned against imprudence in 1838, was kept in the dark during the initial stages of the negotiation. Not till April 4, 1839, did he receive any instructions or information from Palmerston. Nouri, the acting Foreign Minister, then informed him 'that the Sublime Porte could not be satisfied with the Treaty because it is not the Treaty that Reschid Pasha wished to make ;—that the Porte desired to destroy the *status quo*, and the Treaty proposed by Lord Palmerston not only leaves it in full force, but also binds the Porte not to take advantage in future of any favourable occasion that may offer ;—That Lord Palmerston's Treaty with an extraordinary abruptness, stipulates, simply, that England shall unite with the Sublime Porte to act against Mehemet Ali if *He* or his Successor [of his family] shall declare His independence or commit any aggression.'<sup>146</sup> On the 12th Nouri said the Treaty was 'mischievous rather than useful' to Turkey. His irritation and even discourtesy are significant. For orientals are rarely impolite unless they are baffled or desperate.

Under Palmerston's instructions Ponsonby pressed the Turks to accept a Treaty the text of which he had never seen. It was only on April 18 that he saw a copy of it, and he then obtained it from Nouri and not from Palmerston. None the less, he strongly urged the Porte to abstain from attacking Mehemet Ali, and sent messages written in Turkish to his friend the Sultan. Three days later he got a decisive answer. 'On the whole,' Nouri said, 'he was convinced that no Treaty would be of any use to the interests of the Porte which had not for its object the destruction of Mehemet Ali, and therefore the Porte ought not to make any Treaty' (April 21).<sup>147</sup> In this not very courteous fashion the Turks broke off the negotiation for an alliance. Their refusal, like their discourtesy, is significant. It serves at least a historical purpose. For it plainly acquits Palmerston of the charge of having stimulated the Sultan to war. Whether Ponsonby is equally innocent is a question which is not yet solved.<sup>148</sup>

On May 19 Ponsonby communicated Palmerston's instruction of March 15. He proceeded to 'press strongly on the Sultan, that while on the one hand Great Britain would undoubtedly assist him [Mahmud] to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali, it would on the other hand be a different matter if the war was begun by the Sultan.' This warning was received with 'great dissatisfaction.' Naturally, for Mahmud now knew England would not stand by him in the first shock of battle. In effect this despatch declared the

Euphrates to be a Turkish Rubicon. And Turkish troops had just crossed it.

#### IV

*Imperium cupientibus nihil medium inter summa et præcipitia.*— There is no middle course for those who strive for empire. — Tacitus, *Hist.*, II, 74.

Before the Turkish troops cross the frontier we can take a look at Mehemet Ali in the last moments of his full power. He still enjoyed an unrivalled prestige among oriental rulers. Why did he throw it away? Palmerston said that a man who had been a 'waiter at a coffee-shop . . . was seeking to be a Commander of the Faithful.' This is not a convincing explanation of his aims and ambitions. For there is not much evidence that Mehemet Ali sought to become the political leader of Islam and even less that he aimed at its religious headship. The charge seems to have emanated from Mahmud himself, who desired to discredit his vassal. There is, however, some evidence that he sought to become the Grand Vizier of the Sultan. But even this claim was probably put forward as an excuse for demanding the dismissal of the existing Grand Vizier. Perhaps his aims were even more modest than this. He may only have sought to outbid the Sultan in the eyes of the world. His claim to establish equality between Christian and Mohammedan in Syria, and to grant a code more western than that of Turkey, thus form parts of a systematic plan of contrasting Egyptian light with Turkish darkness in order to impress Europe. In 1807, when in conflict with England, he had negotiated for the evacuation of the British troops from Egypt with striking moderation and tact. He had then been singularly prudent and had given no sign that he was blinded by ambition. Yet in the crisis of 1839 he chose to incur risks which ultimately proved disastrous to himself. He matched himself against England's sea-power.

Mechemet Ali returned from a gold-seeking trip to Sennaar early in 1839, aware that the Sultan was preparing to attack and determined to resist him. From that time until a British squadron appeared at Alexandria at the end of 1840 he declined all reasonable offers. The question of why he rejected all compromise is worth asking, and is seldom considered from his standpoint. A westerner might well suggest, as Palmerston in fact did, that no decision so reckless could be made by a man so intelligent. Mehemet Ali certainly counted on divisions at Constantinople, on quarrels among the powers

and on the secret support of France. He gained a good deal by such means. In 1840 Austria would have allowed Mehemet Ali to keep everything except Adana and Crete, and the revised 'Sebastiani offer' (to which both Austria and England agreed) would have given him not only the Palestine coast and the fortress of Acre but a large part of the pashalic of Syria.\* Yet Mehemet Ali refused to consider either offer for reasons quite clear to himself.

Mehemet Ali's numerous struggles with the Sultan had convinced him that he could not defend Egypt without an extensive hinterland to the north. Adana and all Syria, from Damascus to Aleppo, were necessary to him to make his power really strong. To be independent he must be self-sufficing, and neither Arabia nor Egypt gave him what he wanted. He needed timber for his ships and charcoal for gunpowder. There were no forests in Egypt and the wood of the Sudan was inaccessible. But there were terebinths and pines on the slopes of Galilee and of Gilead; there was still a forest in Sharon; oaks and firs grew near Antioch and Latakia. The slopes of Lebanon were green with thousands of mulberry trees which supplied charcoal for his gunpowder. Even before defeating the Turks at Konieh, Ibrahim had begun building a road to the forest districts of Adana. There was timber required for Mehemet Ali's ships. In 1837 over eighty thousand trees went down to Egypt from the region of North Syria and Cilicia, and a million more were demanded by a pasha who arrived in the same year at Alexandretta on a special mission. Mehemet Ali could find neither coal nor iron in Egypt, but his agents reported favourably on the minerals of Lebanon and dwelt fondly on the merits of an indifferent coal mine. Then again Syria was important for commerce, as well as for industry, a bridge along which Central Asian wares passed to Egypt. The commerce of Turkestan, of Armenia, of Iraq flowed from Damascus and Beyruth to Alexandria and Cairo. Egypt fed and clothed Syria in return for these raw materials. She gave her foodstuffs: rice, wheat, dates: and cloth, both of cotton and of wool, in return for raw silk and silk cloth, olives, soap, tobacco and gall-nuts.<sup>149</sup>

Much as Mehemet Ali loved materials and machines he loved humanity more. He found 'food for powder' in Syria. The Sudanese troops wilted in the more northern air and died by scores. Syria and Palestine could only be garrisoned by draining the hitherto untapped reservoir of their man-power.

\* For the 'Sebastiani offer' *vide infra*, p. 113 and n. 169.



The advantages would be two-fold. The Sultan would lose a recruiting ground for his army, while Mehemet Ali would gain one. In this calculation Mehemet Ali erred and the brutality of Ibrahim's recruiting agents illustrated the error. Conscription was a new thing in Syria and in Palestine and resented alike by Mohammedans, by Druses, by Jews and by Christians. Neither Ibrahim nor Mehemet Ali feared temporary unpopularity. Conscription was steadily pursued and enforced. Yet it united all the inhabitants in resistance and directly produced the rebellion of the Lebanon. Mehemet Ali's scheme of military defence seems to prove that he counted on retaining all his conquests. The passes of the Taurus were fortified, roads improved, Acre made a great fortress. These practical dispositions show that Mehemet Ali believed that he could defend his conquests on the land against the Sultan. He seems to have thought almost entirely in terms of land defence. For he was at one time prepared to give up Crete, and saw no special advantage in it for naval purposes.

Mehemet Ali's whole naval policy remains a mystery. He attached importance to Adana as supplying timber wherewith to build his fleet. He built a large fleet which was necessarily looked on with jealousy by England and by France. He apparently thought he could use it against one or the other. If they were divided, he could tip the balance in his own favour. But Mehemet Ali's views on naval power and its possibilities do not seem to have been very clear. And this blindness to sea-power was the direct reason of his fall. What is certain, is that the surrender of the Turkish fleet and its arrival in Egyptian harbours caused him greatly to increase his demands. His head at last was turned. Two fleets, one Egyptian and one Turkish, were now under his control. Could he not secure a third, the French? The Turkish fleet had yielded to him on the advice of the French admiral (and, as he vainly hoped, of the French government in secret). French, Turkish and Egyptian fleets together outnumbered the British Mediterranean squadron. Surely even Palmerston would hesitate to challenge his action. To reason thus was to throw away the fruits of thirty years of calculation. England had only to concentrate her naval strength to be superior to all the three fleets; and the lines of land defence, so laboriously prepared in Syria and in the Taurus, could be pierced and turned by British sea-power. France knew more of that danger than he, and might not support him at need. And in fact she did not. Yet it seems that he believed she would, until too late.<sup>150</sup>

Mehemet Ali had forgotten all his old maxims. He was no longer a rebellious vassal striving to be independent, fighting a localised war against a weak suzerain. He was provoking the intervention of Europe, and he thought Europe could be deluded by words, by forms, by a surrender of the more extravagant of his claims. He withdrew his demand for independence, he withdrew his demand for the dismissal of the Grand Vizier. He was far less yielding over territory. An hereditary tenure of Egypt and Palestine was offered ; he refused. The pashalic of Acre was added ; he still refused. Adana he talked of ceding, Crete he might have surrendered. But when it came to the point he refused. Ultimately he stood out for all the provinces outside Egypt, and lost them all. His territorial greed, his desire for economic self-sufficiency made him forget all his old moderation. Hitherto he had always found a middle course between defeat and victory. Now that he refused to do so, he lost everything except Egypt.

## V

*O proud revolt of a presumptuous man  
Laying his bridle in the neck of sin.*

PEELE, *David and Bethsabe.*

The die was cast. The Turkish army crossed the Euphrates on April 21, 1839. The result was not immediate war, for Mehemet Ali was resolved not to be the aggressor. It suited Russia and Ponsonby from very different standpoints to say that he was, but he does not appear to have been. On May 8 Ibrahim pointed out to a British consul that the Turks were pressing on. 'If you will not believe me, and you have courage, mount a horse and go to Aintab, from where you will see with your own eyes, if they put their feet within my territory or not.' Ibrahim spoke contemptuously of the Turkish commander Hafiz pasha, and declared indiscreetly 'that the Sultan and we must come to blows, for I must have Marash. I must have . . . also . . . the line to Orfa.'<sup>151</sup> The strategic reasons for this addition to Egyptian territory were doubtless strong. But Ibrahim, in thus demanding territory from the Turks, was as aggressive as they were. The difference lay not in intention but in fact. He did not strike the first blow or even the second. For over a fortnight the Turkish cavalry had been inciting the villages round Aintab to revolt against Egyptian rule. The main Turkish army,

concentrated at Bir after crossing the river, constructed lines and sent forward an advance guard well beyond them. On June 10 Mehemet Ali, hearing of these movements, ordered Ibrahim to take the offensive and drive the Turks out of Syria.<sup>152</sup> In case of victory he was to press on to Orfa and Diarbekir.

Before the end of May Ibrahim had moved his headquarters from Aleppo itself to Tellisheir, a place some ten hours to the north. He now regarded a collision as inevitable, but did little to hasten it. On June 8 he sent troops to recover Aintab, which had been occupied by the Turks, and the same day wrote a haughty letter to Hafiz, accusing him of provoking Egyptian subjects to rebel. 'Your Excellency has not probably forgotten that you have to deal with fearless men; consequently your intrigues will not be suffered for long.' Hafiz did not offer to withdraw his troops within his own frontier. He spread further the net of his intrigues from the hills at Aintab and sought to raise rebels against Ibrahim on the coast. After Ibrahim received Mehemet Ali's order of the 10th he hesitated no longer.<sup>153</sup> He broke camp at once, crossed the stream in front, and drove in the outposts of the Turkish army.

Hafiz pasha was concentrated at Nezib. He disregarded his Prussian officers who advised him to stay in his entrenchments.<sup>154</sup> The *mollahs* had bade him smite the rebel in the plain. Declaring it shameful to fight behind ditches and walls, Hafiz advanced against Ibrahim in the open. On June 24 the decisive battle took place at Nezib. Ibrahim had harangued his officers before the battle, and worked them up to enthusiasm. At one point the situation was critical, for the Egyptian ammunition failed. The Turkish artillery was well served, and, if Hafiz had advanced with the bayonet, he might have won. Ibrahim and his best general, Suleiman pasha, stayed the rout by cutting down flying Egyptians with their own hands. At the critical moment fresh ammunition arrived, and the situation was transformed. It was all over in a few minutes. The Bashi-Bazuks fled at once, carrying the infantry with them in their flight and disordering the cavalry. Even then Hafiz pasha might have recovered the day had he acted on the advice of his Prussian officers and sent forward an unbroken column. Transported with fury, he exhausted himself by cutting down some of his own fugitives, and was finally borne away in the rout. A Prussian officer on his staff was reported as dead, but he lived to fight another day. His name was Moltke. He saw Ibrahim gain a victory as complete as he was one day to win himself at Sedan. 'The army

of Hafiz Pasha has ceased to exist. . . . The Turks threw down their arms and abandoned their artillery and ammunition, flying in every direction.' <sup>155</sup> Every gun was lost and ten thousand prisoners were taken. It was the last of Ibrahim's victories, and it was the greatest.

On the 27th a French diplomat, Captain Caillier, arrived in Aleppo. Caillier had acted under most peremptory instructions from Soult. He had taken only six days on the way, and was 'thunderstruck' to learn he was fifty hours too late. He bore a message from Mehemet Ali telling Ibrahim not to act on his order of June 10, but to send Caillier to the camp of Hafiz to try to induce him to withdraw behind the Turkish frontier. Ibrahim had already seized Orfa and written to the governor of Aleppo, 'I shall only stop at Konieh. Have public rejoicings for a week and send out the glad news to all quarters.' The indefatigable Caillier pursued Ibrahim and found him on the road to Marash, still drunk with the wine of victory. 'Have you read history books?' he said, 'have you ever heard that a victorious general arrested his advance?' Under the sobering influence of Caillier, Ibrahim set aside the verdict of history. He agreed to content himself with occupying Marash and Orfa, and promised not to pass the Taurus chain and threaten Konieh, unless he were attacked.

The news of the victory of Nezib was not the only staggering blow to Turkey. The death of the Sultan and the news of the surrender of his fleet followed. Racked with illness, consumed with hatred of Mehemet Ali, Mahmud had drunk heavily to drown his cares. He died five days after the battle of Nezib, and without hearing of the disaster (June 29). His successor was a boy of sixteen, educated by two black eunuchs and an *Imam*, and weak in will and body. The ministers concealed Mahmud's death for two days. Husrev, the 'master-strangler,' was made Grand Vizier and maintained order. He was the enemy of Mehemet Ali. On July 7 the full immensity of the disaster of Nezib was known in Constantinople.\* The same day an even graver calamity became known. The whole Turkish fleet, which had set sail from the Dardanelles to attack the Egyptian navy, went off to Alexandria. There, not without suspicion of the connivance of the French admiral Lalande, the Turkish Capudan Pasha committed an act of the grossest treachery.† He handed over the whole navy of Turkey to Mehemet Ali. In the course of a week Constantinople

\* This is often given as the 8th, but see *F.O.* 78/356. From Ponsonby, No. 169 of July 8, 1839, with letter of Roussin, July 7, 1839.

† *Vide infra*, n. 148 (c), p. 425.



learned that she had lost a battle, an army, a fleet and a Sultan. The boy-successor was without education, without resources, without money, and without a policy.

On July 25 Palmerston knew officially about Nezib and next day of the shameful surrender of the fleet to Mehemet Ali. He had heard of the Sultan's death a few days before. Grave as were the disasters he had reason to believe in the good faith of the Five Powers. In May Soult had become chief of the French government and he had already won Palmerston's heart. 'Soult is a jewel,' wrote he, though in August the jewel began to show flaws. A week later Palmerston learned that Metternich completely agreed with his plans and promised an Austrian naval squadron. On July 23 when he heard of the defeat he wrote, 'We need not change our views and policy.' He could afford to be calm. His instructions to Vienna (July 26) were written when the full measure of disaster was known. 'The death of the Sultan ought to make no difference. . . . The result of the battle of the 24th cannot entitle Mehemet Ali to any greater favour from the Five Powers, but rather the contrary . . . and [it] renders it still more incumbent on the Five Powers to interpose.' The French *chargé d'affaires*, who brought him the news of the disasters, was told 'there was nothing to modify' <sup>156</sup> in the original plans. The Austrian Minister reported that the disasters provided 'only one more motive for hastening and completing their execution.' Metternich at once saw the difficulty. 'There is the secret, the stumblingblock,' he minuted. 'England, for an obvious interest, wishes to reduce the power of Mehemet Ali, France for an interest equally clear wishes if not to increase, at least to preserve, the power of the Pasha.' <sup>157</sup>

The Austrian Chancellor already foresaw the separation between France and England. Even in mid-August France showed clear signs of a refusal to coerce Mehemet Ali. To this view Palmerston never meant to agree, though it was a long time before he advocated acting without France. Here is his thought towards the end of August :

'If this Gallo-Egyptian interest is yielded to now, it will grow stronger and stronger every year and by the time M[ehemet] Ali dies will force the French government to take part with Ibrahim to secure the retention of Syria ; so that look at the matter as you will, the permitting Mehemet to retain Syria is to all intents and purposes sanctioning the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire--and I should much rather leave the whole thing alone than be party to such an



arrangement. . . . I am still not without hopes that all Five [Powers] may be brought to insist upon the evacuation of Syria.' <sup>158</sup> The reason he thought thus in August was because the Five Powers had taken a decisive step at Constantinople in July.

## VI

*Nondum iustitiam facinus mortale fugârat,  
Ultima de superis illa reliquit humum.*

But justice, which from Heaven derived her birth,  
Had not forsook the unpolluted earth.

OVID, *Fasti*, I, 249.

The agreement of the Five Powers on July 27, 1839, was due to events both at Constantinople and at Alexandria. Ibrahim had routed the Turkish army, Mehemet Ali had received the surrender of the Turkish fleet. He was not therefore impressed by the overtures of 'the very magnificent, very formidable, and very powerful' Abdul Medjid. He disdained the offer of a decoration, of pardon and of the hereditary pashalic of Egypt. On July 14 the surrendered Turkish fleet entered the harbour of Alexandria. On the 15th he told the consuls of the Four Powers that the Sultan's offer was 'an act of necessity, not of generosity.' The Sultan was 'innocent and pure as a diamond,' but his enemy Husrev must go, and he must possess Syria and Candia. Not only that, but he sent a proclamation to sixteen Turkish governors of provinces urging them to support him and expel Husrev. Campbell, the British consul at Cairo, rather unwisely seized the opportunity to praise the government and to extol the power of Mehemet Ali.<sup>159</sup> He also complained officially of 'the groundlessness of many of the complaints urged by the Porte against Mehemet Ali.' These transports were reprovved by Palmerston, who told Campbell that his private letter of July 17 contained 'opinions . . . opposed to the sentiments of His Majesty's Government.' Their author was removed from his post in September.

The Porte had decided to answer the demands of Mehemet Ali on July 27. They seem to have been prepared to offer the hereditary pashalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, and Syria to Ibrahim. Ponsonby regarded this step as a concession such as turbulent janizzaries had extorted from weak Sultans in the past. He decided to make himself felt. A conference of the five diplomatic representatives at Constantinople presented a

collective note to the Porte (July 27-8). They declared, under instructions from their governments, that the Great Powers were in agreement on the Eastern question, and asked the Porte to take no definite step without their concurrence. Austria and England were the prime movers, but Russia and France were, for once, in agreement in supporting them. At five in the morning on the 27th Husrev, the Grand Vizier, had received a visit from General Chrzanovski, the trusted agent of Ponsonby. He told him of the support promised to Turkey by the Five Powers and warned him of the danger of refusing to accept the collective note. The Porte, Husrev admitted, had been on the eve of yielding to Mehemet Ali. They would reconsider their views. They would now inform Mehemet Ali that they would act only in accordance with the concert of the Great Powers. It was a victory won by the concert at a critical moment, and it was a European step to which Russia had agreed. Indeed the agreement of the Russian representative had most far-reaching results. Palmerston 'highly approved.'<sup>160</sup> His despatch to Vienna says (August 25) that this step 'forms an epoch in the affairs of the Levant, and seems to fix definitely the mode of proceeding which the Five Powers should adopt in conducting their negotiations, and in planning their measures about these affairs.' \* Europe at last presented a common front to Egypt, and the fact was to have important results for the future. Mehemet Ali's hope now lay in dividing Europe and in seeking the separate or secret support of France. It was on her that future action pivoted.

Towards the end of July Mehemet Ali not only spoke of dismissing Husrev, but of becoming the first counsellor of the Sultan himself. He would introduce into Turkey a pure reign of justice by establishing the French civil code as the basis of law. The collective note of the Five Powers of July 27 was presented to him on August 6 by the assembled consuls. He declared, perhaps with truth, that the Porte would have granted him Syria had not the Five Powers intervened. He must insist on that and on the dismissal of Husrev. Campbell, in reporting this interview (August 7), recommended that his demand for the hereditary governorship of Syria should be granted.

It was remarkable that Admiral Roussin, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, had signed the note of July 27, for France soon departed from her resolute attitude. Ponsonby had received orders to offer the British fleet to assist the Sultan at need. Admiral Roussin persuaded him not to make this

\* F.O. 7/279. To Beauvale, No. 107 of August 25, 1839; cp. n. 160.

communication, on the specious plea that Russia, Austria and Prussia were not yet prepared for such a step.<sup>161</sup> Next day (August 8) the five representatives advised the Porte to reject Mehemet Ali's demand for the dismissal of Husrev. On August 22 the Porte replied, substantially placing their case in the hands of the Five Powers, and asking them to settle matters with Mehemet Ali, stipulating only that the Sultan could not cede Syria in hereditary to him. Ibrahim had just informed his father that his position would be a bad one for the late autumn and winter, and Mehemet Ali had refused to countenance any advance beyond the Taurus. So far, at least, the Powers' note of July 27 had sufficed. Mehemet Ali was impressed by the French government's message that they could not support him against Europe. About the end of September he 'relinquished his intentions to press for the removal of Husrev Pasha.'<sup>162</sup>

Difficulties of weather affected British fleets as well as Egyptian armies. On September 22 Admiral Stopford warned Ponsonby that his squadron, which lay outside Besika Bay, might be forced to enter the Dardanelles and anchor inside if the winds blew too strong. 'It would be much better to make the movement,' Ponsonby advised shrewdly, 'if a real necessity for it should arise, than to talk of it beforehand.'<sup>163</sup> Reschid pasha had agreed to the movement. But there were intrigues in the Seraglio and the boy Sultan trembled before a woman or before a reactionary. Ponsonby, when appealed to by Reschid, said that if there was a violent attempt to restore the old regime 'the British Admiral would certainly not hesitate to give the best assistance in his power to support the Sultan's government against an insurrection of that nature.' Palmerston approved and reinforced the assurance. But in September Palmerston received overtures from Russia which made him want to avoid sending British ships through the Dardanelles as that step might tempt Russian ships to enter the Bosphorus. He put a stop to this by the end of October by ordering the British admiral to leave Besika Bay for Smyrna or 'any other convenient anchorage on the coast of Asia Minor.'<sup>164</sup>

Palmerston recalled Campbell from Egypt in September and appointed Hodges in his place on October 30. The new consul was intended to show a stiff upper lip to Mehemet Ali, with whom French sympathy had now become notorious. He was ominously instructed to report on the number of troops Mehemet Ali could spare to defend Alexandria, and the 'amount of force which would probably be necessary for

a successful attack upon, and for the occupation of Alexandria ; and what impression could be produced upon the town, the arsenal, the palace or the ships in the harbour, by a merely naval attack, supposing the British squadron to be brought to Alexandria.' Mehemet Ali, all unconscious of these plans, was active in intrigue and liberal in bribery at Constantinople, hoping for a palace revolution there. But Ponsonby had already promised the Sultan protection. He needed it, for France was abandoning him. Admiral Roussin, whom the French government considered to be 'too European,' was definitely recalled. His successor, M. de Pontois, speedily gave Ponsonby the impression that 'the French feel it to be their interest to back out of the position they had taken.'<sup>165</sup> The impression was correct.

As the year waned the Porte relied on England more than ever. Husrev and Reschid, who had been much impressed by Mehemet Ali's threats of reforming the Turkish Empire, carried through a counter-reform scheme of their own. The celebrated *Gulhané*, or 'Rose Chamber,' decree proclaimed the Sultan as the most liberal of reformers. Its full effects will be noted elsewhere, but one of them was to force Palmerston to support a liberal Turkey against a despotic Egypt.\* It also ensured a further spell of power for Reschid and Husrev at a critical moment. France had told Mehemet Ali to content himself with the hereditary government of Egypt and Syria, leaving Crete for a son, and to abandon Adana. On October 16 Mehemet Ali refused with irritation, uttering the cryptic word *Bacaloum*, 'We shall see.'<sup>166</sup> He was no longer unshaken or serene, and he was at variance with his only European friend. Though still unbeaten he had abated both in pretensions and in his confidence in French help. Thus the disastrous year 1839 closed at Constantinople with an anti-Egyptian ministry in power backed by strong British support.

\* Cp. ch. vi.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE YEAR OF DEFEAT, 1840

*Miseram pacem uel bello bene mutari.* Best to exchange a wretched peace for war. —TACITUS, *Ann.*, III, 44.

#### I

THE mission of Brunnow the Russian to London of September 1839 inaugurated a diplomatic change of far-reaching importance. He returned to St. Petersburg saying 'England is not yet with us, she is no longer with France.' In December he came on a second mission with new offers. On certain points he was prepared to change his view at different times, such as the hereditary tenure of Egypt or the extension of Mehemet Ali's control to Acre. But on the other main positions he stood firm throughout, and Palmerston and the Austrian Neumann agreed with him from January 1840 onwards as to these.\* These concerned European execution against Mehemet Ali. If he was to be coerced, Unkiar Skelessi was to be abrogated and Europe was to act as a whole. All the Five Powers would see to the execution. If Mehemet Ali refused the allied terms the French and British squadrons would institute a blockade and proceed ultimately to coercive measures. If Constantinople were threatened, Russian naval and military forces would enter the Bosphorus on the invitation of the Porte. Simultaneously and on a similar request, two or three French and two or three British vessels would pass the Dardanelles and enter the Sea of Marmara. Here was the agreed proposition. 'It is expressly understood, besides, that the admission of foreign flags into the Bosphorus as into the Sea of Marmara will be considered only as an exceptional measure, adopted on the sole demand of the Porte itself and only in order to defend it. This measure will in no way injure the existing principle, in virtue of which the Sublime Porte has always considered the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus as having to remain closed

\* Neumann arrived at the end of 1839 on a special mission, as also did Brunnow. Bülow was the Prussian minister.



in time of war as in time of peace to the ships of war of all Foreign Powers. This principle, having invariably served as a rule to the Ottoman Empire for all time as a right inherent in the sovereignty of the Sultan, as master and guardian of the two Straits, the Allied Courts, to manifest their unanimous respect for the integrity and tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire, will agree to-day formally to recognize the closing of the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and will agree to consider henceforth the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea as closed seas, consecrating this principle for ever as a part of the public law of Europe.'

This proposition had been foreshadowed by much previous discussion.<sup>167</sup> As here indicated it proved the basis of the Anglo-Russian alliance in 1840 and the corner-stone of the eventual settlement in 1841. It was a fair compromise. The right of mutual and simultaneous entry of warships into both ends of the Straits was conceded as an exception for this occasion. Russia really abrogated the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, so far at least as it gave her permission to enter the Bosphorus or implied any special relation to Turkey. England, on the other hand, was shut out from entering the Black Sea, as hotheads like Ponsonby and Urquhart wished her to do. Now it was as important for Russia to close the Black Sea to England as it was for England to close the Bosphorus to Russia. Europe was at last useful to the Czar, and the Czar might be useful to Europe. So far, so good. But it was difficult to get the majority of the British cabinet or parliament to accept this view. All the French statesmen, including Guizot, thought that both British cabinet and parliament would refuse. How the miracle of securing this agreement was accomplished cannot be told at all here. It is sufficient to say that it was. The story, when fully revealed, will be one of the most interesting in the diplomatic relations of England and of France.

On April 7 Nouri Effendi, the Turkish plenipotentiary, who had arrived in England, addressed a note to the Five Powers. He was influenced by the Austrian Neumann and had been instructed to refer to him at need. His note recalled the various assaults made by Mehemet Ali on the Sultan since 1832. The Sultan was ready to give Mehemet Ali hereditary rule in Egypt on condition that he restored the Turkish fleet. He claimed the aid and counsel of the Five Powers, in view of their collective note of July 27, 1839. He asked them to sign a convention with the Sultan on these lines, and to agree at the same time 'on the necessary means of carrying it into

effect.' Thiers, now Prime Minister of France, at first declined to take Nouri's note seriously. He instructed Guizot to declare that 'conferences will lead to no good result as we shall differ.' Guizot from London was more serious, and refused to communicate this instruction, as 'it might drive Palmerston to extreme courses.'<sup>168</sup> Thiers approved Guizot's action in having withheld this instruction. He now authorised him to engage in 'discussion only' and to settle nothing. Guizot thereupon replied to Nouri in vague and general terms, and not until April 28. But on the 11th Palmerston had already informed Nouri that England was ready to 'concert immediately' with the other powers the means of giving effect to the note of July 27, 1839. Here again then the separation between France and England was exhibited. But there was this difference now. A crisis had arisen and Palmerston did not mean to be amused by delay or diverted by discussion. He intended that some vigorous action should be taken, and was not now to be deterred by French opposition.

Before deciding on action Palmerston asked Neumann the Austrian to convey a final offer to France. There was a long history behind this concession, connected with what is known as the 'Sebastiani offer.' In October 1839 Palmerston had offered to the French ambassador Sebastiani to give Mehemet Ali the hereditary tenure of Egypt, and the possession, '*equally hereditary, of the pashalic of Acre*. The town of Acre alone will remain to the Porte and the frontiers will start from the glacis of the place in the direction of Lake Tiberias. The Porte will recover all the rest of Syria, including the Sacred Places, considerations of immense weight in the eyes of the English.'<sup>169</sup> This offer was declined by France, as was averred later unofficially, in October 1839. Palmerston then withdrew the concession. But he renewed it in a new form in May 1840, adding to the offer the fortress of Acre, which Wellington deprecated giving to Mehemet Ali, as it was 'the military key of Syria.' It was this offer to France, made through the Austrian Neumann, and refused by Guizot, which enabled Palmerston to convert the British cabinet to his own views. He was also aided by the news that serious troubles were threatened in Constantinople. But for a threat of resignation beforehand Palmerston would hardly have prevailed. The victory was disputed and two Lords (Holland and Clarendon) took the almost unprecedented step of sending a separate remonstrance to the Queen against the decision of the cabinet. The decision was actually taken on July 8, 1840.\* A treaty

\* Text in App. II.

was to be signed for arranging for the coercion of Mehemet Ali by Four Powers. England and Austria were to act while Russia and Prussia looked on and approved. France was to be left out of the arrangement, as she would not agree to any coercion of Mehemet Ali. The transaction was to be secret, but as soon as it became known the blow to French pride would be severe.

Palmerston summed up the matter in a letter of the 9th, a day after the cabinet's decision. 'The determination of the main point whether we should go on with the Three Powers and without France is a most important decision not only as regards the present matter but with respect to our future position in Europe. . . . We shall in all probability accomplish this [the coercion of Mehemet Ali] without any great exertion of force, for I am satisfied that the power of Mehemet Ali is a power built upon delusion and fancy, as much as upon injustice, a bubble which will burst as soon as it is strongly pressed. . . . If we had shrunk from pursuing a course separate from that of France and if we had truckled to the French government upon this occasion, we should have been considered as a merely second-rate Power in Europe held in leading strings by France, and incapable of any manly or independent course of action.'\*

## II

*Our Europe, where is debtor each to each  
Past measure of excess.*

GEORGE MEREDITH.

From July 8 to 15 was occupied by negotiations between Palmerston and his diplomatic colleagues of Austria, Russia and Prussia on the one side, and the British cabinet on the other. These are summarised in the letter of July 9 from Palmerston, from which we may continue to quote. 'The general outline of the scheme which Neumann, Brunnow, Bülow and I thought to-day (9th), would be the best to propose to the Cabinet is that we should give Mehemet gradations of choice. That he should be told that, if he will submit quietly and at once, he shall have the hereditary pashalic of Egypt, and a life interest in the southern part of Syria, bounded to the north by a line drawn just above Acre, and leaving that fortress to him, and to the East by Lake Tiberias, the Jordan,

\* W.S.A., *Berichte aus England*, 295. Palmerston to Beauvale, pte. of July 9, 1840. The English of the original is a little odd.

the Dead Sea and the line thence down to the Red Sea ; but that he must accept this in a given time. That if he does not accept that in a given time he will then only have the hereditary pashalic of Egypt, and if he does not within a further period of time accept that, the Sultan will consider himself released from the offer he has made of that hereditary tenure and Mehemet must then take and abide by the chance or event. But these are merely ideas, subject to the consideration of the Cabinet.

‘What I mean to propose is that our fleet should go immediately to the coast of Syria, interrupt military and naval communications between Egypt and Syria, and give protection to the population who wish to return to their lawful allegiance to the Sultan. I should not be surprised if large districts of country and considerable bodies of troops were to determine to do so when thus supported. I am writing to Ponsonby at the same time to desire him to urge the Porte to have a few ships of war and some thousand men ready to go to Cypres [*sic*] to be at hand to occupy any position on the coast of Syria where they could land and maintain themselves under the protection of our ships. It seems essential that the Turkish flag should fly on the Syrian coasts and that everything that we may do should be done in the name and in the support of the Sultan, that we may not be accused of acting on our own account, and may not excite any Mahometan fanaticism.’

Palmerston's suggestions were carried out to the letter. The British cabinet were so deeply impressed by the rejection of the Neumann-Sebastiani offer that they permitted Palmerston to despatch the British naval squadron to the coast of Syria. A diplomatic revolution took place on July 15 when several documents were signed by representatives of the Four Powers and by Chekib Effendi. The first was a Convention. Article I announced the intention of the Powers to secure the conformity of Mehemet Ali to their wishes, each Power reserving the right to co-operate ‘according to the means of action of which each disposed.’ Article II provided that, if Mehemet Ali refused, the allies would interrupt the sea communications and the transport of arms and munitions of war between Egypt and Syria, Great Britain and Austria engaging to give immediate orders to their Mediterranean squadrons for the purpose. If Mehemet Ali advanced on Constantinople, Article III provided that the Powers should unite to protect the Straits, both Bosphorus and Dardanelles, against all aggression. But, by Article IV, all such measures were to be considered as exceptional, and only to be adopted on express

demand of the Sultan. The Sultan was expressly to declare that the old rule of closing the Straits, and admitting no war vessels either to Bosphorus or Dardanelles, was to be maintained for the future. Article V provided for ratification.

To the Convention three other documents were annexed. An *Acte séparé* defined the territorial limits of the Neumann-Sebastiani offer to Mehemet Ali. It prescribed that it should be merely in temporary occupation of Mehemet Ali. If this offer was not accepted in ten days he should be offered Egypt alone to him and to his heirs. After twenty days the Sultan could withdraw the second offer. A protocol defined the prohibition to armed vessels, mentioned in Article IV of the convention, as not applying to light vessels in the service of the Legations at Constantinople. A reserved protocol provided that, in view of possible loss of time, Article II, the execution against Mehemet Ali, should come into force at once without waiting for exchange of ratifications. It was agreed also that the Sultan should immediately address his offers to Mehemet Ali, and that the consuls of the Four Powers should support them. A good deal of these transactions was subsequently published in the Blue Book, but in deference to France something was suppressed.\*

### III

*Sequitur superbos ultor a tergo deus.*—An avenging god pursues the proud.—  
SENECA.

A last look at Mehemet before Europe's diplomacy stretched him on the rack of war. During the first half of 1840 his spirits mounted high, too high for discretion. He became 'fey' as the Highlanders say. He kept on always with his military preparations; he gave way to strange boasts and outbursts of pride. He had dropped the mask of liberalism when Reschid succeeded as the patron of reform. He felt it easier to rally the reactionaries to his side and to mobilise the fanatics of Asia Minor against Reschid and the decree of the Rose Chamber. He resented the idea that France had induced him to resist. 'So they take me for a savage, incapable of acting by my own will?' (January 5). He still did not believe that Europe would intervene. He held on tenaciously to all territory. On May 6 M. Cochelet conveyed to him the final advice of the French government. He was not to hold out

\* For details *vide* nn. 196, 297.



over Adana, as France could not countenance his exaggerated claims. Mehemet Ali was more haughty than ever. Adana is 'the key of my house,' he must leave it to his children. He would only return Crete to the Sultan on his death. He brushed aside a suggestion that he might share the fate of Napoleon, the other ruler who had resisted Europe. Cochelet left in despair, thinking him consumed with boastfulness and vanity. And then came a piece of news which finally ruined Mehemet. On May 24 Cochelet told him that Husrev had been dismissed from the Grand Vizierate. 'Mehemet Ali leapt up from his divan. His face expressed extraordinary joy, and his eyes swam with tears.' Three weeks later, when the news was confirmed, Mehemet Ali sent Sami Bey to Constantinople to negotiate. He expected a surrender to all his demands. On July 15 he showed himself more 'unreasonable' than ever. He even talked of refusing to restore the fleet. He said only Russia and England threatened him, and he did not believe they could agree. 'As for the English they can only impose a partial blockade, I am self-sufficing. Besides I still remember with what ardour we charged them when they disembarked in Egypt. It will be the same to-day.'<sup>170</sup> Vain boastings of an old man on the very day Europe decided his fate and sent England to execute her sentence !

#### IV

*When once ye have with armed force repressed  
The proud attempts of this Albanian prince  
That threatens thralldom to your native land.*

GORBODUC, Act V, Sc. 2.

The scene of activity is transferred from London, Paris, Vienna to Constantinople, Alexandria and Acre. The tergiversations of Guizot, the bluntness of Palmerston and the honeyed words of Neumann avail no more. Ibrahim is left to make head against British admirals and Syrian rebels. Diplomacy gives way to action. The freedom of Greece, which had baffled diplomats for seven years, was won in an hour when Codrington's guns spoke at Navarino. Four months of fighting destroyed the prestige which it had taken Mehemet Ali thirty years to build up. It was a strange spectacle, Metternich and Palmerston inviting rebels to revolt against Ibrahim, an Austrian archduke fighting for freedom and helping a British admiral to foil the designs of France.

Here is not the place to say why the Druses and Maronites of Lebanon exercised so decisive an influence on the Great Powers.\* But it is none the less true that they did so. The first of oriental generals, who had hitherto been invincible, was vanquished by a handful of British marines, by a few thousand Turkish soldiers, and by bands of hastily armed mountaineers. Thus might Prince Charlie have won back his throne in Hanoverian days by the aid of a few French warships and regiments. The episode, so improbable in the West, is characteristic of the East. There gold and steel and courage have their true value. The improbable happens, the wise men are confounded, the bold player wins.

The Convention, though signed in London, had to be executed at Constantinople and Alexandria. Palmerston did not even wait for the ratifications to be received. He intended to surprise Mehemet Ali, so his instructions went out at once. They authorised Ponsonby to raise Syria against the Egyptians. Constantinople had been a centre of agitation in June and Mehemet Ali had all but prevailed there. For Sami Bey had brought an offer from him to surrender the Turkish fleet if Syria as well as Egypt was retained by him. Reschid thought of giving way, but Ponsonby once more exerted his authority and the Porte finally gave a point-blank refusal (July 12). Even before the end of June Ponsonby had sent a secret agent to Syria who stirred up the rebels and sought (though vainly) to bring the British naval squadrons to Beyrouth. During July Sami Bey renewed the Egyptian offer, aided by Pontois, the French Ambassador. Fifteen thousand troops landed from Egypt to suppress the Syrian revolt. On the 14th a British commodore saw 'the country in a blaze, up to the tops of the highest hills' of Lebanon.<sup>171</sup> By the middle of the month the revolt seemed stamped out. None the less Ponsonby's secret agent declared the Lebanon to be 'a sleeping volcano.'

The words which were to stir Syria into flame came on August 3. Ponsonby then received instructions which delighted him. First there was the Treaty. Then followed instructions to Stopford to cut Ibrahim's communications, to protect the Syrian rebels, and to aid in landing Turkish troops and British gunners and engineers. Then followed orders to give arms and money to the rebels, and to announce that the Four Great Powers had resolved to re-establish the direct rule of the Sultan in Syria. There were no half measures. Pardon and reward were to be given to all soldiers who deserted

\* *Vide* ch. vii for a full examination of this question.

Ibrahim, privileges and liberties to the mountaineers who revolted against him. The 'winged ministers of England's vengeance' were at last at Ponsonby's orders. Supreme in power and unequalled in prestige, he persuaded the Sultan unreservedly to ratify the Convention, and determine on strong measures against Ibrahim (August 5).

It was not till August 6 that Colonel Hodges in Egypt received the news of the Convention. Mehemet Ali had some inkling of it, for he kept his fleet in harbour and absented himself from Alexandria. Rifaat Bey arrived with the Sultan's ultimatum on the 11th, but it was not until the 16th that Mehemet Ali himself heard of the first offer. Acre and South Syria for life, Egypt for himself and his heirs. 'I will rather perish than accept,' answered the haughty old man. Next day he received the four consuls, and on August 26 they decided that he had declined their first offer. The second offer consisted of Egypt alone, and was again limited to ten days. Mehemet Ali, who was ill, pretended to the consuls that he accepted the second offer. But the consuls rejected his claim, since he had given no guarantee of returning the Turkish fleet. They held that he had rejected the second offer by September 5. After that date the Sultan was free to adopt any course that his interests might suggest. The consuls broke off diplomatic relations and left further negotiations to the British admiral.

Sir Robert Stopford has had hard measure in history. He had a naval experience dating back to the Napoleonic wars. He was over seventy and therefore old for an active command. But he was a dignified, handsome old man who impressed even a reckless worldling like the Prince de Joinville, and he succeeded despite embarrassing instructions, Turkish inefficiency, and the insubordination of his second-in-command. He had to solve as difficult a political and strategic problem as any British admiral has ever handled.\* He made some mistakes and showed weakness in details. But his handling of the larger problems was marked by strong common-sense and cool courage, and the complete success, which he ultimately won, was due more to himself than to his brilliant commodore. To say that his subordinate was a Napier is to say all, for, like all his race, Sir Charles was distinguished for quarrelsomeness, for reckless daring, and for vanity.

During July Stopford and the main part of the fleet were off Mitylene, while Charles Napier with two men-of-war lay

\* *Vide infra*, n. 178, for authorities for the campaign and its geography, and *vide also* App. III.

off Beyrouth. On August 3 Stopford received his instructions from home, but judged that 'circumstances were entirely changed' since their issue. He took his own course and recalled Napier and his two ships from Beyrouth. The French naval squadron was nearly equal to his own and was much better armed; the Egyptian fleet might come out and attempt to join it. So he concentrated his fleet. Ponsonby indignantly remonstrated and on August 10 Stopford sent Napier back to Beyrouth with two men-of-war, as he had heard that the revolt was reviving. Napier stood outside the harbour, scattered proclamations inviting the insurgents to revolt and bidding the Egyptians to refrain from useless shedding of blood. No revolt followed, but the Emir Beshir Kassim intimated that he would join the British, though his uncle the grand prince Beshir had refused to declare himself. Stopford himself sailed to Alexandria. He had an interview with Mehemet Ali, but talked no politics. He satisfied himself that the Egyptian fleet would not come out. On September 5, after the expiry of the term allowed for the second offer, he sailed away for Beyrouth, leaving a small force off Alexandria.<sup>172</sup> He had observed the rules of war by leaving enough ships to mask any naval force which could possibly interfere with his operations in Syria.

On September 9 Stopford and a fleet of thirty sail bombarded Beyrouth. His force had been swelled by over five thousand Turkish troops borne in transports from Cyprus. There were also some British and Austrian marines. The bombardment of Beyrouth had not been serious, and on the 10th Stopford decided to effect a landing higher up the coast. Sir Charles Smith, the head of the British engineer and artillery officers, was too ill to command the land forces. So Stopford put Charles Napier in command on land. Stopford himself again bombarded Beyrouth, while the Austrian admiral Bandiera enfiladed the town from the bay where St. George killed the dragon. Under cover of this potent diversion Napier and his force went round to the Dog river. There they dispersed a few Albanian troops and rapidly landed, entering the little town of Djuni from the flank. Its houses cluster gracefully above the shore. Higher up are rocks, picturesquely splashed with green, and the Mother of Lebanon in her great shrine looks down from the top of the mountain. Djuni was the seat of the Maronite patriarch, who was a bitter enemy of the Egyptians. He gave Napier a church for his headquarters, and favoured the distribution of apostolic rewards to the infidel.

‘The operation,’ according even to Napier, ‘was not exactly agreeable to the rules of war . . . nevertheless it has been done.’<sup>173</sup> Seven thousand men had been landed and encamped in a position open to attack from the front, from the right and from the left. But the British frigates stood in to protect both flanks and eager mountaineers swarmed down from the hills. In a few hours eight thousand stands of arms were distributed, and twelve thousand more were given out by the end of September. Napier remained in command of the landing-party at Djuni and was soon to make use of that advantage to the full. He was not impressive to look at, limping in gait, slovenly in dress, stout and grey-whiskered. Yet he was to do wonders, for he had just that touch of theatrical bravery which at once dazzles and dismays the oriental.

At Beyruth the chivalry of war intervened. Suleiman (Sèves) pasha sent Stopford the letters of the Indian overland mail unopened. The admiral replied to the pasha with a present of wine which that renegade Frenchman doubtless enjoyed. But, while passive off Beyruth, Stopford was active everywhere else. On the 12th the *Dido* and the *Cyclops* attacked Djebail, which was defended by some hundreds of Albanians. As night fell they retired and the mountaineers seized the town. Grass grew in Djebail’s streets, for the inhabitants had fled from the Albanians in terror. Now it was the mountaineers who took toll of the Albanians as they fled. On the 15th Batrun was captured almost without loss, a fierce mountaineer presenting the British captain with the head of an Albanian as he entered. Ibrahim himself, reconnoitring too near the shore, was scared by a shell from a British ship and hastily rode off. Nearly five thousand mountaineers were already in the camp of Djuni, and the arrival of one man on September 15 completed the triumph. The man was the Emir Beshir Kassim, nephew of the grand prince of Lebanon. Like Lord Lovat in the ‘forty-five,’ the grand prince thought that he could be on both sides at once. So he would not declare against the Egyptian but would allow his nephew to fight for the Turk. Incidentally the nephew pushed the uncle from the throne.

On the 24th an important action occurred. The Turkish troops were commanded by Selim pasha, with the Hanoverian general Jochmus as chief of staff. Both were brave and Jochmus was skilful. Napier ordered a reconnaissance in force on the 24th. Jochmus and Selim moved up the Dog river with four Turkish battalions and a few British and



Austrian marines and found Ibrahim's advance guard formidably entrenched near [Q]Ornet Chahouane. Jochmus and Selim exposed themselves recklessly and the Turks drove the Egyptians backwards, capturing hundreds of prisoners. This, 'the first victory of the Turks over the Egyptians for many years past,' greatly encouraged the rebel mountaineers. British instructions had advocated the seizure of a strong and defensible position on the coast. This was now accomplished. The camp of Djuni, defended by a hundred thousand sandbags, was practically impregnable. No heavy guns could travel along Lebanon roads, and the Egyptians had made no attempt to attack it. But their failure to resist the British advance on September 24 was extremely important because it showed that successful actions could be fought in the Lebanon without any interference from Beyrouth. Sulciman pasha dared not move from the town while Stopford's ships lay in the offing. The policy of periodical descents on different parts of the coast scattered the Egyptian forces and pinned down garrisons in particular places. There was only failure before one place, and even there the Egyptians were outgunned and their stone fortresses tumbled about their ears. The British ships came right inshore, and the British gunners found it a case of 'carpet bowls' where 'my lady's maid couldn't miss.' Every fresh bombardment increased Egyptian losses, British prestige and Lebanon ferocity.

The next British success was at Sidon. Napier, after a fierce struggle with Stopford, obtained the command. The British had been repulsed in an attempt on Tortosa on the 25th, so a spectacular success was needed. Napier went off promising to return with victory in forty-eight hours. Sidon stands on a promontory with an ancient castle. It has no sea walls, but a reef guards the very small harbour and renders approach difficult. The town was assaulted from three sides. Napier with five hundred marines landed on the north beach, five hundred Turks assailed the castle, and a mixed force of marines and Austrians under their archduke attacked from the south-west. Napier excelled himself that day. He mounted to the assault from the water on the shoulders of his sailors and was always in the hottest of the fire. He was the first to reach the top of the citadel and signalled the victory by waving his cap on his sword. Numbers of the garrison surrendered almost without fighting. The commander alone refused to yield and the bayonets of two marines crossed in his breast. Three thousand men behind strong defences had been beaten by half their numbers, and

over two thousand prisoners taken. Stopford gravely reported, 'The place [Sidon] is still in our possession, and its capture seems to have been an unexpected blow to Ibrahim Pasha, and has much paralyzed his measures.'\* The admiral thoroughly understood the superior mobility of sea-power. He had held down the land forces of Ibrahim to particular points on the coast by the continuous and perplexing movements of the British ships. It was now possible to strike with his full strength at a decisive point.

## V

*England gains the pass the while  
And struggles through the deep defile.*

SCOTT, *Marmion*.

The time had come to profit from the manœuvres which had thus dispersed and separated Ibrahim's army into fragments. On October 4 the Emir Beshir Kassim with a thousand mountaineers attacked the Egyptian outposts in the gorge of the Dog river. They fought in the defile traversed by the armies of Assyrian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman and Saracen conquerors. The Emir Beshir Kassim was outnumbered by four or five to one, but the Egyptians fled before the fury of his mountaineers. Three hundred were slain, six hundred taken prisoners, and a thousand dispersed. Many deserters now came into Napier's camp. They were enrolled as soldiers, and it was decided to exploit the Emir's success. Wood, Ponsonby's agent, had received a *firman* from the Sultan permitting him to depose the grand prince Emir Beshir. Overtures to the prince himself had produced only dark and doubtful answers. So it was decided to give the princely diadem to his warlike though aged nephew. The old prince had been given till the 8th to submit, and his deposition was really decided on that day. On the 9th Napier wrote to the Emir Beshir Kassim as follows: 'The Emir Beshir is not come; if at twelve o'clock to-day he is not here you are grand prince.'<sup>174</sup> So it was. On the evening of the 9th, when the army moved off on a great enterprise, the Emir Beshir Kassim was the acknowledged grand prince of the Lebanon.

\* Napier, *War in Syria* [1842], i, 85. From Stopford, October 4, 1840. Napier as usual made the exaggerated claims that 3,000 were beaten by 'under 1,000.' According to Hunter, *Expedition to Syria* [1842], i, 136, there were about 1,400 allied troops in the attack, confirmed by Wood's account of October 10, in Ponsonby, No. 243 of October 19, 1840 (*F.O.* 78/397).

A nicely combined operation was executed on October 9 and 10. Stopford reaped the fruits and Napier the credit. It was in reality a double operation simultaneously executed in two different areas. Stopford meant to bombard and seize Beyrouth, while Napier diverted the attention of Suleiman's army and prevented any reinforcements reaching it from the mountains. The action began at Beyrouth on the 9th, and Napier's army, though in position on the heights, did nothing that day. His most spectacular action of the 10th was only made possible because Stopford had already won a victory in the main theatre of war. After a heavy bombardment on the 9th the Egyptians evacuated Beyrouth. So before Napier had fought his action Beyrouth had fallen. Stopford occupied it on the 10th, taking two thousand prisoners and a standard, acquiring control of the best harbour on the coast, and hoisting the Sultan's crescent on the citadel. Napier's battle was only a tactical exploitation of a strategic success already won by Stopford.

Napier's men had encamped within sight of Ibrahim's army on the 8th. They rested on the 9th. The evening was an anxious one, for Ibrahim, the invincible, was to be attacked on the morrow. Profiting by the new prince's success on the 4th, Napier had marched his forces across the Dog river and driven them in the blazing heat up to the village of [Q]Ornet Chahouane. This stands on a high narrow ridge between the Dog river gorge on the north and another deep gorge to the south. About six hundred yards farther on, near what was then called the Ardali heights, Ibrahim had elected to stand. He was in front of the village Beit Chebab. He had chosen his position well at the narrowest neck of the gorge, and he had used the stone terraces and pine trees of the Lebanon to turn it into a strong natural fortress. Napier had decided the night before to send parties up on each flank through the gorges to take Ibrahim in the rear. The party sent to the south was headed by the Emir Beshir Kassim and consisted of mountaineers. Their march was delayed since the new grand prince was ill with fever, and his route, by way of Brummana, was so long and circuitous that he only arrived in time to pursue some of the fugitives next day.

The party sent to the north was under Omer Bey, who was afterwards to become the most famous of Turkish commanders. His two battalions exercised a decisive influence on the battle. They marched during the night to Ajeltoun, a ridge north of but parallel to [Q]Ornet Chahouane. Consequently they had to descend into the gorge of the Dog river and climb up the ridge on the other side before they could assail Ibrahim's

rear. 'The movement was very dangerous for, had he [Omer] been [seen] at the bottom of the gorge, he would have been destroyed.'<sup>175</sup> But Napier's frontal attack distracted attention and by 2 P.M. Omer Bey and his men were attacking Ibrahim from behind and the crisis of the battle began.

Napier's miscellaneous forces included four Turkish battalions, some hundreds of British marines, a number of mountaineers, and even a battalion of Egyptian deserters. A despatch from Stopford reached Napier on the 10th, ordering him to retire, as he feared Suleiman might attack him with the forces which had evacuated Beyruth on the evening of the 9th. Napier disobeyed orders and, on this occasion, was perhaps right in doing so. For Suleiman would not matter if Ibrahim was defeated. But he must attack at once as the flanking parties of the grand prince and Omer Bey were already far advanced. Napier confesses that verses from Marmion were floating through his head as he ordered the assault. He said in prose, 'If we can get the Turks and mountaineers to mount that rugged hill, and Omer Bey attacks at the same time their rear, Ibrahim will get such a dressing as he never had before.'<sup>176</sup> Despite assertions to the contrary by Napier's admirers the assault was not really hazardous. It was not fully launched till the firing, heard from Ibrahim's rear, proved that Omer Bey was pressing his attack. Napier was, however, just the man to impress orientals. The mountaineers needed 'a good deal of coaxing' and a 'little manual persuasion,' but they feared the stick of the commodore more than the enemy. Jochmus says, 'After two hours' fighting and the display of the most daring gallantry on the part of the Turks, for the *élite* troops of the hitherto unvanquished Ibrahim also stood manfully to their posts strongly fortified and facing both attacks, we joined Omer Bey.' The grand prince came up towards the close from the direction of Brummana. He cut off the Egyptians' last line of retreat, interposed his mountaineers between Ibrahim and Suleiman, and held in check two thousand reinforcements advancing from Zahle. The rout was complete. The Egyptian troops were flung into the gorge and split up into fragments, escaping by twos and threes. Ibrahim himself was seen flying with a few horsemen from this, his first, defeat in Asia.

This victory has been variously called that of Ardali heights, [Q]Ornet Chahouane, Calat Meidan and Boharsef. It was the last of Napier's exploits on land. General Jochmus and Omer Bey must share in the credit. The defeat was decisive. Suleiman made good his escape with three hundred horse. But Ibrahim could only concentrate a few thousand

troops on the precipitous slopes and in the strong fort of Zahle, which lies on the extreme edge of the Lebanon chain before it descends to the Bekaa and to Damascus. There Napier characteristically wished to pursue him. But Stopford authoritatively intervened and perhaps saved his rash subordinate from disaster. He generously praised Napier's 'splendid operations,' but placed Sir Charles Smith in command, and confined operations to the coast. Sir Charles had been instructed to 'take care not to allow the Turkish force to expose itself to defeat, or to advance imprudently into the interior.'<sup>177</sup> Consequently land operations ceased, except for the raids of the mountaineers under the new prince of the Lebanon. The prestige of Ibrahim had been finally shattered and the lesson was driven fully home.<sup>178\*</sup> On October 2 Ponsonby laid at the Sultan's feet a captured standard. 'A few weeks since,' said Ponsonby, 'some rebellious subjects of Your Majesty boasted that this standard should be displayed before the capital of your Empire. The standard is now here, a monument of the triumph of Your Majesty's arms, and an evidence of the error of those who proclaimed the weakness of the Sublime Porte, and the power of the late Pasha of Egypt.' The standard was, in reality, one of two captured by Stopford and Smith, but Ponsonby represented it as having been taken by Napier on the Ardali heights. But no one knew this at the time, and the standard wrested from the boastful Ibrahim was laid up among the war-trophies of the Seraglio.<sup>179†</sup> Other signs of triumph came soon enough. There were illuminations at night, processions with tinklings of bells and clashing of cymbals by day. Finally a number of Ibrahim's captured troops were paraded in triumph through the streets of Stambul. They were in large white trousers, looking like 'bathers or cricketers,' with 'yellow, orange and black faces.'

## VI

*Our ordnance thunder forth,  
And with the breach's fall, smoke, fire and dust,  
The crack, the echo, and the soldiers' cry  
Make deaf the air, and dim the crystal sky.*

MARLOWE, *Tamburlaine*, Pt. II, Act II, Sc. 4.

Stopford had now to decide on the next move. He was not free from fears of French interruption. Palmerston had

\* This note contains a study of the topography of the campaign.

† *Vide F.O.* 78/398. From Ponsonby, No. 247 of October 28, 1840. Napier characteristically protested that the flag was a 'bogus' one.



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Beit Chebab

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Ardali Heights  
Calat-Meidan Heights

IBRAHIM

706

ahouane

BOMBA  
EV

To Zahle

E OF THE LEBANON  
ING LATE ON 10.OCT



told him that there was 'no intention on the part of France to oppose by force the measures which the Allies have resolved to execute.'<sup>180</sup> But this was in July, and France had become more dangerous in September. He had carried out to the letter the instructions to seize a defensible position on the coast. On October 5 Palmerston instructed him to seize Acre, but with this reservation: 'He [Stopford] should not resolve upon it, unless the prospect of success should be sufficient to justify the undertaking.' Napier of course hints that Stopford hesitated as to the decision, and he might well do so in view of his previous instructions or of this one. Up till October 11 Stopford thought that enterprise forbidden. After that date many claimed the credit of persuading him. But the sturdy old admiral gave no hint of his reasons when he laconically announced to the Admiralty that he had decided 'to proceed on that service.' The ships weighed anchor from Beyrouth on the 31st, just after Palmerston's instruction of October 5 had reached Stopford. They were off Acre on the 2nd, but the winds were too light to bring them in and it was decided to bombard the town at dawn on the next day.

On November 3 the sun rose in unusual splendour over the mighty mount of Carmel. Far beneath it the enormous mosque and huge tower of Djezzar loomed above the walls of Acre. The ships advanced to the attack over waves of azure beneath a sky of turquoise. A strange hush came upon the British sailors, the Mohammedans fell on their knees and turned towards Mecca to pray. The Turkish flagship interrupted the hush with an element of comedy. Despite their fatalism the dervishes on board were found cowering in the lowest part of the hold, beneath the waterline. While the missiles flew thick, a ceremonious Turkish colonel refused to puff his pipe until an English officer had inhaled the first whiff. His pipebearer, a tiny negro boy, grinned from ear to ear with delight as the shells ricocheted through the water, and rubbed his hands as they flew past him in the air. The missiles took off the head of a Greek doctor and killed four Turks. Walker, the Turkish admiral, arrested his gunnery lieutenant for negligence and tore a Turkish decoration from his neck with his own hands. When the fighting began he leant against the mast with 'an air most completely désœuvré.' Selim pasha set an example to his officers by slowly pacing the deck under fire, while Osman pasha retired into a corner and wiped the sweat from his brow. When the day was over Selim allowed Osman to drink his fill of forbidden western liquors in compensation for the risks he had forced him to

run. British sailors were more practical than the Turks. Stopford threw tradition to the winds and abandoned his ponderous flagship for the mobile steamboat *Phoenix*. By this means he was able to cruise up and down and direct all parts of the bombardment.

Owing to contrary winds it was not until nearly two in the afternoon that the ships reached their positions. Then the bombardment began, and, to the amazement of all, the British guns did immediate execution, while the Egyptians fired high. Their chief gunner was a Pole, who had imagined that Stopford's big vessels would not come within the shoal, and had elevated the guns by filling the lower part of the embrasures with sandbags and stones. The British ships at Acre, like the *Condor* at Alexandria, were too near in to be hit. Some of them were lucky. For instance the Turkish flagship 'must have been sunk' had she lain 'a fathom or two either way.' The deadly accuracy of the British guns was aided by the smoke which gathered very thick and blew on to and blinded the Egyptian gunners. The triangle, in which Acre stands, was enfiladed, the Egyptian guns were dismounted from their embrasures, and their crews killed. After over two hours' bombardment an enormous explosion was suddenly heard, like 'the sudden eruption of a volcano.' The ground shook and a huge cloud of smoke mounted slowly to heaven. The arsenal had been fired, over twelve hundred poor wretches blown up, and a space of many thousand yards cleared. Stopford ordered the 'cease fire' 'at sunset, seen blood-red through a dense mass of smoke.'

Napier, as usual, played a lone hand and, for once, without success or popular applause. His conduct alone marred the perfection of the triumph. He first took up a position in the *Powerful* different from that assigned to him, and only the prompt action of Captain Stewart and the intervention of Stopford averted a crisis. This was not his only fault. The *Powerful* went on firing for nearly an hour longer than the others, until the flag-licutenant brought a peremptory order from the admiral. Nothing daunted, Napier visited Stopford at dawn, to express the hope that he had approved his change of position in the fight. 'Not at all,' replied Stopford sternly. 'You ought to have gone on to the south-west angle.' A reproof by a commander-in-chief to his second-in-command on the quarterdeck is rare. But Napier had courted it. He attempted justification, comparing his action to that of Nelson at the battle of the Nile, and demanded a court-martial, which Stopford 'very properly refused.' <sup>181</sup>

The position at dawn on the 4th revealed heaps of dead and dying scattered on the quays, the walls disfigured with enormous breaches, and an universal and melancholy silence. The Turkish admiral Walker landed with three hundred men, but someone was before him. The gallant archduke 'headed a detachment of eighty marines . . . and was the first to enter the citadel where he hoisted with his own hand the flag of His Highness, on the day of St. Charles, the birthday of his illustrious father, which he could not celebrate more worthily.' So ran the servile Austrian despatch. None the less, as the Austrian admiral put it, the archduke had acted 'con molta bravura.'<sup>182</sup> He was not the only one, however. Even Stopford, not given to enthusiasm, spoke of the 'noble' behaviour of his men and 'the beautiful style' of their advance. The success came just in time, for strong winds might soon have forced the ships off the coast. The whole was an interesting and classic example of how ships can beat forts. Though the conditions were formidable, the British owed the success to the excellence of their gunnery. The gunfire of Codrington had destroyed the power of Ibrahim in Greece; that of Stopford destroyed it in Syria.

Acre was a great and authentic victory. 'The moral effect . . . is incalculable. St. Jean d'Acre is regarded as the key of Syria whose inhabitants remember that Ibrahim pasha needed an army of 40,000 men and ten months to take it.'<sup>183</sup> Napoleon himself had failed before a citadel which Stopford had reduced in three hours. Stopford's prudence was equal to his success, for he refused to follow the counsel of Napier and advance into the interior. His duty was to occupy the coast, to garrison the towns he occupied, and to continue the sea-pressure. The effect was soon evident. Ibrahim's power crumbled at its extremities. His troops evacuated Adana, Tarsus, Alexandretta, Aleppo, Jaffa, Jerusalem. Before the end of November Ibrahim had abandoned his rock-fortress of Zahle and taken refuge in Damascus itself.

Some thought, and among these were Napier and Palmerston, that Ibrahim might have been pursued at once into the interior, or harassed on his retreat to Egypt by the desert road east of Jordan. But Stopford judged otherwise and could quote in justification Palmerston's instructions not 'to advance imprudently into the interior.' Sir Charles Smith expressed himself thus late in November: 'Each succeeding victory could only have withdrawn us so much further from our resources without advancing in any degree the cause we have in hand. . . . For the number and the nature of the



troops under my command and the extended line of coast I have to guard compelled me to be strictly on the defensive in the towns already in our possession whilst a forward movement would have been an unmilitary and an unmeaning act of insanity.' Napier had rashly spoken of attacking Zahle, a lofty height crowned by a still virgin fortress. Operations in the interior were dangerous, for the motley character of the troops fitted them much better for defence, and for offensives supported by the navy. Nor does it seem that such action was needed. As Smith wrote, 'So far as regards the sway of Mehemet Ali in Syria I look upon the military part of the question as determined.'<sup>184</sup> If Ibrahim's army was to be annihilated that could only be done by transporting troops to El Arish, where they could oppose and destroy the remnants of his retreating force. But there was no question of doing this in November. Stopford's 'whiff of grapeshot' at Acre had liberated Syria. And in the first days of December Europe had to square that naval success with the diplomatic situation.

## VII

*The Gaul retires for once and all is done.* BYRON.

A diplomatic crisis naturally arose when France heard the news that the Four Powers had concluded a treaty to coerce Mehemet Ali without asking her to sign it. 'The explosion of wrath which occurred at Paris alarmed every statesman except Palmerston.'<sup>\*</sup> This statement is absolutely true, but the story of the dexterity shown by Palmerston at the crisis is one for his biographer. During the dogdays the mercury mounted in the thermometer and blood boiled in the veins of Frenchmen. Armaments increased, but there was no overt act of war and the threats of war began to decline. The crisis was passed early in the month of October. The Dutch minister in London, viewing matters with impartiality, summed them up as follows: 'There are,' he wrote, 'two opinions in the French Cabinet, one for peace and one for war. As will be seen . . . all will keep quiet. Such at least is the opinion of M. Guizot who is persuaded that, whatever happens, everything will remain peaceable and regular.'<sup>185</sup> This was on October 10, and two days later a communication from Thiers of October 3 was presented at London by Guizot. It contained a long refutation of Palmerston's published

\* C. K. Webster, *Brit. Acad. brochure* [1934], 32.

despatches, and a strong protest against the deposition of Mehemet Ali. But Thiers also intimated that he would allow events to decide the fate of Syria. On the whole, the French communication 'astonished' the cabinet by 'its moderation,' and really ended the period of acute danger. Thiers' ministry declined rapidly in popularity and fell. Guizot was recalled on October 24 to head the new ministry. His elderly Egeria, Princess Lieven, remained in London as '*la veuve Guizot*.' But the badness of her temper showed that the game was lost. Palmerston wrote on the 27th: 'The retirement of M. Thiers and his colleagues from office, is a sure pledge to Europe that France is not going to make war in defence of Mehemet Ali.'<sup>186</sup> And events soon proved that he was right.

September had been a busy month at Constantinople. Ponsonby on September 1 declared that Mehemet Ali had rejected the first offer and induced Reschid, the Foreign Minister, to name pashas for every pashalic except Egypt held by Ibrahim or by Mehemet Ali.<sup>187</sup> Ponsonby had these appointments proclaimed on the 2nd, and also published the promise of the Russian Czar to defend Constantinople, at need, with a fleet and an army. By September 10 Ponsonby held that Mehemet Ali had refused the second offer. On the 14th he announced that the Sultan had deposed Mehemet Ali and declared a blockade of Syria and of Egypt. On September 16 Ponsonby recalled Colonel Hodges from Alexandria. On September 23 the four consuls actually left Egypt. The news of these events reached Palmerston by October 6.

By October 15 Palmerston had received news of the successful landing of British and Turks at Djuni and of the arming of the mountaineers of Lebanon. He had already received the fairly moderate French communication of October 3, with its postscript deprecating the deposition of Mehemet Ali. A similar protest against deposition had reached him from Austria. Under these influences he issued his celebrated instruction to Ponsonby of October 15. He intimated that the Sultan should pardon Mehemet Ali if he submitted, that his submission would be proved by his surrendering the Turkish fleet, and by withdrawing from Adana, Syria, Crete and the Holy Cities. In that case England and, as he believed, her allies, would support the reinstatement of Mehemet Ali in Egypt on a hereditary tenure. It was only to be forfeited if he broke the terms of the Convention of July 15.

Though Palmerston had announced on October 15 that he did not desire to depose Mehemet Ali, he was suspected of

that intention by France. To remove these suspicions he directed the Admiralty on November 14 to instruct Sir Robert Stopford to send an officer to communicate with Mehemet Ali. He was to tell him that, if the pasha signified in a written document his acceptance of the conditions laid down in the Ponsonby instruction of October 15, the Four Powers would recommend the Sultan to reinstate him in Egypt. Nothing was said in this instruction as to his hereditary tenure, but Stopford's officer was told not to refuse to receive Mehemet Ali's document if it contained a petition to that effect. A further instruction told Stopford not to relax his efforts for expelling the Egyptians from Syria.

On November 15 Palmerston relieved Sir Charles Smith of his command in Syria on grounds of 'health.' But he took care to tell him that the real reason was his criticism of Napier. Smith had referred to Napier's 'wild usurpations of authority.' Palmerston suggested that Smith might have imitated that 'courage, daring, enterprise, skill and judgment.' He also, most unjustly, attacked Smith for describing the Egyptian evacuation of Tripoli as 'unfortunate.'<sup>188</sup> Smith had taken the military ground that this meant 'the release for active purposes of about five thousand of the enemy's troops.' Palmerston, disregarding this sound logic, declared that 'on the contrary' he rejoiced in such successes. The news of Napier's victories had mounted to the head of Palmerston, and hardened his opposition to Mehemet Ali. That fact, in itself, explains why he did not specifically offer him an hereditary tenure in Egypt on November 14. This attitude of Palmerston provoked much alarm among both his colleagues and his allies and notably excited Metternich.<sup>189</sup> It had also a great effect on Ponsonby. Palmerston's instruction of October 15 advised Ponsonby to urge the hereditary tenure on the Sultan, the instruction of November 14 gave him a loophole for not doing so. And Ponsonby knew how to make use of loopholes.

## VIII

*He that is beaten may be said  
To lie in Honour's truckle-bed.*

BUTLER, *Hudibras*, Pt. 1, c. 3.

Napier, who had astonished the world by his military feats, was now to perplex the Chanceries by his diplomatic exploits. On November 27 the first authentic account of the fall of Acre

reached London. On that very day Mehemet Ali submitted to Napier. But it was not until late on December 7 that the news reached England.\* On the 8th the *Morning Chronicle* published the news together with a violent attack on Mehemet Ali and an assurance that Turkey would regenerate herself. Was it all over, then? In fact it was not all over, and some account of it becomes necessary to explain why.

By November 16 Mehemet Ali had begun to show signs of a desire to settle with the Sultan. On November 22 Napier, who commanded the British naval detachment stationed off Alexandria, sent a communication to Mehemet Ali. His pretext was a demand for the liberation of certain Druse chiefs. But he used it to advise Mehemet Ali to submit, as 'an old sailor' and as 'a great admirer.' Mehemet Ali replied that he was willing to evacuate Syria and restore the fleet on condition that the future position of himself and his family in Egypt was guaranteed by England and her allies. Mehemet Ali expressed well-founded doubts as to the power of his 'great admirer' to give such a guarantee. On the 25th an interview took place and the commodore's bluff self-sufficiency impressed the pasha. A compromise was arranged and a convention was signed on November 27. By Article I Mehemet Ali agreed to order Ibrahim to evacuate Syria immediately, and to restore the Turkish fleet as soon as the Sultan granted him the hereditary jurisdiction in Egypt. The other articles provided for a suspension of hostilities at sea and for the unimpeded retreat of Ibrahim to Egypt.

Napier had negotiated with all his usual arrogance and assurance, and had impressed Mehemet Ali. 'You reckon on your troops and your confidence is illusory, for they abandon you. Look at the plan of its dispositions your officers have given me.'<sup>190</sup> But he was too irresponsible to be a safe negotiator. 'I do not know whether I have done right or not in settling the Eastern Question. . . . The French are in a rage. . . . You have seen me a Lord High Admiral, a Commodore, and a General, I have now turned a negotiator, and have made peace with Mehemet Ali . . . I shall either be hung by the Government or made a Bishop.' That was his account. No sooner was the convention signed than a gale dispersed his squadron and forced it to seek refuge in Marmorice Bay. But this storm was as nothing to that raised in the naval and diplomatic heavens. Ponsonby, enraged because Mehemet Ali was not deposed, wrote a fiery remonstrance. He and his three colleagues at Constantinople concurred with the Sultan

\* The official news did not arrive till the 9th.

in rejecting the convention. Stopford and Sir Charles Smith (who had not yet received his dismissal) anticipated them in refusing to sanction the convention. Stopford sent Captain Fanshawe to Mehemet Ali declaring the convention null and void. 'It was,' he wrote, 'hasty and unauthorized.' In response to Napier's remonstrance Stopford reiterated this opinion and declared the terms of his criticism to be 'perfectly justifiable.'<sup>191</sup>

Napier's abortive convention did harm on the purely military side, and made it more difficult to harass the retreating army of Ibrahim. Mehemet Ali had ordered Ibrahim to evacuate Syria after conferring with Napier. But Napier could not give orders to the Turkish army. Jochmus was now the effective commander of the Turks, and he preferred the 'military style' of Napier in the Lebanon to his diplomatic essays at Alexandria. He incited the Lebanese and the tribes of the Hauran to attack Ibrahim, and moved with his main force on to Jerusalem. He urged Michell to attack Gaza, where was an Egyptian garrison, and Stopford's intervention alone prevented an assault. Ibrahim finally evacuated Damascus on December 30. He moved southwards by the desert road east of Jordan, Arab tribesmen and Lebanese mountaineers harassing his flanks, as flies and mosquitoes draw blood from an animal. By January 3 he had reached Mezerib after losing ten thousand by desertion, straggling or death. Jochmus was determined to prevent his retreat and had reached Jerusalem on January 6. But, on the 17th, when his cavalry were finding touch with Ibrahim's advanced posts, he received definite evidence of the submission of Mehemet Ali and suspended hostilities.<sup>192</sup> It was well for Ibrahim that he did so. That commander had not much over half of a disorganised army, though he still had over a hundred guns. His men had wandered half-starved in the desert and, struggling up in isolated columns, would have been overwhelmed by the army of Jochmus before they reached El Arish. During this retreat he had lost over eighteen thousand men.<sup>193</sup>

A last glance may be given at Ibrahim as his army straggled into Gaza 'in great disorder.' An excellent judge thought 'two hundred determined cavalry' would have swept through the part of the army which he saw. The troops had been feeding on mule and donkey flesh and been without water for three days. Ibrahim's own horse had not had its feed of barley that day. Ibrahim had caused his Egyptians to bivouac among the Syrians to prevent their desertion. Rose produced a letter from Mehemet Ali and gave it to Ibrahim himself.



He read it with signs of some agitation, 'his camel-rider, and chief groom were also endeavouring to read it over his shoulder.' Ibrahim recovered himself and engaged in a rough banter. He jeered at Turkish officials as corrupt and Turkish rule as weak. 'I am the only man,' he said, 'to manage the Arabs and Bedouins . . . I could and did cut off their heads, which the Turks never will do.' He sneered at Palmerston and Ponsonby. 'He was either affecting high spirits, or . . . had been drinking too much. He drank frequently from a bottle, which hung in front of his saddle, and I was informed by an Egyptian colonel of artillery, that it was filled with claret. He talked and laughed constantly with his servants. He is now suffering under a very bad attack of the jaundice, his eyes and head being quite yellow.'<sup>194</sup>

The fate of defeated conquerors in the East is hard. A vanquished despot is despised as a victorious one is applauded. Failure, not tyranny, is the crime. Ibrahim, who had drunk so deep of victory, now tasted the bitterness of defeat. He passed through Gaza, heavy with drink and yellow with jaundice, saluting no one and saluted by none, amid a silence of hatred. 'Not a tongue nor a heart blessed him.' As Ibrahim rode away from Gaza he rode away from history. His victories were over, his fame was dimmed. There was still a Mehemet Ali, but there was no longer an Ibrahim.

On December 6 Stopford, following the spirit of Palmerston's instructions of November 14, sent Captain Fanshawe to Alexandria. On December 8 Fanshawe interviewed Mehemet Ali. He declined to ratify Napier's convention, demanded Mehemet Ali's unconditional submission and the immediate surrender of a part of the Turkish fleet. Fanshawe finally withdrew on the 9th, having in his possession a letter of Mehemet Ali's. The letter contained a promise to evacuate Adana, Arabia and the Holy Places as well as Crete, and stated that Syria was already evacuated. It also gave a written promise to restore the fleet. A second letter of Mehemet Ali's ordered his governor of Crete to evacuate the island. In a third document Mehemet Ali informed his provincial governors that 'the stars were from the beginning unfavourable to my late efforts,' that 'chance entirely rules the world,' and that 'the will of God is the first great cause.' Fanshawe considered these 'somewhat equivocal terms' to be satisfactory evidence of unconditional submission.<sup>195</sup>

On December 8 the *Morning Chronicle* proclaimed 'the

submission of Mehemet Ali.' Palmerston did not receive full official information as to Napier's action until the 14th. On the next day he issued his instructions to the Admiralty. He approved Napier's convention, subject to action on the part of Stopford. But he made a reservation on one point. He refused to endorse the demand that 'The Four Powers should guarantee' to Mehemet Ali 'the hereditary government of Egypt.' That would constitute 'a standing interference by the Four Powers in the internal affairs of the 'Turkish Empire' and destroy 'its independence.' In the main he approved Napier's action. He could hardly do otherwise, for Napier had in fact been stimulated by private letters from Palmerston himself and Lord Minto. Not until January 16, 1841, did Palmerston receive the news of Stopford having procured Mehemet Ali's unconditional submission. But he ended the year in the sweet consciousness of a great and decisive victory not only over Mehemet Ali and France, but over his colleagues in the cabinet.<sup>196\*</sup>

\* This note deals with omissions and suppressions in the Blue Books of this period ; cp. also n. 297.

## CHAPTER V

### THE YEAR OF EUROPE, 1841

PAGE : *What shall be done with him ?*

*What is your plot ?*

MRS. PAGE : *That likewise have we thought upon.*

MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR, Act IV, Sc. 4.

## I

THE year 1841 marked the end of the Eastern and of the Anglo-French crises. In each case Europe intervened with effect. Mehemet Ali bowed before the Four Powers, France joined them in an international treaty, thus re-entering the concert of Europe as soon as the Eastern question was settled. Russia looked to that concert to restrain England, England looked to it to restrain Russia. Europe had become a necessity, she had reconciled the Powers, and was the pledge of their harmony in the future.

The negotiations, whereby the Four Powers reconciled Mehemet Ali with the Sultan, differed from those which brought back France into the European sheepfold. The first negotiations were, in reality, more difficult than the last. Delay might destroy the Sultan's feeble and decadent empire, but delay did not endanger France's return to the comity of nations. War with France, if feared in the autumn of 1840, was not feared in the ensuing spring. France was really anxious to resume her place in the councils of the Great Powers, and the only questions were those of time and circumstance.

Ponsonby was the real difficulty in reconciling Egypt with Turkey. He had the Sultan's ear, and the gift of inspiring Turks with energy, but was prejudiced, narrow and a fanatical enemy of Mehemet Ali. Fanshawe arrived at Constantinople on December 18 with Mehemet Ali's letter to the Grand Vizier. On the 20th Reschid summoned the representatives of the Four Powers to consider whether Mehemet Ali's submission could be accepted. Three allied representatives voted for acceptance ; Ponsonby abstained, declaring it to be

a matter for the Sultan alone, to whom he refused to offer advice. Thus the intention of the allied representatives to put into force the British memorandum of November 14 (which would have settled all) was defeated by the British representative. The Sultan declared on December 27 that he considered the submission adequate, providing the conditions of evacuation were complete. Meanwhile he would send commissioners to Alexandria to receive the Turkish fleet. But before the end of the year the Sultan, doubtless encouraged by Ponsonby, showed pretty clearly that he did not mean to grant Mehemet Ali the hereditary tenure.

Even Palmerston did not altogether approve of Ponsonby's action when he heard of it. He wrote him a mild reproof, of which Queen Victoria 'highly approved.'<sup>197</sup> Ponsonby answered truculently, 'I think I acted right.' Metternich was furious. He suspected Palmerston of wishing to abolish the hereditary tenure and of having a secret understanding with Ponsonby to that effect. He complained of the consequent anarchy, and that Ponsonby's disobedience in one direction supplemented Napier's in another. 'Everyone commands, no one obeys,' wrote Metternich. 'When by chance anyone carries out an order he is regarded as an imbecile. That is in fact the role assigned to old Stopford by the *Morning Chronicle*.' 'Lord Ponsonby turns about in a vicious circle.' 'The second P. [Palmerston] plays his game, like a bold gambler and up till now a lucky one.'<sup>198</sup> Metternich gave his representative at Constantinople the strongest instructions to press for the hereditary tenure. He was a little appeased on receiving the note of January 30 addressed by Palmerston and his three allies to Chekib in London. For that definitely committed the Four Powers to advocating the unequivocal grant of Egypt to Mehemet Ali with hereditary tenure in the direct male line.

Early in January Stürmer, the Austrian representative, revealed his instructions to Ponsonby. But the latter, still irreconcilable, refused to press for the hereditary tenure, and declared that doubts were still entertained as to Mehemet Ali's submission. If so they were not entertained by his colleagues, who were determined to end the matter. The Austrian, Prussian and Russian representatives delivered a joint demand for the hereditary tenure (January 9). Ponsonby at first resisted, but on the 10th he received Palmerston's strong despatch of December 17. This completed his conversion and he joined the others in their demand. On January 12 the Sultan issued a *Hatti-Sheriff* announcing that Mehemet Ali would be restored to the hereditary governorship of Egypt, on surrender of

the Turkish fleet and on evacuation of the specified territories. Ponsonby on February 4 opposed the amount of tribute fixed and thus obstructed final settlement. The *firman* ultimately granted on February 13 was, according to Ponsonby, 'a half-measure.' It professed to grant the hereditary tenure to Mehemet Ali, but in reality gave the Sultan the choice of his successor. 'It leaves the patronage of Egypt in the hands of the pasha without any real control over the abuse of his power.' There were other irritating provisions, all of which had been 'concealed' from Ponsonby and other ambassadors.\* But the Sultan would hardly have ventured on his 'half-measure' at all, unless he had hoped that Ponsonby secretly approved it. Difficulties were caused at Alexandria by another equally turbulent British representative. But this one admired Mehemet Ali as much as Ponsonby hated him. Napier at Alexandria was all in favour of Mehemet Ali. 'He is certainly a most wonderful man and has done a great deal for Egypt—but is a little in the style of Peter the Great. . . . He is our natural ally and we are his. . . . I am very great friends with the gentleman at present.'<sup>199</sup> Napier's attitude ensured that Mehemet Ali would reject the Sultan's equivocal *firman* of February 13.

On March 5 the Four Powers' representatives, assembled at London, declared that Mehemet Ali had fulfilled the conditions laid down and that their consuls could return to Cairo. They reinforced these views in a note to Chekib on the 13th. On March 16 Palmerston embodied them in a strong despatch to Constantinople. Ponsonby was to see that the hereditary succession was secured, though each successor was to receive his appointment from the Sultan. Similarly the tribute was to be reduced and concessions made as to military appointments. On March 26 Palmerston wrote to Granville saying that, in his view, the *firman* of February 13 was not evasive. But on April 2 it was known that Mehemet Ali, in a letter delivered to the Porte on March 7, had refused the greater part of the Sultan's conditions. He objected to the Sultan's demand to choose his successor, and desired that the eldest male should succeed. He showed a clear intention of evading the other provisions, as to execution of the *Gulhané* decree, the reduction of his military forces, and the fixed amount of tribute. The whole question was thus reopened.

\* Ponsonby was wrongly regarded in Egyptian and French circles as responsible for the *firman* of February 13, 1841. Cp. Driault IV, Nos. 79, 85.



## II

*Solitude sometimes is best society  
And short retirement urges sweet return.*

MILTON, *Paradise Lost*, Book 4.

By mid-March the Four Powers had not succeeded in settling Mehemet Ali's affairs, but they had taken a long step towards reconciling themselves with France. All followed on the overture made in the second week of November 1840 which Palmerston had pressed upon Bourqueney. 'Events have decided [the fate of] Syria, but there is still the general European question. On this the British Cabinet cannot sufficiently deplore that it has been for a moment separated from France nor sufficiently express the wish to resume their old relations of confidence and friendship with her.' Bad feeling was temporarily aroused by one of Palmerston's controversial despatches directed in the first instance to Thiers, but, owing to his fall, received and resented by Guizot. Palmerston explained away his despatch, and caused Bourqueney to remark, 'it is long since Palmerston has shown himself so gentle—I could almost say caressing in his language.'<sup>200</sup> Under the influence of this feeling Palmerston wrote his instruction of November 14 to the Admiralty, promising the restoration of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, and told France. On the 25th Guizot, responding to Thiers, said France would insist on Mehemet Ali remaining in Egypt, but curiously said no more about Syria. England obviously wanted to be reconciled to France, as Melbourne, Russell and Lansdowne assured her representative. Late in December Louis Philippe sent a message through Granville trusting that 'the relations which formerly subsisted between the European Powers and France would ere long be re-established.'

During the first days of 1841 Bourqueney was entertained by Palmerston at Broadlands along with Esterházy and Brunnow. There an agreement for the closing of the Straits was discussed. It seemed *maigre* to Bourqueney and 'the question of the Christian populations of Syria and the search of means to assure them protection encountered a decided adversary in Lord Palmerston,' who a year ago had been 'so ardent in this sense.' Now he was tender to his 'new [Turkish] Ally.'<sup>201</sup> The ice had been broken, however. Bourqueney said 'we have two months before us,' *i.e.* before formalities are

required. At the end of January Neumann and Esterházy both assured Bourqueney that they were putting pressure on Palmerston to abandon Ponsonby and restore Mehemet Ali. By February 13 Guizot was instructing Bourqueney that France was disposed to sanction the principle of closure of the Straits in common with other powers. But he made lofty stipulations. 'In inviting us into the Councils of Europe, they must speak to us neither of disarmament, nor attach conditions to our return.'<sup>202</sup> He hinted also at concessions to protect the Syrians, and at provisions to ensure the free transport of commerce along both the course of the Euphrates and the isthmus of Suez.

On March 9 Palmerston showed Bourqueney three documents approved by the Four Powers and by Turkey. Protocol A was that of March 5, providing for the return of the consuls to Egypt. This did not concern France save as a proof that the Egyptian question was finished. Protocol B provided for a proposal to be made to France as to the Straits. A draft convention providing for closure of the Straits was to be signed by France as well as Turkey and the four other powers. Bourqueney, in reporting this, declared that Guizot's principles had been respected. The first overture was made by the powers to France. No sanction was given to the treaty of July 15, 1840; no conditions were made as to France joining the others.<sup>203</sup> Guizot replied by insisting on a few verbal corrections, which were accepted.<sup>204</sup> At the last moment, however, difficulties arose over Mehemet Ali once more. The result was that on the 13th Guizot instructed Bourqueney to initial (*parapher*) the Convention, but not to sign it. The initialling was done on March 15.

### III

*We are convented upon a pleasing treaty  
And have hearts inclinable to honour.*

CORIOLANUS, Act II, Sc. 2.

As was usual at Constantinople a palace intrigue supervened to increase the difficulties of diplomats. Reschid, the most European of the ministers, was replaced by Rifaat at the Foreign Office. Ahmed Fethi, who was not without common-sense, gave way to Said pasha at the ministry of commerce. The changes were all in favour of stupidity and reaction and made the Sultan less likely to pardon Mehemet Ali. Palmer-

ston did not hear of Reschid's fall and the consequent complications until April 17. But he had already been powerfully impressed by France's attitude. She had initialled the Straits Convention instead of signing it, because she considered that the Egyptian question was still unsettled. Palmerston determined to remove that pretext at once. On April 10 he wrote a strong despatch to Ponsonby informing him that, on some points, Mehemet Ali was 'clearly and decidedly in the wrong,' though on others he has 'reason on his side.'<sup>205</sup> But it was necessary to finish. Now here Palmerston certainly differed from Ponsonby, who wished to use Mehemet Ali's refusal of the *firman* of February 13 as an excuse for deposing him. Palmerston added that he disapproved of Ponsonby's suggestion that the Sultan should break off communications with Mehemet Ali. The London Conference would not separate until the question was settled. Other powers had favoured separation 'apparently in compliance with wishes privately expressed to those governments by the government of France.' But all were in fact now agreed on 'the extreme urgency' of 'a final settlement.' Brunnow spoke of 'the dangers of delay' and Esterházy was 'for the first time . . . convinced that Lord Palmerston wants to finish.'<sup>206</sup> The Prussian government indeed announced that it looked upon the treaty of July as terminated. To this suggestion Palmerston tartly replied, 'a question cannot be really finished merely by saying that it is so' (April 21). His fears of Prussia's timidity were in fact groundless, but they show at once his firmness and his restless irritation with her.

Metternich at this period was more cool and wary than Palmerston. He could afford to be so because he was relatively detached. He did not share 'the anxiety of London' about Guizot's delay in signing the Straits Convention. A declaration in London would not, of course, finish the Egyptian affair. But 'this affair being once closed, the second affair, which may be termed the isolation of France, will cease of itself.'<sup>207</sup> When she signed the initialled Convention, it would be a proof that the Egyptian question really was ended. Ponsonby, whom Metternich so detested and decried, was at last working to achieve that object. If he had not been loyal to his home government before, he was loyal now. Ponsonby received Palmerston's instructions of March 16 and began vigorously to carry them out. He induced the Porte on April 14 to concede that the government of Egypt should be inherited by the eldest son, that military appointments of all Egyptian officers below the rank of brigadier should be made by Mehemet Ali,

that the amount of tribute should be reduced.<sup>208</sup> These concessions in fact anticipated the demands of the Four Powers made in their note to Chekib Effendi of May 10. Finally on May 22 the four representatives at Constantinople declared that they had no objection to the new *firman* which the Sultan proposed to issue. Some days elapsed before the *firman* was issued. But finally on June 1 it was sent to Alexandria. It revoked the ambiguous *firman* of February 13 and made all the concessions demanded by the Four Powers. Palmerston received the news of the issue of the *firman* on June 24, and of Mehemet Ali's acceptance and submission on July 8. It was the end of everything. Within less than a year after the signature of the treaty of July 15 Palmerston had broken the power of Mehemet Ali and forced him to sign the witness of his own defeat. The victory was complete, and Mehemet Ali was left with nothing but the memory of his former greatness.

Palmerston had no certain prospect of success in the Egyptian affair until the last week of June, and no assurance of it until July 8. During May and June anxious moments were passed in negotiating with France. Metternich argued that the whole affair was practically finished and Palmerston repeated this suggestion to Bourqueney. Thus on May 23 Palmerston told him 'all was over,' and asked when France would sign the convention she had already initialled. 'We shall do nothing *à cinq*,' answered Bourqueney, 'before having the peremptory certainty that there is no longer anything diplomatically or materially possible *à quatre*, as a result of the July treaty.' The treaty, from which France had been excluded, must be dead before France signed a new instrument. Palmerston said the treaty was 'in fact extinguished.' But, as Bourqueney explained, Guizot could not sign with such an explanation. It was impossible because of 'parliamentary and other domestic considerations,' reported Palmerston.<sup>209</sup>

Metternich was in despair, for Palmerston could not give so exact a pledge as the French wanted unless and until the whole affair was ended. Indeed, 'upon a closer examination,' Palmerston suspected the reason of the French refusal to sign. He thought that, if the allies declared the Egyptian affair finished, France intended that Mehemet Ali should have it both ways. He would profit at once by his refusal to accept the *firman* of February 13, and by the Sultan's concessions. In future 'France would step in and remonstrate on behalf of Mehemet Ali, saying to the Sultan that the Four Powers had in 1841 deliberately and purposely absolved Mehemet Ali from those conditions of the Treaty of July

1840.' <sup>210</sup> These perhaps over-subtle suspicions were opposed by perhaps over-sensitive scruples. 'You must sign the protocol first,' said Bourqueney on June 24. 'I cannot,' said Palmerston, 'sign a piece which begins by declaring difficulties removed, which probably are going to be, but are not yet.' 'And we,' said Bourqueney, 'regard you as bound by the initialling of your protocol, as much as we are ourselves by our initialling of the Convention. One with the other, at once; one without the other, never!' 'You are consistent,' said Palmerston. <sup>211</sup>

Consistency does not beget compromise, and the deadlock seemed complete. Guizot commended Bourqueney, and Esterházy vainly tried to turn him from his purpose. At last Guizot surrendered on hearing the news of Mehemet Ali's final submission. 'Do absolutely nothing,' he wrote in a postscript to a despatch of July 1, 'to adjourn the signature of the initialled acts. Follow my previous instructions and sign as soon as they ask you, after having signed the eventual protocol.' <sup>212</sup> On the 4th, just after he had received this news, Palmerston, when going to the cabinet, met Esterházy. He told him that the submission of Mehemet Ali was satisfactory and that the acts would be signed as soon as an official confirmation arrived. This came on the 8th. On the 10th a protocol was signed by the representatives of the Four Powers and by Chekib, to the effect that the 'difficulties had been removed' and that Mehemet Ali had submitted in accordance with the Convention of July 15. Hence France was now invited to sign the Straits Convention. She did not delay very long. On July 13 she signed it in conjunction with the other powers. Guizot expressed himself as 'fully satisfied' and ratified the instrument a month later. In this way he closed a chapter in European history which Thiers had unwisely opened. Metternich said that 'the attitude of France would have been quite different if M. Guizot had been at the head of affairs during 1839-40.' He summed up the situation with this diplomat's epigram: 'The isolation of a great power is always the result of a fault committed by it.' <sup>213</sup>

#### IV

*The fingers of the powers above do tune  
The harmony of this peace.*

CYMBELINE, Act V, Sc. 5.

The Straits Convention marked the culmination of a long period of struggle. Two general principles emerge from it,



excluding the particular question of the Straits. The first is that Russia's rights under the Treaties of Kutchuk Kainardji, Adrianople and Akerman remained, but that her special position under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi disappeared. Even during 1839-40 she had consented to agreements with other powers (which virtually abrogated any such special rights), and had concerted measures with Europe. The position became clearer still in 1841 as the Straits Convention came near. 'After the Syrian campaign there was a distinct understanding between us and the Russian Government that if we could bring the other Powers, France especially, to enter into those engagements as to closing the Dardanelles in time of peace, which England alone had up to that time subscribed to by the Treaty of 1809, Russia would let the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi expire, and would not renew it, Russia professing to be satisfied with the security which the closing of the Straits would afford her. I am sure that Brunnow will not deny this understanding.\*' So Palmerston in 1853, and there can be no doubt that he represents the substance of a well-understood agreement.<sup>214</sup> As soon as the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi expired, which it did in the autumn of 1841, the Great Powers as a whole, and not Russia alone, took Turkey under their protection.

None the less, as Professor Webster has pointed out, there was no intention of falling in with Metternich's views and giving a territorial or general guarantee to Turkey. He at least had not profited 'from the experiences of the last two years.' And it is surprising that he had not. During April and May 1841 he kept suggesting to Palmerston a self-denying ordinance by England, France, Austria and Prussia 'in no case to accept any aggrandizement at the expense of the Turkish Empire and to complete these acts by the accession of Russia to them.' † To this suggestion Palmerston returned a refusal because he knew Russia would not consent to deprive herself of the chance of annexing Turkish territory in future.<sup>215</sup> She never had done so in the past, at any rate for any long period of time. A second proposal was to make Vienna 'a central point of concert . . . from whence instructions should from time to time be sent to the representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople.' To this second proposal Palmerston was equally hostile on the ground that Austria's action

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, April 10, 1853.

† Webster, *Brit. Acad. brochure* [1934], 34-5, from *F.O. Austria* 7/297, 298, 299. Cp. also *W.S.A. Weisungen nach England*, 306. Metternich to Esterházy, No. 2 of May 26, 1841.

had been too wavering and uncertain, 'in regard to the Turco-Egyptian question,' to inspire confidence. Both therefore dropped.

Self-denying ordinance and permanent concert were thus ruled out. But, while there was no guarantee, there were certain pledges given by the Four Powers in July 1840, and by the Five Powers (including France) in July 1841. The Four Powers in the preamble of 1840 were 'animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe,' and they did actually authorise armed action for the purpose against a rebel. In 1841 these Four Powers, with France in addition, spoke of 'their union and their agreement' in recognising the Sultan's decision to uphold the old rule of closure for the Straits in peace time as 'the most certain pledge of general peace,' and thus gave 'to the Sultan a manifest proof of the respect which they entertain for the inviolability of his sovereign rights, as well as their sincere desire to see consolidated the repose of his Empire.' Now this is, in neither case, a guarantee. The terms of 1840 (in which Russia concurred) mention 'the integrity and independence' of Turkey, and those of 1841 'the inviolability of his sovereign rights.' Thus the terms of 1840 were warmer than those of 1841, and Stratford, in his diplomatic correspondence, preferred to refer to those of 1840 as limiting the encroachment of Russia, though of course they did not bind France. But British Foreign Ministers up to 1853 generally refer to those of 1841, though the terms are distinctly weaker. There is certainly no guarantee and the pledges are hardly specific. But two points may be taken as established. First, the violation of the integrity of Turkey was henceforth a matter which concerned Europe, that is the Five Powers. Secondly, the Straits Convention itself—that is the closure of the Straits—could not be abrogated without summoning the Five Powers to conference.

The provisions of the Straits Convention were few but weighty. The preamble stated that the Five Powers desired harmony as the most certain pledge of general peace, the most constant object of their solicitude, and mentioned the recognition of the closure of the Straits as an example of that view.

Article I declared the Sultan's intention of maintaining the invariable ancient rule of the empire, to forbid the warships of foreign powers to enter either Dardanelles or Bosphorus, and that 'so long as His Highness is at peace he will admit no foreign vessels of war [*batimens de guerre*] within the said Straits.'

The Five Powers engaged to respect this principle. Article II excepted from the closure of the Straits 'light vessels' (*bâtiments légers*) under flag of war, employed in the service of the legations of friendly powers.

The Convention was claimed by Palmerston as a victory for England, in that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi expired soon after and that Russia could thenceforward no longer send her ships down the Bosphorus to Constantinople. Paradoxically Russia claimed an equal victory, in that England could not pass the Dardanelles as it had recently been thought she might do. On one point England had prevailed. Russia had tried to make the closure 'part of the public law of Europe.' Palmerston very rightly insisted that it was 'the ancient rule of the Turkish Empire.' He was plainly right in this contention, for the Straits, being less than six miles wide at many points, were within the territorial jurisdiction of the Sultan. But the contention was advantageous to England.

Russia would have liked to close the Straits in war as well as in peace. In this manner she would have been entirely protected against England, whose ships could under no circumstances enter the Black Sea. But neither Palmerston nor Metternich favoured this suggestion. In war time every treaty is torn up, so that England, if invited by the Sultan, could enter the Straits. But in peace time an invitation was necessary, and the lack of it might easily have put England in a difficulty. Whether the Sultan could, in fact, dispense from 'the ancient rule' and allow a war vessel to enter in peace time was to be a matter of dispute in the future, but not apparently at the time. Such dispensation seemed to require not only the permission of the Sultan but of the signatory powers. The passage of a single warship might perhaps be regarded as an exception<sup>216</sup>; the definition of 'light vessels'<sup>217</sup> permitted some latitude, but the despatch of 'a whole fleet' or even a substantial part of it could not be contemplated.<sup>218</sup>

The question of whether the Straits were closed to warships in peace time, both at the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, was real and vital. Stopford had just shown that even a well-manned and well-armed fortress had to yield to ships' guns. But the forts of the Bosphorus were not well armed. A British artillery officer had just reported that he 'could not conceive anything more wretched than the state of the batteries on both Straits. . . . I can assure Your Lordship that a Russian Fleet might surprise Constantinople whenever it pleased. It requires not only skill, but promptitude in every

battery to secure a victory over a fleet.' <sup>219</sup> But the Russians were, in this case, not anxious to open, but to seal, the Straits. They were ready to give up entering the Bosphorus themselves if they could close the Dardanelles to British and French ships. They thought that they had succeeded in doing so. Nicholas had 'the full conviction that the Porte, as guardian of the Straits will not fail scrupulously to fulfil its engagements. He was convinced that it will never . . . allow their [the Great Powers'] warships to pass the Straits.' Nesselrode made the point even clearer ten years later. 'The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, though annulled to all appearance, has been really perpetuated under another form. The new act, which has replaced it and been recognized by all the powers, forbids foreign warships to enter the Dardanelles, and assures us henceforth against all naval attack.' <sup>220</sup> So much for Russia.

Palmerston was anxious himself to prevent Russia from entering the Straits. He had good reason. Russian ships just inside the Bosphorus threatened the capital : British ships just inside the Dardanelles did not do so. But it is most important to observe that Palmerston thought the terms could be evaded by England. On August 6, 1841, he thus instructed the British Ambassador at Constantinople : 'There might indeed be a question whether the Convention concluded on the 13th of July last would admit of a British squadron passing up to Constantinople even at the invitation of the Porte. But Her Majesty's Government do not think that the Convention of July 13th would prevent the Turkish Government from calling upon Great Britain for naval aid, if it chose to do so, to maintain tranquillity in the capital, though the Convention in question might justify other Powers, as Russia and France, in demanding to be admitted also to take their share in the assistance to be afforded to the Porte.' <sup>221</sup> In the last clause we see Palmerston fearing that his own evasion might be used by other powers as well. This consideration seems to have been the only restraint upon British statesmen. Thus, in the year 1853, both France and England put forward an interpretation of the Convention which would have allowed them to evade it altogether. Walewski, then French Ambassador in England, stated that the preamble 'assigned a general and elevated aim [to the Five Powers] in view of which the prohibition of the Straits to foreign military flags was a secondary and special guarantee. Lord Clarendon [British Foreign Secretary] admits that such was in fact the spirit of the treaty of 1841, but

he doubted if the other signatories would consent to the same interpretation.' <sup>222</sup> (The case hardly arose in 1853, for the Franco-British squadron entered the Straits only one day before hostilities began, and after Turkey had already declared war on Russia.) But this rather sinister interpretation was not that of Russia or of Austria either in 1841 or a dozen years later. It was that of perfidious Albion and of perfidious Gaul.

At a moment of crisis Clarendon was prepared to send up the British fleet in defiance of the Convention, using urgency or the Turkish request as the plea. Aberdeen, the most backward of British statesmen as Palmerston was the most forward, expressed a similar view. 'Unwilling as I have always been to do anything approaching to a violation of the Treaty of 1841. . . . The urgency is sufficient to dispense with all obligations,' and again, 'The safety of human life and especially of the [Turkish] sovereign puts an end to all lesser obligations for the time being.' <sup>223</sup> Thus, if the crisis were great enough, Aberdeen would violate the Straits in time of peace. It is also a matter of historic importance that Cowley, when minister at Constantinople, proposed a secret convention with Turkey which would have allowed England to enter the Dardanelles. Stratford did not apparently support this proposition. But he subsequently proposed an alliance which could hardly have failed to bring about the same result in the end. Palmerston refused to listen to either suggestion and thus averted this particular danger. But on October 7, 1849, Palmerston told Stratford not to send the Franco-British squadrons through the Straits 'unless there were a real necessity,' thus contemplating such an entrance. It seems, therefore, that every British statesman was ready to enter the Straits by one way or another.

These projects of British statesmen to open the Dardanelles to themselves in emergency, or by a secret agreement with Turkey, were against the letter and spirit of the Straits Convention. Russia probably knew of some of them and, whether she did or not, a wide cleavage arose in practice between her and England. This cleavage accentuated the danger due to a most serious and important, though unforeseen, result of the Straits Convention. All the provisions prevented Russia from letting her fleet emerge from the Black Sea. Hence she could only use it against Turkey. None of the provisions prevented Russia from increasing her fleet, and her desire to do so increased with every suspicion of England's desire to enter the Dardanelles. The increase in itself was full of danger. For as Russia's fleet grew Constantinople appeared its natural



objective, and the Turkish Empire became more the natural enemy than ever. Europe had no means of averting the increase of Russia's fleet, though every such increase portended friction and danger. Hence Europe had imposed peace for a moment, but imposed a peace full of danger. A peace which stimulated Russia to increase her fleet inside the Black Sea and England and Turkey to increase their fleets outside it was unlikely to last long. For such a peace had in it the seeds of war. It is remarkable that the peace, which signalled co-operation between England and Russia, ultimately drove the two powers to make war upon one another. And when war came England found France on her side against Russia.

## EPILOGUE

### ‘ BURYING ALL UNKINDNESS ’

*France and England, whose very shores turn pale  
With envy of each other's happiness,  
May cease their hatred.*

HENRY V, Act V, Sc. 2.

THE breach between England and France was almost healed. ‘ Last year,’ said Guizot at Lisieux on August 22, 1841, ‘ France was uneasy, Europe was uneasy. All the appearances of a revolutionary war were in prospect. Nevertheless there existed no legitimate motive for war, no great interest required it or even rendered it advisable.’ Then he thrust at Thiers, ‘ How did we escape from so critical a situation ? The King availing himself firmly of his prerogative, changed his ministry.’ The new cabinet adopted ‘ a policy which was truly that of the *juste milieu*, the wisdom of which was acknowledged, but the instability and failure of which were predicted. But it has lasted, it has succeeded. Peace has been maintained without a sacrifice of our dignity. France has been wise and calm, she comprehended that neither her honour nor her interest prescribed armaments which were more than precautionary, nor a more than temporary isolation. Europe has been strengthened and warned.’<sup>224</sup> Peel, who had just won the election and was to head the new government, at once grasped this olive-branch. He declared Guizot’s speech ‘ deserving of the character of a great statesman. I have seen, I repeat, with great satisfaction M. Guizot’s frank declaration that he rejoices in the prospect of friendly relations between France and the other powers of Europe.’<sup>225</sup>

The words of Peel and Guizot closed a long and painful controversy. But the memories and the scars remained. Half a generation later Palmerston referred to Bourée thus : ‘ [He] is a diplomat of the Louis Philippe and Guizot school and will be troublesome wherever he goes.’\* France had learned her lesson too. During her dispute with Russia about the Holy Places Napoleon and his ministers told England that

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, October 1, 1855.

they could not yield. France had done so in 1840 and Louis Philippe's dynasty had perished in consequence; but Napoleon's dynasty would not perish for lack of firmness. So the events of 1840 contributed in no small degree to the outbreak of war in 1854.

BRUTUS :           *Give me a bowl of wine.*  
                       *In this I bury all unkindness, Cassius.* [Drinks.]  
 CASSIUS : *My heart is thirsty for that noble pledge.*

JULIUS CAESAR, Act IV, Sc. 3.

What remains to tell of the once-invincible pasha and of his valorous son comes from informal records. The first of these tells of a great dinner given to Sir Robert Stopford at Portsmouth on August 5, 1841. The band played 'See the conquering hero comes,' and the Mayor credited Stopford with all the Christian virtues as well as with all the gifts for naval command. He even went so far as to anticipate his death, and say 'give us another Stopford.' In acknowledging thanks the admiral paid a generous tribute to Napier and also to other officers, explaining that the nature of the success had favoured local and dispersed activities. 'Whenever concentrated services were wanted as at Beyrouth and Acre, there I was in person.' His success was due to 'a mighty providence' and to the good condition of the weather, 'which alone enabled us to bring our labours to a successful issue.' \* Napier, who was also present, thanked the admiral for having given him the opportunity to distinguish himself, but added that his own lessons in war had been learned from Wellington at Busaco. The note of all the speeches was that only British valour could have vanquished Ibrahim.

A year later 'the young Austrian Archduke, who was at Acre,' visited London and Palmerston was 'much pleased with his manners and appearance.' Then at last, four years later still, in 1846 came Ibrahim himself on a long visit. He had been well received in France, but was the centre of interest in England. He watched the races at Ascot in a gorgeous scarlet uniform and scarlet cap. He listened to sermons from missionaries and from protectors of aborigines. He visited factories in the North, engineering shops in London and the arsenal at Woolwich. He was as much admired in London society as Garibaldi half a generation later. One particular evening glowed in the memory of diners-out, a

\* *Morning Chronicle*, July 4, 1846. The banquet was on the 3rd.

dinner at the Reform Club. This masterpiece of the famous *chef*, Soyer, was described as 'one of the best entertainments any club ever gave.' Ibrahim was welcomed by Sir Charles Napier in the chair and by Palmerston, who had just again become Foreign Secretary. Napier referred to Mehemet Ali flamboyantly as the most enlightened of rulers. Palmerston, who did not approve of such a description, preferred to emphasise 'the force of his own services and the strength of his own character,' which had raised Mehemet Ali from the dust. 'As a minister, if not of the late, at least of a late, administration,' he explained blandly, 'I had been called to take steps which might appear hostile to Mehemet Ali.' Yet the pasha had been 'a most generous foe' and had 'a worthy representative in our illustrious guest.' To complete the comedy, Ibrahim replied, through his interpreter, that he wished a 'close alliance' between Egypt and England. He recollected little else of the banquet, for the wines of the West proved too much for the conqueror of the East. Ibrahim also appeared at the Mansion House, where he was eulogised by Lord John Russell, the new premier. His last function was a grand private banquet where Palmerston solemnly proposed his health to the diplomatic corps. On July 15 he took a formal farewell of the Turkish Embassy, where the *chargé d'affaires* knelt and kissed his foot. The next day he left Waterloo station, passing, like Agamemnon, over crimson carpets.

In 1846 Mehemet Ali himself had visited Constantinople, where he distributed a quarter of a million pounds in largesse. The town of his birthplace, Cavalla, also saw him for the last time. Palmerston told him he would be warmly welcomed in England, but his tour had exhausted his last energies and he refused with regret. The next year Mehemet Ali became both senile and demented and Ibrahim assumed control. In 1848 he visited Constantinople, to obtain the investiture of Egypt and to reign in his father's stead. Ibrahim spoke 'with great admiration of the French,' wrote Stratford. 'England is not much in favour with him.' By lavish bribes he accomplished his object and returned to Egypt with a full investiture. It profited him little. He 'looked wretchedly ill' and 'coughed at times violently.'<sup>226</sup> The seeds of death were already in him and he died in November, having enjoyed power for a few brief weeks. A year later came the death of the father whom Ibrahim had deposed and succeeded. In the graves of these two men were buried the pride, the hopes, and the future of Egypt.





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# BOOK III

## THE FRUITS OF REFORM

### CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST PHASE ; REFORM FROM THE ' ROSE CHAMBER ' ;  
RESCHID

#### I

*The will of the most absolute monarch is seldom obeyed when his subjects have no longer anything to hope from his favour or to dread from his resentment.—GIBBON.*

WHEN Constantine the Great died in the same city as Mahmud, his officers of state continued to do obeisance before his body for some days after his death. Mahmud's memory received a similar theatrical tribute. Everything was done to suggest that the government and the policy were still his. Reschid, his favourite minister, was summoned hastily from his London Embassy to take over the Foreign Office and to administer it in the spirit of Mahmud. From the start the new Sultan imitated Mahmud's rage for innovation and passion for the West. Even in his ceremonial procession he broke with custom, and stopped in order to greet the diplomats of foreign powers. Was Mahmud, like Constantine, to reign after his death? In each case intriguers knew how to catch a young Emperor's ear. Even as they bowed before Constantine's corpse his officers were planning to exclude one another from power ; and the ministers, who recalled Reschid out of reverence to the dead master, were plotting his ruin with the living one. The new Sultan, Abdul Medjid, was a boy of sixteen, gentle, timid and weak, who possessed more power and less capacity than any previous Sultan. In his youth he was the predestined tool of his mother and of her paramour, in his age of courtiers and odalisques. He was, in himself, that worst of all governments, a despotism without a despot.

At present one point alone concerns us, the fate of Mahmud's reforms and of the new westernising policy. And that fate was bound up with Reschid and with his continuance in

office.<sup>227</sup> Reform in the East during this period, and indeed during most others, can be achieved only in two ways, through the overpowering pressure either of a man or of events. The pressure of a personality was now removed, the pressure of events was still at hand. Reschid argued that England alone could protect the Turks from the terrible Ibrahim and that she would not do so unless Turkey reformed. Here was a valuable lever for enforcing his measures. As the successor of Mahmud in a liberal policy, Reschid attained prodigious fame. All previous parties in Turkey were based on religious differences. Reschid gave character to an epoch and created a party based on political principle. He led the only political party in Turkey which had ever had a principle. Most of his followers indeed ultimately abandoned him, but for the time he inspired them. He was for long the Turkish minister most trusted by Stratford Canning, to whom he appears to have owed much.

In appearance Reschid was impressive, with strong black brows and broad shoulders. His education was good and his enlightenment real, and he had considerable adroitness in the necessary art of intrigue. He was 'morally courageous, but physically timid and weak.' He was ready to plan great principles of reform and to persist in them. Sometimes at a crisis his physical courage failed him. He feared to lose his head and shrank from a struggle *à outrance*. He did not indeed lack moral courage, but he did lack moral principle. His reforms in fact proved a failure, and that failure was due in no small measure to his personal character. He professed to adhere to the western custom of one wife, but kept concubines in secret. He got Akif pasha disgraced for accepting a bribe in 1838; he impressed Ponsonby by declining a present of £500 for himself. But his ostentatious hatred of corruption was simply an expedient for procuring western support. 'How much superior Reschid was to other Turkish ministers,' wrote Ponsonby in 1839. Eighteen months later he wrote, 'I am furious against Reschid Pasha who seems on all occasions to have selected the greatest scoundrels in the Empire for employment in the offices of trust and honour. He is a fool.'<sup>228</sup> If Reschid selected bad instruments he was indeed a fool but, as he ultimately amassed a considerable fortune, he seems to have been a knave. The contrast between his practice and professions was known, of course, to other Turks and ultimately discredited him. The new reformer proved the old corrupter, writ large. As the years went on the truth came out, the mask was lifted, and Reschid's true lineaments revealed.

Reschid's ideas and policy are of the greatest interest, for they differed in some degree from Mahmud's. The Sultan had a real hatred of corruption ; Reschid denounced it in public and practised it in private. Mahmud believed that it was most important to commit his country irrevocably to western habits and introduce western organisation and method. Here Reschid was with him, and his arguments induced Mahmud to sign the Commercial Convention with England and to abolish monopolies. The Sultan seems never to have advocated the admission of Christian subjects into the army, but Reschid certainly favoured introducing them into the navy even in the reign of Mahmud.<sup>229</sup> Some of the complicated reforms of the Council and Civil Service emanated from the Sultan alone, and were dropped soon after his death. Mahmud remained an absolutist to the last, but Reschid seems to have cherished ideas of parliamentary government in Turkey, though he was excusably timid about putting them forward. Apparently the councils of justice and of administration, which Mahmud had set up, were designed by Reschid to be filled by election instead of by nomination. In such case an approach to parliamentarism could have been made. One last difference must be mentioned, for it is the most important. Reschid began his reforms in the midst of disaster, Mahmud had begun his after destroying the janizzaries. A reforming Sultan was much more acceptable than a reforming minister in any case. As in Prussia revolution had to come from the top.

## II

*Mitte sectari rosa quo locorum  
Sera moretur.*

Leave winter's rose where, on the tree,  
It hangs belated.

HORACE.

No Turkish reign ever began in such disaster as that of Abdul Medjid. His army had been destroyed by Ibrahim ; his fleet had surrendered to Mehemet Ali. The young Sultan allowed Husrev, 'the master-strangler,' to remain at the head of affairs, and revived the title of Grand Vizier in his favour. But he could not revive its power. Husrev was old, feeble and a shadow of his former self. Power was more in the hands of Halil, the Sultan's uncle, and of Reschid. The young Sultan had no army, no fleet, and no money ; he



could only get them from the West. France was suspected of collusion with Mehemet Ali, Russia was doubtful, Austria weak, England alone was strong. A policy of reform would impress her, and here was Reschid's opportunity. He only returned in September 1839, but by the third week of October 'a project was announced for securing the subject against Capital punishment without a trial . . . and protecting property from arbitrary power.'<sup>230</sup> A whole code of enlightenment, on the latest western models, was published on November 3 and known as the *Gulhané* or 'Rose Chamber' decree.<sup>231</sup> 'New institutions' were necessary to ensure 'a good administration.' Guarantees were promised, ensuring to all subjects perfect security for life, honour and fortune. 'From henceforth . . . the cause of every accused person shall be publicly judged in accordance with our Divine law, after inquiry and examination, and so long as a regular judgment shall not have been pronounced, no one can, secretly or publicly, put another to death by poison or in any other manner. . . . No one shall be allowed to attack the honour of any other person whatever. Each one shall possess his property of every kind and dispose of it in all freedom.' In particular the property of a criminal was not to be confiscated or his innocent heirs deprived of their rights. The newly formed Council of Justice, joined with an increased Divan (council), was to frame laws for security of life and fortune, and to compile a penal code. The *ulemas* and other grandees were warned that this code would contain clauses punishing them for attempting to 'infringe these institutions' without respect to rank, position or influence.

The second great reform was to be the institution of a 'regular system of assessing and levying taxes.' Thanks were given to God for having already abolished monopolies, but the system of farming known as '*Iltizam*' was denounced, and a law was passed 'against the traffic of favouritism and of appointments [*richvet*] which the Divine law reprobates, and which is one of the principal causes of the decay of the Empire.' Each member of the Ottoman society was in future to be 'taxed for a quota of a fixed tax.' A third reform affected the army. The term of military service was reduced to four or five years. It was 'the duty of all the inhabitants to furnish soldiers,' and this system would in future be applied by a law regulating the amount of the contingent to be drawn from each locality. All districts would equally bear the burden, so that a few would not be impoverished or depopulated as heretofore. The reference to the duty of all inhabitants

to serve in the army was the great innovation, and was further amplified by the statement, 'These Imperial concessions shall extend to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be ; they shall enjoy them without exception.' In other words, a Mohammedan ruler declared Mussulmans and Christians absolutely equal before the law, proposed to enrol both in his army and to treat them alike. He actually speaks of 'the Nation' as if it was one without distinction. He proposed to take oath in the name of God to keep this equality and make his *ulemas* and grandees do the same. He announced his intention of punishing them in this world if they opposed him in this respect. He ended thus : 'May those who shall pass an act contrary to the present regulations be the object of Divine Malediction and deprived for ever of every kind of happiness.' The decree was issued from the kiosk of *Gulhané*, and known as the *Gulhané* decree, the decree of the 'Chamber of Roses.' It was the vision of a new dawn tingeing the grey sky with rose.

The *Gulhané* decree was solemnly proclaimed to the world on November 3 at Topkapu.<sup>231</sup> The Sultan himself looked on from an upper window of 'the Chamber of Roses.' On the ground floor were the diplomats, for the first time associated with Turks in a public ceremony. The Prince de Joinville's cynical eye noted Husrev—'the master-strangler'—with his big red head, white beard and spiteful look ; and the *Kislar-Agasi* blazing with gold embroideries, black, hideous, 'with hanging lips and the haunches of a woman.' Less spectacular but more important were the Sheikh-ul-Islam and Reschid. In attendance were the *ulemas*, the Turkish grandees, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs, the chief rabbi, soldiers, and a many-coloured crowd of Turks and *rayas*. The *ulemas* began with prayers. An astrologer, strange portent among the enlightened, surveyed the heavens and pronounced them favourable. Then the Sheikh-ul-Islam gave a sign. Reschid stepped forward, prostrated himself before the Sultan, read the *Gulhané* decree, prostrated himself again. He handed the edict to the 'master-strangler,' who pressed it reverently to his lips. Then the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the religious head of the Turkish Empire, stepped forward. Prostrating himself before the Sultan, he prayed aloud to God to 'preserve precious days to his Highness, for his good fortune and prosperity, as also for the good fortune and prosperity of his people.'<sup>232</sup> The end of the prayer was saluted with discharges of artillery. Finally the Sultan himself received the edict and took it to the chamber of relics, where was the 'glorious mantle of the Prophet.' Where

Mahmud had prayed for strength to exterminate the janizaries, Abdul Medjid prayed for strength to help all his subjects. He left the edict in that holy chamber.

Abdul Medjid claimed that 'this alteration and complete renewal of ancient customs' was 'solely for the purpose of reviving religion, government, the nation and the empire,' and that 'we engage not to do anything that is contrary thereto.' The Sheikh-ul-Islam and the *ulemas* had bowed the knee. But the faithful had kept the *giaours* in subjection too long to acquiesce in their sudden rise. And there was one way of escape. The edict was due to the sole power of the Sultan. The Sheikh-ul-Islam, the representative of religion, and Reschid, the representative of enlightenment, had both bowed in the dust before him like slaves. The power of the Sultan remained as absolute as ever, indeed was more absolute than before. What he had given, he could take away. Reaction could not only destroy Reschid, it could destroy the 'Rose Chamber' decree.

For the moment the stroke succeeded. Even the unimpressible Dutch minister wrote: 'I cannot express . . . the degree of content which the totality of the population of this capital shows since this promulgation.'<sup>233</sup> But the population of Constantinople did not remain impressed long.<sup>234</sup> The 'Rose Chamber' decree had a good reception from the Jews of Salonica, but it took a year for it to be translated into Bulgarian and some other languages; and in fact it had actually become a dead letter before it had been promulgated in some parts of the Empire. Yet its effect on foreign diplomacy was electric. The Russian representative called it 'a theatrical stroke,' but, none the less, a successful one. 'A victorious answer to those who say that this Empire cannot be saved by its ancient Government,'<sup>235</sup> declared Ponsonby. 'Fraught with incalculable advantage,' replied Palmerston. Reschid showed that he was capable of estimating its value in figures. He asked England for a loan of two million pounds in December. He did not get it, but none the less he forced England's hand. Palmerston had repeatedly declared that Turkey could reform herself. She had now begun to do so, and he could not abandon her to the attack of Mehemet Ali. So the comedy of the 'Rose Chamber' did much to produce that European intervention which defeated Ibrahim and restored Syria to Abdul Medjid.

Reschid's successful stroke over the 'Rose Chamber' increased his prestige with the Sultan and enabled him to persevere in his course of reform. In May 1840 appeared the

Penal Code, based on French models and 'remarkable for its spirit of justice.'<sup>236</sup> In June old Husrev fell before a harem intrigue, and was subsequently convicted and punished for corruption. The mediocre Rauf became Grand Vizier, but Reschid remained as powerful as ever. By the end of 1840, however, all danger from Mehemet Ali was over. Ibrahim's army was back in Egypt, Syria was in Turkish occupation. In January 1841 the Turkish fleet was restored intact. That was enough. The reactionaries, who had tolerated the 'Rose Chamber' decree in order to secure western support against Egypt, now felt safe enough to intrigue against it. Palmerston went on with his vigorous exhortations. When Ponsonby suggested that the Turks be urged to treat Catholics in Syria 'not less well than Mehemet Ali [did],' Palmerston substituted 'better than,' and advocated extending this treatment to 'Christians of all denominations.' He wrote a separate and secret instruction in March for the Sultan's eye about the 'Rose Chamber' decree, describing it as 'an act of the greatest wisdom as well as the most enlightened justice and benevolence.' He got the young Queen to approve his despatch. Finally he definitely instructed Ponsonby to make an effort to keep Reschid in office.<sup>237</sup> This was on April 1, and the date had a cruel appropriateness. For Reschid had been dismissed at the end of March. The story of his last struggle and fall is interesting and symbolic. The Commercial Code was brought before the Council of Ministers preparatory to its publication. 'Is it in accordance with the Holy Law?' Rifaat asked. 'The Holy Law has nothing to do with such matters,' said Reschid. 'Blasphemy,' protested the *ulemas* present. The young Sultan promptly dismissed his minister of enlightenment.<sup>238</sup>

### III

*Now, pile your dust upon the quick and dead.*

HAMLET, Act V, Sc. 2.

The first sign of reaction was that Rifaat, Minister of Commerce, suspended the Commercial Code. The suspension lasted for eight years, to the great injury of foreigners and of trade. The next sign was the increase in power of Riza, a reactionary and intriguer of a deep dye, and a court official believed to be the paramour of Abdul Medjid's mother, the Sultana Valide. During the whole of the next four years, his at least is the most constant and reactionary influ-

ence. Rauf was deposed before the end of 1841 and Izzet Mehemet, a well-known reactionary, became Grand Vizier. He was not without virtues of the old Turkish type, and had a habit of wandering disguised through the capital in the style of Harun-al-Raschid. On one occasion he caught a pastrycook using false weights and caused him to be seated for some minutes on the hot copper plate on which he baked his cakes. On another he caused himself to be shut up in a common prison as a debtor to learn the true conditions of gaol life. He was there denied the normal ration of soup and bread and received only coarse bread and water, even when he offered money. He protested, only to be threatened with the whip. Then he lost patience. 'Where is the governor?' he thundered out. 'Where are the other scoundrels, his servants? By your souls you shall learn what it is to disobey the Sultan and oppress the unfortunate!' He flung open his coat to show his diamond star. He seated himself majestically upon a ragged carpet taken from a prisoner while the terrified governor and his turnkeys hastened to make their obeisance before him. After inspecting the whole prison Izzet Mehemet issued his orders. Warm food was to be given to the prisoners, the governor was arrested, and every turnkey received one hundred strokes of the bastinado on his feet.<sup>239</sup> Izzet Mehemet carried all this out by no process of law, thus violating the 'Rose Chamber' decree, even while executing his wild justice. Izzet Mehemet had been commissioner in Lebanon in 1840 and been recalled because of his hatred of foreigners and opposition to his allies. He was, in fact, appointed Grand Vizier just because he hated western ideas and would oppose them.

Ponsonby had shown a good deal of energy in resisting Mehemet Ali, and had for a time exerted himself in support of Reschid.<sup>240</sup> But he displayed little interest in the *Gulhané* decree and less in the attempt to upset it. Aberdeen finally replaced him by Sir Stratford Canning. But Ponsonby left in the autumn of 1841 and Stratford did not arrive till next year. By then reaction was already in full swing. Forgetful of their oaths to God and of their promises to man, the ministers indulged in a senseless reversal of all previous measures. Almost every Turkish person who knew a western language was excluded from office. Reschid was exiled as ambassador to Paris. No young Turkish diplomats went with him to learn western ways, but he was allowed to take Armenians. *Rayas* could learn from the West, but Turks must not be contaminated. Torture resumed its place in judicial procedure. The Chris-



tians, who had been allowed to wear the same dress as Moham-medans, were summoned before the Grand Vizier, who read them an edict ordering them to resume their old distinctive garb. In this instance even Izzet Mehemet perhaps recognised that he had gone too far, for the next day he summoned them again and told them that the edict had been reversed.<sup>241</sup> The medical hospitals and clinics were starved of money, and senseless attempts were made to close some of them. The *haratch* was once more imposed on individuals instead of being levied on communities, with the result that 'personal violence and brutal ill-treatment' was reintroduced. Tithes, Customs and Fisheries were once more farmed out and both government and individuals suffered by the change. Corruption greatly increased, both *rayas* and foreigners were openly cheated by the government. One example, which Stratford considered as typical, will suffice.<sup>242</sup> An Austrian merchant bought a large quantity of grain from the Turkish government in Constantinople at a certain rate per kilo. It was to be delivered in Thessaly. When it reached there the price charged for freight 'exceeded by a third' the price of the grain itself. But as the kilo in Thessaly was six times the size of the Constantinople kilo, he had to pay six times as much for the consignment as he had contracted. This was a fraud deliberately perpetrated by Turkish government officials, and only fear of Stratford prevented similar ones from being perpetrated on British merchants. In the middle of 1842 Abdul Medjid had assured Stratford that he would carry out the 'Rose Chamber' decree, but had spoken airily of the 'men of the old system' and the 'difficulty of acquiring new habits.'<sup>243</sup> But he was in fact a consenting party to lucrative speculations of Riza and other pashas. The young Sultan and the Sultana Valide 'are known to have a personal interest in more than one of them.'<sup>244</sup>

There was more reason in reaction than Stratford would admit. Reschid's followers were persecuted after his fall, but even Ponsonby had said they were 'the greatest scoundrels in the Empire.' Reschid's financial policy was probably interested, and certainly unfortunate. By abolishing monopolies the government had lost a large revenue. In compensation Reschid had fixed an export duty of 9 per cent. on goods exported by Turkish subjects, in addition to the 3 per cent. duty levied under the Anglo-Turkish Convention on all goods exported. This was felt as a hardship, though it was certainly

not the fault of Reschid. It was the deliberate opinion of Calvert, an experienced foreign resident, that 'it was a mischievous tax but much less mischievous than the system which it replaced.' It would, of course, have been better to increase the duty on foreign imports. But, as was admitted, 'the Turkish government is not *maître chez soi*,' and was prevented by treaties with England and other powers from imposing import duties beyond the amount of 5 per cent. At the time of the imposition, and for twenty years later, British import duties on Turkish goods amounted to an average of about 20 per cent., and those of every other country were higher still. This is a good example of how Reschid was rendered unpopular by western obligations from which he could not release himself. In other respects, however, he committed blunders for which foreigners were not responsible. Thus his attempt to replace the farmers of taxes by *Muhassils* had led to 'intolerable grievances,' as even Stratford admitted. Owing to their inexperience the tithe was both 'undervalued and overvalued' and *rayas* and Turks actually united to demand the abolition of the new system.<sup>245</sup> The farmers, whom the reactionaries brought back, were actually less oppressive.

As to one reform the reactionaries agreed, and that was to reorganise the army. But it was not to be by equalising the Christian and Turk. The passing of the danger from Egypt revived all the hatred and prejudice of foreigners. But the reactionaries were not free to indulge this passion while the Turkish army was weak. Ponsonby wrote: 'If the Turks would make an army, which they can do, they would be substantially independent of all foreign powers. I think I can get this done—but you must let me take the only road that I think can lead to success—and allow me not to hurry the Porte too much nor to offend prejudices by the introduction of our officers—either seamen or landmen—I want to get the edge of the wedge in.'<sup>246</sup> To the reactionary the *Gulhané* decree was most obnoxious just because of its insidious proposal to enlist Christians in the army. There were practical difficulties anyhow. 'The union of Turks and Christians in the same regiments and companies as if they would mingle like wine and water' was thus characterised by Palmerston a dozen years later: 'I fear that at present at least the fusion might be more like that of cat and dog shut up in the same box.'<sup>247</sup> No Turk would have consented at this stage to enrol separate Christian regiments. There remained only the possibility of employing Christian officers, but this expedient was also abhorrent to the reactionaries, for it set infidels in

command of the faithful. Prejudice was so excited on this subject that Captain Williams, who was in a position to know, greatly deprecated any such move. Ponsonby endorsed his opinion.<sup>248</sup> The reactionaries set out to make a purely Turkish army. They had much to do. Jochmus reported conditions as deplorable in 1842. Soldiers slept habitually in their clothes and had no uniforms; each battalion numbered only three hundred, of whom fifty on an average were unfit for service. None the less increases in the army began, an ominous sign, and increases also in the illicit gains of Riza, the Grand Marshal of the palace. Great stupidity was of course shown. Conscripts were actually seized while worshipping in mosques or rounded up in a series of slave raids. The Albanians, who had always supplied the best volunteers for the army, rose in revolt as soon as they were conscripted. But a census was properly taken in 1843, and the work began. The organisation of a conscript system is a long and painful process—even Napoleon at first failed to impose it with entire success in France. In Turkey brutality led to revolt, and inefficiency to corruption. The census revealed fourteen millions of Mussulmans available for service, and a western state would have mobilised well over a million of all ranks. Riza's utmost efforts produced about a third of that amount. He enrolled a quarter of a million soldiers in all, including *Nizams*, active troops, and *Rediffs*, reserves, the latter being about one hundred thousand. In addition there were some twenty thousand militia, but these were largely worthless. Bearing in mind the difficulties of the Treasury, the unrest in distant provinces and the Turkish lack of organising capacity, the result was creditable. Mahmud's *Nizam* army had been doubled, the *Rediffs* trebled or quadrupled. The only reform in which Turkish reactionaries believed was in the perfection of the instruments of force, and this belief bore fruit. Aberdeen with his usual pessimism doubted first whether these numbers would be raised, and next whether 'a disorganized mass of uneducated soldiery was a surer safeguard to a state than a small amount of disciplined force.'<sup>249</sup> His fears and doubts were confounded by Stratford, by Riza, and by the event. Palmerston, who is usually worth hearing on military matters, made interesting and expert comments. He deprecated the substitution of British for German officers, he commended the Egyptian model for Turkish imitation, and he praised their improved system and the development reached by the year 1849. The Turkish army made a far better stand against the Russians in the Crimean war than they had done in the war

of 1828-9. Without the numbers raised by Riza no such achievement would have been possible. He rendered no other service to his country, though his public career was as long as it was discreditable.

The navy may here claim attention. The fleet, which had surrendered to the Egyptians, was in the end restored intact. Slade, a British captain renamed Mushaver pasha, was employed to reorganise it under the control of a Turkish pasha, a new Mehemet Ali. He was a favourite and brother-in-law of the Sultan, a friend of Riza, who imitated him and filled his pockets at the public expense. Yet he possessed considerable energy and courage. Slade succeeded in producing a naval hospital that was a model of order, and in raising a force of ten thousand sailors, some of them by Reschid's insistence being Christians. But he did not increase the number of fighting ships above the total under Mahmud. A gloomy fate hung over the Turkish fleet in wartime. Codrington's victory at Navarino had destroyed the sea-power of Turkey. It could offer no naval resistance to the Russians in the war of 1829-30. After Mahmud's death the Turkish fleet surrendered to Mehemet Ali without firing a shot. It was restored in the end and further improvements were added. Yet in 1853 it was annihilated by the Russians at Sinope without inflicting any damage on its opponents. It was as if Turkey was doomed either to have no navy at all or to lose it as soon as a war began.<sup>250</sup>

The first or 'Rose Chamber' phase of reform, as directed by Reschid, lasted from 1839 to 1841. The next four years were pure reaction save for one important development, which will be described later. The reactionaries could point to partial reform of the currency, and to improvements in the army and the navy. But these were a big price to pay for the disappearance of justice, of security, and of progress. The Turks themselves, who seldom lose the opportunity for a play on words, contrasted the periods. The word *Gulhané*—'Rose Chamber'—sounded like *Gulhan*—'Dust Hole.'\* The decree was called that. If it had issued from the 'Rose Chamber,' it had ended on the dust heap. And there it lay until Stratford de Redcliffe picked it up again.

\* It is really the Persian word *Gul-Khan*. My friend Mr. R. Levy says the Osmanli version was written and pronounced *Gulhan*.

## CHAPTER VII

### REVOLT IN THE LEBANON AND SETTLEMENT BY EUROPE, 1841-5

#### I

*Cosa non è che sanza  
ordine senta la religione  
della montagna, o che sia fuor d'usanza.*

The holy rule of the mount suffereth naught that is arbitrary and that is outside custom.—DANTE, *Purgatorio*, Canto XXI.

THE approach to Beyrouth is past long inlets of blue water, and beneath towering heights, until you reach the bay where St. George killed the dragon. Before you on a bold promontory lies the town, its white walls gleaming in the evening light. High above it are piled the hills of Lebanon, one above the other in stern dark lines. At night these hills sparkle with thousands of lights, like fireflies in a tropic garden. In the daylight their populated character is still more evident. Against the hillsides are banked terrace after terrace of red earth bound with stones. Groups of white and brown houses emerge from leafy valleys and climb the slopes up to the very mountain crests. Solitary houses or monasteries crown even the overhanging heights and the isolated peaks. Seldom anywhere can a hillside display such teeming life.

The bare and lonely hills of Anatolia contrast with crowded and cultivated Lebanon. You may sail past the coast of Asia Minor for a day and not see more than one or two towns on the shore and half a dozen villages on the heights. Three towns and twenty villages look down from the hills upon Beyrouth. Compared with Anatolia Lebanon is not only populated and civilised, but an ideal land of beauty and peace. Its beauty indeed nothing can mar, but its peace has been at the mercy of man. Population and wealth abounded even in Ibrahim's time, so that his withdrawal to the Nile seemed to promise a long period of peace. Yet danger came. It arose from the age-long and stubborn hatreds of the two strange peoples who disputed the mastery of 'the Mountain,' and from the deep and insidious purpose of the Turk to sow discord between them. Yet in the end these peoples were rendered happy by the intervention of Europe.



The victory over Ibrahim pasha produced exactly opposite effects on Turkey and on Europe. The Great Powers thought that it gave Turkey an opportunity to complete her reforms ; Turkey's reactionaries thought it gave her an opportunity to evade them altogether. The *Gulhané* reforms had induced Europe to intervene and had thus overthrown Mehemet Ali. The reactionaries wished the reforms to follow him into obscurity. They dismissed the reforming Reschid and threw the decree of the ' Rose Chamber ' on the dust-heap. But reaction carried with it unforeseen consequences. A restless, meddling activity produced formidable resistance in two quarters. Bosnia was goaded into revolt by inconceivable misgovernment ; Lebanon was driven into civil war by Machiavellian intrigue. Bosnia showed the Turks at their worst, ' the Mountain ' revealed Europe at its best. Europe had learned a good deal from Mehemet Ali. She had learned the danger of unsettling the Lebanon, and even Aberdeen exerted himself to tranquillise it.

' Syria is the key of the Levant and the Lebanon is the key of Syria.' These were certainly the views and are probably the words of Palmerston.<sup>251</sup> Lebanon had proved more important than Aleppo or Diarbekir in the crisis which drove Ibrahim and his Egyptians from Syria. At Lebanon the British sea-power had been most effective against Ibrahim. ' Now how was it we did drive him out of Syria ? ' asked Palmerston in rollicking mood. ' Merely by giving a few thousand muskets to the people of the country ; by sending a few hundred marines on shore to aid them, and saying " Go it boys, if you want to get rid of Mehemet Ali, here we are to back you, if you intend to act, now's your time " (*a laugh*). They took us at our word, they kicked him out neck and crop and his army too. They hailed us as their deliverers, and whatever may be said of some small and trifling quarrels that have since arisen between the two sets in that country, it is now peaceable, contented, and happy, and there is a striking contrast between the present state of things and that which formerly existed there.' \* This address, reeking of the hustings, shows England's idea of the strategic importance of the Lebanon. Its mountaineers, allied with ' the few hundred marines ' and the British navy, had defeated the greatest of oriental generals, flung him back in utter rout on Egypt, preserved Syria ' and the other avenues of Mesopotamia ' to the Sultan, and assured ' the alternative route ' to India. A

\* Palmerston's speech to the electors of Tiverton, July 31, 1847. This is the pamphlet version and differs from the report in the press of August 2.

small country had played a part in great events. It had been marked out by destiny to do so. It was a nerve centre which every English statesman felt no foreign power must touch, and which, therefore, internal revolt must not menace.

## II

*They (the Druses) hated Maronites with a bitter hatred which, when encouraged by the Government and the fanatics of Damascus, found expression in great periodic killings.*—T. E. LAWRENCE.

The Lebanon itself, 'the Mountain,' was an area which the Turks had never assimilated or indeed wholly subdued. It had always been a special and autonomous area, usually ruled by a quasi-independent prince. Technically it was under the control of the pasha of Sidon or of Tripoli, and the district of the pasha of Damascus abutted on it. The Principality of Lebanon or 'the Mountain' began at Tripoli and extended as far south as Sidon on the west.\* Its eastern boundary took in the whole Lebanon range. In practice it was divided, like Gaul, into three parts. The northern area, peopled mainly by Maronites and Orthodox Greeks, extended from Tripoli to the road (or modern railway) between Beyrouth and Damascus. South of the Damascus road were the mixed districts based on Deir-el-Kamar, where Druse and Maronite struggled for the mastery. Further south again was the Druse area extending to Sidon. In the central and southern areas the hills were lower and the climate milder, but the Druses were manlier and wilder than the Maronites. The influence of each race extended far beyond the narrow bounds thus indicated. Between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon mountains lies the fertile plain of the Bekaa, the old hollow Syria. In this area Maronite colonists had settled at places like Hasbeya and Rasheya, on the slopes of Hermon's noble hill, an alien intrusion which proved a great provocation to the Druses. The Anti-Lebanon range, by contrast with fertile Lebanon, is sandy and stony. Druse robbers lurked in its gorges and interfered with the caravans between Beyrouth and Damascus. As everyone knows, Damascus is watered by fair rivers, and lies on a green oasis in the waste. It contained a fanatical Mohammedan population who sometimes provoked the Druses against the Christians. Beyond it again

\* The city of Beyrouth itself was seldom or never reckoned as part of Lebanon until the post-war French occupation.

lies the immense district of the Hauran, which ends to the south in Jebel Druse. This natural fortress of volcanic lava was a virgin citadel which had defied the assaults even of the redoubtable Ibrahim. It was the home of the most turbulent Druses, ever ready to succour their co-religionists in the Lebanon with arms and reinforcements. The pasha of Damascus occupied a strategic position. He could control the Bekaa, could block the defiles of Mount Hermon, and prevent the Druses of Hauran and of Jebel Druse from aiding their brethren of 'the Mountain.'

The Druses claimed that they had carried the oldest and purest of religions to the hills at Lebanon, and there possessed it undisturbed.<sup>252</sup> They claimed to be

Warders on our Mount  
Of the World's secret.\*

Like Egyptians of old their worship took strange and repulsive forms. It was a fantastic perversion of Mohammedanism. They had taken as their god—or as his divine incarnation—Hakeem the Fatimite Caliph of Egypt who died in 1021. This monstrous and maniacal ruler had been inspired by strange hatreds. He had alternately and impartially warred on Christians, on Mohammedans, and on Jews. He had proclaimed his own divinity and procured some acceptance for this article of faith during his lifetime. At last he was murdered on the edge of a mountain either by his injured sister or by a desperate band of conspirators. But a strange circumstance hallowed his ignoble end. His clothes were found but his body never was. The absence of his material body was taken as a proof of his spiritual presence. His godhead may have been enhanced by the manner of his death.

The Khalif vanished erst  
in what seemed death to uninstructed eyes  
on red Mokattam's verge.\*

Hakeem, already worshipped as prophet or divinity, became one whose return to earth as a Messiah was duly expected. The master was not dead but had merely soared to a serener sphere.

The Druse cult, which was gradually formed around this monstrous divinity, was singular from its beginning. The true founder, Hamza, transmitted a system without giving to it a name. Derazi, a by no means reverent follower of Hakeem, contributed his name without believing in the system. The

\* Robert Browning, *The Druses*.

Druses were divided into initiated and uninitiated. The former knew everything and commanded ; the latter knew nothing and obeyed. Hakeem was proclaimed the descendant of Adam and the embodiment of universal reason. This divine being was one day to return to earth and meanwhile permitted the initiated to exercise his attributes in commission. Frantic or savage excesses, doubtless a correct imitation of the moods of the master, were occasionally enjoined by the initiated as a tribute to his memory. This extraordinary creed formed characters as remarkable for firmness and for independence as for savagery and for deceit. A Druse seldom now wears his old black and white costume, but he is usually recognisable. His pride, his exclusiveness, his intense individuality are stamped on his features and mark him out from all the other inhabitants of the Lebanon. 'The Mountain' is no longer a scene of blood but, like Cromwell's Ironsides, the Druses show virtues in peace not unworthy of their old-time prowess in war.

It was part of the Druse religion to keep its rites and worship concealed, as the Jews did :

*Non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti.*

The Druses went much further than this. Not only did they conceal their doctrines from strangers but they deliberately mystified the world as to their character. Other religions might be professed by Druses for political reasons. Some of them became Mohammedan, others Christian, but, as soon as the need departed, they returned to the Druse faith. Indeed they were in reality Druses all the time. Deceit was not only a virtue but a duty with a prescribed ceremonial. Sham religious services were, and are, staged for the deception of other creeds. It was only when Ibrahim broke into their strongholds in the thirties that their sacred books were known or read. But these may also have been designed to deceive others. Even now all that is fully revealed is the dark and gloomy intensity of the faith, and the strength of the tie which has bound the Druses in a unity more compelling than that of any masonic society. They always acted together when it came to fighting. In 'the Mountain' itself they were usually the masters of the Maronites, though never reaching to more than a third of their numbers.

Society in the Lebanon among the Druses, as among the Maronites, was feudal. Feudalism is often an anarchy, for each chief is powerful enough to strive with his neighbours, and able to prevent all large or concerted operations of war. The

Druse organisation was feudal, yet it was not anarchical, and it was admirably suited for war. The feudal anarchy was counteracted by the unity of this religious and masonic society.\* There were a great many nobles, one hundred and sixty-four in 1860. Their followers were often arbitrarily treated in peace time, yet they possessed land of their own, for the small holding predominated in the Lebanon. The greatest Druse chief was of the Jumblatt family, from which the incarnation of Hakeem was to be reborn. His possessions were very large. He owned a hundred and forty villages, he produced yearly one hundred and thirty thousand pounds of oil and three hundredweight of silk. His rent-roll amounted to fifty or sixty thousand pounds sterling, but he remitted two-thirds of it to his tenants. This remission was the pledge of their loyalty. The head of the Jumblatt family did not command the Druses in war. The fittest chief took the lead naturally, and the others followed and worked in a perfectly understood concert with him, for the religious bond compelled the uninitiated to obey the initiated. The Druse chiefs were able by this mysterious power to command their followers while absent and to direct their movements without themselves appearing on the scene. For instance, they were rarely present at a massacre of Maronites; it was so much more convenient for them to be away. But they were generally responsible for it, and their power was the more formidable because unseen. The Druse peasants were models of loyalty in war time, and the leader was implicitly obeyed whether present or absent. At the mysterious fiat of their secret leaders they assassinated individuals and massacred whole villages. These Druse mystics were practical enough when it came to war, and is not a practical mystic 'the most formidable and terrible of all combinations'?

The Druses were almost irresistible in mountain warfare. They sang their war-song in preparation, but were silent when they rushed to the attack. They kept no rank, order or step. 'Each man bounded over rocks and obstacles at his best.' But they all converged on the doomed Maronite village with extreme and desperate resolution. They developed the ideal military attack, like a pack of hounds running individually, working separately, but each with a common aim and instinct. This unity of purpose, with diversity in action, was combined with secrecy of plan and with obedience to orders. The Druse method was quite different from the Maronite. In the attack on the village already described the Maronites began

\* *Bey. MSS., passim.*



by 'defying' the Druses 'with their flags and shouts and shots,' but they fled precipitately before the Druses closed with them.<sup>253</sup> Sometimes they were entirely the victims of surprise. In a single night—and without warning—villages would be sacked and burned, the inhabitants slain or dispersed, in half a dozen different places by a series of admirably concerted and secretly timed blows. The Maronites were helpless before opponents who assembled in secret, who attacked suddenly without warning and apparently without leaders. Their own leaders were divided, their followers less resolute and less disciplined. They seldom met Druses in the open, but sometimes fought well behind cover. Thus their great rock fortress of Zahle had always hitherto held out victoriously against the Druses.

In 'the Mountain' the Maronites seem at all times to have been nearly thrice as many as the Druses. Their nobles were also more numerous.<sup>254</sup> But their feudal organisation unsuited them for war, for they had no secret bond uniting them in obedience to their lords. Towards their lords the Maronite peasants were not over-friendly. A manliness had remained with the mountaineers which was absent in the plain-dwellers of the Nile. The Maronite peasants were men enough to resent the scorn with which their lords treated them, one of them even applying to his subjects the supremely contemptuous title of *giaours* (infidels). They were not bound by any secret bond of religion to respect their chiefs, and agrarian difficulties contributed to their revolt in 1859. No such revolt took place among the Druse peasants at that time, and this fact, as well as any other, illustrates the difference between the two creeds.

The Maronite peasants were discontented with their lords because they were divided in their allegiance. They were not a feudal society held together by a secret religious tie. They were a society in which religion actually weakened the feudal bond. In their society the feudal and theocratic elements struggled for supremacy, and the result was disastrous. The patriarch of the Maronites governed his see like a theocracy. He interfered in politics and sought to curtail the power of the nobles. In result the nobles retaliated and defied his authority. The intrusion of religion into politics is seldom beneficial in the modern state, and had strange results in this medieval society. The Maronite church became political without the Maronite state becoming religious. Manners and morals were not improved by ecclesiastical example. 'Unfortunately even a Maronite Archbishop presented a forged petition to Her Majesty's Government.'<sup>255</sup> In 1844 a case of embezzlement involved Maronite patriarch, judge, clergy and three sheikhs,

the Turkish government secretly abetting the fraud. The conduct of the Maronites was thus no better than that of the Druses. The latter deceived on principle and from religious motives, the former in practice and for political reasons. The results were much the same. Rose said 'perhaps there is hardly an inhabitant in the Lebanon who has not either assisted in getting up, or been connected with forged petitions.'<sup>256</sup> And he said roundly, 'Altogether there never were such persons as the Lebanese, when one has to do with the Christians one thinks nothing so bad as they. When with the Druses [one thinks] the same.' Nor were these deplorable instances confined to 'the Mountain.' Rose found an instance where 'a Christian Bishop of Beyrouth had exercised the greatest tyranny and oppression of Christians in his own diocese, and that within a month he had bribed witnesses and threatened excommunication to others in order to convict two innocent men of a murder in order to exculpate his own brother and nephew of the murder of which they have since been convicted.'<sup>257</sup>

There were certain elements in the Maronite creed that were good. It had produced a homogeneous culture out of a mixed race. The patriarch, though acting partly from motives of ambition, did something to alleviate the agrarian distress of his poorer parishioners, and hold up some standard of idealism. But, like the Greek Orthodox clergy, with whom he usually worked hand in hand, political exigencies corrupted and perverted his religious activities. To be successful and popular with his flock he must be a corrupt wire-puller as well as a religious leader. He must be savage and unscrupulous, like some of those medieval ecclesiastics who sanctioned forgeries or massacred heretics for the glory of God. The election of a patriarch was a source of corruption or of intrigue. A French consul describes the election of a patriarch in the forties. He boasts of having secured the elevation of his candidate and describes how the new patriarch was menaced with rifles after his election in order to induce him to resign, and was only rescued from personal violence by good fortune. In this case, and in this case only, during this period was the patriarch a man of irreproachable virtue. Unfortunately his ability and strength of character in no way equalled his piety. Usually a crafty and unscrupulous politician became patriarch and pandered to the political prejudices of his flock. Piety and virtue are not the chief aims of politics in Lebanon or even perhaps outside it. In any case they are not the results of it. The Maronite creed itself was a compromise between East

and West, a mixture of local prejudice and of Catholic tradition. This creed was Catholic and their patriarch was elected by a local chapter and confirmed by Rome. Maronite obedience to the Pope was at once limited and peculiar. The language of their liturgy was Syriac, their rubrics were Arabic transcribed in Syriac letters. By an extraordinary privilege, with which even the Pope dared not interfere, their lower clergy were married. Their political tie with France was even stronger than their religious one with Rome, and had been closely maintained since the days of Louis Quatorze. The French were bound by treaty to protect them, and gave them money and promises in abundance. With their own schools, their own customs, their own privileges, supported by the Vatican and the Tuileries, the Maronites became arrogant and ambitious. They were less trained to act together, less self-reliant, than the Druses. Yet though less formidable they were equally fanatical, and during the ages it would be hard to say whether Druse or Maronite had been the more aggressive.

### III

*Oh ! nation miserable !  
With a tyrant . . . bloody sceptred !  
When shalt thou see thy wholesome days again ?*

MACBETH, Act IV, Sc. 3.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Emir Beshir began to extend his power in the Lebanon. He had acquired immense riches by his marriage, and used them to promote his political influence. He was of the famous Shehab family, who were supposed to be descended from the tribe of the Prophet. But he was actually a Druse by upbringing, though he pursued a Maronite policy. He was indeed Christian, Druse or Turk as it suited his purpose. His palace was called 'the House of Faith,' and his faith was comprehensive. It was alleged that he built a mosque, a church and a Druse shrine, and worshipped at each in turn. A Druse, a Christian and a Turk, having each claimed that the prince was of their faith, referred the matter to his secretary. That official ordered each of his questioners to receive a hundred blows of the bastinado for presuming to ask what was the religion of their prince. These may be fables, but there was a calculated mystery as to his faith and his policy, which enabled him to pose as the champion of one or other sect at

will. He finally became independent of all parties, outwitting or cajoling the pashas of Beyrouth and Damascus, betraying or destroying the feudal chiefs who opposed his will. Early in the nineteenth century he became grand prince of 'the Mountain' and retained power for a generation. He made no attempt to subvert the feudal privileges of either Druse or Maronite chiefs as a class. But his hand fell heavily on individuals questioning his will, and heaviest of all on the leading Druse chiefs. Thus he confiscated the estates of their wealthiest Sheikh (Jumblatt) and held them for sixteen years. His taxation was oppressive also. He extorted regularly from 'the Mountain' a sum almost twice what was considered equitable immediately after his deposition. In addition he imposed other large exactions. Then his cruelties were frightful. One of his own family lost both his eyes. Two others lost one each. One had his tongue slit in addition because he called out in his agony. 'Witness the Emir whom he blinded, witness the Abubekeds, seven of whom with many children he put to death in his Serai, the infamous exactions . . . [He was] the direct cause of the oppression of the Greek church and [of the] spoliation of their property . . . the indirect instrument of Ibrahim pasha's cruelty and oppression and the direct instrument of his own rapacious and cruel oppression.' <sup>258</sup>

The Emir Beshir was one of those singular oriental tyrants whose policy is cruel and barbarous while their tastes are artistic and refined. At Beit-el-Din he built one of the most charming examples of modern oriental art. Perched on a Lebanon crag and overlooking a deep ravine is a palace in the Saracenic style. With its graceful galleries and cool colonnades it seems a fairy castle. This delightful creation of his fancy was no less ingenious than his policy. Fully as artistic and subtle were his methods of holding Maronites and Druses in check. His chief residence was at Deir-el-Kamar, the capital of the Druse country. Strangely enough it was an object of great veneration to Maronites; it had a convent of the Moon and was sacred to the Virgin. The prince developed this town in such a way as to play off Maronites against Druses. His policy was 'to render it a focus as well of Christian industry, as of Christian physical force; for thus he improved the cultivation of his own estates, [and] the manufacture of their produce, and had always at hand the warlike population of the town to oppose to the Druse chiefs. . . . He put to death several of the Abubekeds, the feudal Druse lords, confiscated their estates, and either sold them at reduced prices or gave them to his Christian adherents. He made roads,

passable at least, to the sea, and to the interior, and his exertions converted the wild and small capital of the Druses into the most thriving commercial town in the mountain with a population of Christians exceeding by five or six times that of the Druses. But the policy of the Emir had prepared an abundant harvest of misery for the town of Deir-el-Kamar. . . . He had raised the Christians on the ruins of the fortune of the Druses, he had caused blood to flow between them.' <sup>259</sup> It was a masterly example of the policy of '*diuide et impera.*' But it was purely personal to the prince, and, as soon as a weak ruler arose, the Druses wreaked a bloody vengeance on the Christians of this cultivated town.

The old prince showed an unsurpassed talent for dealing with the politics of his native Lebanon, and it was not till his old age that he failed to appreciate the world beyond his mountain. In his earlier days he had shown a rare prudence in dealing with it. Napoleon had sent him a present of a magnificent musket in 1799 and asked him to join the French. Beshir answered that he would do so as soon as the French had taken Acre, and it was precisely at Acre that Napoleon failed. He managed with great address to play off one Turkish pasha against another, and to play off the Sultan against Mehemet Ali. He was hardly disturbed or even threatened by Ibrahim's conquest of Syria. He had already betrayed his master, so he came to terms with the conqueror and ruled in peace. He assisted in disarming both Druses and Maronites in Lebanon. When Ibrahim attempted to force conscription on the Hauran the prince kept the Lebanon quiet and sent troops to assist him. In the proscription that followed Ibrahim's victory the Druses suffered both in 'the Mountain' and the plain. The old prince took advantage of the opportunity and furnished weapons to seven thousand Maronites whom Ibrahim had previously disarmed. In this way he obtained their support in case Ibrahim should turn against him. At the same time he took care to punish such Druses as were his enemies and to pardon any who were his friends. Once again the old man had triumphed and by the end of 1839 he seemed more powerful than ever. He was, in fact, about to commit the great blunder of his life.

Ibrahim's measures at the beginning of 1840 were calculated to drive the whole Lebanon into revolt. The two principles by which all the tribesmen held were that they should carry arms and should not pay more than their accustomed taxes. It was rumoured at the end of 1839 that Ibrahim was going to disarm them and then proceed to a military con-



scription. Nothing but the rumour was needed to turn them all against Ibrahim, and to make the Sultan for the moment popular. 'I do not remember,' wrote the British Consul from Beyrouth, 'so strong and general a panic to have prevailed amongst the inhabitants even in the worst times of the conscription in Syria. I doubt much whether the Christian population of Lebanon would quietly submit to a fixed levy. There is decidedly a strong reaction in favour of the Sultan among them since the publication of the *Hatti-Sheriff* which any violent measure on the part of the government could not fail to increase.'<sup>260</sup> The Egyptian officials denied any intention of enforcing conscription for the present. But they could not deny that disarmament was intended and that this was directly contrary to Ibrahim's pledges to the Maronites of the year before. By the end of February Moore reported that Christians and Druses 'would resist all attempts to enrol or disarm them.' Ibrahim, having thus brought two deadly enemies together, proceeded to weld them into unity. He announced that he was going to exact taxes in one year equivalent in amount to the sums usually exacted in three years. Finally he issued to the insurgents on June 6, 1840, a proclamation. He then declared that he 'would destroy their persons and ruin their dwelling places completely' unless they yielded obedience to their prince.

Now was the moment for Emir Beshir to decide. Palmerston as early as April 21 had instructed Ponsonby to press the Sultan to make every concession to the Druses.<sup>261</sup> Promises of aid came through secret agents to 'the Mountain.' The insurgents got together and encamped in the pinewoods at the gates of Beyrouth. They showed no signs of yielding, their numbers increased till they included some of the prince's own family. In June they issued a proclamation declaring that the prince was misled and constrained by Ibrahim. They appealed to England and to France to protect them against a foreign tyranny. A last effort was made by Ibrahim. He sent fifteen thousand troops to Beyrouth and told the prince to meet the insurgents and conciliate them with promises. Force and cajolery were alike useless. 'I consider Egyptian influence at an end in Syria, and if arms and munitions are supplied, the pasha's troops will be driven out to a man or massacred.'<sup>262</sup> In July twenty-four chiefs signed a declaration deposing the prince. In August, after his celebrated July treaty was published to the world, Palmerston openly declared that the British fleet would come to the aid of the Syrians. On August 14 Napier's advance guard of British,

Austrian and Turkish ships was off the Syrian coast and visible from the slopes of Lebanon. Arms and freedom were in sight.

In the middle of August Wood made a last overture to the old prince. He promised him substantial autonomy if he would abandon Ibrahim. Reschid pasha promised him the pardon of the Sultan. Napier issued a proclamation bidding the Lebanese break the force of the tyrant, and the tyrant was still Ibrahim, not Beshir. But the old man remained true to Egypt. Ibrahim had concentrated twelve thousand troops at Zahle, as an ominous hint of the consequences of disobedience. The prince did not understand sea-power and acted, as he thought, with great cleverness. He sent his eldest son to the British, pretending to be in their favour, but stating that at present he must be neutral. Though British ships were on the coast, though arms were being poured into 'the Mountain,' though Druses and Maronites were combining against him, the prince refused to declare against Ibrahim. He did not understand that only a public declaration for the Sultan would save his diadem. A month after the British had landed the old prince was still wavering, and was consequently deposed. In his extremity he offered twenty thousand pounds to a British consul if he could remain in Syria, and, for the first time in his life, found a bribe refused with indignation. He was conveyed with every mark of respect to a British ship and thence to Malta. After a time he returned to Constantinople, where he drew a pension and intrigued ceaselessly for return. He scattered his agents and his gold through Lebanon. He was surrounded by members of his family, some of whom turned Mussulman.<sup>263</sup> Various reasons were ascribed as the cause. Two of them had wives 'very old and plain' and wished to try a change; the rest seem to have thought they might promote their return to Lebanon by apostasy. The old man, however, remained enigmatic. As in the days of his power he was 'so liberal that he was Christian, Mohammedan and Druse according to circumstances.' He lived till 1850 and died at the age of eighty-seven. His active career had ended ten years before when he rejected the British overture of August 1840.

Emir Beshir's successor was a Shehab, but not the Shehab he would himself have named, a nephew who, though seventy years old, had offered his sword to the British. 'The Emir [Beshir Kassim] was the first to answer the call of Her Majesty and the Sultan's officers to the Syrians to support their legitimate sovereign. He risked his all to do so.'<sup>264</sup> He rode into

the camp of Djuni with five thousand mountaineers. On October 4, 1840, he sallied out with a thousand followers against five times that number of Egyptians. They fought in the gorge by the Dog river, beside rocks inscribed with the victories of Assyrian and Babylonian kings, of Pharaohs, of Roman and of Moslem conquerors. The Egyptians retreated with a loss of two thousand men, and the Emir won the princely diadem on the field of battle. Wood, the British commissioner, published the Sultan's *firman* deposing the old prince, and solemnly invested Beshir Kassim.<sup>265</sup> On the 10th the new prince supported Napier in the victory at Calat-Meidan, where the hitherto invincible Ibrahim fled the field in disgrace with only a few followers. Napier turned off to capture Acre while the new prince and his mountaineers pursued Ibrahim. That general showed a flash of his old greatness in a night attack. But the more grandiose scheme of retaking Acre was defeated by the new prince, whose mountaineers made a stubborn resistance to Ibrahim's projected advance in the Anti-Lebanon. In December the prince boldly advanced to within three hours of Damascus and threatened Ibrahim in his capital. Before the end of the year Ibrahim abandoned Damascus for Egypt. The new prince had a brief moment of triumph, which was literally the last he was ever to enjoy.

The common hatred of Ibrahim had united everybody against the old prince. The Druses and the Turks speedily repented of having elevated his nephew. The new prince was as haughty and tyrannical as his uncle, but soon proved to be weak and incompetent. To the Druses a second Shehab was anathema, for the old one had mortally injured their race. They believed that a new Shehab would favour the Maronites, and indeed he speedily did so. The Druses were resolved to get rid of the hated Shehab race and, if they could not do it by agitation, they meant to revolt. And revolt would be safe enough as soon as the British troops disappeared. The Druses did their best in secret to discredit the new prince, awaiting the time for deposing him. They found fellow-conspirators in the Turks, though they were not betrayed by their treacherous masters. They wanted another prince, perhaps a Mohammedan; the Turks wanted no prince at all. The Turks, of course, saw their opportunity for reducing 'the Mountain' to the state of an ordinary province ruled by a pasha, and wished to abolish at once prince, privileges and feudalism. But to the Druses they pretended only that they were ready to depose the prince. England was his only true friend. Ponsonby and Palmerston both saw that the con-

stitutional position of a prince was understood and that it ensured the liberties and privileges of 'the Mountain.' The Lebanon was the actual place where Ibrahim had been overthrown and the key to the situation. If the Turk alienated peoples so well able to harass his communications, he would simply make it easier for Ibrahim to reconquer Syria. Their view was right enough, but the wrong man had been chosen for prince.

## IV

*In 1841 the Turks . . . secretly fomented a civil war between Christians and Druses with the culpable object of weakening and destroying these rival sects.—*  
RICHARD WOOD, March 28, 1853.

A strong government, treating all religions with impartial severity, had disappeared. A corrupt rule, favouring Mohammedans at the expense of Christians, had followed. The Mohammedans, delighted at the opportunity, sought to promote 'a general reaction in favour of the Koran.' The *Gulhané* decree of reform hampered governors both ways. The pasha of Sidon declared he 'dared not strike a workman,' and did not try to prevent the Mohammedans from arming. The pasha of Beyrouth regarded the decree of *Gulhané* as a dead letter, and lifted no hand to protect the Christians. The pashas of Damascus and Aleppo acquiesced in, and even promoted, anarchy. The Arabs of the desert, whom Ibrahim had so sternly repressed, raided from the gates of Damascus to the shores of Galilee. They looted and burned villages, held up small towns to ransom, and terrorised peaceful citizens. Misrule, tending to anarchy, was everywhere. But in 'the Mountain' itself lay the real difficulty. There Druses and Maronites had received abundance of arms from the British, and their quenchless hatred had revived. The old prince was sending money to the Maronites to procure his recall; Ibrahim pasha was intriguing with the Druses. The new prince had no efficient bodyguard, the Turks kept him short of cash, and the British had halved the taxation exacted under the old regime. The new prince had therefore only one resource, and fell back on the Maronites. They proposed to reduce the privileges and power of the Druse chiefs and compelled the helpless prince to support them. 'The patriarch's intolerant attempt to do away with the feudal rights of the Druses over their Christian vassals was one of the primary causes of the revolt of 1841.'<sup>266</sup> It was in fact the most important single

cause, and, in this sense, the Maronites were aggressive and provoked the conflict. The actual incidents producing bloodshed were utterly trivial, as in all cases in this period. One revolt arose from a dispute about a partridge ; a second from a quarrel about cockchafers ; a third began when an old man pushed an old woman away from a fruit tree.

The Turks had a strong reason for letting the Druses cut the throats of the Maronites, a reason carefully kept out of the Blue Books of the period. If they did the throat-cutting themselves the French might intervene on behalf of the Maronites. Hence the Druses must strike the blow, not the Turks. ' It was an unprincipled and a shortsighted policy. . . . On the other hand, they [the Turks] raised up a power, that of the Druses, which now controls them.' <sup>267</sup> The prince might still have weathered the storm if he had had time to execute the new proposals of the powers and been honestly supported by the Turks. Wood headed a Turkish commission of settlement, which succeeded in inducing both Maronites and Druses to pay tribute. He also got a '*Mejliss*' (council) established for 'the Mountain,' consisting of three Maronites, three Druses, one Turk, one Greek and one Metuali. This gave proper representation of all parties, which would in time have acted as a check upon the prince and his Maronite advisers. But this reform was instituted in August 1841, just a little too late. The Druses, who were clever enough, soon saw that the Turks had no intention of checking any excesses which they might commit. The worst possible governors had been installed. The pasha of Beyruth pandered to the natural and unnatural vices of his officers. He did literally nothing to avert the uprising beforehand ; he remained inert after it had broken out, and was finally compelled to act by the foreign consuls. The conduct of the governor of Damascus was even worse. Nejib pasha was a brutal reactionary who had been dismissed on one occasion by Mahmud for intolerance to Christians, and was in principle favourable to the Druses. After that he had been used by Ibrahim to corrupt the *Divan* in Constantinople and was suspected of still being in his pay. At this crisis he played a most shameful part, making it easy for the Druses to attack the Maronites.<sup>268</sup> One of his officials naively confessed that he had known a fortnight beforehand of the Druse intention to attack Deir-el-Kamar. Nejib removed a moderate and popular Mohammedan governor from the Anti-Lebanon (close to the scene of action) and replaced him by a Druse chief.<sup>269</sup> Aided by five hundred Turkish horse this ruffian attacked Zahle and slew over two hundred persons before



the foreign consuls intervened. Not content with stimulating attacks on the Lebanon from without, Nejib pasha did his best to excite Druses to further excesses within. He instructed an official 'not to trouble himself about what was going on in the Lebanon, for that everything that had taken place there had been done with the full sanction of the Porte.'<sup>270</sup> Then he declared his intention of going to Mecca, and his departure would certainly have been the signal for a massacre of Christians, and was no doubt intended as such. Only with great difficulty could he be persuaded to abandon it. Long before they actually came to blows with the Maronites the Druses were well aware that the Turks would do nothing to save their enemies from their vengeance. 'Every day increases my long entertained suspicions that the Druses act with the consent of the Turkish authorities. It is the universal opinion of all my colleagues.'<sup>271</sup> So reported Rose.

None the less the Maronites struck the first blow and killed a number of Druses in a trifling affray near Deir-el-Kamar. The Maronites were victorious, but their very victory was to be fatal to them. 'The Druses previous to the attack . . . were very nearly coming to hostilities amongst themselves, but they sacrificed their private quarrels to what they conceived to be the common good.'<sup>272</sup> In a few days, by one of their surprisingly swift and concerted movements, they advanced on Deir-el-Kamar and blockaded the grand prince and the Maronites within the town. During September 14 and 15 they met a feeble resistance, and on the 16th were on the point of capturing the town. But Colonel Rose appeared on the scene in company with a Turkish pasha and, galloping between the combatants at the risk of his life, induced them to stay their hands. It was only at the last moment that the consuls had agreed to send Rose with Ajoub pasha to stop the conflict and Ajoub alone would certainly have done nothing. As it was he showed no pleasure at the relief of the town and grossly insulted the prince. From the Damascus side Nejib pasha secretly incited the Druses of the Hauran to revolt, and is even said to have supplied them with arms. These actions so encouraged the Druses that they advanced once more on Deir-el-Kamar on October 14. The city was seized and given over to loot. Colonel Rose again arrived in time to stop an indiscriminate slaughter, but he could not prevent men, women and children from being killed and churches and villages from being ruined in the neighbourhood. The Christians seemed helpless, though exhortations to battle of a most unchristianlike character came

from their bishops. The Greek bishop of Zahle urged his flock to 'spare the females but as to everything else, such as murdering, plundering and burning, be sure to do all this, and continue your prayers and confessions, for this is a holy war.' <sup>273</sup> The Maronite patriarch was ill in bed. He declared in public that he wanted to be carried into battle at the head of his men, and in private asked for a ship to be sent to rescue him and his followers. The prince had already, in effect, abdicated.

On October 5 the prince, finding his orders disobeyed and the situation dangerous, had decided to evacuate Deir-el-Kamar. The Druses attacked him as he issued from the town and cut down some of his retainers. The prince himself lost his turban and received a wound in the hand, but he retained his seat in the saddle and escaped. As he fled along the road to the coast he saw his palace at Baabda in flames. Near Beyrouth his followers were actually assaulted by some Turkish irregular cavalry, who had been sent out to protect him! His followers were harassed and pursued up to the very gate of the town, but the prince again escaped, only to find his home in the city in flames. The mob had destroyed it under the eyes of the pasha, who did nothing to hinder them. Henceforth the prince was without honour, without power and without even a dwelling-house. He dared not return to 'the Mountain' and lingered on miserably at Beyrouth till deposed by *firman* of the Sultan in January 1842. He went into exile like the old uncle he had superseded, having lost property worth a million piasters which was never repaid him.

## V

*Europe is sometimes useful.*—TALLEYRAND.

The Four Powers had promised that Lebanon and Syria should enjoy a rule better than that of Ibrahim. Early in 1841 one British agent reported Syria as 'ripe for revolt,' and in October the Lebanon rose. The real cause was the refusal of the Turks to fulfil their honourable obligations. Even in the midst of the fighting Izzet Mehemet had tried to ignore them. So early as April 1841 Palmerston directed Ponsonby 'earnestly to exhort the Turkish to cause the new laws for the improvement of the various branches of administration throughout Turkey to be rigidly and impartially executed in every province of the Empire.' <sup>274</sup> It was especially the Lebanon and Syria that he had in mind, for Palmerston's interest in Jews as well as in Druses was assuming significant forms. <sup>275</sup>

These obligations were fully accepted by Aberdeen, the successor of Palmerston. 'The preservation of the authority of the Sultan, and of the actual state of possession in the East, are considered by the Allied Powers as essential to the permanence of general tranquillity in Europe. This object, therefore, is the foundation of their policy.' Aberdeen desired 'real reforms' not 'a busy meddling policy.' The instrument of reform was 'the union and concert' of diplomats, but there was not to be 'anything like a formal conference of ambassadors at Constantinople.'<sup>276</sup>

These instructions of Aberdeen were addressed, not to Ponsonby but to the famous Sir Stratford Canning, who had resumed his old post at Constantinople. He was much more in earnest about reform than his predecessor, but, unfortunately, at this moment reaction was supreme. Early in 1841 the reactionaries had dismissed Reschid and by the end of the year had sent all reformers packing. The savage Izzet Mehemet became Grand Vizier, a choice specially unfortunate for Syria. During his short stay there in 1840 as 'Viceroy of Egypt and Syria' he had alienated everyone. Jochmus declared him, and not Ibrahim, 'the greatest enemy in Syria at present.'<sup>277</sup> Wood had to intervene to prevent him giving five hundred lashes to a cook for over-salting his soup.<sup>278</sup> Rose found both him and his secretary 'notorious for corruption.' He was the personal enemy of the new grand prince. He disclosed his programme of policy in an interview with Testa, the Netherlands Minister, 'in a dirty shop' and disguised. He 'swears by the one God that to submit the Druses to a Christian prince would be to deliver the Christian population of the mountain to certain destruction. . . . The inhabitants of this country are indocile and almost savage, and when one has to do with them, one recognizes the truth of the axiom—*the baton is a gift fallen from heaven.*'<sup>279</sup> He had already illustrated these principles. He had made the ruthless Omer pasha chief military commander in the Lebanon, he had refused to remove the tyrannical Nejib pasha from Damascus. His chief Civil Commissioner in Syria, Mustapha pasha, had promptly degraded and removed the Emir Beshir Kassim from being grand prince. More ominous still, the office remained in suspense. The obvious aim was to abolish the prince and the old constitution of Lebanon with its carefully defined powers and to substitute a direct Turkish military rule. The baton, not the sceptre, was to prevail. Such a policy could only end in rebellion so long as the Lebanese held arms in their hands.

The European Powers at first failed to get Omer removed

from his command. But they got Nejib transferred from Damascus to Bagdad (April 1842), where his brutality proved equally useless, but actually less dangerous, to the Porte. Mustapha pasha, who was named *Seraskier*, or Minister, began forging a series of petitions in which the Lebanese mountaineers prayed for direct Turkish rule. 'Petitions and counter-petitions are going on here and Mustapha Pasha alternately employs blows and cajolings for what suits his policy is [direct] Turkish government in the Mountain. The situation would be a farce, were not such grave issues involved.'<sup>280</sup> Above all he sought to work on the Druses to prevent a third Shehab from becoming prince. There was 'the most direct oppression of those who declare for the Shehab,' oppression taking the shape 'of Druses with sticks.' But force failed, as did fraud. The petitions were generally admitted to have been due to forgery or to terrorism. The signs of rebellion grew. Mustapha pasha's nerve gave out and he slunk away in the autumn. 'The *Seraskier* embarked the day before yesterday. His end was of a piece with a career here marked by fanaticism and delusion. The Emir Rasslan headed a sort of triumphal parting procession followed by a mad and somewhat naked dervish, with whom the *Seraskier* shook hands as his foot left Syria.'<sup>281</sup>

While Mustapha had been forging petitions and hobnobbing with dervishes in Syria, Europe had at last intervened at Constantinople. In January 1842 the Five Ambassadors at Constantinople had advised the Porte to put in another of the Shehab family as prince. This proposal was not a wise one, for it would have disturbed the Druses. Fortunately the Porte proved obdurate until Stratford became convinced of the unwisdom of the attempt. Aberdeen showed himself unexpectedly resolute. 'One thing is certain. With every desire to respect the independence of the Porte, to abstain from all interference in the internal administration of the Empire; and making allowance for the many and great difficulties in the government of Syria, the Powers of Christendom will never tolerate a continuance of these excesses, which are in truth perfectly gratuitous, and which it is manifestly in the power of the Turkish government at once to check.'<sup>282</sup> Aberdeen could state the general principle, Stratford produced the practical measures. So early as March he thought he had procured the recall of Omer pasha. He despaired of obtaining the reinstatement of the Shehab family, but hoped 'to effect some arrangement tending to the restoration of the former state of things.'<sup>283</sup>

A memo written by Stratford on March 17 formed the basis of Aberdeen's instruction to him in July. The proposal was to divide 'the Mountain' into two districts, each under a *kaimakam* (deputy-governor). The division was to be roughly geographical: a Maronite area to the north, which included Deir-el-Kamar, and a Druse area to the south. There was to be a Druse *kaimakam* for the Druse district, and a Maronite for the Maronite. Stratford's March memo had provided that these two governors should be under the control of a Shehab prince. The July instruction abandoned both prince and Shehab and proposed that the ultimate control should be a Turkish pasha at Damascus or elsewhere.<sup>284</sup> The Turks resisted this new project for a time, but the reactionaries began to weaken and to fall. Izzet Mehemet was turned out from the Grand Viziership in favour of the more conciliatory Rauf. Mustapha was recalled in October and replaced by Aasaad pasha. Finally Omer pasha and most of his savage Albanian troops were recalled. The July plan was accepted in principle by the end of September 1842, but it proved just too late to avert disaster. European intervention too often does.

The Porte surrendered to Europe just after 'the Mountain' had already burst into revolt. The Lebanese despaired of the Turks ever making concessions, and sought to extort them by arms. Omer pasha had proved a good soldier but a bad politician. On at least one occasion he looked on with indifference while Druses battered Maronites with clubs. The Druses, who were past masters in fraud as well as in force, were not long deceived by his pretended favour. Even so early as February 1842 it was remarked that the notable Druses 'are not his lieutenants.'<sup>285</sup> In March it was reported that 'powerful Druse chiefs have made overtures to Maronites.' On April 6 Omer pasha invited five of their leading chiefs to dinner, arrested them and hurried them off to a prison at Sidon. These acts of shameful treachery only united Maronites and Druses against him. He confiscated all the immense estates of the Jumblatt family, and in October made another attempt to capture Druse chiefs and succeeded in arresting one of their best generals by stratagem. By this time the 'Druses as a body' were 'prepared to go every length against the Turkish government.' They turned to their first general, Shibli-el-Anian, and requested him to lead them against Omer.

Towards the end of November thousands of Druses besieged Omer at Beit-ed-Din. They occupied the adjacent heights, cut off the water-supply, and held him in a trap. But Omer was an undaunted soldier. He sallied out as a convoy



and reinforcements were arriving, heavily defeated the Druses and brought both triumphantly into camp. In mid-November negotiations ensued. The Druses demanded the release of their captured chiefs, the dismissal of Omer and the suspension of attempts at disarmament. Omer replied that the Druses had not paid the indemnities due for their spoliation of Christian property the year before. They answered by stating 'the well-known fact that by far the largest portion [of the plunder] had been given in bribes to Mustapha, Selim and other pashas and Turkish authorities.'<sup>286</sup> One sheikh had given Mustapha's coffee-maker five pounds, and other bribes had been proportionate. There seemed a complete deadlock. The Druses could not storm Omer's camp, and would not accept his terms.

The concessions already made at Constantinople at last proved of service. Omer was recalled and the Druses relaxed their blockade. He took some of his turbulent Albanians with him overseas. The new governor, Aasaad pasha, though not ideal, was 'on the whole better than any pasha who has been here,' his fault of 'avarice' being comparatively venial. In addition the Porte was sufficiently frightened by the Druse revolt to put Stratford's scheme of government by the two *kaimakams* into operation.<sup>287</sup> The question whether the Maronite *kaimakam* should be of the Shehab family distracted the Five Powers, but ultimately it was decided not to have one. The Powers thus adopted an anti-Shehab policy, which was disagreeable to the Maronites.\* On January 1, 1843, the Emir Haider Abui Lama was chosen Maronite *kaimakam*. The Druse *kaimakam* Emir Achmed Raslar was (appropriately enough) summoned from a prison to his governorship. The other leading Druse chiefs were released in February. In March the new Druse *kaimakam* suddenly declared himself a Mussulman, a conversion which disturbed both his compatriots and the Turks.

The sorely tried mountaineers might have settled down in peace but for the insidious policy of the Porte. Nejib, as a last legacy of evil, had recommended on his departure that the district of Djebail should be separated from the Maronite *kaimakamship*. The Porte accepted the proposal without consulting the Powers. The transfer of the Christian Djebail area to Turkish rule would have enabled Turkish direct rule to be instituted over about a third of 'the Mountain' and

\* As if to complete the comedy a Druse petition for a Shehab had been produced. Rose thought it sincere. *Vide* Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 75-6, and F.O. 78/496. From Rose, No. 79 of November 4, 1842.

placed two-thirds of it under anti-Christian control. Stratford at once remonstrated in conjunction with the other diplomats. In reply the Porte showed its usual duplicity. They first contended that the Djebail was really a district under the pasha of Tripoli; and next argued that they had never meant to separate it from the northern half of Lebanon. They gave way in the end and even Stratford entertained 'a sanguine hope' of a permanent settlement. But the reports of his consuls were as pessimistic as ever. 'There is nothing which denotes that the Sultan's officers can govern these countries,' wrote the consul from Aleppo in July. 'The Egyptians with all their vices and defects managed matters much better.' Rose made a still more mournful admission: 'The Porte has deemed fit to resume, or rather to continue her policy of fostering the [bad] feeling between Christians and Druses.'<sup>288</sup>

## VI

*Civil dissension is a viperous worm  
That gnaws the bowels of the Commonwealth.*

HENRY VI, Part I, Act III, Sc. 1.

*That foul conspiracy  
Of the beast Caliban and his confederates.*

TEMPEST, Act IV, Sc. 1.

The settlement of 1843 had a good many merits. Communications were improved, taxation lightened, brigandage became for the time less common. The *kaimakams* even succeeded in getting debts paid to British merchants by occasionally arresting the debtors. The peasants, whether Druse or Maronite, showed their sense of the new economic benefits. The relation of landlord and tenant remained absolutely undisturbed, and even the tribal hostilities slumbered. Disturbances or revolts of the period were due to the ambition of feudal chiefs or to the duplicity of the Turks. The two *kaimakams* had unfortunately little wherewith to curb their nobles or to checkmate their suzerain. Each had authority, dignity and position; neither had executive power, money, soldiers or police. The mixed districts, where the Druse and Maronite populations met and mingled, added to the danger. Ethnic or religious difficulties can generally be solved, if each distinct race or creed is confined to a definite area. But such homogeneous units are rare, and the gorges of the Lebanon were full of debatable lands. In the valley of Deir-el-Kamar

Druse landlords controlled Maronite peasants. In the Kesrouan Christian sheikhs ruled over Druse peasants. Here was a carpet of mingled and clashing colours. These 'mixed districts' could only have been well governed if the two *kaimakams* could have relied upon the loyalty of the Turkish government. But, according to a singularly detached observer, 'Whatever policy may have directed the Councils of the Porte, it is evident that the new systems of administration met with no support at its hands.'<sup>289</sup> Now, if the *kaimakams* were condemned by the Sultan to be 'men in buckram,' the mountaineers would soon be in revolt.

Just when the *kaimakams* were being inaugurated Rose announced 'the fresh, the fourth obstacle, or artifice, which in one short month had been planned by the Porte in order to render nugatory the plan of government proposed by the Powers.'<sup>290</sup> This treachery was ultimately fatal to success, for it was accompanied by reluctance and opposition on the part both of Austrian and French consuls and agents. These two Catholic powers recognised too late that a Shehab as prince would have promoted the interests of Catholicism. Every effort of secret intrigue was therefore used to discredit the existing government so as to justify the recalling of the old dynasty. Unfortunately an ideal centre for intrigue existed at Deir-el-Kamar. Any intriguer, by a little gold or other stimulus, could stir one or other faction of this city to madness. Though it was the Druse capital, it had been handed over to the Maronite *kaimakam*. Its Maronite peasants, Druse landlords and Turkish garrison formed a witches' cauldron of unrest.

One advantage existed, and that was that Stratford Canning was prepared to intervene from Constantinople. The bastinadoing of a Lebanon sheikh led him to compel the Porte to issue an order that no sheikh or emir should be subjected to such an indignity again. When three years' arrears of tribute were demanded from the Kesrouan, Stratford immediately intervened, and secured the suspension of the exaction, because England had promised that these arrears should not be levied. But even Stratford's activity could not prevent the Druses and Maronites from quarrelling again or the Turks from inciting them to do so. 'No government understands so well the art of placing at variance sheikh with sheikh, family with family, and sect against sect. They know the price of all, and lastly they feel no compunction in abandoning any measure however strongly they may have brought it forward, however much they may be pledged to it.'<sup>291</sup>

For two or three years Europe had shown a united front to Turkey over the Syrian question. But in 1844 this harmony disappeared and each European nation intrigued in the Lebanon against the other. The fruits of this dissension were soon seen. France showed special activity among the Maronites, 'for her own purposes,' said the ex-prince, Emir Beshir. The future Maronite *kaimakam* 'admitted that the French agents had endeavoured to create a party in Lebanon favourable to French and adverse to British and Turkish interests, that the patriarch, and others of the Maronite clergy had assisted those endeavours.'<sup>292</sup> The French vice-consul of Sidon was said to have armed a Christian village against the Druses. 'We know positively that the French have intrigued to incite the Christians to revolt.' The most specific charges against France are made by Colonel Rose. 'In May, June and July last [1841] here [Beyruth] the French agents made promises of physical assistance to the Maronites, in resisting the payment of the taxes imposed by the officers of the Porte. . . . Such a knowledge was calculated not only to cause mistrust of the French and a dread of her intentions, but similar feelings as to the Maronites, in the minds of the Turkish authorities. This circumstance was the first and real cause of the fear of foreigners on the part of the Turks. That in revenge and in dread of the alliance of French and Maronite influence they should have let loose on the latter people, their hereditary enemies the Druses, no one deplotes more than myself.'<sup>293</sup> \*

Here is a definite indictment both of French and Turks by an English consul. It is easy to exaggerate its weight in the case of the French, especially as their consular archives are not open. Moral and historical ties attached them to the Maronites by an older and stronger bond than attached any other race to a European power. Yet all European powers were interested. The Austrians had made advances to the Maronites, the Russians to Greek Christians and even to the Druses. But the Druses, just because the French favoured the Maronites, chose the English for their protectors. They in fact received various favours from us and were doubtless encouraged to revolt in 1841 by the belief that the British would condone their action.† In January 1843 Aberdeen definitely forbade British agents to take side as between the two races. He also endeavoured to restrict the activity of his agents. 'They must not be too authoritative, they must abstain in future from active inter-

\* *Bey. MSS.*, pte. Rose to Wood, March 22, 1842. He speaks of 'an intercepted (French) correspondence' and 'other satisfactory evidence' as his proofs.

† For the British connexion with the Druses *vide infra*, n. 261, pp. 439-42.

ference,' they 'must not make themselves responsible in any way for the performance of engagements into which any parties in Syria [Turks or Syrians] may think fit to enter.' <sup>294</sup> England, under the gentle Aberdeen, tried to calm the turmoil of Syrian politics. In particular, she renounced any attempt to restore the Shehab dynasty, in deference to Turkish views. She aimed steadily at a balance of power in Syria, just as much as in Europe. Her efforts were to keep the Shehab out and therefore to maintain the existing status. France and Austria sought to restore the Shehab and therefore to upset it and the system of 1843.

In April 1844 Halil, the Capudan pasha, with six Turkish three-deckers and three frigates, arrived at Beyruth. He explained to Rose that the Turks would not allow a Shehab to return to power and meant to enforce and apply the system of the two *kaimakams*. He also professed a desire to better the condition of Christians in the mixed districts. But the fleet, though imposing enough in the Bay of Beyruth, made no impression on those who dwelt in the gorges and mountains of Lebanon, because 'The Capudan had literally no troops.' <sup>295</sup> In August a local rising in the Besharré district in favour of the Shehabs was suppressed with surprising quickness. Halil took advantage of the calm to announce his policy. The Porte, he said, would pay three-quarters of the indemnity due to the Christians, leaving only a fourth to be paid by the Druses. On October 31 Halil announced this to a meeting of notables as one of several 'immutable decisions' of the Sultan. Immediately after this decision the Maronite patriarch announced his refusal to accept it, and threatened his followers with excommunication unless they followed his example.

Halil proved a broken reed in face of this formidable opposition. 'So far from endeavouring to carry it [the policy] out [he] had sought to cause its failure.'\* When taxed with his behaviour he 'made a wretched defence' and impressed Rose with 'his lamentable disregard of truth.' The Christians of the mixed districts refused to obey his orders, and he then announced that his instructions 'did not empower him to use coercion.' Then he lost heart and, in shameful wise, left Syria altogether. Stratford summed up the situation thus: 'The Turkish authorities are openly accused of having acted with premeditated hesitation and duplicity, in some instances

\* F.O. 195/235. From Rose, No. 71 of November 21, 1844. Incredible as it may seem, the Porte had dictated this attitude by deciding not to sanction coercive measures without consent of the five consuls. As Rose wrote, 'I do not think the French consul would ever sanction . . . coercive measures.' F.O. 195/235. From Rose, No. 55 of September 24.



promoting the progress of disorder by the slowness and inadequacy of the means employed for its prevention, and in others actually stimulating to the commission of crime those whom they were commissioned to restrain. To crown all it was in the midst of so many revolting incidents that [Halil] the Capudan pasha took his departure.'<sup>296</sup> The Turkish government in reply admitted the inconvenience of Halil's departure and made practically no attempt to refute the other charges. Most of them were kept out of the Blue Books.<sup>297</sup>

The situation was exactly depicted by a Druse sheikh. 'It was as clear as day,' he said, 'that the government wished troubles to take place between Christians and Druses in order to step in and establish their rule.'<sup>298</sup> The same testimony came from the Druse *kaimakam*, from his brothers, and from various Maronites. Rose was horrified to learn that a Turkish official had told a Druse that, in case of a conflict with the Maronites, 'he would not interfere at all or put a stop to the collision but simply report.' Halil's departure from Beyrouth was a great encouragement to all the elements of disorder. When peoples thirst for one another's blood there is no difficulty about pretexts. It was not a cockchafer, but a partridge which led to fighting this time.

The Maronites certainly began the attack in the mixed districts. They moved on the Choueifat (Shoof) district, burning fourteen villages, and reached Mukhtara itself, the residence of Said Bey Jumblatt (April 1845). They got up to the walls of the castle, but were repelled by volleys from Turkish regular troops, who for once arrived in time. Encouraged by this success, the Maronites launched a great offensive on the Druses of the Meten district in May. It was successful because the Turkish soldiers withdrew just before the Maronites arrived. The Turkish arrival at Mukhtara and their departure from the Meten seem to have been equally accidental. The Druses soon found their revenge, for the Maronites never made head against them for long. They slew nine priests, plundered one convent and burned another. They penned over five hundred Maronites, including some Shehab emirs, in a castle at Abey.\* The Druses offered to allow them to depart under a Turkish escort to Sidon and Beyrouth. The Turkish troops had made no effort to resist the Druses and probably intended to let the fugitives be attacked by the numerous bands of Druses hovering in the neighbourhood. But, just as the procession was departing, Colonel Rose rode up and told the Druses that British honour was pledged to protect the

\* Abey is about 28 kilometers south of Beyrouth.

Maronites. The Druse sheikhs agreed to ride with him, to ensure their safety. The strange convoy moved on. Christian emirs of the Shehab race, dejected and in tears, their wives and daughters with horns of gold and silver on their foreheads, poor women with babes at the breast and loads on the back, old men hardly able to walk. They passed a convent and two villages in flames, and more than once met parties of stern-faced Druses with levelled weapons. At the word of the Druse sheikhs the weapons were lowered, and the convoy came safely into Beyrouth. The chiefs told Rose at the end that 'they only gave a safe conduct to the Christians for my [Rose's] sake and not for the Turks.' <sup>299</sup>

The criminal conduct of the Turkish government and officials needs hardly any further testimony. The Turkish irregulars, Bashi-Bazouks raised by the government and 'sent to preserve order, committed their usual atrocities.' <sup>300</sup> In the early days of the revolt Daoud pasha told a Druse chief he could not permit open war, but would wink at guerilla action, adding 'when you can, do it secretly.' <sup>301</sup> Subsequently he made no attempt to punish two Druse murderers brought before him. The severity of the evils produced the remedy. Halil pasha had fortunately left Syria for ever. Aasaad, old and incapable, was replaced by Wagieah pasha from Aleppo. He was personally pure, though there was 'nothing more corrupt than his entourage.' But he was on the whole 'the best pasha sent to Syria' (since 1840). He had 'intelligence, tact and great courage,' qualities seldom united in a Turk. Articles of peace were signed, under his authority, between Maronite and Druse by the end of May 1845.

Adequate measures were taken to restore order in the autumn. In mid-September Chekib pasha arrived from Constantinople with eighteen Turkish battalions and sixteen guns. The Druses and Maronites, exhausted by fighting and now surprised, offered a feeble resistance. Before the end of 1845 'the Mountain' was, if not at peace, at least quiescent. Disarmament was actually applied, though Aberdeen agreed with Stratford in describing it as 'highly impolitic.' Disarmament, if impartially applied, was in principle sound. But no Turkish official was, or could be, impartial. There was, wrote Rose, 'great want of faith over disarmament and, reprehensible as were the means by which it was applied, it would not do now to arrest the Porte's progress in it [the Mountain] or the Besharré, in which the French have their strongest interests, would remain armed and the rest of "the Mountain" disarmed. The disarmament must now be classed with other

*faits accomplis.*' <sup>302</sup> And again, 'Unfortunately it is not or at least it was not the policy of the Porte . . . to disarm the Druses whom, fewer in number, they wished to keep as a counterpoise to the Christian interest. . . . As the Druses had plundered the Christians in their mixed districts twice of their arms, when the Government took one musket from each man, the Druses still retained one, if not two, stands of arms per man.' <sup>303</sup> The partiality of the Turkish disarmament policy threatened to unsettle the whole settlement.

Aberdeen, as Stratford informed the Porte, 'does not believe in disarming "the Mountain".' <sup>304</sup> He had professed impartiality between Druses and Maronites, but the situation altered when the Maronites were disarmed and the Druses were not. This fact led to a curious overture, of which there is no record in British archives. The French, having been convinced of the British intention to support the Druses, made some effort to convert Aberdeen to different views. Guizot sent Bourée to Aberdeen to say the French influence was worth nothing in the Lebanon. Aberdeen replied, 'with that slightly abrupt clearness habitual in British diplomacy, "By what *arrière pensée* do you explain this interest we should have in the Druses?"' Bourée replied that he did not know, but had thought a full explanation with England would lead her to appreciate Colonel Rose's ideas at their right value and renounce them. 'Lord Aberdeen and I were then standing near a window looking on the garden of the Foreign Office. "My Lord," I added, "I have an intimate conviction . . . that if instead of having before you that green sward and calm perspective, your Excellency saw the torrents of blood which our failure to agree has cost, and will cost the Christians, you would let me bring away from London [the conviction] that henceforth our governments will act together." The blood flushed in Lord Aberdeen's face with a feeling I could not clearly perceive. Had I repelled him or had I moved him? I have never known.' <sup>305</sup> Anyhow Palmerston came into office a few months later, and his arrival ended any prospect of disarming the Druses.

The temporary success of the settlement owed much to the vigilance of Stratford. He it was who urged the Porte to 'encourage natural emigration from mixed districts,' and thus gradually to separate Maronite from Druse. He it was who succeeded in devising the system by which Deir-el-Kamar, the storm centre in the mixed districts, was subject to a Turkish garrison and governor. The Druses never forgave this slight, but the arrangement was successful for a time. In 1848

Stratford interfered successfully to prevent a further disarmament in 'the Mountain,' and caused the Porte to desist from a project of introducing conscription there.<sup>306</sup> This attempt was not only a gross breach of faith but a ridiculous blunder. In 1850 Stratford interfered again, got some vexatious Turkish regulations cancelled, and organised satisfactory new *Mejliss* (council) for 'the Mountain.' He was at last able to report 'the present system has kept "the Mountain" quiet for several years.'<sup>307</sup> But even when the Turks allowed Lebanon to govern itself, they were incapable of governing the rest of Syria well. Serious outrages on Christians were reported from Aleppo in the autumn. Palmerston was moved to write, 'If the Christian subjects of the Sultan are to be liable to become the victims of such abominable crimes, Christian Europe will come to the conclusion that the existence of the Ottoman Empire is an evil, and that its overthrow would be conducive to the general interests of the human race.'<sup>308</sup> A stern warning indeed from the upholder of Turkey.

The system of the two *kaimakams* in 'the Mountain' was, on the whole, a good one. It had its weak points, such as the placing of Deir-el-Kamar under a Turkish governor, and the absence of any supreme head of 'the Mountain.' Ibrahim may have governed better, but there is no period when the Turks governed so well as during the half-generation between 1845 and 1860. The project of a Shehab dynasty had been finally defeated, and the Turks had been compelled to abandon their plan of directly governing 'the Mountain.' They had indeed no approach to Lebanon save through the Druse and Maronite *kaimakams*. The fifties were a peaceful period on the whole, and prosperity smiled. The Lebanon produced again its own corn and wine, its own milk and oil in abundance. In 1856 Moore said that it was 'better cultivated than any province of Syria.' When signs of trouble arose in 1858 the causes were primarily economic. A peasant revolt preceded and occasioned the horrors of 1860. No settlement could be other than makeshift when tribes were so turbulent and the suzerain power so treacherous. But for half a generation Europe had compelled Turkey to govern Lebanon with decency. Her influence had been beneficent and inaugurated a notable achievement in international control.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE INSURRECTION IN BOSNIA ; THE WAR IN MONTENEGRO ; AND THE AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION (1848-52)

#### I

*Our rough land was the Land of Lays,  
The one good thing left in evil days,  
Since the Mid-Age was the heroic time.  
And only in such wild nooks as ours  
Could you taste of it yet as in its prime.*

R. BROWNING, *Flight of the Duchess*.

A REBELLION in a Turkish province has often caused the fall of a pasha or Grand Vizier. Sometimes it has caused a European war or brought death to the Sultan. A revolt in Rustchuk seated Mahmud on the throne, and a revolt in Lebanon helped to turn Mehemet Ali out of Syria. Twelve years later a revolt in Bosnia caused Austria to send a menacing ultimatum to Turkey (1853). The Sultan gave way, but Austria's success encouraged Russia to imitate her example. Turkey refused to accept humiliation a second time, and thus gave rise to the Crimean war. Bosnia proved the plague spot which inflamed all Europe.

Bosnia herself had been inflamed by the reforms first of Mahmud and then of Reschid. The *Gulhané* decree at once saved and ruined Turkey. It brought Europe to her aid against Mehemet Ali, but it kindled civil war within Islam itself. In both the capital and the provinces two Moham-medan factions were henceforth perpetually at war. In Constantinople open defiance of the *Gulhané* decree was for a time impossible, for Europe supported it as the price of aid against Mehemet Ali. But Mehemet Ali fell, and Reschid and reform fell with him. The ardour and zeal of Stratford Canning galvanised reform again into life at the centre, but even he admitted to failure by 1851. In the provinces reform had already failed. There the Sultan had often small authority and Europe had none at all. In some provincial



centres, as Beyruth or Salonica, the *Gulhané* decree had produced an impression; in other districts, like Bulgaria or Albania, it was proclaimed in a language the people did not understand. In Bosnia, most prejudiced and conservative of all, the very whisper of reform under Mahmud produced a violent reaction. Twenty years later the attempt to enforce the *Gulhané* decree drove the haughty Mohammedan beys into revolt.

No account of Bosnia would be complete without reference to the *haiduks*, who had moulded its history and altered its frontiers. The word *haiduk* means simply a robber, and *haiduks* had actually existed in Jugoslav lands before the coming of the Turk. With the Turkish conquest they acquired a nobler status as champions of oppressed Christians. Wherever a mountain, a forest or a marsh rendered a place easy of defence or difficult of access, there *haiduks* were to be found. They were the last rebels against Turkish authority. At the famous rock at Clissa in Dalmatia, in the mountains of old Servia, in the depths of the Shumadya forests, they long held out. Their existence was precarious and they were gradually stamped out. Byron could still find them 'by Suli's rock and Parga's shore.' A few years later and they were gone from both. But in Herzegovina, and conspicuously in Montenegro, the *haiduks* fought on. In Bosnia they played a part almost as important and unique. For they had the peculiar function of conquering land from the Turk and handing it over to the Habsburgs.<sup>309</sup>

The *haiduks* were not mere robbers. They had customs, ideals and a political organisation of their own. Their ideal was not robbery but freedom. All agree that the Church and the *haiduks* liberated the Jugoslavs from the Turk, and that freedom would have perished without them. The *haiduk* leaders acquired legendary proportions and inspired scores of songs, becoming the Robin Hoods and Rob Roys of the Balkans. They had no class distinctions and included some of the best intellects of the time. The leader (the *harambasha*) was elected, but, once chosen, his authority was supreme. He inflicted the most terrible punishments, such as burning or impaling, for treachery to the band. A series of rules and a hundred songs inculcated hatred of the Turk. Vengeance for blood shed was a sacred duty. 'Who does not avenge will never be a saint' was one whimsical saying. 'Avenge yourself on the Turk, even if you have to wait fifty years,' was the watchword of the men of Clissa.\* Nowhere was bitterer hatred or intenser fighting than on the Bosnian border.

\* Dušan Popović: *O Haiducima*, Belgrade [1930], II, 94.

Bosnia lies near to other Yugoslav lands, and in that lay her tragedy and her hope. Her territory marched with that of Croatia, a Latinised Slavonic state ruled by the Habsburgs. To the east was a half-free Serbia, to the south the half-subjected and still turbulent Herzegovina. Farther south again, behind a white and purple line of mountains, lay an eyrie of eagles. There were the free men of Montenegro, always ready for battle. Between 1830 and 1851 Montenegro was ruled by the poet-bishop Peter II, who was too prudent to take risks. His inaction paralysed the half-free tribes of Herzegovina. Serbia was equally helpless. She had just ended the reign of a strong Obrenović prince, and adopted a weak Kara-Georgević as his successor. His seat was unstable and he was in no mood for adventure. So during the period 1830-1850 Bosnia had, for once, to act for herself with no hope of aid from her Slavonic brethren. Indeed the Mohammedans of Bosnia, who were the rebels of the period, had no sympathy with Christian Slavs, and sought aid from the Mohammedans of Albania.

During the seventeenth century the gallant Prince Eugene had reached Serajevo, but he had failed to remain there or to occupy the country. Bosnia seemed inaccessible to the world, for she had no roads. Yet there was one side on which Bosnia was accessible. The Turkish boundary with the Habsburg power in Croatia had varied from generation to generation. It ebbed and flowed with the tide of military success. There had been no delimitation in peace time and the chances of border warfare caused the frontiers to advance or to retreat. Austria had organised an admirable Serbo-Croat force of border troops, who spent their lives on the frontier. Raids by armed men across it were perpetual. There were always Christian *haiduks* in revolt in Bosnia, and there was often a rebellion near the frontier. If successful, it usually led to a transfer of territory. The Croat frontiersmen advanced and occupied the turbulent district in the name of the Habsburg, and the Porte generally acquiesced in the transfer. The Bosnian frontier was like a coast continually worn away by the sea. It receded or disintegrated as armed peasants asserted their independence of the Sultan and induced a Christian power to adopt them as their subjects. Thus the *haiduks* really determined and delimited the frontier. By 1830 a *modus vivendi* had been reached and a boundary line of approximate permanence assured. The Lika (once a stronghold of Turkish pashas) was recognised as Austrian territory, the Kraina (or Turkish Croatia) as the Sultan's. But even so the frontier

was continually crossed and recrossed by *haiduks*, smugglers and rebels fleeing from Bosnia to Croatia. Reprisals were frequent. Jellačić relates how the Turks shot a Croat frontiersman beyond the Bosnian border, how he demanded redress and, when it was refused, crossed the border and fought a battle. The Turks lost eighty men and Jellačić sixty-seven.<sup>310</sup> Thus the frontier, even when fixed, was perpetually violated by both sides, and its chronic disorder gave Austria a pretext to make war on Turkey at any time.

History alone explains the unique sufferings that fell to the lot of Bosnia. When the Turks entered the land as conquerors in the fifteenth century they allowed the existing nobles to retain their lands on condition they became Mussulmans. Elsewhere the Serb nobles refused the bribe and lost their lands and position. But the Bosnians were many of them Bogomiles or heretics who had no liking for either Catholic or Greek Church. In revenge they embraced the creed of Islam. So in Bosnia (and nowhere else in the Yugoslav lands) arose a feudal system in which Serb Christians were oppressed by men of Serb blood though of Moslem faith. Under normal circumstances the Turks created a feudal system in which Turkish beys settled on the conquered land as barons and Turkish *spahis* as yeomen.<sup>311</sup> Both classes were genuine Turks imported for the purpose of supplying cavalry regiments in war time. This was the system introduced into 'Servia' proper, where the Turkish beys and *spahis* remained aliens and true to Stambul. But in Bosnia both beys and *spahis* were natives, so the system worked out quite differently. The beys had no love for the Turks of Stambul, though they professed the Mohammedan faith. Their idea was to emancipate themselves from Turkish control and, if that was not possible, to make that control a nominal one. The military service was a farce, for the Bosnian beys soon obtained the concession that they should not have to serve outside Bosnia. They also obtained control of the administrative machine. They divided the province into forty-eight captaincies, and made each one of these captaincies hereditary in a family of beys. This circumstance, so contrary to Turkish practice, greatly increased the power of the local magnates.

The Turkish governor of Bosnia actually found it unsafe to reside at the capital, Serajevo. His Mohammedanised subjects forced him with menaces to withdraw to the town of Travnik. He obeyed and lived there in the old grey fort which picturesquely overshadows the town. His compulsory residence in

a town inferior to the capital established and proclaimed his impotence. His haughty subjects, the Mohammedanised Serb beys, enjoyed the power he relinquished and became typical feudal magnates. Each had limitless power over his vassals, broad acres, castles beside shady trees and flowing waters. Their public appearances were splendid. They rode on magnificently caparisoned horses, in robes of scarlet and blue trimmed with gold, followed by a train of attendants with glittering scimitars. They were the last medieval knights in Europe, and, to complete the illusion, often rode out hawking with hooded falcons on their wrists.

The cardinal fact in Bosnia's history is that about one-third of her sons were converts to Mohammedanism and that this Mussulman minority obtained all power. The Christian majority was divided into Serbs or Orthodox and Croats or Catholics. The Serbs were about double the number of Croats.\* The division between them prevented a united front from being shown to the enemy. Their traditions were different. The Serbs believed in protesting and revolting; the Croats believed in protesting but submitting. The Croats of Hungary had submitted to Austria, and the Croats of Bosnia submitted to Turkey. But the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina defied the Turks, and found inspiration and help from Montenegro whenever they were in revolt (and it was often). The majority of the Mohammedans of Bosnia were patient and hard-working peasants, and among the best subjects of the Turk. They were more liberal than most Mohammedans. They secluded and veiled their women and punished their infidelity with death. But they drank wine in secret and showed little of the Mohammedan gravity. Their boys played the national Serb game of '*crvat*,' their elders 'put the stone' like Christians. Then too they had all the Serb love of colour and decoration. Their dresses were embroidered in the Serb fashion though with oriental touches. Their veneer was of the East, but at heart these Mohammedans remained Serb.

The essential unity of Mohammedan and Christian Serbs in Bosnia is seen in their poems.<sup>312</sup> These are the creation of the peasants and represent the soul of the people. The Mohammedan *guslar* is at once reciter and a poet like his Christian counterpart. A long series of Mohammedan poems are based on Slav traditions. Their love-songs breathe all the Slav melancholy and passion. Sometimes the song broods on the awful imminence of death, as in this address to a young girl :

\* *Vide* n. 322 to this chapter, p. 450, for statistics in 1851, 1910 and 1931.

Today thou wearest a robe so white  
 'Twill be thy winding sheet tonight.  
 Today green-mantled art thou seen,  
 Tomorrow wrapped in turf as green.

One of the most famous Mohammedan songs relates the tragedy of two lovers. Mujo loved Fata and met her in secret. Then Mujo was missing for some days and Fata saw a funeral procession pass beneath her window. When she learned that the body was Mujo's, she drew a dagger and slew herself. They were buried in two graves side by side. One day, as the two stricken mothers visited the graves, they beheld a strange growth :

From Mujo's grave a figtree green,  
 From Fata's a red rose, had sprung ;  
 The rosetree clasped the figtree close,  
 As Fata once to Mujo clung.

This is the thought in the border ballad :

Out of her breast there sprang a rose,  
 And out of his a briar.

The warlike songs of the Mohammedans of Bosnia are also Serb in spirit. The ballad of Mustaj Beg of Lika is called a 'Mohammedan hero-song,' and Mustaj Beg is termed 'a national hero.' \* All the expressions are those of the Christian poems ; for example, such a sentiment as 'heroism is not to be bought for money.' Mustaj Beg is imprisoned, just like Marko Kraljević in the Christian Serb lays. The description of him after years of imprisonment is the same :

Black indeed was Mustaj Beg of Lika,  
 To his waist his matted hair is hanging,  
 And his nails are like the claws of eagles.

It all ends in a fight in the heroic style :

So they came along the green, green meadows  
 Shouting, praying God and wielding iron.  
 Gallant were the warriors who met us,  
 Flames shot out like hailstones from the heavens,  
 Gracious God, how awful was the struggle !

In exactly the same way a Mohammedan ballad celebrates the valour shown by Prince Nicholas and his Montenegrins in a fight near Gusinje. The Mohammedanised Serb praises

\* *Narodni junak Lički Beg, Mustaj-Beg* (Muslimanska junačka pjesmarica), Serajevo [1927].



the valour of the Christian and evinces a sympathy which no Turk would show. The Christian ballads of Montenegro and Herzegovina never sympathise with the Mohammedanised Serb. They show even more hatred for the 'damned renegades' than for the Turks proper.

All the Christian peasants and a number of the Mohammedan ones were serfs.<sup>313</sup> But the Mohammedanised peasants retained much of the charm of the Serb race. Though their advances were ill received, they were by no means unfriendly to their Christian brethren. They spoke Serb (for only officials spoke Turkish). They sometimes bound themselves to the Christians by formal bonds, such as the practice of blood-brotherhood. When opportunity offered (as when a new rectification of frontier in favour of Hungary was effected) the Bosnian Mohammedans were converted back to Christianity by whole villages.<sup>314</sup> They marched to battle in 1831 with this singular fatalistic chant on their lips :

We march to the plains of Kossovo,  
There our fathers lost their faith and honour.  
Haply we may lose our faith and honour,  
Haply we may keep both and return home.

If the Mohammedan peasants were liberal and friendly, their nobles were reactionary and tyrannical. In the best times of Servian history the Christian nobles had proved quarrelsome, factious and jealous and oppressive to inferiors. Their successors, the Mohammedanised beys of Bosnia, exaggerated their vices. This proud, irritable and suspicious aristocracy was determined to be masters over their inferiors. They were surrounded by dangers and irritated by the difference of faith with so many of their subjects. Fear and wrath made them cruel. They were not content with bastinadoing their Christian victims. They carried a terrible instrument for tearing their flesh, and this horrible hammer (the '*nadjak*') was often in use. Cruelty and refinement went hand in hand, for the '*nadjak*' was sometimes artistically inlaid with silver. The beys went further in their hatred of Christians. They indulged in acts of symbolic degradation, burying men to their necks in dung, desecrating Christian churches, riding on the backs of Christians like Timur bestriding the sovereigns of Asia. The beys were sunk in medieval superstitions and prejudices, and intoxicated with their pride. They had so often oppressed their own subjects with impunity that they did not fear to rise against the Sultan. They were to find that they had rebelled once too often.

## II

*It is obvious that these were not ordinary insurrections. . . . The grand vital question was at issue . . . whether Bosnia should subsist, as it had subsisted for centuries . . . or submit to a police system of order.*—RANKE on Hussein's revolt of 1829.

Trouble began when Mahmud sent an energetic pasha to restore order in 1821. By allying with some chiefs and appealing to the Christians Mahmud's pasha captured Mostar and beheaded some of the beys. But the destruction of the janizaries in 1826 renewed the unrest. The beys felt it would be their turn next, and were infuriated when ordered to wear the new Turkish uniform. Its crossed belts excited their wrath. 'If we want crosses we will get them from the other [Austrian] Emperor not from the Sultan,' said they. The Bosnian Vizier took up arms against them and stormed Serajevo. But the beys rose in their wrath, and hunted him from the town after a fight in the streets (1828). The peace with Russia next year gave Mahmud an opportunity of dealing with Bosnia. The Vizier of Bosnia was ordered to put on his new Turkish uniform and to attack Serajevo. Before he could do either, rebellion had already broken out. Hussein Aga, a leading bey, summoned 'the famous, proud and lionhearted sons of Bosnia' to wage a 'holy war' against 'the unbelieving *Giaour* Sultan,' for 'the restoration of the true Islam.'<sup>315</sup> Forty thousand men rallied to the standard of Hussein. He styled himself 'the Dragon of Bosnia,' and declared that he was 'fighting for freedom' and 'for his ancestors.' Hussein captured the Bosnian Vizier at Travnik, stripped him of his new Turkish uniform, ceremoniously washed him and forced him to repeat penitentiary prayers. Thereafter, and until he escaped, the Vizier was dragged in the train of Hussein, clad in old Turkish costume. The movement was one of pure reaction to Bosnian-Mohammedan nationalism. When Hussein entered Serajevo he dismissed all Turkish officials and destroyed all traces of Turkish rule. By 1831 Hussein was actually threatening to dismember the Turkish Empire. He advanced to the famous plain of Kossovo, where he joined forces with Mustapha pasha and an army of Albanians. Mustapha had already played an ambiguous part in the campaign against Russia.\* Now he emerged from his neutrality

\* Cp. *supra*, pp. 55-6.

and openly advanced against the Turks. Hussein and Mustapha were joined by a third pasha from Sofia. They held Old Serbia and nearly all Bulgaria within their rebellious hands. Even Constantinople might fall.

The end came suddenly. Reschid Mehemet pasha, the Grand Vizier, negotiated with Hussein and Mustapha secretly and simultaneously. Each suspected his colleague and, while they hesitated, Reschid turned suddenly on Mustapha and beat him at Prilep (1831). The Albanians held out for three months, until Scutari surrendered. Just before its fall Hussein 'the Dragon' and his Bosnians advanced on Mehemet Reschid from the Kossovo plain. They had captured Peć and Prisrend and threatened to attack the Grand Vizier in the rear. Reschid Mehemet, however, promised to make Hussein Vizier of Bosnia and to allow a native Bosnian administration. 'The Dragon' eagerly accepted the bribe, and allowed the Grand Vizier to proceed against Mustapha. By May 'new victories over Mustapha pasha' were reported and Scutari was stormed.<sup>316</sup> Mustapha was spared, but many of his followers were put to death with excruciating tortures, and the Albanian revolt stamped out in blood. '*Diuide et impera*' has always been the Turkish motto, and Mehemet Reschid understood how to practise it. He had no longer any need to keep his promises to Hussein. He refused to make him Vizier of Bosnia, and artfully induced other chiefs to question his authority. Finally he nominated Kara Mahmud Vizier and sent him against 'Dragon Hussein' with thirty thousand men. Kara Mahmud advanced on Serajevo and fought a severe battle with Hussein. He despaired at one time of victory but, at the last moment, Ali Bey Rizvanbegović appeared with a force of Herzegovinan Christians and decided the day in his favour. All resistance was at an end and the Grand Vizier had triumphed. In October Mahmud received him with extraordinary marks of favour. He gave him 'a robe of honour studded with gold and diamonds, a fez covered with diamonds, a sword set with precious stones.' Finally 'a special order was hung round his neck by the Sultan himself.'<sup>317</sup> The honours were great, but Reschid Mehemet had really subdued Albania and Bosnia. A few months later he was to undergo a shameful defeat, and surrender Syria, himself and his army into the hands of the redoubtable Ibrahim.

The subjugation of Bosnia was real. Kara Mahmud established himself triumphantly at Serajevo. Hussein, 'the Dragon' of Bosnia, had fled. He had been received in Austrian territory with great respect, and given a bodyguard. But his

presence led to disturbing raids on the frontier. Finally the Sultan offered to pardon him, but condemned him to exile at Trebizond. 'The Dragon' deplored, but accepted, the sentence and died on the way to his place of exile. As a result of his rebellion the hereditary captaincies were abolished, although direct Turkish rule could not as yet be introduced into Bosnia and still less into Herzegovina.

### III

*I'll wreath my sword in myrtle bough,  
The sword which laid the tyrant low.*

GREEK EPIGRAM.

Bosnia had not been wholly conquered. Herzegovina remained a wild province to the south, filled with half-independent Serb tribes and bordering on free Montenegro. The two chief beys in Herzegovina had defied 'Dragon' Hussein and remained unimpeachably loyal to the Sultan. The Porte could not with decency deprive either of any power, and in fact both were promoted.<sup>318</sup> The most powerful was Ali Bey Rizvanbegović, who had brought up his forces in the nick of time to defeat Hussein before the walls of Serajevo. He was the largest landowner in Herzegovina and had built a wonderful palace by the source of the Buna, overlooked with frowning crags. He now became governor of Herzegovina and soon showed his power. He surrounded his castle at Stolac, a grim eagle's nest, with stakes bearing the heads of hundreds of his enemies. He could be beneficent as well as tyrannical; he introduced rice-culture and the silkworm into the vale of the Narenta, and planted the vine and the olive. But his power was too great and it was destroyed by the jealous Turk twenty years later.

Another bey had remained faithful to the Turk. Smail Čengić Aga, the capetan of Gacko, was rewarded by receiving the office of deputy-governor of Herzegovina. He inaugurated a new era in the history of the district by attempting to subdue all the recalcitrant and semi-independent Serb tribes of Herzegovina. Of these there were some half-dozen lying between Gacko and free Montenegro.\* Their revolts against the Turks were perpetual and they depended for success or failure on Montenegro. They were always aided and encouraged by the Montenegrins, who supplied them with arms

\* The Banjani, Drobniaci, Piva, Rudine, Šaranzi and Župa were semi-independent.

in case of victory and with a refuge in case of defeat. No murderer or rebel who fled from Herzegovina to Montenegro was ever given back to the Turks. ČengiĆ Aga had a plan. He meant to end the independence of the turbulent Herzegovinan bands. If he could suppress and control them, Montenegro's resistance would be weakened and perhaps even mortally injured. His calculation was bold, and he forgot only that Montenegrins might do something to interrupt his plan.

ČengiĆ Aga fixed his headquarters at Gacko. It is the centre of a wide plain, golden and green in summer. The Piva river curves gracefully through it, showing at each bend sheens of blue like a Chinese dragon. The town itself nestles beneath a hillside, the red roofs and white walls contrasting with an azure sheet of adjoining water. Its situation was of great importance. It commanded the Muratovizza pass, whence so often had issued the marauding bands of Montenegrins. It separated the subject clans of Gacko and Nevesinje from the semi-independent Banjani and Piva clans. ČengiĆ Aga had chosen his fortress and he had fortified it well. But he had not realised that he could not always be behind impregnable walls. From 1833 onwards ČengiĆ Aga increased the vigour of his rule. Every semi-independent tribe was forced to pay the *haratch* (tribute). An oppression of the Christians took place. Women were violated, men flogged. Strict obedience was enforced by the Aga and his terrible *pandurs*.\* For seven years the oppression went on until it became intolerable.

What happened is recorded in song, and song in this corner of the Balkans is sometimes our only source of history. If the song is to be trusted it was three Montenegrins in Čevo, 'bloody Čevo, the nurse of heroes,' who planned the death of ČengiĆ Aga. They were drinking wine in an inn. Where could they get sugar (always a dainty desired by Montenegrins) and 'where could they find a good lot of heads to cut off?' 'Why not,' says one of them, 'attack ČengiĆ Aga, the worst persecutor of the Christians? When I lived in broad Gacko I wept often and was full of wrath when I saw what he did to the poor Serbs and how he tortured them.' This was enough. One of the drinkers 'swears by God, by the red wine and by his arms, to eat nothing till he has cut off the Aga's head. I would rather avenge the poor *raya* than be the richest man on earth.' †

\* The *pandurs* are a kind of police.

† The quotations are from the Herzegovinan folk-ballad *Smrt Alaj bega ČengiĆa*.



The enterprise thus decided on was carried out in 1840. The three conspirators took fifteen comrades, pushed out from Čevo, passed the Turkish fortress of Nikšić and struck north to the Muratovizza defile—

Where the mountain green slopes downward  
To the plain they stopped and rested.

In the distance they saw the bey riding by the village of Miholjace. As he passed on his horse he flogged his labourers as they worked in the fields so savagely that the linen on their backs was forced into their flesh. The watchers swore an oath once more :

God and Mary grant our wishes !  
May the Servian musket slay you !  
May your horrid head be severed !

All unconscious, the Aga rode towards his concealed enemies. The horse was graceful as a swan, with a gold-plated bridle, with gold trappings which touched the ground. The Aga wore a silk and gold turban, a green velvet dolman with gold buttons, a damascened sword and a musket studded with gold and jewels. As this glittering hero approached the Montenegrins sprang out and a fierce struggle took place. Čengiċ Aga met his death like a brave man. His followers came up and renewed the fight and the Montenegrins escaped only with difficulty.

Starless, moonless was the night-time,  
So the Turkish robbers lost them.  
Safe they came to bloody Čevo,  
And the Aga's head came with them.

The death of Čengiċ Aga was an event of great importance. It at once provoked reprisals. The Turks sent forces into all parts of Herzegovina which ravaged the land. Every house in the Žabliak area (bencath the mountain of Dormitor) is said to have been burned.\* But they made no permanent impression. They did not subdue the tribes on the Herze-  
govinan border, and the more desperate spirits found refuge in Montenegro. The Turks indeed attacked Montenegro, but were speedily forced to suspend operations. The prudent poet-bishop, Peter II, had just strengthened his connexion with Russia and come to a diplomatic agreement with Austria.

\* This is the tradition I found in the district. The existing houses are certainly later than 1840. There are many traces of older houses, of which most were certainly burned.

He appealed to both against the Turks. It was impossible to hold that he had stimulated the assassination, for he was always restraining his followers. When Montenegrin raiders captured Žabliak on Lake Scutari in 1835 he had forced them to restore it to the Turks. So in 1840 Austria and Russia applied pressure to the Turks, who reluctantly withdrew from the contest. The death of ČengiĆ Aga resulted in the defeat of his designs. He had proposed thoroughly to subdue the semi-independent tribes of Herzegovina, and to make this subjection the prelude to a conquest of Montenegro. His death deranged the plan. The Turks inflicted great loss on the Herzegovinan tribes. But they did not effectively subdue them, nor did they continue to raise the *haratch* from them as ČengiĆ Aga had done. Above all, they did not subdue Montenegro, that nurse of heroes and rebels.

The death of ČengiĆ Aga had a symbolic meaning to the half-free Serbs of Herzegovina and to the free men of Montenegro. It was a

victory for the Cross most holy  
and for golden freedom.

A stone marks the place where he was murdered, a spot which no Serb ever passed without rejoicing. A local *guslar* celebrated the event in song, and only six years later it formed the theme of a most famous poem by Mažuranić. Though an imitative poem produced by a cultivated scholar it has a kind of primitive vigour and appeal and is still read and recited in all Yugoslav lands. The theme of both songs is the glory of little Montenegro, who freed Herzegovina from its oppressors. And the thought of Mažuranić is that mountains are the source of liberty.

'Mid crags the eagle builds his nest  
For vain in plain is freedom's crest.\*

The love of freedom seems innate in these mountaineers, and is combined with a savage exultation at the defeat of their oppressors. Montenegrins and Herzegovinans celebrate the murder of ČengiĆ Aga as a glorious victory, just as all Serbs celebrate the deed of Obilić, who murdered Sultan Murad on the field of Kossovo. But it was not only in Herzegovina and Montenegro that the deed was remembered. The Christians of Bosnia saw in it a proof that there were still men

\* *The Death of Smail Aga* by Mažuranić is translated by J. W. Wiles [1925]. I have often quoted this verse in the original to peasants in remote villages in Montenegro, and never found one unfamiliar with it.

of the Serb race with stout hearts and bloody hands. As long as such men lived the future need not be despaired of. One day the Mohammedans would see them advancing, not upon Gacko but on Serajevo, and not slaughtering one man but thousands. The day of vengeance was still far off, but now it was certain. These dreams had a solid basis of reality. So long as tribes in Herzegovina were unsubdued and Montenegro was free, the Turkish Empire was always in danger. And when Herzegovina revolted in 1875, the old Turkish Empire fell.

#### IV

*Each people sees in each a brother  
And all acclaim their one Slav mother !*

SLAV FOLK-SONG OF 1848.

Herzegovina was the country of the future, but Bosnia was of the present. After the events of 1831 Bosnia was no longer independent, but she was still capable of insurrection. The Turks did not fear an insurrection of Christians as in Herzegovina. In Bosnia they feared an insurrection of Serb Mohammedans. Feudalism had been curbed, but the new government had not developed its goodly heritage. Bosnia is a country which is capable of development. The Posavina, which looks towards the Save, is a garden. Even in the Kraina there are green-floored valleys, forested hills, and mountain torrents ending in noble rivers. There is not the stony desolation of Montenegro, nor the aridity of Herzegovina. Bosnia had resources far beyond the capacity of either, minerals, forests, cornlands and pasture, all rendered useless by Turkish economic policy.

In 1850 Bosnia exported silks, wax, wheat, cattle, wool, furs, potash and iron. She imported coffee, sugar, molasses, rice, figs, soap and calico. But trade was made difficult by the supineness of the government. There had always been smuggling into Croatia, extending even to the cutting down and transporting of trees. The Bosnian side of the frontier was stripped. On the Croatian side all trees were carefully preserved. The Turkish government built no roads, and pursued an inconceivably stupid economic policy. Exports and imports had formerly been charged with a uniform duty of 3 to 4 per cent. Reschid's reforms imposed an additional 9 per cent. on Turkish merchants on both imports and exports. It was not equally imposed on foreigners. So Bosnian iron, imported into any part of Turkey (even into Herzegovina), paid 12 per

cent., while Austrian iron paid 3 per cent. Serbia found that, if she imported goods from Bosnia direct, she paid 12 per cent., but that Austria could get them for her at 6 per cent.<sup>319</sup> Well might Churchill exclaim, 'Turkey's system of customs was calculated to ruin her own subjects.' She was equally ready to ruin herself. In 1852 she farmed the customs for £6,776. They were really worth about £20,000, but the government did not know it. Similarly the economic policy tended to bring Bosnia into connexion with her fellow Slavs in Croatia. For the only way the Bosnian merchants could circumvent the 12 per cent. duties was by illicit exports and imports over the Austrian border. 'The Austrian traders were thus enabled to exploit the resources of the [Bosnian] provinces and carry on an extensive system of smuggling with impunity.'<sup>320</sup>

Great as was the inefficiency of the government, the main cause of the trouble 'was the *Tanzimat*,' the new system of reform. That was Stratford's opinion and it was true. Such energies as the Vizier had were absorbed in introducing reforms, which were certain to be most bitterly opposed by the whole force of Mohammedan Bosnia. It was an additional grievance that the pasha applied to the Christian *rayas* to help him in the struggle. Tahir pasha, the last governor before 1850, busied himself in improving their lot. This is the more to his credit as he was 'a Turk of the old school.'<sup>321</sup> He certainly introduced new methods into Bosnia. The land was held by the *raya* from the bey or *spahi*, on condition of forced labour and of certain payments. If provided with seed and cattle he gave half his produce to the landlord, and one-third if unprovided. The Turkish imperial tithe and the capitation tax were both levied on Christians, Mussulmans being exempt. In addition there was the *povez*, a tax exacted from Christians and Mussulmans alike and intended to be adjusted to their power to pay. Tahir pasha endeavoured to lighten the Christian lot by abolishing the bastinado and by remitting forced labour. He also aimed at simplifying the taxes and arranged that the quota should be fixed by the elders of the village and not by the local Mussulman *spahi*. These were real efforts at improvement and provoked a Yugoslav poet to exclaim, 'All the Christians of Bosnia are now receiving a new life.'

Tahir pasha's efforts were too advanced to be permanently successful. The punishment of the bastinado remained until 1878, and forced labour continued even longer. But the very meaning of reform, the mere attempt to lighten the lot of Christians and to make them equal to Mohammedans, roused

the Bosnian beys to fury. The revolutionary movement in Europe during 1848-9 produced a rising in Bosnia, but a movement different from that in any other country in Europe. Elsewhere the people revolted against kings or nobles. In Bosnia Mohammedan nobles revolted against the Sultan to prevent him from improving the lot of the peasants. It was the purely selfish attempt of a hereditary caste to revive and to perpetuate their exclusive privileges. It was a revolt of medieval barons against the age of railways and of firearms.

The revolt of the Mohammedan beys would have had small chance of success in any country except one governed by the Turk. But for that reason it came within an ace of success. One element which favoured it was the strange feeling of brotherhood evoked by Jellačić and the Croats, who had revolted against the revolutionary government in Hungary. They appealed for support to the Slavs of Bosnia whether Mohammedan or Christian. Jellačić, a native Croat, was appointed ban or governor of Croatia by the Austrian emperor after the first outbreak of revolution in Vienna and Budapest. In September 1848 he called Serbs and Croats to his aid in the name of the unity of the Slav race, and attacked the Hungarian revolutionists in the name of the Austrian emperor and of Slavdom. He summoned the southern Slavs of all races, Slovenes, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgars, Macedonians, Bosnians. Was the unity of the Slav race to stop there? Was not the moment come of which the poet had dreamed? 'Scattered Slavs, let us be one united whole and not mere fragments.' 'All Europe will kneel before this idol. His head will tower above the clouds, his feet will shake the earth.' 322 \*

Jellačić appealed to Slavs at an extraordinary moment. The Christian Serbs and Croats were wild with enthusiasm for Jellačić, who had made Croatia a nation, and was attacking Hungary in the name of the Serbo-Croats. They spoke of the unity of Illyria, but meant that of the southern Slavs. For it was the first really Yugoslav movement. Songs of unity were on the lips of all southern Slavs.

For ever lasts not sorrow,  
 Good comes as evil flies,  
 For us a fairer morrow,  
 A brighter sun doth rise.  
 Why speak of foeman's numbers,  
 If only we can see  
 Serbs, Croats waked from slumbers,  
 And clasped in unity?

\* Ján Kollár in *Slavy Dcera*.



Nor was the enthusiasm confined only to Serbs and Croats.

The hour has struck, the flame's alight  
From Adrian sea to Balkan height.  
Our blood o'er-comes the shades of night.

So great was the enthusiasm that the poet-bishop of Montenegro forgot his usual prudence and offered Jellačić ten thousand soldiers. Jellačić was too wise to accept. Servia remained neutral; her prince was not firm on his throne and the Czar had advised him not to move. But thousands of volunteers poured to the aid of Jellačić from Macedonia and even from distant Bulgaria. What would the Bosnians do?

The Mohammedan beys were in a difficulty. They had no sympathy with popular movements or with the Yugoslav cause, but they realised that the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia and the Slavs of Macedonia and Bulgaria were all for supporting Jellačić and the Croats. The beys therefore agreed, though with secret reluctance, to support this Slav confederation. An insurrection at once began and Ali Kiedić, a cousin of Jellačić, was declared their general. The Mohammedans, the Serbs and the Croats of Bosnia rose and besieged Bihac. Old Tahir pasha failed to raise the siege and advised the Porte to treat with the Bosnian representatives. He was directed to summon a Slav congress to Travnik. But no sooner did the congress meet than its members quarrelled. The Mohammedans and Christians had only been united for a moment. As soon as the congress opened the Mohammedans made clear that their sole aim was the retention of their old privileges. The divisions between them and the Christians were not to be healed, and it only needed a clever intriguer to set them fighting against each other.

## V

*Oft had he shown in climes afar  
Each attribute of roving war.  
The sharpened ear, the piercing eye,  
The quick resolve in danger nigh.*

SCOTT.

In May 1850 the Porte deposed Tahir pasha and placed Omer pasha in supreme command in Rumelia. Omer was a strange character. He was a Croat by birth, named Michael Lotis, who had deserted from the Christian service while a military cadet. He fled to Bosnia, where he became servant

to a rich bey who befriended him and urged him to become a Moslem. Omer took the advice, apostatised and entered the Turkish army. When a captain he was noticed with favour by Mahmud II and promoted to the rank of major. He became the teacher of Abdul Medjid, the heir to the throne, and thus laid the foundation of future promotion. He had fought in many lands with success. In the Lebanon he had led the forlorn hope which took Ibrahim in the rear and gave Napier the victory. He had contended against the Druses with the alternate weapons of force and fraud. He had conducted important operations in Albania, in Kurdistan and in Bulgaria. Now he was appointed to a still higher command. He was a stern, resolute man, not so much an expert in war as a born leader, with just that mixture of cunning and bravery which impresses orientals. And his presence in Bosnia at the critical moment was decisive.<sup>323</sup>

Omer pasha had about eight thousand troops and a number of excellent Polish and Hungarian officers, victims of revolution and exiles from their native lands. He had pacified Bulgaria by generous concessions to the revolted Christians and the news of his clemency preceded his arrival in Bosnia. His promises of equal justice to Mohammedans and to *rayas* were therefore the more readily accepted. The Christians, already most suspicious of the rebellious beys, promptly laid down their arms. The Mohammedan beys alone remained in revolt. In the first engagements Omer easily dispersed them and reached Serajevo. He summoned all the beys to meet him there and, speaking in the Bosnian dialect, personally informed them of the Sultan's commands. Travnik was no longer to be the residence of the Vizier. The capital was to be Serajevo. The *Tanzimat*, the programme of reform, was to be rigidly applied to the whole of Bosnia. Christians and Mohammedans were to be treated as absolutely equal before the law. There was to be no preference to the Mohammedan religion. Above all a rigid system of conscription was to be applied to Christians and Mohammedans alike. Taxes were to be equally raised from both, and conscripts liable to military service outside Bosnia were to be enrolled. If Omer's will prevailed, old Bosnia would cease to exist. All of the beys withdrew from the meeting in deep indignation. They had no intention of obeying and roused all Mohammedan Bosnia to revolt. But the Christians of Bosnia accepted Omer's promises with joy and supported the renegade Croat as if he had been a follower of the Cross.

The most powerful and able of the beys was Ali Bey

Rizvanbegović. He had long been under suspicions which his conduct at this crisis only intensified. He temporised when the Mohammedan beys revolted against Omer. He acted like Lord Lovat in the 'forty-five' or the prince of Lebanon a decade earlier. He did not openly declare against Omer, but sent his chief executioner to head the rebel forces in Herzegovina and his servants to assist them. In secret he urged them on to battle. One of Omer's ablest lieutenants, a Pole, who had taken the name of Iskender beg, completely defeated the Herzegovinan rebels. He opened the way to Mostar, which was besieged by the rebels. Omer pasha arrived in time to relieve the city and to defeat the insurgents. That accounted for Herzegovina, but he hurried north against the rebels of Bosnia. There in March 1850 there was a three days' battle beside the blue lake of Jezero. Omer was outnumbered but victorious. His troops were infinitely superior to the rude feudal levies, and he entered Jajce as a conqueror. He had ended the last feudal régime in Europe.

Ali Bey Rizvanbegović hypocritically professed his loyalty to Omer on hearing of the victory. Omer visited the Bey at Buna and invited him to a banquet at Mostar. Thither went the old chief believing that he had hoodwinked his enemy. But Omer was more than his match in cunning. Before Ali Bey had reached Mostar, Omer's troops had occupied his two strongholds at Buna and Stolac. All unconscious, Ali Bey attended the banquet at Mostar, which was celebrated with great splendour. As it ended Omer rose and directed his attendants to seize Ali Bey. They carried him down to where the great bridge flings its single span over the broad Narenta. There they seated the old man on an ass and exposed him to the ridicule of the people. The old man passionately assailed Omer. 'Why dost thou trouble me? . . . Thou too art a Wallach, the son of a Wallach\* . . . Even had I taken up arms against the Sultan, thou wouldest not be worthy to associate with me . . . Oh thou unclean Wallachian, send me rather before the Padishah, that he may pass judgment upon me, and do not thou insult me in mine old age.' The crowd murmured at this humiliation to their oldest and proudest bey. Omer took this accusation to heart, dismounted Ali Bey from the ass and placed him in honourable confinement. But a few days later the old man was shot through the head while asleep, and the sentry explained

\* Asbóth, *Bosnia and Herzegovina* [1890], 272; but contrast with *Leben Omer pasha*, von Dr. Koetschek, Serajevo [1885], 26. Omer was in fact a Croat, but he married a Wallach,

that his gun went off accidentally. These accidents happened too often to Omer's prisoners. Of the one hundred and fifty leading beys sent to Constantinople 'the most dangerous came all of them to sudden deaths.' Some 'suddenly became ill and died; others, slightly wounded, never recovered; accidents on the line of march despatched a few.' <sup>324</sup>

Omer's methods were barbarous, but he 'did not his work negligently.' His appeals to the Christians for support were entirely successful. 'The few Christians taken in arms were liberated,' and the mass of them ardently supported him. One by one the castles of their feudal tyrants fell before Omer and his artillery. The fugitive beys were tracked like beasts to the hearts of forests or to the summits of mountains, and captured or shot. By December 1850 'the Sultan's arms were reported to have had complete success.' <sup>325</sup> Omer proceeded to consolidate his victory. He announced the end of all feudal privileges. He built the first road in Bosnia between Travnik and Serajevo. He repressed brigandage with a stern hand. He closed the frontier to Croatia, and stopped smuggling. He proclaimed the forests to be crown property, and cancelled the very profitable concessions for timber enjoyed by an Austrian sawmill company. He even attempted to construct a line of steamers for the rivers of Bosnia. Omer's methods were as vigorous as they were rough. But it was his vigour which was most hurtful to other powers. For Austria demanded and ultimately obtained his recall, and with his fall ended all hope of permanent reform in Bosnia.

## VI

*Aloft and wild  
Huge cliffs and toppling crags were piled;  
The guards with which young Freedom lines  
The pathways to her mountain shrines.*

MOORE, *The Fire Worshipers*.

The insurrection of Bosnia and the vigour of Omer brought Austria upon the scene in earnest, for she could not afford to be disinterested in relation to Bosnia. The able and ambitious Prince Schwarzenberg had restored Austria and looked for a further sphere of influence in the East. Bosnia was to be his pawn in international politics. Even early in 1849 M. de Budberg (the Russian *chargé d'affaires* in Frankfurt) had informed M. de Gagern, the Austrian representative, that, in the event of the Turks being driven out of Europe, Bulgaria and

Rumelia would fall to Russia. But they perfectly understood each other, and Serbia and Bosnia must become part of Austria. The Archduke John of Austria, on learning this, added that 'a few years ago, he had himself drawn up a plan, which he had communicated to Prince Metternich, and which if adopted, would secure Bosnia, Herzegovina and Serbia to Austria, and would erect the remainder of the Turkish European provinces into an independent kingdom.'<sup>326</sup> It may be doubted whether these designs for the partition of Turkey were seriously entertained. But the more limited object of advancing the frontier of Croatia to include part of Bosnia was a real object of policy and was favoured in Vienna itself. Austrian troops during the thirties had occupied Kraina (or Turkish Croatia) and parts of Turkish territory were so occupied in 1850 when Omer appeared. Disorder and anarchy on the frontier gave Austria the chance of annexation or rectification in the old style. But Omer's success made smuggling difficult and Austrian occupation impossible. He thus annoyed both the frontiersmen and merchants of Croatia, who appealed to Vienna for redress. Austria was only too willing to listen to their grievances. She had shown herself much opposed to Turkey in the matter of the Capitulations and of the Hungarian refugees. However, she had already tried and failed to get Turkey to alter the Capitulations. She had also united with Russia in a great effort to get Turkey to deliver up the Hungarian refugees. In fact the two powers had only been repelled by Palmerston's threat of sending the British fleet to Constantinople. Austria therefore fell back on the Bosnian grievance.

It was in March that Austria formulated and presented her list of grievances against Omer to Constantinople. His attack on Austrian commercial privileges was serious and his employment of Hungarian revolutionary officers unwise. His military cordon on the Austrian frontier was denounced because it prevented legitimate trade (and incidentally smuggling, which was even more important). It was also made matter of complaint that while he stopped trade on the frontier he drove refugees across it. At the end of March five hundred Bosnian exiles entered Croatia from one village alone, and at least five thousand came in all.<sup>327</sup> Omer was not altogether to blame. The oppression of Christians was in areas where his troops were not present, though it seems that more Mohammedans had arms than Christians. The humanitarian complaint about the refugees was put in the forefront. It was a legitimate grievance on political grounds also, because injuries to Slav



Christians inside Turkey disturbed their brethren under Christian rule. Aali was Foreign Minister when these grievances were presented. It was just after the Austrian general Haynau had terrorised Italy and Hungary. Aali told Stratford that he defended Omer by contrasting him with Haynau. 'Has ever Omer pasha shot or killed anyone as your General [Haynau] did?' <sup>328</sup> It might have been retorted that General Haynau executed his prisoners in the open, while Omer shot his in secret. But the Austrian accounts of the incident make Aali's attitude anything but jocular. They represent him as listening meekly to a torrent of reproaches and giving the strongest assurances that Omer would amend his ways, respect Austrian subjects and interests, and disarm Mohammedans as well as Christians. Aali also certainly hinted at Omer's recall, and Vienna confidently expected it even so late as July 1852.

England's support prevented Omer from being dismissed in the middle of 1852. She had not been entirely consistent in her views. Turkish proceedings in Bosnia in 1850 had excited the indignation of Palmerston. He reported 'atrocious and disgraceful outrages' by the Mohammedans on Christians, and stated that all complaints had been met 'by doubts and cavils and endeavours to throw the blame from off those who perpetrated the crimes, and to lay it upon those upon whom the crimes have been committed. . . . The Turkish Government ought to feel how much the Turkish Empire in the present state of things stands in need of the support of the Christian Powers of Europe, and it should recollect that this support could no longer be counted upon if the day should ever arrive when Christian Europe should come to the conviction that barbarous fanaticism and atrocious cruelty are inseparable concomitants of Turkish rule, and that the Christian people of the Turkish Empire were given up by the Turkish Government to be the helpless victims of the ferocious violence of their Mussulman fellow-countrymen.' <sup>329</sup> This utterance was not a very fortunate one, for Omer at this time was supporting the Christians in Bosnia. When, two years later, he failed to protect Christians, England did all she could to excuse him. 'Omer had to be severe,' reported Alison privately on his return from Serajevo. <sup>330</sup> Malmesbury twice sent instructions in 1852 to maintain Omer in Bosnia, though he wisely abstained from defending his measures. Stratford even went so far as to say that Omer's chief offence in Bosnia was that of 'relieving it from abuses.' This zeal saved Omer for the time being, but was perhaps unwise. For Omer was encouraged

by this support to attempt to attack Montenegro. That sealed his fate, for it brought Russia, as well as Austria, into the scale against him.

## VII

*The hope and expectation of thy time  
Is ruined, and the soul of every man  
Prophetically doth forethink thy fall.*

HENRY IV, Part I, Act III, Sc. 2.

Omer pasha's policy towards the neighbouring state of Montenegro went far to justify the attitude of Vienna. The poet-bishop had died in 1851 and his nephew Danilo had grasped power after a dispute as to the succession. Danilo was a strong and able ruler and determined to marry. Being in love with Darinka, a lady of Trieste, he secularised the bishopric and made it a hereditary principality (1852). Austria and Russia had been consulted as to the change and both had signified their approval. But Danilo maintained that Montenegro was independent, and omitted to consult Turkey. The Sultan, who claimed sovereignty over Montenegro, refused to accept the change and looked round for opportunity to embarrass Danilo. He soon found it. Danilo had introduced a new scale of taxes and the Piperi tribe refused to pay it. 'We did not,' they said proudly, 'fear the great eagle [Peter II], we shall not fear this little cockerel. Rather than pay taxes we will perish or become Turks.'<sup>331</sup> The very threat shows that the Turks had intrigued with the Piperi. Omer pasha had in fact promised to relieve them from taxation and to grant them land if they successfully rebelled. They did not do so. The 'little cockerel' marched on their territory with a thousand men and received their submission and their taxes. Meanwhile a band of Montenegrin desperados suddenly descended on the isle of Vranina in the lake of Scutari. They seized the island and captured the town of Žabliak which nestles between twin peaks beside the lake. Danilo ordered the restoration of the town, declaring that he had not authorised these actions. Omer thereupon advanced on the town with twelve thousand men. The Montenegrins made little resistance because of the orders of Danilo. Two hundred prisoners were taken. One authority has stated that Montenegrins cut off the noses of the Turks. The Turks preferred cutting off ears and sent two hundred loads of them to Constantinople. The Dutch Minister found it 'extraordinary that

men's ears are sent [here] as an irrefutable evidence of the exploit, but it is an old custom, followed by the Turks.' \* However that may be, Omer declined to admit Danilo's surrender of Žabliak as evidence of his good faith. He refused all terms and declared war on Montenegro.

Danilo was now in a dangerous situation. He was attacked by no less than five Turkish armies. He appealed both to Austria and Russia for support, and he did not appeal in vain. Austria now had a real grievance and not a mere pretext. If the war went on Serbia might join in the struggle, and Austria's Yugoslav subjects would certainly do so as volunteers. Austria could not allow Montenegro to be crushed, and Russia was determined to protect her. Count Leiningen was sent by Austria on a special mission to Constantinople. His instructions were peremptory. Austria would not permit Montenegro to be destroyed and would insist on a change of government in Bosnia. A reply was to be demanded in a short time, under pain of serious consequences. The whole was, in fact, an ultimatum, and it was the more serious because the Czar intimated quite clearly that he was prepared to support Austria against Turkey, if necessary by arms.<sup>332</sup> The campaign had not progressed very well. Omer was certainly held up. So the Porte agreed to abandon hostilities with Montenegro, and sacrificed Omer. The man who had saved Bosnia for the Porte was dismissed, he indignantly complained, 'with harshness and cruelty.'<sup>333</sup> On February 12 difficulties with Austria were really adjusted and the Turkish official journal stated the fact on the 17th. Peace was signed between Montenegro and the Turks on March 3. The latter were defeated on all points. They agreed to restore the *status quo* and to recognise the secularisation of the principality. An Austrian envoy upheld Danilo's claim that he was not a vassal of the Porte. Danilo was declared a prince. He appointed a relative to be Vladika or Bishop of Montenegro, and married his beautiful Darinka. Danilo had secured his object. Montenegro was turned from a theocracy into a principality, saved from destruction, and declared of importance in the eyes of the world. There was to be no long peace either for Bosnia or Montenegro. Each had contributed to unsettle Europe. Bosnia had become a factor in international politics by her insurrection. Montenegro became so by her war. And on the heels of a local war and a local insurrection followed a general war.

\* N.R.A. From Mollerus, No. 8 of January 16, 1853; cp. Koetschek, *Leben Omer pasha*, Serajevo [1885], 23; as to nose-cutting, vide M. E. Durham, *Tribal Origins and Customs of the Balkans* [1928], 85, 96, 177-9.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE SECOND PHASE ; REFORM IN THE ' DUST HOLE ' ; STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

#### I

*The great mischief of this country is the dominant religion. This is the real ' Leviathan ' which, ' floating many a rood,' overlaps the prostrate energies of this country.*—STRATFORD, February 1851.

*Nihil opinionis causa, omnia conscientiae faciam.*—I will do nothing under the compulsion of opinion, everything under that of conscience.—SENECA, *De Vit. Beat.*

THE decree of the ' Rose Chamber ' had proved abortive after the fall of Reschid in 1841. A year later Stratford found the roses of reform flung into the ' dust hole ' of reaction. Izzet Mehemet and Riza had restored the old abuses and Stratford failed for some years to stay them in their courses. But to this monotonous record of his failure there was an exception in 1844, which will now be described. Over the apostasy question Stratford won a great and authentic victory. No episode of his career was more dramatic, and in none did his personality and character assert themselves with more vigour. Yet his religious victory actually tended to impair his ability to secure future administrative and political reform, and showed the danger of raising religious issues in the East.

Stratford took up his post as ambassador at Constantinople again at the end of January 1842. His position was unfortunate. Reaction was proceeding apace in Turkey, and, for that matter, in England too. Palmerston, who had vigorously supported the ' Rose Chamber ' decree, had fallen and Aberdeen reigned in his stead. This mild cosmopolitan feared to meddle in the internal affairs of Turkey, being timid by nature and anxious to offend neither Russia nor France. Stratford began by cautiously declaring his disbelief in the idea that Turkey was on the eve of dissolution, and expressing ' a hope that much may be effected by European influence and example, sufficiently exerted and properly directed.' <sup>334</sup> But an English, rather

than a European, influence was his aim. For he soon suggested that England might make some concessions over the Turkish Commercial Treaty to induce Turks to allow Christian evidence to be taken in the law courts and to abolish the slave trade. Aberdeen replied with a mild and perhaps intentional irony : ' It may be doubted whether any modification which could possibly be effected in the Turkish system with regard to slavery and Christian evidence would be of such material importance, as would satisfy the commercial body in this country that the concessions in matter of commerce made by Her Majesty's Government were fully compensated for by the equivalents obtained by the Porte.' Concessions to humanity would not compensate John Bull for losses to his pocket. Yet Stratford was not an easy man to beat and he was about to teach a lesson to everybody, to British public, to diplomats, to Turkey, and to Europe.

In August 1842 the severe and reactionary Izzet Mehemet was succeeded by the mild Rauf. It had been hoped that Reschid might regain power. He had returned from his Embassy at Paris and had held secret interviews with Stratford. But neither he nor his followers were popular. The wits of Stambul recalled a fable known both in Turkey and to Aesop. A dog in his rambles abroad got caught in a trap, and only escaped from it by leaving his tail behind. He returned to his fellow dogs and informed them that he had learned from his travels the advantage of ridding himself of incumbrances. Reschid was now the incumbrance of which the reactionaries desired to be rid. They first sent him to govern Adrianople and then allowed him to return to Paris, where he would be out of the way. In Reschid's absence Stratford soon found that the Sultan had ' more goodness than strength.' He had failed to win over Riza, the mayor of the palace, and was still no nearer his goal. Then suddenly a horrible event displayed oriental fanaticism in its worst colours. The crusading spirit awoke, and Stratford, setting his lance in rest, rode into the fray.

A young Armenian had abjured Christianity and embraced Mohammedanism. He said later that he did it for two reasons. One was that he had been intimidated, and the other that he had been drunk. Having recovered from both physical and moral weaknesses he once more declared himself a Christian and publicly apostatised from Mohammedanism. For this offence death had been the usual penalty in Turkey.



Thus a missionary a decade before wrote, 'The instant a Mussulman abandons his faith he is led away to execution.' The offence was obviously more serious when a Christian, turned Mussulman, once more apostatised to his old faith. Abdul Medjid had refused to execute a blasphemer in 1841, but apostasy was a much more serious crime and the religious reaction was now in full swing.<sup>335</sup> Undoubtedly the Porte feared their own public more than the Powers, and the Council finally determined that the apostate should die. The Armenian's mother and sisters appealed to Stratford, who passionately intervened. On the side of mercy were the Sultan himself, Ahmed Fethi, his brother-in-law, the Foreign Minister, the Grand Vizier (who said he hated even to kill a fowl). Even the *ulemas* seem to have been undecided until Riza and Halil urged them to insist upon sentence of death. The victim 'obstinately persisted in refusing the proffer made to him by the law to re-become a Moslem.' On August 22 1843 he was led out to die. Turks spat on him as he passed, but none of his thirty guards wished to strike the death blow. One was at last with difficulty induced to do so. The mutilated body was clothed in European costume, and the head carefully covered with a European hat in deliberate and symbolic insult to the European community. The unfortunate lad's mother brought the news, rushing into the European quarter, tearing her grey hair and rending the air with her shrieks. When she returned to the place of execution and sat by the corpse the police removed her from the spot. They kept the boy's body exposed and unburied for three days, and finally cast it into the sea.

Stratford 'offered' his remonstrance 'in a spirit of compassion rather than of resentment.'<sup>336</sup> He expressed himself thus over the victim of the outrage: 'Youth no less than nature pleaded for him; the best interests of the Empire called aloud for his pardon. As a friend of the Porte, I added my voice to theirs. A voice has also been given to his mutilated remains. Exposed in the streets of Constantinople they tell the Turk what spirit animates his Government.' This protest, though it escapes 'from the perilous limits of the sublime,' shows Stratford's deep and noble indignation. It does not show the means he took to achieve his ends. He impressed on Aberdeen that 'some check should be given to this cruel and fatal tendency' lest 'a fanatical arrogance, making little distinction between the *raya* and the foreigner, will trample upon our commercial privileges, and embroil the Porte with her [*sic*] best friends.' He was assured that Nafiz was the chief

culprit, not the Sheikh-ul-Islam nor the *ulemas*.\* Aberdeen protested, but with moderation; France and Prussia added their remonstrances. At this stage, however, even Stratford wished to rest content with the dismissal of Nafiz and with the Turkish government's verbal assurance that in future the death penalty would not be inflicted. It was not wise to ask 'for a declaration of the same import to be made officially' as 'religious prejudices' would not allow it. 'In trying to strengthen, we might essentially weaken, our position.' Aberdeen and the other Foreign Ministers of Great Powers had every intention of continuing to let the matter rest.

Religious fanaticism did not rest. Before the year ended the Turkish 'assurance' was broken and a young Greek, 'who had become a Mussulman and returned to his own creed,' was executed at Brusa just as the young Armenian had been at Stambul. Stratford reported this new outrage, intimating that he thought the Porte had tried to hush the matter up. He determined that nothing should now prevent him from obtaining an official declaration, and stirred even Aberdeen into demanding that the Porte should 'renounce absolutely, and without equivocation, the barbarous practice' of execution for apostasy. Stratford was instructed to seek an audience with the Sultan for the purpose. The Turks said that he was now trying to get them to 'abandon a law [in their view] prescribed by God himself.' Rifaat said he was exposing the Sultan to a 'heavy, perhaps even to a dangerous, responsibility.' It was a question 'neither of policy nor of administration . . . it concerns religion. If we refuse we lose the friendship of Europe; if we consent we hazard the peace of the Empire.'

Aberdeen justly complained that Stratford did not give 'a full detail' of how he had proceeded. But Stratford dared not do this. He had had 'private communications with the Sultan,'<sup>337</sup> undoubtedly behind the backs of both ministers and *ulemas*. Not only that, but he had separated ministers from the *ulemas* and split the *ulemas* themselves into two parties. He suggested that the putting of apostates to death was not sanctioned by the Koran, but only by later custom. Alison, his dragoman, disputed with the *ulemas* and confounded them by quoting the Koran against them. Stratford's dramatic appearance among the prophets not only distressed but actually divided the old religious party. He

\* F.O. 78/521. From Stratford, Nos. 180-1 of August 21, 1843. These details are all suppressed in the Blue Book version of the despatch, as also is the next quotation, which is in F.O. 78/523. From Stratford, No. 237 of November 17.

dismayed all, he convinced some. A gathering of ministers and *ulemas* discussed his views. 'There was some appearance of schism.' The results were comical. The politicians, thinking that there was an anti-Stratford majority, declared that the matter should be decided 'on religious grounds.'<sup>338</sup> But the Sheikh-ul-Islam feared that a vote could not be taken without much discussion, and that division would still further develop religious schism.<sup>339</sup> So he considered it necessary to yield to 'political considerations.' Stratford used very practical arguments with the politicians. On March 22 he presented Rifaat, the Foreign Minister, with an official declaration that the Porte would put no further apostates to death. He asked him to receive the document and to return it to him signed. Rifaat refused. Stratford advanced on the astonished minister and forced the paper on him, 'stuffing it,' some say, in the bosom of his robe. He threatened Rifaat with dismissal, though dismissal was the prerogative of the Sultan. In the end he obtained a declaration, but in the form of a *note verbale* and unsigned. Stratford was not to be beaten. On March 23 he saw the Sultan himself and induced that meek autocrat to 'give his royal word that henceforth neither should Christianity be insulted in his dominions, nor should Christians be in any way persecuted for their religion.' This assurance was one which Stratford knew the ministers dared not deny, and he gave it the utmost publicity. The Sultan, while not venturing to alter the law imposing the penalty of death for apostasy, had promised not to put it into practice against Christians.\* The Sultan repeated the same assurances to the ambassador of France and to the patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church.<sup>340</sup> In due course a letter from Queen Victoria arrived to clinch matters, congratulating her brother sovereign on his good action.

Stratford had stated that the measure 'will remain a monument of purest glory to Your Lordship and His Majesty's administration,' and designated himself as 'under providence' 'the humble instrument' of success. He must have been both disappointed and enlightened to find that Aberdeen suppressed both passages when he published the Blue Book. There is indeed little trace in it of Stratford's noble efforts. Aberdeen had indeed warned him 'not to establish an English interest in contradistinction to that of other powers at Constantinople,' in the very act of praising his achievement. 'The British Ambassador' was not to 'stand forth as the avowed

\* The Sultan's opinion had no legal validity, as Stratford well knew; *vide* n. 335.

protector of the Christian subjects of the Sultan' or the 'organ through which complaints of hardship or persecution should be conveyed.'<sup>341</sup> Stratford showed some resentment at this suggestion, as well he might. For the glory had been his alone. The French representative had supported him for a time, but had receded from the extreme steps. The Prussian representative had been platonic, the Austrian 'very equivocal,' the Russian too late in the day. Stratford had not received wholehearted help even from the Christians of Constantinople. An Armenian had been found base enough to defend the execution of his countryman by suggesting that it was due to 'a great respect for law' and was therefore 'surely no barbarism' (*Morning Chronicle*, September 19, 1843). No public opinion from England supported Stratford during the campaign. Even the laying of the papers before Parliament in May 1844 produced no debate, and only perfunctory references in the press. The *Morning Chronicle*, while pronouncing Stratford's effort to be 'bold and humane,' diverted attention in another direction. It gave horrifying details of tortures inflicted on some prisoners by the Pasha of Trebizond. But it stated that these were punished for offences against Russian subjects, and had been tortured in order 'to please Russia.'\* This was a good way of shifting attention from the inhumanities of Turkey to the inhumanities of Russia. Nowhere had there been adequate support to Stratford during the negotiations nor adequate praise to Stratford for its success. In Turkey at least the achievement was understood, though not discussed. He alone had chosen that the incident should not be passed over.

Nor chose alone but turned the balance too,  
So much the weight of one brave man can do.

From henceforth Stratford became 'the Elchi,' the ambassador *par excellence*. He was an exception to all rules, the man who could, or might, do anything. 'He has more pluck in his little finger than the whole *Divan* put together,' said Reschid of him.

For the time the policy and the man triumphed. Moham-medan fanaticism had showed itself once more. During one year, a second, perhaps even a third, apostate was executed. The Mohammedan murderer of a Christian had been liberated, a Greek had been forcibly converted to Islam. An Armenian corpse had been dug up near Jerusalem and subjected to an

\* This is mentioned by the Constantinople correspondent of May 7, to which a leader draws attention; vide *Morning Chronicle* of May 27, 1844. Was it suggested by Palmerston?

unspeakable desecration.<sup>342</sup> All these outrages were known to all Turks though studiously concealed from the British public. But the Sultan's public declaration and the orders he conveyed to the provinces produced a marked change in opinion. In four separate instances apostates from Moham-medanism to Christianity, who had been arrested, were released by the local pashas and allowed to go their ways. Strangest of all was the case of a Greek priest, who had been punished by his bishop with exile. To avoid the penalty he declared himself a Mussulman and applied to the pasha for protection. The pasha, having heard the case, refused to accept his conversion and sent him back to the monastery at Ochrida, there to find his old religion and to undergo his new punishment.<sup>343</sup>

Here then was a change effected at the Sultan's word and at Stratford's dictation. Stratford followed up his success by other triumphs in the religious field. In September 1845 he obtained leave to establish a Protestant church at Jerusalem for British and Prussian subjects, a victory which Ponsonby had failed to obtain and for which even Aberdeen expressed 'satisfaction.' Finally he took up the cause of the Armenian Protestants who were oppressed by the Armenian patriarch as well as by the Turks.<sup>344</sup> He won a victory again and followed it up in 1850 by obtaining full rights and a *firman* giving to all Protestants throughout the Empire the status of a '*millet*,' or 'nation.' In the last two cases the victories, though real, affected only insignificant parts of the population.

Stratford's victories on behalf of Christianity and humanity were less great and permanent than they seemed. They were gained at the expense of the feelings of all the Turks in the Empire and were likely to be lost whenever the government was weak or the people fanatical. The future was to show that persecutions for apostasy had not ceased in the Turkish Empire, and that the Sultan broke his word forbidding executions just as easily as he broke the promises of his 'Rose Chamber' decree. While acknowledging the chivalry of Stratford, it is possible to doubt his wisdom. He told Aberdeen that success 'will ultimately produce the most beneficial result in the policy and administrative system of the Porte,' and promised 'an entire and salutary change of policy as a sequel.' But the mere fact that the Turks had made concessions to the religious ideas of the West steeled them in resistance to further political innovation.



## II

*As we hear you do reform yourselves  
We will, according to your strength and qualities,  
Give you advancement.*

HENRY IV, Part II, Act V, Sc. 5.

It was not until August 1845 that Stratford finally procured the fall of the corrupt and reactionary Riza, the paramour of the Sultana Valide. After that the Finance Minister, whose peculations fell not far short of a million, was dismissed, and at last in October 1845 Reschid pasha became Foreign Minister once again and the chief influence in the government. He soon became Grand Vizier and made Aali Foreign Minister. Aali was a new man and a good one and afterwards became very famous in Turkish history. The policy of the 'Rose Chamber' decree was revived and known as the *Tanzimat*. The word does not mean reform, but simply organisation. It was not meant to denote reform in the western sense, but a return to an old system. Everything was to be reorganised in the old, pure and tolerant spirit of Islam. The *Tanzimat* seemed launched on its course with Reschid as captain and Stratford as pilot.

By a curious irony Stratford was threatened with dismissal just at the moment of his success. Aberdeen fell and Palmerston became Foreign Minister in June 1846. Stratford returned home in the autumn, as it was thought for good. Ambassadors still retired from power with their party. Stratford was not a Whig; he had sided with Urquhart over the *Vixen* affair, and had had an acrimonious discussion with Palmerston in the Commons. Palmerston suggested he should use discretion, and Stratford had retorted: 'If he thought it necessary to take lessons of discretion, he should not go to the noble lord's school for instruction' (June 21, 1838). Even so late as 1844 the *Morning Chronicle* declared that Stratford's many good qualities were 'so spoiled by quickness and acerbity of temper that a more dangerous steed to drive with diplomatic reins we cannot conceive.' None the less the journal complained that Aberdeen had not properly supported Stratford or British prestige at Constantinople. 'The despatches of the Foreign Office are like the touches of the torpedo [eel]' and had a 'benumbing influence.'\* But, if neither Palmerston

\* *Morning Chronicle* of August 9, 1845. The previous quotation is from December 18, 1844, and both seem Palmerstonian.

nor Stratford was discreet, neither man was small. They agreed to forget their differences because each desired to increase British influence and to regenerate Turkey in retrospect. Stratford consented to return on one condition. 'It was,' Palmerston said on May 1, 1856, 'that he should be supported by the Government at home, and urged to continue his exertions—those exertions which he had never intermitted during the long years he had been in Turkey—to obtain that equality between Christians and Mahommedans.' Stratford, who might well have claimed the Embassy at Paris or Rome, once more chose Constantinople. But he spent two years in other fields, and when he reached Constantinople in 1848 it was to find Reschid expelled once more by the reactionaries. It took time to restore him and to undo the work of reaction. This incident is typical of the difficulties both of Reschid and of his protector, and explains how the intrigues of the court defeated the best intentions of both.

It is perhaps best to sum up the progress made by considering first what Reschid achieved himself and next what he achieved with the aid of Stratford. Apart from Riza's army reforms the only benefit his predecessors had conferred on Reschid was the introduction of a new silver and gold coinage. This undoubted advantage was offset by a species of loan contracted on Turkish Treasury Bonds issued at the ruinous rate of 12 per cent. in 1841, and by the introduction of a corruption which Reschid did nothing to check. But the decade 1840-50 was marked by great changes alike in justice, the civil service, provincial administration and education. Not all the credit is due to Reschid, for some of the projects had already been long planned. For the Penal Code (1840) Reschid was mainly responsible and, like the Code Napoléon on which it was based, it made all men equal before the law. It contained references to the 'Rose Chamber' decree, of which some were very naive. His Highness the Sultan had 'already bound himself not to put to death publicly or secretly either by poison or otherwise' anyone without trial. Also His Highness had 'abstained from usurping the goods or property of any private individuals.' These admissions did show the advance made. It was a great achievement to issue the Penal Code only six months after the *Gulhané* decree.<sup>345</sup> The influence of the Penal Code led, though slowly and with difficulty, to punishment of high officials by due process. In some cases the great men tried and condemned were simply punished for purely political reasons or by political opponents. Such was the trial and punishment of old Husrev, the ex-Grand Vizier known as

'the master-strangler,' in 1841. But it would be wrong to deny that an improvement in the administration of justice took place at the capital and in large towns and provinces really under European supervision. The special case of the remoter provinces will be examined later, and it is here enough to say that the ideas and modes of the West were introduced most successfully when foreigners were present to supervise and report upon their progress.

Reschid deserves credit for his work on the Commercial Code. The introduction of this code, which had been retarded by his fall in 1841 and again in 1848, took place in 1850. It was a mere copy of the French commercial laws dealing with partnerships, bankruptcies and bills of exchange. It depended for its efficacy on the tribunals of commerce. But it had the all-important effect of defining, protecting and facilitating the commercial transactions of foreigners. The inhabitants of Turkey consisted of Mussulmans and of *rayas*, i.e. of Christian and other non-Mussulman subjects. But in addition there had been foreigners resident for purposes of commerce since early times. They were known generally as 'Franks' and included many British, French, Russian, Austrian and Dutch subjects. They had never been able to get their commercial affairs adjusted in a Turkish court. Stratford had declared in 1844 that 'the difficulty of settling commercial claims is altogether insuperable.'<sup>346</sup> 'It is of the utmost importance,' wrote one of his consuls, 'that bonds and contracts should not be affected by the quibbles or evasions of the Mahommedan Law.'<sup>347</sup> The difficulty was solved by erecting commercial courts and by extending the old Capitulations.

It is impossible here to enter into detail over the Capitulations system, but the following memo was submitted to Palmerston as descriptive of its judicial aspect. 'The Porte leaves to the agents of each European Power in Turkey, the right to hear and decide all cases of criminal and civil jurisdiction over the subjects of each State respectively. In mixed cases, both criminal and civil, the case, by common consent of the European Powers, is heard before the agent or consul of the Power whose subject is the culprit, or the defendant.

'I therefore assume that in all mixed cases heard and decided in the court of the British consul-general, his decision must be founded on the principle of British Law, modified, by what is called the usage of the Levant. . . . The term "usage of the Levant"—I conceive to be that agreement which, by the common consent of all the European or Christian Legations in Turkey, has been from time immemorial acted

upon by the agents of the European Powers in Turkey. . . . One of the great objects of the Capitulations or Treaties which the European Powers have wrung from the Porte, has been that their subjects, being Christian, should not be tried and punished by Mahommedans.' <sup>348</sup>

This memo explains tersely how foreign Christians were protected in civil and criminal law. But they could not own real property, and the Commercial Code was useless unless their commercial transactions were protected by a machinery similar to the Capitulations. Mixed tribunals of commerce were therefore created to give to foreigners the same protection in commerce as they had in civil and criminal affairs. This was done by developing the old *Tidjaret Mehkemessi*, or Court of Commerce. The Porte constituted a tribunal composed of twenty members, ten (Turks and *rayas*) appointed by itself, and ten consisting of representatives of Europeans. Commercial cases between a Turkish subject and a foreigner came before, and were settled by, these tribunals. This system was open to abuse. It began in Constantinople in 1847 and its opening was very unfortunate. The 'Frank' representatives were merchants, some of whom were venal and disreputable. The Turkish representatives were not above reproach, least of all the infamous Riza, who was the first president of the court. He was given this office and a large salary as a sort of consolation prize for being disgraced and expelled from the ministry by Reschid. Riza himself was disgusted with his new post, and showed his discontent by attending irregularly and going to sleep on the bench. The crude Turkish wits made the most of his attitude, as well as of the fact that the court itself sat in Constantinople in a building near the old mad-house. Things improved in 1849, when Riza was dismissed and sent off to misgovern Salonica. The *Tidjaret Mehkemessi* was instituted with more success at Smyrna, where 'Frank' commercial interests were strong. Before the Crimean war began it had functioned in Salonica, Adrianople, Beyrouth, Damascus and Aleppo. It was extended to Egypt and, though the Sultan's idea seems to have been to annoy his vassal by forcing him to introduce reforms, advantage resulted here also. It is true that the right sort of 'Frank' representatives were not always appointed. But, in the end, if Turkish representatives did not prove satisfactory the powers intervened. The intervention of foreign powers could be effective, as the framework of reform had been instituted. Hence a step forward was really taken by this reform. The same system was applied, as an extension of the Capitulations system, to criminal cases

in which Turks and foreigners were involved. These were settled by mixed tribunals of Correctional Police, organised and administered on the same system as the *Tidjaret Mehkemessi*. This system, though not wholly new, was greatly improved between 1847 and 1850.

Education was also greatly developed as the result of a commission, appointed in 1845 and reporting in 1846, of which Aali and Fuad were the leading spirits. The bare rudiments of education already existed.<sup>349</sup> Every Turkish village, however poor, had its mosque and school attached; Greek churches too had Greek schools in the neighbourhood; Bulgars were beginning to develop them. But all were very poor, small and rudimentary, and usually endowed from voluntary sources. The commission dealt mostly with the Turkish schools and found the chief opposition from the obscurantist and intolerant *ulemas*.\* They went steadily to work, assigned minimum salaries, making up the deficit where needed from state funds. The curriculum was somewhat improved and better text-books provided. But education was made alike obligatory, universal and gratuitous. Christian and Jewish schools received less attention, the chief point being an attempt to introduce the teaching of Turkish history into their curriculum. A beginning was made with secondary education in 1851, and six schools founded. But the attempt was suspended almost immediately, and not extended to the provinces. Colleges for training civil servants and military, naval and veterinary officers were founded. The Imperial School of Medicine, founded by Mahmud, and the Agricultural School, founded by Abdul Medjid, were institutions of the greatest importance to the Empire and the civilian population. In these two cases the pupils were half Mohammedan and half Christian. But it was noticed by keen observers that there was no amalgamation, and little intercourse, between the two elements. The ambitious project of founding a university was started in 1846. A splendid medal was struck representing the complete building. The foundations were laid and the walls rose about six feet from the ground. But upon the first tidings of the revolutions of 1848 work on the building was suspended, and the whole project soon collapsed. Though there was much disillusionment, some progress was achieved and the general purport of the reforms is clear. They aimed

\* Such was always the case, for they had the vested interest. I visited the University of Constantinople in 1933 just after it had adopted completely modern methods. I was informed that the chief obstacle to their doing so had been the autonomy of the University!



at enabling the government to control the public opinion of the future, and at curbing the excessive power of religious reaction in the present. They had some success in both directions and can at least claim this merit, that they anticipated the British government by twenty-four years in making education compulsory and universal.

Of course Reschid had a great support in Stratford, who brought him back to office in 1846 and again in 1848. But when an oriental minister depends on the support of a foreigner his situation is always unstable. Stratford's direct contribution to education, to the *Tidjaret Mehkemessi* and to the Penal Code had been small. Two reforms may be laid definitely to his credit. By a direct reference to the Sultan he obtained the abolition of the slave trade in so far as Turkish vessels were in future prohibited from engaging in the traffic in slaves (August 1850). It was due to him again that the *haratch*, which Izzet Mehemet had caused to be collected from individuals, was again collected from the heads of communities. This was an important service. Previously it had been hard to say whether the 'principle or the practice is the more objectionable.'<sup>350</sup> But Stratford's great religious reforms were somewhat ephemeral in character. He entirely failed to place Christian evidence on a level with Mussulmans in the law courts. The most that he succeeded in doing was to maintain it where it existed before, as in the Lebanon, and to prevent the religious reactionaries from abolishing it. His failure here showed how deeply ingrained was the Turkish resistance to all ideas of equality with *rayas*. He failed to reform either the state of the prisons or to improve the means of communication. He did not even claim to have suppressed corruption or improved the finances. He confessed that his attempt to persuade the Turks to enlist Christian *rayas* in the army had been a total failure. Now this touched the root of the matter.

The *Morning Chronicle*, probably under Palmerston's influence, had blamed Aberdeen for not supporting Stratford in the aim of inducing the Turks to 'treat their Christian subjects with fairness and interest them in the defence of the Empire.'\* Again, 'If the Turks' are to refuse 'to enlist other than Mussulmans in their defence, we fear that, however dignified and consistent they may exist as Turks, that existence will not be long-lived.' Judged by his own tests Stratford had failed. For after five years of strenuous support from Palmerston, the fusion of Christians and Turks was as far off as ever. The Turks still refused to enlist Christians in the army and

\* December 18, 1844; January 1, 1845.

held apart from them in sullen hostility. If Stratford had not gained so many religious privileges for Christians, he might have secured to them more political equality. For Stratford's veto on the religious persecution of Christians provoked a Turkish veto on their admission to the army. In Turkey the army is either the state itself, or something more important than the state. As long as Christians had no right of entry into the Ottoman army, they could never exercise real influence in the Ottoman state. Stratford's noble and devoted efforts had produced major concessions in words but minor concessions in deeds.

### III

*The physiognomy of the metropolitan government can be most fully appreciated in its outlying provinces.*—DE TOCQUEVILLE.

Before Mahmud centralised his power the provinces had been wholly at the mercy of their pashas. His rule brought order into remote districts and Reschid's reforms sought to introduce law into them. There was at least enough done to excite attention and to mark the difference from the past. Thus the infamous governor of Konieh was convicted of various crimes, including the murder of a servant, and condemned to hard labour for life in the city which he had misgoverned. Special commissioners were sent through the provinces to inquire into and judge abuses during 1850 and 1851. One of them judged the pasha of Larissa for corruption and forced him to reimburse the victims of his extortions.<sup>351</sup> No such fate befell the infamous Riza, who had been disgraced and sent to govern Salonica. Among his many other misdeeds this may suffice. Two Greek shepherds killed a Turkish brigand in self-defence after they had vainly asked Riza for protection against him. Riza had them both executed. Immediately after execution he had their clothes stripped off 'their still warm bodies' and sold by auction.<sup>352</sup> Riza was ultimately dismissed, let us hope for this offence. He was too strong to be brought to trial and later regained his power in Constantinople. None the less the principle that pashas could be brought to trial and punished for maladministration had been established as part of the reform system.

Parallel with this was an improvement in the justice administered by the pashas in their governments. In the old days the pasha was a despot, killing or robbing whom he would. Mahmud had deprived pashas of the death penalty, making it

dependent on an appeal to Constantinople. Reschid's reforms did undoubtedly result in an improvement in the justice administered in the provinces. Here is an example. An old European resident at Antioch was astonished to note that, when two rich Christians came to blows, the pasha patiently reconciled them. 'In the old days,' he exclaimed, 'he would have put them both into prison from which they would not come out until they paid at least 20,000 piasters (at that time equal to £300) each.'<sup>353</sup> There were of course abuses, but the worst vices of the old régime, arbitrary executions, impalement and torture, had all disappeared in the more civilised provinces. Unfortunately, however, the pasha was not left to himself to govern his people under the protection of the law. He was himself hampered and hindered by it.

Thus, while the reign of law was actually introduced into the provinces where it had not existed before, its practical effect was often small. Reactionaries and reformers were at one in keeping reality and appearance apart. Turks excelled in violating the spirit and in keeping to the letter of the reforms, and the provinces were the area in which these shams and realities were both revealed. One reform of Reschid, which was certainly well-intentioned, associated a council, or *Mejliss*, with each pasha. In this way it was thought that sane control would be exercised and the germ of a representative system created. The *Mejliss* was elected by the different communities. Turks were always in a majority on it, but *rayas*, Greeks or Armenians, Slavs, even Jews could be, and often were, represented. The pasha was unable to do anything without consent of the majority of his council. This rule had several unforeseen effects, every one of them disastrous. The Turkish majority was almost always formed from bigoted and reactionary conservatives. The pasha could always appeal to their prejudices when he wanted to persecute *rayas*. If the Turks on the council were divided, he could always intimidate the *rayas* on his council into voting for him as the chief official. Incredible as it may seem, the *raya* minority representatives invariably agreed with the decisions of the majority, sometimes because they did not understand Turkish, sometimes because they dared not oppose what they understood. The Greek bishop of Kutaya once received a paper from the governor for which his seal as representative of the council was required. 'I cannot read Turkish,' said the bishop. 'I have never been consulted in this matter; I know not what it may be; this may contain my own death sentence; but I must seal it.'<sup>354</sup> And he did. The *Mejliss* system was absolutely bad. During his

voyage in the Lebanon David Urquhart found its deliberations most impressive and at Beyrouth he even discovered 'virtue and patriotism' in the *Mejliss*. But it was of this visit that a consul wrote: 'I have heard only one opinion as to the views and ideas that Mr. Urquhart advocates and that is that they are visionary.'<sup>355</sup> He is the only person who ever found merit in a *Mejliss*.

It would be easy to quote the opinions of consuls as reported during the next twenty years in refutation of Urquhart's view. But it will suffice to quote from Barker, whose experience as consul and as permanent resident in the East extended over forty years and was unique in authority. He declares that they 'combined with the Pashas or Governors to *legalize* their spoliations by a lying document called "*Mazbatta*" sent to the Porte signed by *all* the members of this council which declared whatever they pleased, at the suggestion of the pasha. Sometimes, however, this weapon could be used both ways, and the Porte was defrauded or despoiled. . . . After twenty years' residence in habitual contact with this council or "*Mejliss*" on public and private business wherever we have resided, we can with truth declare it to have been the most baneful and unfortunate concession, on apparently liberal principles, that could have been made to a country just emerging from anarchy, as the Empire then was.

'The members of the *Mejliss* are always the rich [Turkish] landed proprietors. . . . They are *de facto* the governors of the country for their own benefit, and they always combine together when any matter is proposed inimical to their collective interests, however secretly inimical they may be to one another. "We keep the people ignorant and oppressed, in order to be able to govern them, for otherwise how could we govern them?"' was told us by Haji Halef Aga, one of the leading members of the *Mejliss* at Antioch. We could relate many cases of extortion, injustice and violence by this man, always under the legal sanction of the "*Mazbatta*.'"<sup>356</sup>

The *Mejliss* screened a bad or designing governor and hampered a good one. So far from protecting the minority 'the object . . . as displayed in its operation, seems solely intended to increase Turkish influence.'<sup>\*</sup> At all of the new *Mejlisses*, moreover, oppressive measures could be passed with more show of justice than of old, since Christian representatives could be cowed into agreeing to them. Stratford himself

<sup>\*</sup> F.O. 78/800. From N. Moore (Beyrouth), No. 53 of October 26, 1849. Consul Finn said exactly the same at Jerusalem. In 1880 Kitchener reported as much at Katamuni in Asia Minor: *Kitchener in his own Words* [1917], 57.

twice formally denounced *Mejlisses* and once to the Sultan himself. It is true that this method sometimes brought a bad pasha to justice, but bad governors did not cease in the outlying provinces in this period. The governor of Mosul ran amok in the streets, mad with drink. The governor of Trebizond cut the throats of two criminals in public. During most of this period Nejib pasha at Bagdad refused to pay tribute and grossly oppressed the inhabitants. He was too distant to be subdued. But nearer home at Brusa, within a few days of Constantinople, tyranny and oppression went on to a remarkable degree, even though one governor was dismissed. At Salonica Riza oppressed Christians until he was recalled, and his brother reactionary Halil reintroduced torture at Smyrna. These two, though disgraced for misgovernment and corruption in the capital, managed to practise their vices in the provinces. For all these abuses Reschid must bear his share of responsibility. Most of his appointments to provincial pashalics were bad, and many were said to have been influenced by Armenian bankers, of course for financial reasons.

It might, however, be argued that 'salutary neglect' in the Turkish provinces was better than active oppression. But there were areas in which 'neglect' was anything but 'salutary.' As a specimen let us take the district of Mentesche south of Smyrna, part of the ancient Lycia and Caria. Once it had been a land of fair cities, of merchant princes whose ships had fought at Salamis and traded with Alexandria. It was now a Turkish province, full of wretchedly poor labourers. The area was large and the population, though small, paid £50,000 tribute to Constantinople, and a tenth tax of over £18,000. It had no foreign inhabitants nor visitors in the shape of missionaries nor merchants. It had no troops, no public education, no roads. Brigands abounded, the archbishop levied a heavy toll on the district, even farming out burial and baptismal fees. A very little energy by the government would have removed the plague and drained the malarial districts. A little work on the roads would have enabled the district to be traversed in five or six days instead of in fifteen or twenty. There was no commerce worthy of the name and no ports. Yet there were excellent natural facilities for establishing quays and harbours. Had they been used, a thriving coastal trade would have sprung up. This was what Turkish administration did, when isolated and left to itself. What a contrast with free Greece, whose schools and colleges were increasing, while a fine system of harbours was developing commerce everywhere !



Stratford, in transmitting his report on Mentesché, mournfully described it as 'a sad picture . . . of misgovernment, exaction, and decay, . . . [It] is the more painfully interesting as it gives but too just an idea of the evils prevailing in other parts of Turkey.' <sup>357</sup> In the same year that this report was presented there was a Christian revolt in Bulgaria, due to unspeakable outrages inflicted by Turks, and a Mohammedan rebellion in Bosnia due to the improvement in the lot of Christians. In these circumstances the despatch of commissioners to reform and amend the state of provincial administration was simply a farce. <sup>358</sup>

Incredible as it may seem, this neglect of all official aid to remote provinces and the universal abuses of the *Mejlisses* elsewhere represented a bettering of older methods. The 'Rose Chamber' decree and the *Tanzimat* had caused the position of Western Powers and their consuls to become more important. It enabled them to intervene with more effect both on behalf of their own nationals in commercial cases and generally on behalf of Christians. Longworth admitted that the Turkish 'hands have been in some measure tied up and have been prevented from plundering the Christians directly by the *Tanzimat*,' even in Monastir, where the pasha 'is the most slippery and corrupt rogue I have ever had to deal with.' <sup>359</sup> Another experienced consul wrote, 'bad as the system of administration is . . . it is happiness itself to what it was previous to the *Hatti-Sheriff* of *Gulhané* [Rose Chamber], and however bad it may appear to us still the reform that has been worked has greatly ameliorated the state of the Christians.' Agriculture had increased in all its branches, and in most of the villages Christians were acquiring all property, for 'the Turks are degrading as fast as the Christians improve.' 'Notwithstanding the increase of commercial importance which this town [Salonica] has taken within the last ten or fifteen years there does not now exist within the walls a Turk who is a merchant. The beys who were the exclusive landed proprietors are also all more or less ruined. [Their estates] are either heavily mortgaged or let. Hence the improvement in cultivation, and the increased amount of produce brought to market is the work of Christians who enjoy all the profits and advantages whilst the wealth of the Turkish proprietors vanishes in apathy and smoke!' <sup>360</sup> In other words, progress meant the growth of commerce, and that spelt ruin for the Turk and increase of wealth and population to the Christian. And this progress continued despite every effort of Turkish reaction. The future lay with the provinces. There the Turkish popu-

lation dwindled and sank into poverty, while the Christians grew in wealth, in numbers, in self-consciousness.

#### IV

*I will never look on the city, for now I know that it was no design of God's to allow me to take it, though it was certainly His desire that I should come to this country.*—RICHARD LIONHEART.

The story of the failure of reform is even now a sad one to read. Towards the end of 1849 a great crisis occurred. Austria and Russia threatened Turkey; Stratford covered her with the shield of England's protection, and enabled her to resist the demands of her opponents. During the next year his prestige and power were perhaps greater than any other ambassador had ever enjoyed in Constantinople. Yet in this very year the weakness of the Sultan, of Reschid and of the reform movement revealed itself. The Sultan showed himself afraid of reform for fear of making his brother Abdul Aziz (whom he held in captivity) popular with the reactionary party. He was also impressed by the fact that the reform movement had provoked a dangerous rebellion in Bosnia. In both June and August Stratford had audiences with the Sultan and wrung from him the abolition of the slave trade and the abolition of the *haratch*. But he failed altogether to obtain larger or more extensive reforms. The Sultan, graciously but a little wearily, admitted 'corruption and cupidity' to be the worst of evils. 'Fanaticism was very prejudicial to the general interest.' Riza was 'a bad man.' 'For myself I consider the people committed to my charge whether Christians or Mussulmans in the same light and endeavour to have them enjoy the same rights.' 'Tell the Elchi Bey,' he said to the dragoman, 'that I am no longer the same man.'<sup>361</sup> Unfortunately he was as weak, as amiable, as indolent, as ever.

Stratford, observing that reform was weakening, took the unusual step of interviewing the Sheikh-ul-Islam. He returned with the conviction that, if the Sheikh fathered the reform movement, it would be as 'a result of moral compulsion not of voluntary compliance.' Among laymen he found opposition, in general, 'not so much rooted in the prejudices of the people as engendered by the vices of all who have access to the power or emoluments of office.' None of them believed, as he did, that the progress of reforms was bound up with the future of Turkey. In despair Stratford drew up another very long list of desired reforms and sent it in to Reschid. He and his

innermost colleagues sat on it and returned the ominous reply that they admitted Stratford's programme in principle but were divided as to the application of particular measures. This was the beginning of the end, for it marked that Reschid himself was weak and weakening.

Reschid had in fact perceived the trend of events. In 1839 the Egyptian danger had enabled him to bring in the *Gulhané* decree ; in 1845 he had been helped to power by the misdeeds of Riza and his associates ; from 1848 to 1850 reforms had taken place because the dangers in Europe had made Stratford's support essential. The world was now tranquil and reaction could resume its sway. The Turks had lost faith in reform and Reschid had lost faith in himself. He was a little timid, a little weary, a great deal disillusioned and compromised. He had discredited both reform and himself. The year 1851 opened with demands for the better government of the provinces, and for prompt measures to arrest the rapidly approaching financial catastrophe. Stratford brought the prospect of bankruptcy before the Sultan. 'He listened patiently, he answered graciously, he dismissed me with an appearance of goodwill.' Stratford found Reschid weary of difficulties, averse from further struggle, and inclined towards resignation. The Sultan in his interviews with Reschid said nothing about either admitting Christians to the army or reforming the finances. Stratford had already abandoned hope. 'The few good measures are far from sufficient. They have moreover been accompanied with several disastrous events afflicting to humanity !' <sup>362</sup> Reschid was 'unequal to the task of either producing unanimity in the Cabinet or of removing the scruples of the Seraglio. In proportion as diseases take root repugnance to the means of cure seems to strengthen also. The test has been fairly applied. A further pressure would in all probability, under present circumstances, either deprive me of the Sultan's goodwill or send the Grand Vizier into long retirement.' <sup>363</sup> He proposed, therefore, to suspend the campaign. Palmerston, replying early in March 1851, decided not to press for any 'great or aggregate system of reform.' Stratford regretfully acquiesced in the 'failure to give effect to the earnest wishes entertained by Her Majesty's Government and by no individual member of it more cordially than your Lordship.' He wrote in private, 'The *great* game of improvements is altogether up for the present' (April 5, 1851).

Stratford had set out to drive orientals along new roads, a task to baffle the most expert of drovers. There seem to be two ways of moving orientals in new directions. One way is

to imitate them, to yield to them, to pretend to be theirs. Then they follow you as a flock of sheep the bell-wether. That was Lawrence's way with the Arabs. In the process he lost his western faith and based his eastern works on 'fraud,' on 'pretences,' on 'hollow worthless things.' There is another way, and one by which an Englishman may preserve his faith and yet instruct orientals in reality. It is 'to stand against them, to persuade himself of a mission, to batter and to twist them into something which they, of their own accord, would not have done.' That is to drive, not to lead, and it was Stratford's way with the Turks. But nature has set limits to such exertion. Even Stratford could not always be 'exploiting his old environment to press them out of theirs.'\* In the end the very souls of the Turks revolted against such a pressure and such a taskmaster. Stratford saw the material failure and confessed it. But he differed from his successor in this particular: he did not admit spiritual defeat.

In the desert Lawrence lost one faith and he did not find another. He wavered between 'two customs, two educations, two environments,' and wondered which was the true one. To Stratford there was only one custom, one civilisation, one cause, the cause of heaven. Faith in the cause, and a burning faith, remained. But a doubt had begun to dawn, and a doubt in himself. Was he worthy, was he marked out as the chosen instrument of God to finish His work? When he doubted thus, it was time to abandon the field of his labour. A peerage came to him as the reward of his toil, but no honour could allay the agony of doubt or confirm his faith in himself. It was in June 1852 that he left Constantinople in this mood of deep dejection, 'perhaps never to return.'<sup>364</sup>

## V

*Of all causes of decadence . . . the sum of these ills is the spirit of reform on the European model.*—METTERNICH.†

Between Stratford, so noble in aim, so violent in means, so vehement in temper, there can be no greater contrast than Reschid. This smooth, eloquent, plausible oriental could not face the grim ranks of organised reaction. He failed Stratford as Pliable failed Christian, and without even escaping from the mire. Unquestionably intellectual and with a strong

\* Lawrence, *Seven Pillars* [1935], 31-2.

† W.S.A. Weisungen nach England, 306. Metternich to Esterházy, No. 1 of May 26, 1841.

passion for the West, he had been ardent for reform under Mahmud, and achieved much for a time under his feeble successor. But all Stratford's influence could not prevent him from steadily degenerating as he grew older. His early enthusiasm and purity disappeared. He became corrupt and immoral in secret, while openly professing the standards of the West. His physical cowardice was a weakness on which his enemies played, and he became morally discouraged at the apathy and at the reaction he encountered.

Reschid certainly preceded Stratford in abandoning hope of further reform. He was probably influenced by the Sultan's example. Abdul Medjid's weak mind was much impressed because Franz Josef revoked the constitution he had formally granted in Austria. His brother despot had thus set his face against 'concessions made by his government . . . to the spirit of the age.' 'Whichever way we look,' wrote Stratford, 'some cause of discouragement strikes upon the sight.' He was at length disillusioned even in Reschid himself. He found him wanting 'in that vigour of mind and frequent conviction which overcomes resistance by force of resolution and finds resources in the midst of difficulty.' He said 'he is thought by many, even friends, to have been somewhat unfaithful to the cause.' Stratford admitted that Reschid's 'turn for expense has plunged him deeply into debt,'<sup>365</sup> but did not himself confirm the ugly rumours as to shady dealings with an Armenian banker. On the whole Stratford, though condemning the policy of his old friend, dealt tenderly with his personal faults. Macfarlane's opinion that 'it was difficult to state which was the biggest rogue, Reschid or Riza,' was confirmed by a high authority.<sup>366</sup> Before departing, Stratford regarded him with deep suspicion, and in the autumn of 1852 Reschid put the finishing touch to his baseness by a secret intrigue with Russia, of which the effects were to reach far.\*

One cause of Reschid's failure was not due to himself. Knowledge and education had increased, but Turkish public opinion had not kept pace with their evolution. The number of periodicals had considerably increased by the days of the reform movement. The State Gazette (*Takvimi Vakai*) was the official organ of the government. The *Register of News*, edited by an Englishman, William Churchill, though unofficial, received money from the government. Two French papers were the *Courrier de Constantinople* and the *Journal*, of which the first was probably, and the second certainly, under both French and Turkish official influences.<sup>367</sup> Two Italian journals were

\* *Vide infra*, p. 304 ; and nn. 458, 467.



mildly political. Four other journals were wholly technical, and there was finally one Greek, one Armenian and one Bulgarian weekly newspaper devoted in each case to its national interests. There were several newspapers at Smyrna, Belgrade, Bucharest and Beyruth. What is interesting, however, is that press criticism of the government usually came from foreigners or *rayas*.<sup>368</sup> There was no genuine organ of Turkish opinion, and it was not until 1860 that a modern Turkish literature arose. It was then effective and influential because released from the old classical models and based on an assimilation of modern and western culture. During its first important period the Turkish reform movement worked almost wholly without a genuine national or popular impulse from below and without stimulation from parallel cultural movements or from literary men. That undoubtedly was one reason for its failure. Turkish public opinion, in the shape of lawyers or journalists, was not mobilised in Reschid's favour. There was no educated citizen class to support him among Turks. He depended, therefore, upon those Turkish officials and politicians who saw their interest engaged in supporting him. Naturally, therefore, they were loyal in fair weather, but deserted him as the storms arose.

That Reschid lacked moral earnestness was now patent. But a man may be a real reformer, as Constantine the Great was, even if his fervour is open to doubt. The larger question remains whether failure was not inherent in his reforms. It has been argued that Mahmud's reforms were within the range of Islamic ideas and that Reschid's went beyond them. This suggestion seems to me doubtful. Mahmud's attitude towards *rayas* at the end of his life suggests that he was contemplating a programme even more advanced than that of the *Gulhané* decree. But in raising this query we touch on the weak spot of all reform in that age. New methods were not necessarily an improvement on old ones, since western ideas were so strange to the East. Riza was a reactionary because he was corrupt and Izzet Mehemet because he was prejudiced, and these were the main motives of the opposition. But there was also a party opposed to the radical reforms of Reschid consisting of men of the highest character, led by the afterwards famous Ahmed Vefyk. They believed that the Reschid-Stratford remedy was too drastic and quite unsuited to the oriental mind. They considered that so rapid a change to western ideas would injure the Turkish nation without aiding the Christians. They did not believe it possible to melt down

so many different metals and weld them into one. They did not think you could confound the Crescent with the Cross. You could not mix predatory Kurds with thrifty Armenians, desert Arabs with miserly Jews, intriguing Maronites with fierce Druses, untamable Albanians with industrious Bulgars, calculating Greeks with haughty Ottomans. Their remedy was to go slow, to preserve the old religious and racial differences, to promote justice and efficiency and to attack corruption. They were sincere in believing that too hasty reform would in the end produce obstruction and reaction. But they exercised too small an influence. Conscience forbade them to support the blind reactionaries on the one side or the ardent reformers on the other.

At the time almost all Europeans believed that Turkey could save herself from ruin only by adopting reform. The one exception was Metternich, but Metternich was a fossilised conservative.\* The policy of Reschid and Stratford was originally accepted and advocated by Layard and by nearly everyone else. But it is very interesting to learn that, towards the end of his life, Layard abandoned his original opinion and confessed that Ahmed Vefyk and the moderate conservatives of Turkey had been largely right in their opposition. Layard himself possessed unrivalled knowledge of oriental ideas, yet even he seems to have failed to perceive the obstacles to progress rooted in the character and history of the Turkish people. The early Victorian era was an age of optimism where history counted for little and abstract theory for much. In that age a Turk alone could see that his countrymen might not profit by the model of the West, and might even assimilate its vices and not its virtues.

At a last audience with the Sultan Stratford had received nothing but fair words and easy promises. Neither he nor any man had believed them. On his departure the whole reform ministry and movement collapsed. Reschid fell and was succeeded as Grand Vizier by Aali, and Aali after a few months by Mehemet Ali. The latter was the Sultan's brother-in-law. He exercised a sinister influence on the Seraglio and was very partial to bribes. He had at one time professed to follow Reschid, but had 'even [then] been looked upon with suspicion'; he was now a notorious reactionary. This was what one correspondent told Stratford. 'Things are going from worse to worse every day,' wrote another.<sup>369</sup>

The finances were in fearful chaos, and a loan could not be obtained. Favourites, like Ahmed Fethi and Mehemet Ali,

\* *Vide supra*, quotation and note †, p. 243.

monopolised power. 'The Sultan's liking for drink increases daily which has such an effect upon his nervous constitution that it produces a kind of delirium which I am assured is next to madness. What can be expected from such a man and with an adviser like Ahmed [Fethi]?' It was all over then. Stratford, Reschid and Reform had all gone. Financially bankrupt and politically corrupt the Turkish Empire was jolting down the slope which led to the Crimean war. The decree of the 'Chamber of Roses' had produced a garden of withered and decaying flowers. All was 'in folly ripe, in reason rotten.' Even Stratford said that the reforms were 'superficial improvements which, like Potemkin's villages, only make dupes because there is a willingness to be duped.'<sup>370</sup> Reschid's party, the only party hitherto based on political principle in Turkey, had collapsed. His two disciples Aali and Fuad were now his secret or open political opponents. Reschid himself began secretly intriguing with Russia in the autumn of 1852. Stratford's influence was extinguished as soon as his presence was withdrawn. No further stimulus to reform could come from personalities; it could come only from events. That pressure was supplied when war burst upon Turkey in 1853. Again, as in 1839, the Turks professed a desire for reform, because of their desire for armed aid from the West. The war with Egypt had produced the decree of the 'Rose Chamber'; the war in the Crimea produced the *Hatti-Humayun*. Behind the last, as behind the first, was the burning enthusiasm of Stratford de Redcliffe.



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# BOOK IV

## THE FRUITS OF DIPLOMACY

### CHAPTER X

HOW CZAR NICHOLAS NEGOTIATED (1840-53)

#### I

*Non enim possumus omnia per nos agere.*—We cannot do everything by ourselves.—CICERO, *Sext. Rosc.*, 38.

CZAR NICHOLAS had been delighted to unite with England against Mehemet Ali. For a triumph over Mehemet Ali was a triumph over France. She represented all that Nicholas hated. She had expelled Henry V, the rightful King of France, she had elevated Louis Philippe, an upstart usurper. Her insolent bourgeois ministers had openly sympathised with Poland's revolt against Russia. Her whole people were revolutionists. A revolutionary war was imminent, and France would be its author. That seems to have been his genuine belief. He could meet the danger by dividing France from England. The French would never risk a war in Europe if England was allied with Russia. Nicholas decided to separate France from England, and proposed to negotiate the separation in person.

Late in December 1840 the Czar asked Lord Clanricarde 'if Her Majesty's government would object to record and establish by some act the alliance, which now happily existed between the Four Powers [Russia, England, Austria and Prussia], to serve as a security against any efforts France might make to awaken revolutionary feeling in Europe, or against perhaps a revolutionary war. In short His Imperial Majesty proposed to me the Holy Alliance,' said Clanricarde. He dared not explain to the imperial despot 'how repugnant to myself, and in my opinion to my countrymen and my government would be any league formed for the repression of any opinions or principles whatsoever.' Clanricarde fell back on parliament. 'The intention of such an alliance,' he said,

'would be misinterpreted and such misrepresentation would probably awake the very feelings which His Majesty wished to repress and that I did not see how the determination to oppose any attempts at excitement or propagandism by foreigners could be recorded without trenching upon those principles of constitutional liberty, to which we in England were so much attached.' The Emperor replied 'he did not require a treaty ; a clear understanding would suffice him—the assurance of ambassadors—my word would be ample security to him if I [Clanricarde] was authorized to pass it.' <sup>371</sup>

Nicholas' overture was quite clear and, in its way, quite frank. He asked for British support against France, 'in a war of revolutions this year or later.' As Clanricarde explained, 'neither His Imperial Majesty's treasury nor His army are prepared for war at this moment.' Nicholas therefore wanted help. It might be unwise to discuss the matter in parliament, so he asked for the word of an English gentleman, having an unshakable belief in the validity of that pledge. Palmerston replied to this overture with equal frankness. He began by proclaiming Canning's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, but qualified it by saying that England might interfere if any state sought to derange or alter the balance of power. England, however, had an objection to enter into engagements with reference to cases which had not actually arisen, or which were not immediately in prospect. The reason of that objection was the difficulty of inducing parliament to accept an agreement 'which bound England to take up arms in a contingency which might happen at an uncertain time, and under circumstances which could not as yet be foreseen.'

So far Palmerston had stated the policy of England as revealed to the world. Now he came to the suggestion that it might be secret. 'It is true that His Imperial Majesty has spoken of an understanding which need not be recorded in any formal instrument ; but upon which he might rely if the turn of affairs should render it applicable to events. But this course would not be free from objections. For, in the first place, it would scarcely be consistent with the spirit of the British constitution for the crown to enter into a binding engagement of such a nature, without placing it formally upon record, so that parliament might have an opportunity of expressing its opinion thereupon, and this could only be done by some written Instrument ; and to such a course the objection which I have alluded to above, would apply. But if the engagement were merely verbal, though it would bind the Ministers who

made it, it might be disavowed by their successors, and thus the Russian Government might be led to count upon a system of policy on the part of Great Britain which might not eventually be pursued.

'Under these circumstances it seems to Her Majesty's Government that the cabinet of St. Petersburg should be satisfied to trust to the general tendency of the policy of Great Britain, which leads her to watch attentively and to guard with care the maintenance of the Balance of Power; and Her Majesty's Government hope that His Imperial Majesty will not think that this policy is the less deeply rooted in the minds of Her Majesty's Government, if they should not think it expedient to enter at the present moment into engagements such as those mentioned by the Emperor.'\*

Palmerston says quite clearly that, whatever may be the personal views or even obligations of British statesmen, parliament alone can sanction binding engagements or alliances. It was, he implied, against the spirit of the British constitution to give such an undertaking without parliament. Even more important, if ministers gave it, 'it might be disavowed by their successors.' Plain speaking this, to an Emperor, and it ended the overture.

## II

*Culpa enim illa, bis ad eundem, vulgari reprehensa prouerbio est.*—For to stumble twice against the same stone is a disgrace, you know, even proverbially so.—CICERO, *Ep.*, X, 20.

It is extraordinary that Nicholas did not profit by Palmerston's lecture on the British constitution. He might well have turned elsewhere and adopted a suggestion of Nesselrode's to raise (*soulever*) the Balkan nationalities against Turkey.<sup>372</sup> Yet he refrained and returned to his old love. So far from being discouraged by this first rebuff, he made similar secret overtures to the British government on a second, and again on a third, occasion. And each time he seems to have hoped for success. Nicholas was a despot who did not easily admit defeat, and who relied on his personal prestige and his personal charm to achieve victory. It is in this spirit that we must view the second attempt, marked by his famous conversation with Aberdeen in 1844. He decided suddenly to visit England, and to renew the attempt to obtain the word of an English

\* This passage and the two preceding ones are from the despatch referred to in n. 371, and have already been in part quoted by Professor Rodkey and others.

gentleman to a secret obligation.<sup>373</sup> Nicholas delighted everybody by his visit. Victoria was impressed by the 'greatest potentate on earth,' charmed by the handsomest of men, awed by his grave look portending some grim future destiny. There was indeed something tragic in the way his meetings with her ministers led to misunderstandings on this and on other occasions. Peel, the Prime Minister, Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, and the Duke of Wellington all had speech with him. Nicholas himself reported that Aberdeen 'opened his eyes wide' at his remarks. Shortly afterwards Aberdeen said to the Russian representative, Brunnow, "'You do not think then, that Count Nesselrode wants to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with me?'" This observation, although made with a smile, was singularly unexpected by me [Brunnow]. Lord Aberdeen perceived it and resumed his tone of pleasantry. "Certainly we are not there yet, and we must not laugh too much about it. I remember well that the Emperor told the Queen, when at Windsor, that she could count on his troops. The time might come when we should need them." ' \*

Nesselrode held that Aberdeen had committed himself or at least could be made to do so. 'He [Aberdeen] has given his assent without reserve to the system of conduct traced out for the present and the eventual obligations indicated in it for the future.'<sup>374</sup> The Russian Chancellor sent him a memo dealing with the subject, which was based on definite principles. England and Russia have a common interest in maintaining the *status quo* in Turkey, that is her independence and territorial integrity. It was difficult to make Turkey treat her Christian subjects properly, unless the powers were agreed. The Turkish Empire contained 'many elements of dissolution,' and its fall might easily be hastened. The result of such a 'catastrophe will be much diminished if, in the event of a catastrophe occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common.' The Emperor, during his visit to London, agreed with the English ministers: (a) To maintain the existing state of Turkey as long as possible. (b) If anything unforeseen should happen in Turkey, Russia and England should come to a previous understanding with each other, as to what they should have to do in common. Russia and Austria are already agreed [by the Convention of Münchengrätz]. If England joins in, France will be obliged to adhere unconditionally to whatever is decided at Vienna, London and St. Petersburg.

On December 3, Brunnow, by instruction, submitted this

\* The allusion is to the then strained relations between England and France.



memo. Aberdeen made a few suggestions, but accepted the document in principle. Brunnow asked Aberdeen to agree to an exchange of letters, by which the Czar could authenticate the memo and Aberdeen admit the correctness of the principles stated. Aberdeen asked for permission to reflect before accepting this suggestion, but he eventually accepted. Brunnow wrote to Nesselrode that an exchange of letters would be important, for neither Peel nor Aberdeen had said what they would do if the Turkish Empire collapsed. Nesselrode replied on December 16 that such an exchange would 'give new strength to the engagement contracted verbally *lors du séjour* of His Majesty the Emperor at London.' Aberdeen was told that His Majesty had authorised the memo as 'a most faithful *résumé* of his conversations with you and your colleagues.'<sup>375</sup> Aberdeen took some time in replying to this communication. When he did he admitted 'the accuracy of the statement.'<sup>376</sup> He also referred to 'the mutual expression of opinions in which I think we were entirely agreed and which I hope may be kept in view during all our negotiations connected with the Levant.' But his wording is eminently cautious, and his reception of the memo is lukewarm.

Aberdeen was cautious because he did not himself agree with the main thesis of the Czar, that the Turkish Empire was crumbling to pieces. In this very year he had written to Stratford: 'There appears to be in Turkey a principle of vitality, an occult force, which sets at nought all calculations based upon the analogy of other states.'<sup>377</sup> We cannot suppose Aberdeen to have repudiated in June the view which he had proclaimed in January. So he disagreed here with Nicholas, though he did not say so. It is also significant that Aberdeen's account to Stockmar of his conversations merely said that the Czar viewed Turkey 'as a dying man' and that he talked of how much an Anglo-Austro-Russian combination could do against France. He said nothing of any preliminary Anglo-Russian concert in case of the break-up of Turkey. The topic had indeed been discussed, for Aberdeen admitted the accuracy of the memo. But he describes the agreement merely as one 'of mutual expressions of opinion,' and he 'hopes' these may be kept in view in the future. Aberdeen evidently wished to keep Nicholas to his pledges of disinterestedness about Turkey, and did not see how he could do this if there was no suggestion of preliminary discussion with Russia in the future. He sought, however, to evade any pledges on the English side, though he does not seem to have been wholly successful in his aim.

The Russian negotiators undoubtedly thought that they had pinned Aberdeen down to something more binding than he was ready to admit. Nesselrode said 'he [Aberdeen] has given without reserve his assent to the system of conduct traced for the present and the eventual obligations indicated for the future.' Brunnow answered that, when the exchange of letters was completed, 'the agreement morally established between the two cabinets will have received the finishing touch, which although it adds nothing to the obligatory force of the engagements contracted since the visit of His Majesty will serve to state its existence in writing which will remain in possession of the archives of St. Petersburg and London. The English cabinet has entered on a new road. It has taken it as a rule to have an understanding with Russia before agreeing with all the other Courts of Europe. This system, we must not forget, only dates from the month of June of this year.'<sup>378</sup> The Czar is credited with having produced a new system and the claim is made that the English cabinet has agreed to it. In fact, this was just what the cabinet had not done.

Aberdeen had undoubtedly agreed to preserve the Turkish Empire as long as possible. To this principle any British statesman could subscribe without consulting anybody. But the Russians argued that he had also agreed, in the case of the break-up of Turkey, to enter into preliminary conference with them. Aberdeen did not entirely admit this suggestion, though he confessed to some commitment. No 'agreement' on his part could bind anyone except himself and perhaps Peel. Wellington had not seen the memo, though he had discussed the matter with the Czar.\* As the 'agreement' had not been submitted either to cabinet or to parliament, it was not binding upon either. As Palmerston had explained in 1841, 'personal agreements' were against the 'spirit of the British constitution,' and the decision of cabinet and parliament was necessary in 'cases which have not actually arisen, or which are not immediately in prospect.' Now the dissolution of the Turkish Empire had not yet taken place, so it is quite clear that, in so far as any 'agreement' existed for the future, Aberdeen and Peel were not responsible agents. They may have bound themselves, but they had not bound their own cabinet, so they certainly could not bind that of their successors in office. Nesselrode declared that Aberdeen had promised to

\* Aberdeen wrote later that Nesselrode's memo was shown only to Peel. *Pte. Russ. MSS. G. & D.* 22/105. Aberdeen to Lord John Russell, January 3, 1853. Hence Wellington was not bound by the memo.

devote all his efforts to make closer the union 'between conservative cabinets.' <sup>379</sup> Anyone can see that a Whig ministry, with Palmerston as Foreign Secretary, could not accept such a proposal.

Succeeding foreign ministers found the Nesselrode memo in the archives, but not the personal correspondence between Aberdeen and Nesselrode. Now the personal letters were intended to strengthen the 'agreement' implied in the memo, and Nesselrode and the Czar thought they did so. But their absence from the archives is decisive. Future ministers could not be bound at all by a private correspondence of which they knew nothing. Aberdeen asked Palmerston, when he became Foreign Minister in 1846, to show the Nesselrode memo to no one but the Prime Minister (Lord John Russell). Palmerston refused to agree to this, and thereby implied that neither he nor his colleagues were bound by it. So he seems to have repudiated the memo. He certainly showed a friendly feeling towards Russia for a time, but he came into conflict with her and contradicted every tenet of the 'agreement' in 1849. The Nesselrode memo was seen by Malmesbury, who was Foreign Secretary in the Derby government (1852). But both Malmesbury and Derby later declared (March 31, 1854) that they had not considered themselves or their government as bound by it. Lord John Russell saw it in 1853, and seems to have regarded it merely as a source of information. The memo itself, if a pledge, was one of a purely personal character. Palmerston's despatch of 1841 had told the Czar that personal pledges might not be honoured by succeeding foreign ministers and in any case could not bind the cabinet or parliament. If, therefore, the Czar was deceived he had himself to blame for the deception.

### III

*The man in conscious virtue bold,  
Who dares his secret purpose hold,  
Unshaken hears the crowd's tumultuous cries,  
And the impetuous tyrant's angry brow defies.*

HORACE, *Odes*, III, 31.

Palmerston, who became Foreign Secretary again in 1846, reappointed Stratford to Constantinople and advocated reform in Turkey. But he was at first unusually friendly to Russia. During 1848 he was, on the whole, conspicuous by his support of her. Cowley, who was acting for Stratford, expressed the fear that Russia might seize the Dardanelles, and the suspicion that there was a secret treaty between Russia and Turkey.<sup>380</sup>

Reschid pasha, once again Foreign Minister, gave assurances that there was no danger of that. Palmerston hardly needed any such assurance. He was less suspicious and more conciliatory than either Cowley or Stratford. During the storms that broke over Europe in 1848 Palmerston advised kings to save their crowns by granting constitutions and accepting advice from a majority in parliament. But he made one exception to his rule. In Turkey he 'had not advised the Sultan to follow the example of the Pope Pius the IXth, and to grant constitutional institutions to the Ottoman Empire.'<sup>381</sup> He commended Stratford for saying there was 'no question of transferring any portion of power from the [Turkish] sovereign to his subjects.'<sup>382</sup> This attitude was highly gratifying to the Czar, who had hitherto regarded himself as the sole champion of despotism amid a tossing sea of democracies.

Palmerston knew that Nicholas was a genuine conservative who wished to preserve the Treaty of Vienna. That was something in a world of revolution. So he remained conciliatory. The Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) had been greatly disturbed by the revolutionary movements everywhere. They were governed by an instrument called the *Règlement Organique* based on a series of agreements, which were now threatened by the revolutionary wave. The revolutionists wished to tear up 'both the agreements of Akerman and Adrianople,' which 'contained stipulations respecting the intervention of Russia in the internal government of the Principalities.'<sup>383</sup> In particular the Treaty of Adrianople provided that the hospodars (governors) of each Principality should rule for life and have full liberty to manage 'the internal affairs of their provinces after consulting their respective *divans*.' This system was quite obviously overturned. The Rumanian revolutionaries wanted hospodars elected for short terms under democratic control. They had had enough of Russian 'protection,' and were, in fact, anti-Russian and not anti-Turkish. In July the Russophile hospodar of Moldavia asked for protection and Russian troops entered his territory. Shortly afterwards Prince Bibesco, the hospodar of Wallachia, was compelled by a popular rising to abdicate. A provisional government was set up and a copy of the *Règlement Organique* solemnly burnt. That act symbolised a gross violation of the rights not only of Russia but of Turkey. There was no Turkish army at hand to vindicate rights, but there was a Russian one. Also the Czar could fairly contend that Bessarabia was threatened by the agitation of the Rumanians over the border.

The Czar's circular, defending his occupation of the Principalities, was quite apologetic in tone. 'It [our action] opens, we in no way conceal it, a free field to all ill-disposed interpretation. . . . [It had] the appearance of a departure from the [disinterested] principles . . . proclaimed.' England was calmed by Palmerston on September 1: 'Russia has certain relations with those principles [Principalities] as a protecting power by virtue of treaties; and therefore it is not actually a case of the entrance of the troops of one government into the country of another with which it has no concern. The [Russian] entry is on the authority of the hospodar, and there is no disposition for the acquisition of territory.' He may have doubted Nesselrode's suggestion that 'our [Russia's] stay there . . . will promote the interest of Turkey, of England, and of Europe.' But he was convinced that Russia did not mean to make her occupation permanent. He did not admit Russia's contention that her authority was co-ordinate with that of the Sultan. He refused to be drawn into a discussion of right, as that might cause difficulties. He knew that, at bottom, Russia could not 'permit a republic,'<sup>384</sup> but then he did not care for a republic himself. He believed the Czar's promise that he would evacuate the Principalities in due course, and events showed that he was right.

In response to a remark of Nesselrode's at the end of 1848 Palmerston had replied, 'The Continental powers would be much mistaken if they reckon upon drawing Great Britain into a war brought on by them by pursuing a course diametrically opposite to the counsels of Great Britain.'<sup>385</sup> When in May 1849 Russia decided to intervene on the side of Austria and crush the Hungarian revolutionists, he still remained pacific. 'Much as Her Majesty's Government regret this interference of Russia, the causes which have led to it, and the effects which it may produce, they nevertheless have not considered the occasion to be one which at the present calls for any formal expression of the opinions of Great Britain on the matter.'<sup>386</sup> The fact is that, while he admired the gallantry of the Hungarian revolutionists, he regarded Austria as a European necessity and an essential element in the balance of power. He could not, therefore, consistently oppose Russia's military action, which crushed the Hungarians and restored Austria again to the rank of a first-class Power. By August the Russian intervention had proved decisive. 'Hungary lies at the feet of your Majesty,' telegraphed Marshal Paskiević to the Czar. The crisis of Europe seemed over, and the waves of revolution had ebbed. But Hungary, though conquered, was



still able to cause trouble. There was still a swirl in the waters. A crisis for England was yet to come. Within two months Palmerston was actually to risk war with Russia and Austria on behalf of the Hungarian refugees in Turkey.

## IV

*If, as his nature is, he fall in rage  
With their refusal, both observe and answer  
The vantage of his anger.*

CORIOLANUS, Act II, Sc. 3.

The question of the Hungarian refugees brought four great powers to the brink of war. Two years of revolution and of war had frayed nerves and heated passions. It might be argued that the dispute was trivial and the concession demanded of Turkey slight. But the movements of a fly or a mouse are important, if they obstruct a delicate piece of mechanism and cause a great engine to explode. In diplomacy no dispute is trivial if its consequences may be war. No concession by a government is slight, if it is at the expense of its reputation or of its honour. In fact, the surrender of these political refugees would not have been the last of the Sultan's concessions, or of his humiliations. For the very act would have deprived him of dignity and independence in the future.

Palmerston saved Turkey at this crisis, and did so without humiliating Russia. Throughout 1848 he had shown no undue suspicion of her action towards Turkey and had avoided any attempt to secure special advantages for England. He returned no answer to a suggestion from Cowley (then deputising for Stratford) as to signing a secret convention with Turkey allowing the British fleet to pass the Dardanelles at will. This agreement would, of course, have been anti-Russian. Nor would he listen to a more urgent appeal from Turkey, 'to be prepared to countenance, uphold and assist her in the hour of need.'<sup>387</sup> He refused to believe in the tale that Turkey was united by alliance with Russia. On September 20, 1848, he instructed Stratford to approve of the Sultan's refusal to accept a Russian overture for 'a more intimate alliance. . . . The Sultan should keep well with Russia but should avoid having any exclusive or preferable engagements with that Power. Such a course would be dangerous to the independence of the Sultan and would be at variance with the Treaty of 1841.'<sup>388</sup> Even in 1849 he did not think 'that Russia meditates at present any act of violence against Turkey.' Such was the situation

when the question of the Hungarian refugees became acute. The Russian armies had crushed Hungary. Her revolutionists were in flight, with the Austrians on their trail. In their eyes the Hungarians were rebels and mutineers for whom no punishment was too severe. Noble Hungarian women were flogged on their bare backs, Hungarian generals were shot and Hungarian statesmen hung. The more fortunate were already exiles in Turkey. Among them was Kossuth, the leader of the revolution, who carried with him the Hungarian crown and buried it at Orsova just before he crossed the frontier. Along with 3,600 Hungarian refugees came some 800 Poles, Russian subjects like the celebrated generals Bem and Dembinsky, who had aided Hungary in the war. The Emperors of Austria and Russia both wished these fugitive subjects of theirs to be delivered up. They made formal demands for their surrender, and made it pretty clear that non-compliance on the part of Turkey might mean war.

There were solid grounds on which Russia and Austria could rest their demands. They could contend, for instance, that the presence of the leader of the Hungarian revolution and of two leading Polish generals raised a quite different point from that of ordinary political refugees. Then again they both had treaties of extradition with Turkey. By Article II of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji Russia could demand the extradition or expulsion of refugees from Turkey and *vice versa*. Russia had disregarded her part of the treaty in times past, and it had therefore become invalid. Austria had a better claim under Article XVIII of the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. 'Henceforth asylum or refuge shall no longer be afforded to evil doers, or to discontented or rebellious subjects ; but each of the contracting parties shall be compelled to punish people of this description [ces sortes de gens], as also robbers and brigands, even when subjects of the other Party.' Palmerston pointed out that 'officers and soldiers . . . fighting for the constitutional rights of Hungary against the armies of Austria and Russia . . . cannot be deemed to be the persons described by the expression "ces sortes de gens" or to be classed with robbers and brigands.' Turkey did not wish to comply with the demand if she could avoid doing so. Turks had a friendly feeling for Hungarians and did not want to surrender them to the Habsburg. They knew also that the Poles hated the Russians, so they did not want to surrender them to the Czar. The Council decided on August 30 that it could not give up the refugees 'without dishonour.' But could Turkey resist the imperious demands of two Emperors ?

## V

*Their encounters, though not personal, have been royally attorneyed with interchange of gifts, letters, loving embassies.*—WINTER'S TALE, Act I, Sc. 1.

'The Sultan,' wrote Stratford, 'is always more or less fearful of Russia.' Stratford apprehended a bolder line of policy from Nicholas than from Franz Josef, 'owing to Slavonic influences.'<sup>389</sup> But on October 4 it was the threats of Stürmer, the Austrian representative, which shook Aali the Grand Vizier and Reschid the Foreign Minister. The same day Prince Radziwill arrived direct from Russia on a special mission. On October 7 the prince had an audience with the Sultan and presented a letter from the Czar. 'Russia had intervened in Hungary in virtue of the same principle which determined the aid I thought it my duty to offer spontaneously to Your Majesty last year.' The surrender of the refugees would tend to calm 'the anarchic convulsions of the world.' The Sultan temporised and finally decided to refer matters to St. Petersburg. He sent Fuad there on a special mission, the existence of which he concealed until Fuad was over the frontier. The Austrian Stürmer declared that the Turkish object was only 'to gain time so as to be assured of French and British support.'<sup>390</sup> Stratford and General Aupick (the French Ambassador) advised the Porte not to yield and gave every hope that France and England would support them. The Turks remained firm, so diplomatic relations were suspended on September 17. The flags were hauled down from the Austrian and Russian Legations, and Prince Radziwill steamed back up the Bosphorus to Sebastopol. The Russian Minister Titov, like the Austrian Stürmer, remained behind, but, as it were, *incognito*. They offered privately to resume diplomatic relations, if a promise of surrendering the refugees was given. But the Porte returned a flat refusal, and diplomatic relations ceased altogether.

In fact this crisis was settled by the mission of Fuad Effendi to St. Petersburg, and not by the events at Constantinople. None the less, what passed on the Bosphorus was of great importance, for it might have brought about war. On September 17 Stratford wrote to Sir William Parker asking officially for 'a part at least of Her Majesty's Mediterranean Squadron to be available for any purpose of demonstration in the Archipelago.' He wrote privately, 'our position is suddenly become very ticklish.' Parker answered this appeal by cruising 'between the Ionian waters and Athens.' On October 8 the

Admiralty ordered Parker up to Besika Bay just outside the Dardanelles, and he proceeded there in the last week of October.

On September 17 Stratford addressed a despatch to London stating that the Porte had refused the Austrian and Russian demands and that he had supported their action up to date along with the French Minister. But 'in all probability His Majesty's firmness will be still more severely tried.' He hoped that 'Her Majesty's Government will sympathize with the Sultan and be earnestly disposed to rescue him, if possible, in some way or other from the necessities of his present position.' This was a direct appeal for help. Palmerston was quite ready to answer it. On the 16th Stratford had declared that Stürmer had demanded the surrender of Hungarian refugees 'with the full intention, no doubt, of consigning the most illustrious among them to the executioner.'\* On the 26th Palmerston had written privately to Stratford, 'You have my authority to give the most illustrious of all, Kossuth, a passage on a British ship.'<sup>391</sup> Of course shipping of refugees secretly would not lead to war, but Turkey's open support of refugees might do so.

## VI

*With a little manly firmness we shall successfully get through this matter.*—  
PALMERSTON TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL, September 29, 1849.

Palmerston received the appeal on October 1, and the cabinet decided to support Turkey. On the next day (2nd) Palmerston sent off a private assurance at once and gave a strong hint to Russia of his intentions. But it was not until the 7th that he finally sent instructions to Stratford.<sup>392</sup> The famous despatch, in which Palmerston's determination was recorded, was approved by the Queen, who, for once, saw eye to eye with her Foreign Minister. 'The Turkish Government requests the moral and, if necessary, the material support of Great Britain. Her Majesty's Government, thus appealed to, cannot hesitate to comply with such a request.' He stressed 'the solemn declaration, by which, no longer ago than July 1841, the Five Powers recalled their desire and determination to respect the inviolability of the sovereign rights of the Sultan. . . . Her Majesty's Government have every reason to believe that the French Government will be as ready as the Govern-

\* F.O. 78/778. From Stratford, No. 279 of September 16, 1849. Passage suppressed in *Accounts & Papers* [1851], LVIII [1324], No. 11, pp. 9-10.

ment of Her Majesty to grant the support which is asked for.' Austria and Russia would be asked to desist from their demands. 'In the meanwhile, with a view to guard against possible accidents, Her Majesty's Government mean to propose that the British and French squadrons in the Mediterranean shall proceed at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, to be ready to go up to Constantinople,'<sup>393</sup> if so requested by the Sultan. So far the published part of the despatch. A suppressed passage says that the British and French squadrons are not to be brought up through the Dardanelles 'unless there were a real necessity . . . but the decision upon this point must depend upon many considerations belonging to the place and the moment in regard to which your Excellency and General Aupick [the French representative] and the Turkish Government will no doubt exercise a sound discretion.'<sup>394</sup> A similar instruction went out to the Admiralty, stating that the purpose of Sir William Parker was 'defensive not offensive.' The Admiralty did not hurry themselves, and only sent instructions to Parker on the 8th. Palmerston, on the other hand, sent off copies of the despatch by three different messengers and routes urging haste on all. A gallant courier, who rode overland, half killed himself in the effort and made a record ride from Belgrade.\* He arrived on the 26th, but a little too late. Messenger Waring, who came by steamer from Marseilles, actually reached Constantinople two days before.

On October 24 Stratford received the news that he had power to call up the fleet. In addition he had full promises of support from England, and could presume the consent of France. Stratford carried his despatch exultantly to the Sultan saying, 'the cause of honour and humanity has been vindicated.' His cause was already won. The news of public enthusiasm in England and the stout attitude of Stratford had already greatly impressed the Turks. They had no idea of surrendering. Two days before the despatch arrived the Prussian Minister had noticed that Aali was 'not only encouraged and strengthened but over-confident and almost scornful in regard to the question at issue.'<sup>395</sup> The popular feeling in Stambul entirely supported the government. Yet it was just at this moment, when the victory was really won, that Stratford allowed the naval squadron to make a false move.

Admiral Parker had arrived with his squadron at Besika Bay, outside the Dardanelles, on the 27th. The French naval squadron was a long way behind and could not actively co-operate. While Parker was waiting, Stratford received

\* For this famous ride of Captain Townley, *vide infra*, ch. xii, n. 555.



some important news. Calvert, the British consul at the Dardanelles, suggested a new interpretation of the Straits Convention of 1841. He held that the terms of it allowed war vessels to enter the Dardanelles up to the so-called 'Narrows' point. That was the stretch of water across which Leander swam to meet Hero. Calvert held that British ships were justified in going up to this point, but that they must not pass it. Stratford began by favouring this interpretation and then doubted. Finally he left Calvert and Parker 'discretion' in the matter. Calvert had no doubts and soon removed those of the admiral. On November 1, Parker, finding 'the wind set in very strong,' brought the squadron through the outer castles and anchored between the inner castles and Point Nagara. The move had not taken place until the full approval of the Porte had been secured. It has been suggested that there was no wind, that the move was inspired by the malevolence of Stratford, and that there was a deliberate infringement of the Convention of 1841. These charges are baseless. It is perfectly true that the move brought the British fleet nearer Constantinople, and thus tended to impress both Austria and Russia. But the doubts as to the legality of the proceedings had been raised by Stratford himself. Parker really took the step under stress of weather, and on his own initiative, after having satisfied himself that it was defensible under the Convention of 1841.\* Paradoxically enough the new station of the squadron became embarrassing. Stratford did not hear the news until November 2, and immediately afterwards perceived that the diplomatic situation had become easier. So he wrote to Parker on the 4th that the position of the squadron was 'no longer a matter of immediate importance' and that he would probably soon have to order it out. He did order it out on the 7th, and Parker left on the 13th. The French fleet had been delayed. It never actually entered the Dardanelles, though joint action had been ordered.

## VII

*Let your cares o'erlook  
What shipping and what lading's in our haven.*

PERICLES, *Prince of Tyre*, Act I, Sc. 1.

Parker's move certainly astounded the diplomats. It had one humorous result. The Russian Minister, M. Titov, in spite of having broken off diplomatic relations, rushed off to

\* *Vide App. IV, passim.*

Aali and demanded explanations. He was followed by the Austrian *Stürmer*. Both absurdly professed that their inquiries were personal and unofficial. Aali met the Austrian inquiry by asserting, most falsely, that the British naval move had taken place without consent of the Porte. But the incident actually did good, for it led to resumption of negotiations about the Hungarian refugees. The situation had visibly improved when Stratford sat down to write a despatch defending Parker's advance to the middle of the Narrows, that advance of which he had really doubted the propriety. It is unnecessary to detail his arguments. Palmerston was willing to admit both Russian and Austrian protests as he had been successful on the main issue. He did not trouble to defend Stratford's questionable proposition. He frankly admitted that the British naval commander had erred. 'In any matter which bears on the construction of a treaty it is best to be, if possible, on the safe side, and not to run matters so near as to be obliged to contend for a disputable interpretation.' <sup>396</sup>

The protests made by Russia and Austria Palmerston answered by admissions of error and undertakings not to repeat the offence. But he was unable to resist a jibe at Austria, which had so recently invited Russia to protect her against her own subjects. 'If the Sultan threatened in so peremptory a manner by the official organs of two great Powers immediately adjoining to his frontiers, had actually invited into the heart of his empire the armed assistance of friendly allies to protect him against a formidable danger, the outbreak of which he might be unable to prevent, it is not the Government of Austria that could with any degree of consistency have objected to the general principle upon which such an invitation would have been founded.' In the correspondence with Russia he entered on more serious arguments, and showed the precedents. But he gave a definite undertaking that a British squadron would not again invoke the Convention of 1841 as a defence for passing the outer castles of the Dardanelles in time of peace. Austria sent a courteous reply to Palmerston, but Russia's language was menacing. 'We cannot but congratulate ourselves on receiving so formal a disavowal and such positive assurances. We are thereby relieved from the painful necessity . . . of availing ourselves in the Bosphorus in regard to our Black Sea squadron, of the precedent established in the Dardanelles in favour of the English fleet' (Nesselrode, December 21). Here was the true reason for Palmerston's meekness. The Russian fleet was always in the Black Sea, the British but seldom in Besika Bay.

The advance of Russian ships halfway down the Bosphorus (say to Bujukdere) was more dangerous than that of British ships up to Point Nagara. Nesselrode, on December 10, had actually sent an instruction to Titov to claim this privilege for the Russian fleet in view of the British advance into the Dardanelles. Palmerston's prompt apology caused Russia to withdraw this demand and to admit that the Bosphorus was sealed by the Convention of 1841.<sup>397</sup> It was worth her doing that, if England admitted that the Dardanelles were sealed too. And a year later, in reviewing the achievements of his reign, Nesselrode told Nicholas that the sealing of the Dardanelles was one of the greatest.<sup>398</sup>

## VIII

*Upon thy princely warrant I descend  
To give thee answer of thy just demand.*

HENRY VI, Part I, Act V, Sc. 3.

The great decision was to be taken at St. Petersburg in reply to Fuad. His mission had been kept so secret that he was actually over the frontier before Radziwill or Stürmer had heard of his going to Russia. Yet in appealing to the Czar the Sultan had paid him a subtle compliment. Fuad was fitted for a delicate mission ; he was refined and cautious and possessed of great powers of conciliation. He arrived at St. Petersburg on October 5, and on the 8th Nesselrode told him that the matter could probably be arranged, but that everything depended on the Czar. On the 9th Fuad was given a further warning : ' If Foreign Powers pretended to interfere in the question at issue, His Imperial Majesty would not listen to any terms of accommodation whatever.' In reality Nicholas was probably influenced by Palmerston's warning of the 2nd, and by the attitude of the British people as revealed in the press. Palmerston wrote to Stratford on October 11, ' there never was so strong and unanimous outburst of generous feeling, all men of all parties and opinions, politicians, soldiers, sailors, clergymen and Quakers. All newspapers, Tory, Whig and Radical have joined in chorus.' Nicholas was impressed, though he pretended not to be. He received Fuad on the 16th, was at first haughty and then amenable. He seems to have been moved by the Sultan's letter which spoke of ' your regard for my dignity and your sincere friendship.' At any rate he gave up the demand for

extradition and thereby solved the difficulty. The notice in the *Official Gazette* of the 19th stated that Nicholas had listened to 'this direct appeal on the part of an intimate ally. . . . This mission originated only in the desire of the Sultan to come to an amicable arrangement with the Emperor, without the arrangement of any other party.' The British Minister requested a copy of Nesselrode's communication to Fuad. Nesselrode refused, 'because he could never admit the principle of foreign interference in the relations of Russia and Turkey.'<sup>399</sup> This was ominous too.

Nicholas had spoken, and his word was peace. He brushed aside Austria's remonstrances as of no special importance, deeming he had done enough for her in subduing the Hungarian rebels. The decision of Nicholas rendered further negotiation easy. Ultimately over three thousand refugees accepted the offer of an amnesty and returned to Austria. The more illustrious remained behind. There was no pardon for them, and they had to be protected and watched in Turkey. Austria showed the worst temper throughout, but was forced to 'forego another opportunity of quaffing her bowl of blood.' She refused to resume diplomatic relations with Turkey for six months, and for nearly two years she sought, by one way or another, to attain her purpose. It was not till 1851 that Kossuth and other exiles were allowed to proceed to America. Bem, the Polish general, and some others became Mohammedans and entered the Turkish service. And so the long-drawn-out dispute ended. All danger of war had long been over. By the end of 1849 the British squadron had left the Aegean and Russia had resumed diplomatic relations with Turkey. Nicholas had already shown a friendly attitude to England. In an interview with Bloomfield he referred to the interviews of 1844, and repeated his desire to maintain Turkey intact. Without such support, 'we would soon see it crumble to pieces.' He showed distrust of Stratford and criticised his conduct during the crisis. But he expressed great pleasure that Palmerston had not defended his subordinate over bringing the naval squadron to Point Nagara. He reiterated his own adherence to the Convention of 1841, and it is of interest that he had told Fuad of his determination to do this. None the less, he expressed confidence in Palmerston.<sup>400</sup> So a dangerous crisis had been averted without soreness on the part of Nicholas.

## IX

*'Tis not enough to help the feeble up,  
But to support him after.*

TIMON OF ATHENS, Act I, Sc. 1.

The Turkish Empire had been saved from a grave danger by Palmerston. Stratford saw in the prestige acquired by this event the means of impressing the Sultan with the necessity of reform and of forcing him to put the Christians on an equality with Turks. Palmerston believed in a more material kind of reform and urged the Turks to fortify the Bosphorus and to reform their army and navy. Stratford had long been considering a proposal for alliance between Turkey and Great Britain. In November Reschid finally proposed 'a defensive treaty engaging each party to act in aid of the other against unprovoked foreign aggression, the party, whose aid is required, being free to judge whether the case, intended by treaty, has actually occurred, and the requiring party being chargeable in part or in whole with the expenses of the auxiliary force.' The alliance was to be for a term of years, and open to other powers, if they wished to accede to it. Furthermore, it was bound up with a comprehensive scheme of reform. All Stratford's desires were thus attained and he urged acceptance in pressing terms. Palmerston had already sent a private letter pointing out the weak side of an alliance. Stratford begged him not to reject it too quickly. 'Are not the motives for making an exception to the general rule of British policy as strongly now in favour of Turkey as formerly of Portugal?' Then, with passionate emphasis, 'The great Eastern question is virtually at stake.'<sup>401</sup> Palmerston declined to carry the matter further. We do not know in detail his reasons for refusal. One, clearly implied in a private letter, was that he understood Canning's famous warning that England should not lightly make a guarantee 'either of territory or of internal institutions.' An alliance with Turkey was likely to involve both.

Russia, however, played an important part in preventing the conclusion of this alliance. Before the end of the year Reschid feared that Titov, the Russian minister, had discovered the project and henceforth could never be got to discuss the matter seriously. Palmerston was ready to consider the Russian point of view. There were many testimonies to Russia's disinterestedness. Here is one from Lord Bloomfield.



'I think we may reasonably expect that at all events during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas no attempt will be made by Russia to subvert the Ottoman Empire.'<sup>402</sup> Palmerston only partially accepted this view. 'If Turkey is weak, Russia will on every suitable occasion encroach upon her rights and independence.'<sup>403</sup> But he did not believe that Turkey could 'depend on foreign aid' for really reforming herself, or that an alliance with a foreign power would really help her. Reform could only come from within.

## X

*The Emperor of Russia is ambitious and grasping, but he is a gentleman and I should be slow to disbelieve his positive denial of such things as those in question.\*—*  
PALMERSTON, April 11, 1853.

The year 1849 closed with Russia and England reconciled after a tough contest, and not unfriendly towards one another. But Nicholas could not remain friends with Palmerston, and so long as Palmerston was Foreign Secretary close relations were difficult. But a mission of Brunnow's to Russia in the autumn of 1851 conveyed friendly communications to Nesselrode from Russell the premier and from the Duke of Wellington. Palmerston's dismissal at the end of 1851 caused the Russians, like other diplomats, to breathe a sigh of relief. Brunnow regarded him as the arch-mischiefmaker, 'not a revolutionary . . . but [he] aimed at profiting by revolutions. A disciple of Machiavelli, who believed that "if you disturb the world you govern it." ' Russell's ministry lasted only a few weeks longer and was replaced by Derby's, in which Malmesbury was Foreign Secretary. During the year 1852 England and Russia drew steadily nearer together, for Malmesbury was amiable and conciliatory. The dispute about the Holy Places embittered Russia's relations with France but improved them with England. It was this fact which determined Nicholas to try once more to tighten the links between Russia and England and to sever those between England and France. He would use again the old method and try the effect of a personal negotiation. His Sybilline books had been rejected twice; could they be rejected a third time? The Derby government actually fell on December 17, and Nicholas determined on his plan on the 29th of the month. But it was not until January 6 that he learned that his favourite, Aberdeen, had succeeded in forming a new ministry. Lord John Russell

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, April 11, 1853.

was Foreign Secretary, and Russia's *bête noire*, Palmerston, was relegated to the humble post of Home Secretary. This news doubtless increased the Czar's hopes, but does not seem to have influenced his original determination.

This was the third and last attempt of Nicholas to bring about friendly relations with England by direct methods. At the last moment Nesselrode sought to dissuade the Czar from making the negotiation. Nesselrode may have been over-cautious, but Nicholas was certainly overbold in deciding to be his own negotiator. Years of autocratic power had strengthened his confidence in himself and convinced him that his personal address was almost irresistible. He undertook the work of flattery and negotiation himself. He defied the advice of his wisest counsellor, who spoke from experience. Nesselrode had seen Czar Alexander 'of glorious memory' fail in an overture to Castlereagh at Vienna. He knew that history would repeat itself. Despots may safely talk to one another on state affairs, they do not know how to talk to lesser men. A despot does not weigh every word, he can seldom be contradicted, and never convicted of ignorance. Alexander tried his blandishments on Castlereagh as Nicholas tried them on Aberdeen and Seymour. Disillusion resulted in both cases and for the same reason.

'Your Majesty is not a gentleman,' said the Duke of Wellington once to George the Fourth, and explained to the astonished monarch that he must not carry his private feelings into public affairs. Nicholas badly needed some such blunt counsel. The cautious and urbane Nesselrode tried to dissuade his master from attempting the proposed overture. 'I should then advise not informing the British Cabinet of the ideas of your note. We should keep them [the ideas] in readiness. . . . A communication with the British Government, besides being dangerous, would be entirely useless. For the fundamental condition of her policy has always been, never to take engagements for a more or less uncertain future, but to wait for the event in order to decide what course to adopt. She will infallibly respond to overtures in this sense, so that we shall have communicated our views without obtaining hers in return.'<sup>404</sup> Wise words had the Czar but heeded them!

All those who remember the old régime in Russia witness to the awe which Nicholas inspired at public functions. He moved among a circle of guests, who bowed reverentially before a frank, courteous and agreeable master. The Czar was hardest of all to resist when he was in idle or pleasant

mood. He discussed policy at a banquet, in a drawing-room, as well as in his cabinet. But a despot does not see the result of breaking down the barriers imposed by courtesy or by etiquette. He is not trained to both official and private negotiation. The Czar sought to cajole or charm a British diplomat by candour between man and man. He revealed his secrets more fully than he had ever done, but he got no candour in return.

On January 9, 1853, at a reception in the palace of a grand duchess, the world-famous conversations with Seymour began. The Czar summoned the British ambassador, gave him gracious messages for Aberdeen and for Russell, and spoke of his wish for 'close amity' between Russia and England. He was silent about his attitude towards Turkey, and about Russian military demonstrations towards Moldavia. So Seymour led the conversation dexterously on and finally got the Emperor to speak fateful words. 'Turkey seems to be falling to pieces, the fall will be a great misfortune. It is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding . . . and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprized.' And again, 'We have a sick man on our hands, a man gravely ill, it will be a great misfortune if one of these days he slips through our hands, especially before the necessary arrangements are made.' Seymour tried to suggest that the 'sick man' should be treated with gentleness, in order that he might recover. He advocated a physician not a surgeon.

The 'sickliness' of Turkey obsessed Nicholas during his whole reign. What he really said was omitted in the Blue Book from a mistaken sense of decorum. He said not the 'sick man' but the 'bear dies . . . the bear is dying . . . you may give him musk but even musk will not long keep him alive.'\* This very expression had already been used to Seymour by one of the Czar's most confidential servants. The Czar spoke of the 'sick bear' everywhere to ambassadors, to courtiers, even to officers on parade. Nesselrode himself did not share his master's view and was not far off from the British one. He told Seymour, 'The fact is the Emperor is too disposed to see these matters *en noir* and occupies himself too much with what might happen on the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps its existence is precarious, but above all let us occupy ourselves with prolonging it as long as possible. Nations have more vitality than is often allowed.'<sup>405</sup>

\* F.O. 65/424. From Seymour, No. 87 of February 21, 1853. This and other despatches fill up the gaps in the conversations as published.

When Nicholas next received Seymour he was at pains to explain that he had abandoned the designs of the Empress Catherine on Constantinople, and how he had as much territory as he desired. But he could not neglect the millions of Orthodox Christians beneath Turkish sway, or the fact that the Turkish Empire might fall to pieces. Seymour interposed with a protest in the old English style. His government 'objects as a general rule to take engagements upon possible eventualities,' and did not like to anticipate the end of an old friend and ally. 'I desire to speak to you as a friend and gentleman,' answered the Czar, 'if England and I agree, I care little for the rest or what others do or think . . . I tell you plainly I shall not allow it, if England thinks of establishing herself one day at Constantinople. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better at such times to speak plainly. For my part I am equally ready to promise not to establish myself there as an owner (*en propriétaire*). As for temporary tenancy (*en dépositaire*) I do not say I might not. If no previous provision were made, if everything were left to chance, events might lead me to occupying Constantinople.' A French expedition to Turkey, he said, would bring Russia's troops over her border.

Nicholas had told Seymour to report the conversation to the British government, magnificently leaving it to the foreigner's discretion whether to tell the Russian chancellor or no. Seymour 'generally found straightforward conduct to be the best policy.' So he drove to the Foreign Office and told all the secret to the Russian chancellor. The British government were less surprised than Nesselrode. After all it was very much what Aberdeen remembered of the Czar's views in 1844 which he had lately brought to the notice of Russell. But it was an overture which had to be answered. Seymour himself suggested that 'a little concession to the Emperor will produce a greater amount on his part,' and therefore perhaps a little information, as to what England would *not* do, might be given. But he hoped anyhow that some 'expressions might . . . have the effect of putting an end to the further consideration, or, at all events discussion, of points' in question.<sup>406</sup>

Nesselrode had stated the real objection. England could not discuss contingencies, 'especially a contingency fixed in point of time.' The same point was taken by Russell in reply to the Czar; he wrote more wisely than he knew. In June of this very year Russell circulated a memo to the cabinet discussing various alternative methods of countering Russian designs

upon Turkey. Aberdeen warned him against 'speculations.' Palmerston and Sir James Graham said there was no use determining a policy till the contingency contemplated had arisen. This was just what men always said in the cabinet and probably always will say. 'It was a maxim . . . impressed upon me by several statesmen of great eminence,' said Lord Sanderson, 'that it was not wise to bring before a cabinet the question of the course to be pursued in hypothetical cases which had not arisen. A discussion on the subject invariably gave rise to divergence of opinion on questions of principle, whereas in a concrete case unanimity would very likely be secured.'<sup>407</sup> This was in 1906. André Maurois says the same of the Englishman in 1932, 'par goût, il est improvisateur.' He quotes Chamberlain as saying 'any statesman who pretends to see beyond the next fortnight is a fool.' He says himself, 'Englishmen don't like too precise engagements, they like better to take decisions at the last moment.' The attitude was exactly the same in 1844 or 1853, 1906 or 1924.

A copy of Russell's reply of February 9, 1853, was laid up in the Russian archives and is scored with comments in the Czar's own hand.<sup>408</sup> Lord John begins with a historical comparison. At the beginning of the eighteenth century France and England framed treaties of succession for partitioning the Spanish Empire. But the Spanish king was childless, sick in mind and body, and visibly falling into the grave. The Spaniard's death could therefore be speedily foreseen, but the Turkish 'sick man' might be long a-dying. His death might take place 'twenty, fifty or a hundred years hence.' (*'Very certainly,'* added Nicholas, *'he might also survive unexpectedly.'*) Also apparently he might not. 'These disputes may bring war,' Russell wrote with reference to Montenegro. (*'This war,'* commented Nicholas, *'might easily end with the fall of the Ottoman Empire especially if it took place by reason of the horrors committed in Montenegro, to which the [other] Christian subjects [of the Sultan] could not remain indifferent foreseeing that the same fate awaited them.'*) \*

Russell then declared it was not possible to carve up the Turkish provinces beforehand. It would be necessary to consult France and Austria (*'but as for Austria I am sure of her, our treaties define our mutual relations'*). It was not possible to make a convention or to ensure secrecy for long, for revelations 'would alarm and alienate the Sultan . . . and stimulate all his enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflict.' (*'My aim is simply not to find myself in contradiction with England*

\* These words in italics are comments in the Czar's own hand.



*and it is also with this aim alone that I gave the most intimate form and confidence to our exchange of views, which cannot with advantage be treated officially, and hence [must] remain strictly secret between the Queen and Myself.'*)

Last, Russell touched on the old object of England's suspicion. The position of Russia's Emperor 'as depository not proprietor of Constantinople' would be exposed to 'numberless hazards.' It would lead, as Russell plainly hinted, to annexation ('*which the Russian Emperor,*' wrote Nicholas himself, '*will not permit as he no longer seeks to establish himself at Constantinople*'). On behalf of England Russell was ready enough to give a pledge. She 'renounced all intention or wish to hold Constantinople' ('*a precious assurance since it proves what perfect identity of intentions exists between England and Russia*'). Russell added, 'Nothing could be more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe,' than the course which the Emperor had so long followed. ('*I do not deserve eulogies for I have acted according to my conscience.*') Russell's eulogy on the past was really intended as a warning against anticipating events. He meant that no man and no engagement could guarantee the future. The Emperor did not see this, for he ended thus: '*I am very appreciative for I see [in all this] the guarantee against the future which I fear.*'

The solemnity of Seymour's official reports disguises his private contempt for the whole episode. 'At St. Petersburg,' he wrote, 'a poet ought to succeed better than a historian in a diplomatic capacity. Facts are here so studiously kept out of sight that the latter has small materials to work upon.' He summed up 'the late overture' thus: 'I, Nicholas, by the grace of God and so forth, not willing to incur the risk of war, and desirous not to compromise my character for magnanimity, will never seize upon Turkey; but I will destroy her independence. I will reduce her to vassalage and make her existence a burden to her and that by a process which is perfectly familiar to us, as it is the same which was employed with so much success against Poland. The danger is that England and France will foregather for the purpose of preventing this consummation. I will therefore show a decided preference for one of these powers and will do my best to disunite them.' 409

Some ten days after he had penned this diatribe Seymour was again received with special favour by the Czar at the party of another grand duchess. Nicholas told him his government were incorrect if they believed the 'sick man' was not dying. The Czar flattered him greatly, expressing confidence in him and a great desire to speak without reserve. The next day

(February 20) Seymour talked once more with the Czar in his cabinet. He praised the Emperor for his candour and gradually squeezed out his secrets. If the Emperor wanted England to tell him 'what ought not to be permitted in the event of the sudden downfall of Turkey,' perhaps he would say what Russia would not permit. Nicholas said he would allow no permanent occupation of Constantinople by Russia, and 'it [Constantinople] shall never be held by the English or French, or any other great nation.' Again there should be no reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire by making Greece a great state, since her finances were too unstable. There should be 'no breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe, . . . so long as I have a man and a musket left.' Seymour then suggested that, if Turkey broke up, the property might remain, as it were, 'under seals' till it could be adjudicated. Nicholas demurred and said such a course would produce chaos and anarchy. He then proceeded to propound the last of the several plans he had made in the case of Turkey's dissolution.<sup>410</sup>

Nicholas declared that the interests of Russia and Austria were identical. Seymour was greatly surprised, but dared not question him here. The Czar's evident intention was to isolate France. He said she had her eyes on Tunis and was therefore 'endeavouring to embroil us all in the East.' He had, he said, 'little more than a month ago apprised the Sultan that, if his [Russian] assistance were required for resisting the menaces of the French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan.' He was moderate, for the Sultan had broken his word to him. Yet he was sending Prince Menšikov on a peaceful mission, and his military preparations were merely 'a show of force to prove I have no intention of being trifled with.' He then went on to give a sketch of a proposed partition when Turkey was dissolved. The Principalities should be independent, and Servia likewise, both 'under my protection.' 'So again with Bulgaria there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent state.' These states were not to be republics, but under princely rulers and imperial protection. Nicholas had disclaimed the ideas of Catherine and even of Alexander I, but reproduced those of both in this scheme of veiled protectorates in the Balkans. Then came the famed offer to England, 'As to Egypt I quite understand the importance to England of that territory.' In the event of a Turkish collapse, 'you should take possession of Egypt, I have no objections to offer. I would say the same

thing of Candia [Crete], that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.' Seymour, not wishing the Emperor to 'imagine that an English public servant should be caught by this sort of overture,' answered shortly that all we wanted was 'a safe and ready communication to India.'

Nicholas was trying to be frank but did not wholly succeed. Perhaps no diplomat ever can. Seymour formed unjust suspicions. He thought that Nicholas wanted temporarily to occupy Constantinople, in the event of a catastrophe to Turkey. Now we have Nicholas' own thoughts in writing after he had discussed the situation with Field-Marshal Paskiević.\* He was determined that it was utterly impossible for Russia to annex all European Turkey or hold Constantinople. He meant it to be a free port, and for there to be free trade. This wish he had slightly hinted to Seymour. But he did not say to Seymour that he thought Russian troops might have to garrison the Bosphorus, and Austrian troops to guard the Dardanelles. In this way he barred access to Constantinople to Mediterranean powers such as France and England. Again he meant to give England Egypt, but not Crete. To judge by this private memo he really meant to give Crete and other islands to France, and to content England with Egypt, Cyprus or Rhodes. He said nothing to Seymour about compensation to Austria, to whom he meant to assign the Turkish coasts of the Adriatic and Archipelago. As regards other Russian accessions, what he suggested to Seymour was less than what he really meant to do. He meant Servia and most of Bulgaria to be 'independent,' but he stopped there. Moldavia and Wallachia were not to be 'independent,' but to be 'Russian'; so also was the port of Constanza and some part of northern Bulgaria. Thus his real views as to ultimate partition, though less selfish than Seymour thought, were more ambitious than he actually admitted.

The Czar was in no way disconcerted by the ambassador's hauteur or scepticism. He told Seymour that Russell's despatch quite satisfied him, but might be 'amplified.' He wanted more communication with the British government, 'not an engagement or convention . . . a free exchange of ideas and, at need, the word of a gentleman . . . that is enough between us.' † The two parted; Nicholas went, un-

\* Zaiončovskii, I, No. 98, p. 357; and Schiemann, IV, 280-2. The paper is in Nicholas' own hand written in January 1853. Cp. n. 410 for his three Partition Plans.

† All this was embodied in a document by Nesselrode and placed in Seymour's hands on March 7. *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1736], No. 7, p. 846.

suspecting, from what he thought a frank conversation between two honourable gentlemen. Seymour wished the whole overture ended, and thought Nicholas an intriguing hypocrite, eager to compass the ruin of Turkey by separating England from France and bribing her with the spoils. But of all of this Nicholas had no idea.

Even Seymour thought England had now 'some recorded security against eventual dangers.' The British cabinet were less suspicious than their diplomat, but did not believe that Nicholas spoke for Austria. For Count Buol had already told Russell that he was for the *status quo* in Turkey (despite his attitude on Montenegro). He added, 'we have seen with the same regret as Lord John, the order for the assembling of troops in the Southern provinces of Russia.'<sup>411</sup> The British cabinet did not like the Emperor's attitude towards France, and still less his suggestions about a temporary occupation of Constantinople. But, on the whole, his assurances were considered satisfactory.

The Emperor's overtures were not finally answered until March, and by that time events had precipitated a crisis elsewhere. Yet even so, Englishmen considered that his overture proved his disinterestedness and pledged his honour to make no attack on the Turkish Empire. In that sense the overture did positive good, for it enabled England and Russia to have more confidence in one another. The next year, when the war fever was at its height, one Blue Book published the Seymour conversations and the next one published the Nesselrode memo of 1844. A connexion between the two was promptly drawn by an excited public. Both were interpreted by an angry press as revealing the dark ambitions of a foreign despot. The Czar's wickedness was stressed in historical textbooks. He was the tempter whom England had virtuously withstood, and the legend of his wickedness was bequeathed to posterity. It was not a contemporary one, for his assurances steered England through a dangerous crisis in March 1853. The earliest suspicion of Nicholas' good faith was breathed by Russell on April 29, a month after the overture (and incidentally the crisis) had ended. These suspicions were thought unworthy not only by Aberdeen and Clarendon, but by Palmerston, who declared Nicholas to be 'a gentleman.' Thus, though Nicholas failed in three attempts to obtain the word of an English gentleman as a guarantee for an alliance, he did not fail to impress British statesmen with his good faith.\*

\* It is an interesting fact that Lord Salisbury in 1895 regretted that Nicholas' offer of 1853 had been refused, but awakened Germany's suspicions by saying so. Vide *Grosse Politik*, X, 10-11.

The efforts of Nicholas to arrive at a good understanding with England were inspired by a sincere and even noble emotion. It was unwise for an Emperor to try to negotiate with British diplomats or to believe that the word or the friendship of Queen Victoria was all-important. It was unwise to try to discuss potentialities with parliamentarians. But the suggestion that there was anything criminal in such an attempt is ridiculous. An explanation, which might have passed in the hour of war mania, cannot serve as the judgment of history. It is thus denounced by Prokesch-Osten : ' If people want to make out that it is a crime on the Czar of Russia's part, that he proposed a peaceful and friendly negotiation about the eventuality of the fall of the Turkish Empire, it is a proof of their own stupidity.' Though not a crime on the part of Nicholas, it was none the less a blunder. And the penalty for blunders is exacted in this world.



## CHAPTER XI

### HOW LATINS AND GREEKS DISPUTED ABOUT THE HOLY PLACES

#### I

*The profane of every age have derided the furious contest which the difference of a single diphthong excited between the Homousions and Homoiousians.*—GIBBON, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xxi.

‘It was the rivalry between protections granted to the Christians in Turkey which engendered the Crimean War.’<sup>412</sup> That was the view of the most detached of British statesmen twenty years afterwards. The failure of Turkey to reform herself, the insurrection in Bosnia, the war with Montenegro, and the resultant Austrian ultimatum all contributed to disaster. But none of these disputes so darkened understanding and so enflamed passion as that over the Holy Places. More serious than the dispute itself was the rivalry which it produced between the two great powers. A diplomatic defeat over a religious dispute could not be risked either by France or by Russia. The Emperor Nicholas felt himself bound to protect the Orthodox Greek Church, the Emperor Napoleon to champion the Roman Catholic. The matter was not one for arbitration nor for compromise. A Mohammedan emperor could not arbitrate in a Christian dispute and a religious dispute can seldom be compromised. For even if emperors agreed, they could not control the religious passions of their subjects. War might have been averted had they been able to do so.

The Prince-President would not have raised the question of the Holy Places at all but for his desire to secure the political support of the Catholics. None the less, he had a better case for asserting his claims than is usually admitted. The Greeks were growing yearly more arrogant and powerful. The Latins had once had access to shrines from which they were now excluded. At the end of the eighteenth century Latin monks declared in a written statement to an English traveller that Bethlehem ‘the birthplace of the Saviour has been forty

or fifty years in the power of the Greeks.' <sup>413</sup> It was asserted, possibly with truth, that they had bribed the Turks to issue a *firman* excluding the Latins. The *firman* in question was dated 1757 and was effective. Our English traveller saw forty-four lamps burning in the church of the Holy Sepulchre and less than a third of them lighted by Latins. He saw the tombs of Baldwin and of Godfrey de Bouillon, the first of all Crusaders. In 1831 a Latin Trappist pilgrim to Jerusalem broke his vow of silence, opened his mouth and asked to see the tombs. He saw only the spurs and sword of Godfrey de Bouillon, and found a melancholy satisfaction in drawing the latter from its sheath and whirling it thrice round his head. The tombs both of Godfrey and of Baldwin had disappeared. After the fire in the church of the Holy Sepulchre, Greek monks are said to have destroyed the tombs and plastered over the inscriptions. When the Greeks repaired the cupola, they replaced the statues of the four evangelists and changed their Latin robes for Greek ones.<sup>414</sup> Latin prestige was at its nadir in the thirties, and Orthodox influence at its zenith.\*

The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the steady growth of the Greek influence. It was due mainly to the enthusiasm of Russian pilgrims and to the gold disbursed by Orthodox believers throughout Europe. In 1808 the church of the Holy Sepulchre was burnt. The patriarch of Jerusalem rebuilt it in a few years by the aid of subscriptions from Orthodox Christians in all lands. He also repaired it some years later at no small expense, after it had been injured by an earthquake. In 1832 Sultan Mahmud allowed the patriarch of Constantinople to levy a tax of one piaster per head on all Orthodox Christians in Turkey for the purpose of redeeming the Holy Sepulchre from debt, and himself made a handsome subscription. Within two years the debt was paid off (1834). There were developments too. A number of poor were maintained by the fraternity, a hospital was founded in Jerusalem, schools were built and endowed through the length and breadth of Palestine. Large amounts of property were acquired by the patriarch both in Jerusalem and in Bethlehem. He could not have done all, or perhaps any of these things without Russian gold from the pilgrims, and it came in large quantities also from the Russian government. But aid from a government is not usually disinterested. In 1842 Russia established a mission under an agent who early became notorious by stealing some pages from a beautiful

\* The term 'Orthodox' is the correct term, but the term 'Greek' has been established by usage.

eleventh-century Greek manuscript in the patriarch's library and depositing them at St. Petersburg.<sup>415</sup> But he started a Russian propaganda which began to do its work. A still greater victory was won soon after when the election of the Orthodox patriarch was transferred from Constantinople to Jerusalem. And this victory served to exalt Russian influence.

The patriarchs of Alexandria, Constantinople, Jerusalem and Antioch, the four pillars of the Orthodox Church, were equal and independent in power. He of Constantinople was the first in prestige, but had no right as such of electing or deposing any of the other patriarchs. The Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem had for some centuries resided on the Bosphorus and been under the influence of Constantinople. In fact, during this 'Babylonish captivity' of the patriarch of Jerusalem, the Constantinople patriarch had contrived to elect his own nominees to that see. There had been two elections, one at Constantinople, and the second and confirmatory one at Jerusalem. The first election was attended by Turkish officials, by the patriarch of Constantinople and his metropolitans, by the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, and by certain representatives from Palestine. These latter, the real electors, were the fraternity of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. They were influenced by the princely and ecclesiastical dignitaries they met on the Bosphorus, and when sitting again by themselves at Jerusalem, normally confirmed the pre-election of Constantinople. Another circumstance increased the dependence on Constantinople. The patriarch of Jerusalem, if he resigned, usually nominated his successor. If he grew old and feeble, he chose a coadjutor or 'successor' to work with and to succeed him. But he always chose a Greek and one agreeable to the patriarch of Constantinople, and his choice was usually confirmed at the two elections.

In 1843 the patriarch of Jerusalem died and the patriarch of Constantinople sought to obtain pledges from his 'successor' and make him more dependent than any of his predecessors. This particular 'successor' declined to give pledges and eventually refused to stand for the patriarchate. Local patriotism at Jerusalem revolted against influence from outside and Russia abetted the movement for her own ends. Finally, the election of 1843 was held not at Constantinople, but at Jerusalem and by the brethren alone. Cyril, bishop of Lydda, was elected patriarch, and a resounding triumph thus won by Jerusalem over Constantinople. Cyril himself was a commanding personality, and he marked his victory by taking up his permanent residence in the Holy City.<sup>416</sup>

Russia's pilgrims were even more active in Palestine than her bureaucrats. They were the chief source of the wealth of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. From all the Russias pilgrims streamed to the Holy Land. From Lake Baikal, from Archangel, from the Carpathians, from the Caucasus came ragged peasants in procession, chanting their hymns, confessing their sins, trusting in the simple precepts of the gospel. Some fed entirely on the bread of charity, others walked a thousand miles to their place of embarkation, others faced robbers and murderers along the dangerous journey through the Caucasus, Anatolia and Syria. One-fourth of the European pilgrims and one-half of the Asiatic ones were supposed to have died by the way. But the reward of the survivor was great. He conferred lustre not only on himself but on his whole district. The village elders, who heard his experiences, felt that they too had bathed in the waters of Jordan, had wept for joy in the manger of Bethlehem, and for sorrow in the garden of Gethsemane. These sacred memories united all Russia from peasant to Czar. At Christmas and at Easter fifty millions of Russians turned their eyes and prayers towards Jerusalem, where the pilgrims of their race were kneeling before the shrine of the Redeemer.

## II

*If you will tarry, holy pilgrim,  
But till the troops come by.*

ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, Act III, Sc. 5.

According to one English traveller there were 'Popish pilgrims' at Jerusalem in 1697, and some of them may have been French. But the religious zeal of France waxed faint during the days of Voltaire and even of that French king who laid it down that an archbishop must believe in God. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Latin and French pilgrims became few. A French monk in Jerusalem, during Christmas 1831, found only four Latin pilgrims out of four thousand, and was told that at Easter there might be twenty out of ten thousand! Even in the fifties, when the total number of pilgrims had grown to fifteen thousand, 'the majority of them are not Roman Catholics.'<sup>417</sup> The few Latin, and fewer French, pilgrims made up in eminence what they lacked in numbers. Chateaubriand 'wreathed his pilgrim's cross with lilies,' and brought back holy water of Jordan to baptise a son of France. Lamartine became famous

by publishing the rhapsodies composed on the shores of the Lake of Galilee. Then there were Michaud the poet and Poujoulat the historian, and scores of lesser lights. But French pilgrims were still often only travellers who went to write books and to paint pictures.<sup>418</sup>

The Holy Places were objects of sentiment rather than of devotion in France, and a pilgrimage was a mode rather than a passion. Interest in the Holy Places had waned. General Bonaparte on his entry into Palestine declared 'Jerusalem does not lie on my line of march.' As emperor he tried to share in the repair of the church of the Holy Sepulchre, but did not push his interest far. The two Bourbons who succeeded him seem to have been equally indifferent. But the crisis of 1840 turned French attention towards Palestine. During 1842 the French made the first claim in connexion with the 1740 Treaty and demanded the right to repair the church of the Holy Sepulchre.\* In 1843 the first French consul appeared in Jerusalem. He was made a knight of the Holy Sepulchre at a solemn ceremonial, in which the spurs and sword of Godfrey of Bouillon were used. He attempted to interfere in politics and to take Latins under his protection. He caused a riot by hoisting his country's flag over his consulate, a right which every other consul had abstained from demanding. 'Jerusalem is now a central point of interest to France and Russia,'<sup>419</sup> declared the British consul in 1844.

The ultramontane party began to pay attention to Palestine during the forties. French monks began to fill the Latin monasteries and French nuns to teach in Latin schools in Jerusalem. The election of Pius IX to the papal throne in 1846 developed these tendencies. The Pope himself was moderate, but saw the need of conciliating the ultramontane party. For many centuries the Pope had appointed regularly a patriarch of Jerusalem *in partibus*. He had the title of patriarch but resided at Rome and took no interest in his titular see. Pius IX now made the office of the Latin patriarch a reality, and despatched the holder of it to reside in Jerusalem. This was in 1847, only two years after Cyril, the newly elected Greek patriarch of Jerusalem, had also decided to make his permanent home there.

The Greek patriarch was increasing his property, his prestige and his activity, just at the moment when the Latin patriarch arrived. Cyril the Greek had already astonished the society of Jerusalem by splendid entertainments in his spacious rooms. Beside a great divan of scarlet, over which

\* *Vide infra*, n. 425.



was spread a leopard skin, appeared the stately figure of the patriarch, 'in his robes of rich black satin, with immense diamonds and emeralds surrounding the enamel painting of the Redeemer on his breast.'<sup>420</sup> Cyril had great urbanity as well as dignity and had already greatly enhanced the Orthodox position. Joseph Valerga, the Latin patriarch, tried the experiment of counter-receptions. He received sitting on 'a velvet-covered throne,' and asserting his superiority over his guests by being helped to all refreshments before them. His real 'dignity of deportment' was impaired by these eccentricities. His temperament was hasty and violent, but allowances must be made for him. The Latins were conscious of their defeat and anxious to retrieve the situation. Perhaps it was this fact which nerved the Pope to issue an encyclical to the Orthodox Church in 1848. This strange document sent 'words of peace and affection' to the Eastern Church, but declined to recognise her present rulers even as bishops and intimated that the Orthodox worshippers could only find salvation by submitting to the Pope's mercy. An indignant answer came from the four patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople and Jerusalem. The Pope, it was declared, had made blunders of historic fact. He 'neither knows the truth nor cares to learn it. Rome was compassing sea and land to make a proselyte to deceive the Orthodox.' Nay, she was the 'demon of innovation.'<sup>421</sup>

For a century the Latin monks had fought a losing battle in every sense at Jerusalem. They generally had the worst of it in the disgraceful skirmishes which took place in the spots most sacred to their faith. In 1847 the pasha thought the situation so dangerous that he brought sixty soldiers into the church of the Holy Sepulchre itself, and posted three hundred outside it. In December of the same year there was actual 'personal fighting' at Bethlehem and the monks of either persuasion fought with crosses and candlesticks.<sup>422</sup> A Greek bishop was wounded, the Latin silver star, which marked the birthplace of Christ, was wrenched up from the rock and stolen. In 1848 a Jew entered the church of the Holy Sepulchre on Good Friday. The Latins sought to murder him and the pasha himself drew sword to protect him. On Easter Tuesday of this year a divine light descended and illumined a cross in the Armenian Cathedral, and the faithful knelt in rapturous adoration before it.<sup>423</sup> But even this miracle failed to allay the strife of the sects.

The Armenians were more gentle than the Greeks, with whom they usually sided. Both were better organised than

the Latins. 'There can be no doubt,' wrote the British consul in 1848, 'that Roman Catholic interests in this country have suffered hitherto from having remained stationary under the rule of ignorant monks, while the Greeks and Protestants have their affairs administered by high ecclesiastical dignitaries.' The situation improved, but even in 1850 there was great discontent. 'The Latin communion are dissatisfied with the inefficiency of French protection for a long time past . . . but especially within the last few years. They complain that the French have suffered the Greek ecclesiastics to usurp, by gradual encroachments, most of the sacred localities in Jerusalem and Bethlehem—they shew by documents and old maps that a century ago the Greeks had scarcely any property in the sanctuaries about the Holy Sepulchre whereas now they possess the largest proportion—and that the same is the case at Bethlehem, although at the period above mentioned they had not even a chapel for worship there. . . . Complaints of French inefficient protection are not novel.' <sup>424</sup>

What was novel in the situation was not the inferiority of the Latins, but the French determination to remove it. Austria disliked, and even ridiculed, the French claim to represent the Catholics. But until France took action there was no betterment in their situation. It was not the interests of the Church as such, but the demands of the clerical party, which forced the Prince-President to intervene. 'The men in black' were Napoleon's sole support against the 'men in red.' The Church was his only barrier against revolution. The clericals were reviving old claims and resurrecting old privileges everywhere. As regards the claim on the Holy Places the Pope remained moderate, but the Ultramontanes and the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem forced the pace.<sup>425</sup> They had neither need nor desire to be reasonable, and the Prince-President could not afford to be. At a later stage he admitted 'the error into which he had fallen' and put it down 'to bad advice.' But he also put the blame 'on the *parti-prêtre* of the Montalembert school and the Legislative Assembly.'<sup>426</sup> Turgot, and his successor Drouyn de Lhuys, both deplored the raising of so contentious a question, and said the clericals had made the Latin claims a question of national honour. De la Valette, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, explained that they had made the pressure intolerable. 'His [Napoleon's] power is "*absolu, dangereux si vous voulez*" ; his responsibility is not shared, or lightened by parliamentary institutions ; and therefore if he were to brook what would be considered in France a national slight, his throat would be cut in half an hour.'<sup>427</sup>

## III

*And be these juggling fiends no more believed  
That palter with us in a double sense.*

MACBETH, Act V, Sc. 8.

In the middle of 1850 General Aupick, the French ambassador at Constantinople, delivered the first formal demand of his government to the Porte. The position taken was skilful. The French had certain rights under the Treaty of 1740, and these could not be abrogated by subsequent arrangements made in the Sultan's *firman*s issued since that date. For mutual consent was needed to abrogate a treaty, while the Sultan could revoke his *firman* at will. The claim of France, while sound in law, was dangerous in practice. Her rights in the Holy Places had been acquired while Russia was weak. She had allowed them to lapse while Russia grew strong. Shrines and privileges, once Latin, had been acquired by Greek monks. To insist on the letter of old rights is always dangerous in diplomacy. Few would be safe if claims which had been dormant for a century were vigorously re-asserted. Even had he desired to do so, Nicholas could hardly have expelled Greek monks from the Holy Places, or surrendered the *status quo*. So far as religion was concerned he was not a despot nor even a free agent. 'Like the constitutional sovereigns of the West . . . [Nicholas] is bound' to consult opinion, and this public opinion consists almost wholly in religious sentiment.'<sup>428</sup> That was the admission of the French ambassador.

The attitude of the Porte towards the French claim and the Russian opposition to it might have been exactly predicted beforehand. With his strange tolerance of other faiths the Turk was as neutral in the religious sense as he was partisan in the political one. He would decide for the party which could put most pressure upon him. France had the advantage that her fleet could demonstrate against Tunis or Tripoli without difficulty, but Russia occupied the Principalities with an army until 1851. She was the enemy of Turkey and her religious claims were at once extensive and dangerous. Russia had recently threatened Turkey in the matter of the Hungarian refugees; France had joined England in protecting her. Consequently Turkey at first favoured France. The Porte appointed a mixed commission to examine the French claims, and the terms of reference were ominous. Aali pasha, while

admitting that the treaty with France remained in full force, referred to 'several ancient *firman*s and titles' as affecting the matter. Aupick at once protested that such acts could not invalidate the treaty. Immediately afterwards Austria sent in a note supporting the French claim. The commission consisted of a French and Turkish and Greek majority, but included one notorious Russian partisan. This commission soon showed a French bias, and rejected the famous 'Traité du Khalif Omar' of the year 636, which put the Holy Sepulchre under the Greek patriarch and was thus the groundwork of the Greek Orthodox claim.<sup>429</sup>

M. de Lavalette, who succeeded General Aupick as French representative at Constantinople, proved more conciliatory. The Greeks actually held exclusive possession of four out of the nine holy buildings at Jerusalem, and there was a joint possession of the others. At Bethlehem the Latins could only enter the grotto of the manger by a side door, though they had once held the key of the great door. De Lavalette, conscious of the practical difficulties of enforcing his claim, proposed that all the sacred buildings should be held in joint possession. He was prepared to accept this concession without reference to his government, and had already come to an unofficial agreement with Aali on the subject. He might have had difficulties in getting either Pope or clericals to accept it. But at this moment the decision was taken from his hands. M. Titov waited on the Sultan with a letter from the Czar. 'The Emperor of Russia was persuaded that no change would be allowed to take place as to the possession of those sanctuaries.\*' The Sultan gravely agreed to consider the Emperor's recommendation. He was not pro-French like his ministers. 'The Sultan himself would gladly content Russia by leaving matters as they are, and he has shown some dissatisfaction with his ministers for having gone too far in compliance with the wishes of France.' † Moved by the Czar's personal appeal the Sultan rejected de Lavalette's compromise by October.

Deadlock ensued and events moved towards a crisis. Each side feared that the other controlled the Sultan, and sought by threats to redress the balance. M. Titov, the Russian minister, stated that he would leave in twenty-four hours if any change in the *status quo* were attempted. M. de Lavalette, not to be outdone, said 'if it depended upon him, he would

\* *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1698], No. 19, p. 18; Zaiončovskii, I, No. 88, p. 333. The Czar's letter was dated September 13, 1851.

† F.O. 196/36. From Stratford, No. 323 of November 4, 1851. Passage suppressed in *E.P.* I, No. 20.

not hesitate to make use of the great naval force now possessed by France in the Mediterranean, and by blockading the Dardanelles bring the question in debate forthwith to a satisfactory issue.' <sup>430</sup> It did not, however, depend on him. Napoleon's *coup d'état* had just disturbed Europe, but it tended to settle the Near East. Napoleon tore up the Constitution, dismissed the parliament and arrested its leading members (December 2, 1851). In order to do this, he had to relax the pressure at Constantinople. According to M. de Lavalette, 'Last November [1851] the President had actually given orders to the Squadron of Admiral la Susse to go to Besika Bay on account of the Holy Places, and the events preceding the 2nd of December alone caused the order to be countermanded.' <sup>431</sup> This is the best justification for the *coup d'état* yet put forward and the whole incident shows the desperate situation of Napoleon. Paris needed an admonition from Dante.

*Ahi gente, che dovezzi esser devota  
E lasciar seder Cesar in la sella.*

Oh people that should'st be obedient  
And let Caesar sit in the saddle.

*Purgatorio, Canto VI.*

The people were not very obedient; the President, not yet Caesar, sat uneasily in the saddle. So he was very humble to the Czar. According to the Russian account, 'the President declared positively that his representative at Constantinople would be disavowed for having exceeded his powers.' <sup>432</sup> If so, he soon changed his tune. 'Their object is, as usual, to temporize,' remarked Stratford of the Porte at this juncture. But in view of the menace from both sides, the Porte had for once some excuse. The Sultan dissolved the pro-French Commission and appointed a new and purely Turkish one to decide the matter. Gibbon had derided the questions put by Byzantine emperors to their church councils. Macaulay was alive to be amused by those which the heir of Byzantium propounded to his newly appointed commission. Could a century-old treaty repeal a twelve-hundred-year-old decree? Could the Latins replace a silver star which the Greeks had filched from the Sacred Manger? Could the Latins have a key to the great door of the church at Bethlehem and, if they had it, would they be justified in placing it in the lock? If they placed it in the lock, might they turn it and open the door? The questions seemed trivial enough, but on their answers peace and war might depend.



The settlement was contained in a note addressed to France on February 9, and in a *firman* of the Sultan issued to the Greek Church a few days later.<sup>433</sup> A compromise was contained in these two specious and self-contradictory documents. Ultimately Nicholas refused to assent to the 'French note' and Napoleon to the 'Greek *firman*.' Each despot had originally been inclined to accept both. The Prince-President wanted no complications abroad, for the Paris boulevards were red with blood and the ablest Frenchmen were in gaol. At such a moment he thought Paris more important than Constantinople. He only needed 'some little concession . . . [over the Holy Places] in order to enable him to retire with honour. . . . As he was only insisting on rights allowed by the Porte to be secured by Treaty to France he could not abandon them entirely altho[ugh] he admitted that through time and negligence they had fallen into abeyance.' The 'French note' at first convinced him, and not only him but his foreign minister, that the concession had been made. In March Turgot expressed himself as 'overjoyed' at the settlement, acknowledging that France had made a 'great mistake . . . in bringing it [the question] forward.'<sup>434</sup> If the French were pleased with their note, the Greeks were delighted with their *firman*. They declared it to be the 'Charter of their liberties.' But it soon appeared that there were curious contradictions between the two documents. The 'French note' of February 9 gave the Latins two keys of the great church of Bethlehem and a key of the grotto to the manger, but the 'Greek *firman*' stated, 'it does not follow that it is permitted to alter the existing state of things . . . the smallest pretension in regard to this shall not be allowed or entertained.' The Latins were now admitted to the Virgin's shrine, but 'upon condition that they shall make no alteration either in the administration or in the present condition of that monument.' They were given new privileges, but the *status quo* was none the less to be maintained.

In reality 'the note' and the *firman* 'kept the word of promise to the ear, but broke it to the hope.' The Turks granted the Latins two keys to the great door of the church of Bethlehem, but gave a secret assurance to the Russians a few days later 'that the Latins should not pass through the great door of the church of Bethlehem.'<sup>435</sup> The 'Greek *firman*' was granted to the patriarchs of Constantinople and of Jerusalem, but Aali, by his own confession, 'told them very distinctly that *it was not to be read*, but only kept to be produced

in case of any emergency.' \* Now the *firman* did not become law until it was read to pasha, cadi, and councillors of Jerusalem. So the Latins had received a key which was not to open a door, and the Greeks had received a *firman* which was not to become law.

The diplomats were at first deceived by the Turkish casuistry. Stratford pronounced the 'French note' to be 'equitable' (February 18) before he had received the 'Greek *firman*.' When he did so he transmitted it without perceiving its sinister import. He left Constantinople in June and Colonel Rose acted as his deputy. Rose seems to have been deceived till the end, for even in December 1852 he quoted Stratford's opinion with approval. He was still unable to see that the 'French note' could not be squared with the 'Greek *firman*.' The Greeks, first as always in subtlety, put forward the plea that the two keys to the great church were given to the Latins as symbols and were not meant to be used. The world found this argument over-subtle, but eyes began to open and by midsummer there were deep suspicions of Turkish good faith. 'The general opinion here is that the Porte committed a breach of faith, and in deed an error in policy, in inserting in the *firman* to the Greeks terms at variance with the understanding which had just before been come to between the Porte and the French Embassy.' <sup>436</sup>

The true explanation of conduct, which was tortuous even for the East, was secretly revealed about a twelvemonth later by M. Ozérov, the Russian *chargé d'affaires*, to Colonel Rose. It was this. The draft *firman* was submitted for comment to Titov, the Russian minister, and was over a fortnight in his hands before publication. As the 'French note' had been already issued, Titov did not think it possible openly to revoke the concessions therein made by the Sultan. He thought it better to question their validity. 'He therefore . . . inserted in the *firman* passages which contradicted as it were, or threw in doubt, the concessions to the Latins recorded in the 'note' with respect to the key and the tomb of the Virgin.' <sup>437</sup> So that is why the two contradicted one another.

The Porte had an answer for every argument. Thus Aali contended 'that the Porte would never consent to exclude any sect of Christians from places venerated by them all, consequently, . . . there is nothing inconsistent in giving a

\* F.O. 78/895. Pisani to Rose, December 4, 1852; cp. also Zaiončovskii, I, No. 88, p. 335, where it is said that the pasha of Jerusalem was secretly instructed not to surrender the key.

*firman* to the Greeks in which their right to worship in those places is recognized.' <sup>438</sup> This argument, though plausible, is unconvincing. Even if it could be held (which it certainly could not) that there are no verbal contradictions between note and *firman*, there remained a greater contradiction still. The 'French note' declares that the Porte carefully maintains inviolate her treaties with friendly powers. The 'Greek *firman*' speaks of 'ancient and contradictory documents' between which the Sultan claimed to decide. Now the 'French note' was not made public, while the 'Greek *firman*' appeared in the newspapers. This created 'the impression that France had advanced unfair pretensions, supported only by doubtful documents, and distinguished by obstinacy, rather than by concession.' \* What is more, the will of the Padishah appeared to be superior to treaty. He announced that his *firman* must be accepted without question. 'The provisions contained in my present and Imperial edict are the real and definite result of the searching examination which has just been made into ancient and contradictory documents. . . . Let all take heed not to act in opposition to them. . . . None of the parties shall allow themselves to contravene my decision. Such is my decided and sovereign will. . . . [The *firman* is] to serve constantly and for ever as a permanent rule. Understand this and give heed to the noble signature with which it is decorated.' Mahomet the Conqueror could not have asserted his will with more pride.

## IV

*Why now, blow wind, swell billow, and swim, bark !  
The storm is up and all is on the hazard.*

JULIUS CAESAR, Act V, Sc. 1.

The last month of quiet was April 1852. M. de Lavalette rushed back to Paris and early in May his *chargé d'affaires* demanded that a French warship, the *Charlemagne*, should pass up to Constantinople. This demand meant that a three-decker carrying ninety guns would pass the Dardanelles. The passage of so heavy a ship as the *Charlemagne* seemed to violate Article II of the Straits Convention of 1841, which permitted only light ships to pass. The demand was at first

\* F.O. 78/894. From Rose, No. 76 of September 7, 1852. It is characteristic that an autograph letter of the Sultan to the Czar called the latter's attention to the French treaty of 1740, though it is not mentioned in the *firman*.

refused, then a half-promise was given. Finally, after French menaces, permission was granted 'as an exception' and '*spontanément*,' which meant by decision of the Sultan alone, without his ministers. Thus the Convention of 1841 had been violated. Strong remonstrances were made by England, Austria and Russia. Turgot admitted the wrong and promised not to offend again. The incident, serious enough in itself, was the more so since it showed the French readiness to resort to violence. Turgot declared that the French ministers had wanted to send the *Charlemagne* avowedly as a ship of war but that he had 'with great difficulty prevailed on them to agree that M. de Lavalette should return to his post on board of her.'<sup>439</sup> This was an important concession, for a vessel carrying an ambassador might be reckoned as equivalent to a vessel carrying royalty, for whom a special exemption might conceivably be claimed. But Turgot only obtained this concession 'with great difficulty.' Again, the captain of the *Charlemagne* was ready 'to force his way out' and de Lavalette to tell him to do so if necessary. Brunnow, the Russian representative in England, wrote later: 'The threat was made on the part of the French *de forcer le passage*. This fact is well-known, and could not have been forgotten by the Turks.'<sup>440</sup> Violence had indeed been threatened, as de Lavalette quite frankly said, because the President's political position necessitated such action.

As if the *Charlemagne* incident, and the violence accompanying it, were not enough, the French government raised other difficulties in July. They demanded the dismissal of the military and civil governors of Epirus, reparation for injuries to French subjects in Antioch, and the surrender of two French deserters who had taken refuge in Tripoli. The now familiar means of coercion was adopted. 'The President, irritated at what he conceived to be the low state of French influence at the Porte, sought to restore it by sending a [naval] squadron to redress French complaints in Turkey.' On July 29 a French squadron appeared in the Bay of Tripoli and the gunners were about to fire when the Turkish pasha gave way and released the French deserters. In the short space of seven months the Prince-President had thrice threatened to coerce Turkey with armed naval force, and had once (if not twice) actually done so. What was still worse, no one thought that the Prince-President's alleged motive for interference was the real one. 'All, even the Porte herself [*sic*], admit that the *firman* to the Greeks was the main although unavowed cause of the appearance of the French squadron in support of the late

French demands.' <sup>441</sup> De Lavalette confessed the truth in private: 'the affair of the *Charlemagne*, Tripoli, all our anger with Turkey, everything has its origin in the "Greek *firman*." ' So the dispute about the Holy Places had already made war possible.

After the Tripoli *coup* de Lavalette remained quiet for a time, though not because he was himself serene. He told Rose that the issue of the *firman* had been 'a *trahison inouïe* . . . and as treacherous as it was impolitic, as it forced the French Government either to reopen the question, or to allow that the treaty [of 1740] was an untruth. . . . Unless the objectionable parts in the *firman* are altered or explained by a note, France must eventually go to war with Turkey if she sides with Russia, or with Russia if she alone supports the *firman* in its present form.' \* None the less, he wanted peace. 'The President and myself wish to get rid of this question, but let us be enabled to do so; I would be satisfied if the Porte would address me a note saying that the *firman* merely meant that the Latins had not an *exclusive right* to the Holy Places. The question may be very easily settled now, but not, if it goes on.' France meant to move, but waited for the Tripoli incident to be forgotten. 'France,' said de Lavalette, 'might wait one, two, five months, but that she would, sooner or later, insist on a satisfactory explanation of the obnoxious passages in the *firman*, and a fulfilment of the promises made to the French Embassy respecting the Holy Places.' <sup>442</sup>

In October the Sultan's decision received partial execution at Jerusalem. Afif Bey, sent as special commissioner by the Sultan, reached Jerusalem on October 18. On the 21st the Russian consul-general entered Jerusalem and was received with extraordinary honours, the French consul and the Austrian arriving almost unnoticed about the same time. Afif Bey entertained his visitors in the church of the Resurrection with sweetmeats, sherbet and pipes. He then summoned them and the Greek, Latin and Armenian patriarchs to a conference in the church of the Virgin within sight of Gethsemane. <sup>443</sup> 'There he read an order of the Sultan for permitting the Latins to celebrate Mass once a year, but requiring the altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. No sooner were these words uttered than the Latins who had come to receive their triumph over the Orientals, broke into loud exclamations of the impossibility of celebrating Mass upon a schismatic slab of marble, with a

\* F.O. 78/893. From Rose, No. 50 of August 14, 1852; passages suppressed in *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1698], No. 41, p. 42.



covering of silk and gold instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before a crucifix which has the feet separated, instead of one nailed over the other.' But the victory was not to the Greeks, for the *firman* was still unpublished. The Russian consul-general called on Afif Bey and 'angrily insisted' that it should be publicly read. Afif Bey shuffled, and finally declared he had no copy and no instructions to read it. The Russian 'stamped with rage' at this evasion. The Turks had succeeded in preventing the *firman* from becoming law ; so the victory was to the Latins.

Nicholas was at all times 'very little disposed to see his rights encroached upon.' The French had used menaces successfully, so would he. Both began again in November, 'only with this difference that M. de Lavalette menaces to defend the advantages he has gained, while M. Ozérov [the new Russian *chargé d'affaires*] menaces to regain what he had lost.' The Turks measured the importance of menaces by the dynamics, or rather by the thermo-dynamics, of the moment. 'The appearance of the *Charlemagne* conveying successfully her mass of artillery and men against the most rapid currents of the Bosphorus, by the sole power of the screw, produced a great effect here.' This demonstration caused the Turks to speculate whether France would be victorious in naval warfare. They finally 'came to the conclusion that France, on account of her screw line-of-battle-ships was the more powerful ; that a French fleet would beat a Russian fleet even united with a Turkish one.' In that case the Holy Places dispute must be settled in favour of France. 'Thus a little instrument, the screw, affects, and will probably still more affect, great political events.' <sup>444</sup> In fact, the French screw was beginning to turn.

## V

*A crowd of monks with bare foreheads stood quarrelling for a key at the sunny gates of a church in Palestine.*—A. W. KINGLAKE, Vol. I, ch. iii.

The dispute as to the Holy Places was likely to be settled by the iron arguments of France. But a fatal blunder on the part of Russia contributed to turn the French screw. Early in December M. Ozérov took a step calculated in a high degree to raise suspicions against Russia. He reinforced his argument by an appeal to Article VII of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji.\* But this article merely records the Porte's

\* *E.P.* I, No. 54. From Rose, December 5, 1852, and see discussion in n. 445.

promise to protect the Christian religion and its churches. It had always been interpreted as giving Russia a right of friendly advice to Turkey on behalf of her Orthodox subjects.<sup>445</sup> But it had nothing to do with the special question of the rights of the Greek Church at Jerusalem. It was the more unfortunate because de Lavalette had already carefully restricted the Latin claims. He said that France 'only claims the protectorate of the Pope, his rights in the East and of European Roman Catholic ecclesiastical establishments, which is our right by treaty.' When asked if he claimed to protect Catholic subjects as a whole, as distinct from ecclesiastics, he replied 'Certainly not.'<sup>446</sup> Thus France limited her claims to what was narrowly ecclesiastical, just when Russia extended hers to what was dangerously political. She put forward a demand to protect the twelve million Orthodox Greek *rayas*, subjects of the Porte.\* At the most delicate stage of the negotiation Russia's pretensions threatened to sap the loyalty of the majority of the European subjects of the Sultan. The Sultan had feared the *Charlemagne*, but he feared Kutchuk-Kainardji even more.

The Grand Vizier had recently been changed. Aali, a sensible man enough, had been replaced in October by Mehemet Ali, the Sultan's brother-in-law. He was undoubtedly opposed to Russia, though for a time she believed him to be a friend. He was now trying to marry his son to the Sultan's daughter. He welcomed Russia's support and encouraged her delusion. His ambition and his son were both disappointed and he thereupon threw off the mask. On December 6 new instructions went to Jerusalem. The sole concession to the Greeks was to permit the *firman* to be read publicly (in fact this ceremony had already taken place on November 29, with Latin patriarch and French consul absenting themselves).† Otherwise the new instructions favoured the Latins, for they enjoined that the matter of the key of the great door of the church of Bethlehem was to be settled in their favour. Early in December the silver star, which the French government had given to replace that which was missing in the manger, was brought to Jaffa. The Moslem effendis of Jerusalem ('the aristocracy of the city') met it and escorted it with much pomp to Jerusalem, induced thereto, said the British consul,

\* The number of twelve million includes Serbs and Rumanians, but excludes Montenegrins and Greeks; *vide* calculation in J. M. Neale, *Holy Eastern Church* [1850], I, 162.

† The statement in *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1698], No. 58, p. 68, that Latin patriarch and French consul were present is wrong; *vide* *ibid.*, No. 132, p. 106, and Zaiončovskii, I, No. 88, p. 340; No. 105, p. 373.

by 'considerable sums of money.' On December 22 the Latin patriarch deposited it with great ceremony in the sanctuary at Bethlehem. At the same time the keys of both inner and outer church of Bethlehem were taken from the Greeks and given to the Latins. The surrender of the keys was taken as the sign that supremacy had passed from the one to the other. 'The Greeks feel this severely and are highly indignant.'<sup>447</sup> The wrath of monks on a far hillside in Palestine was to fan a flame which burst into war.

## VI

*My due from thee is this imperial crown.*

HENRY IV, Part II, Act IV, Sc. 4.

On December 4, 1852, Napoleon attained the summit of his ambitions and was solemnly proclaimed Emperor of the French. He had no longer the same need to pursue a dangerous foreign policy and he might even have moderated his demands over the Holy Places. But in this very month the award had gone finally in his favour and he could not abandon the concessions already made to the Latins by Turkey. His victory at Bethlehem was made the more intolerable by his proclaiming himself Emperor and demanding recognition from other sovereigns. Most of the powers of Europe, for one reason or other, determined to recognise the title of a revolutionary who had picked up his crown from the gutter. But Russia remained obdurate. In January of the new year the Czar refused Napoleon the title of 'brother,' but accorded that of 'friend.' The refusal was 'in some sort a question of archaeology, touching the origin of sovereignty.'<sup>448</sup> That was the smooth explanation of the Russian representative at Paris. Nicholas himself used plainer language at St. Petersburg. 'The title of my brother could only be addressed to one whose authority was received from heaven.'<sup>449</sup> Henry V, the exiled Bourbon, was the legitimate ruler of France. The Prince-President had been recognised as a *de facto* ruler. For an Emperor, chosen by universal suffrage, could not be recognised by an Emperor chosen of heaven. Thus a wholly new and profoundly important cause of dispute separated Holy and despotic Russia from revolutionary and Napoleonic France.

Assailed in his deepest conservative instincts the Czar acted, as he thought, in favour of order. Revolution had demonstrated, so also must legitimacy. On December 30,

1852, he mobilised two army corps in South Russia. A Russian army soon stood on the Turkish border. As yet it remained there. To cross the Turkish border was to awaken diplomatic Europe, and Nicholas feared the results of that awakening. He certainly feared the opinion of Europe more than the opinion of his own subjects. A conference of the Great Powers was the bugbear of his diplomatic life. In the cabinet of nations Russia's policy could be arraigned or opposed by the minister of a parliamentary state like England; he himself might be summoned to 'the correctional bench.' It was better to avoid a meeting so wounding to his dignity, and safer to deal separately with the Great Powers. He felt sure of Austria's young Emperor, his friend and pupil. Of Prussia's pious King he had hopes. But he must separate the two great naval powers of the Mediterranean. And, with England once on his side, France could be neutralised or disregarded. He could overcome the *parvenu* French Emperor if he stood alone.

England was likely soon to be approachable. In December the Derby Ministry was tottering to its fall, and Aberdeen was likely to succeed him. When previously Foreign Minister Aberdeen had had secret interviews and conversations with the Czar, and been a friend of the Russian ambassador, Brunnow. At the end of November Aberdeen received a letter from Nesselrode containing a 'pure and simple hypothesis' of the motives and aims of Napoleon. He averred that this *parvenu* was eager for glory, desirous of embroiling Russia and the Porte, anxious to send French men-of-war into the Black Sea. 'This plan,' wrote Nesselrode, 'if not real, is at least very plausible.' So fantastic a sketch might impress Aberdeen, who was terrified of Napoleon. At the end of November before he had actually become Prime Minister Aberdeen had told Brunnow that he feared a French invasion of England. He was not sure even of British naval strength, because steam gave France an advantage; he was quite certain of British military weakness. 'Even with equal numbers we should begin by being beaten on land, fifty thousand Frenchmen would beat fifty thousand Englishmen, and we have not so many to oppose to a sudden invasion.' Derby, the actual Prime Minister, Russell and Lansdowne thought the same. Brunnow suggested closer relations with Russia. Aberdeen agreed; 'these considerations,' said he, 'make us doubly desirous of strengthening our ties with the Continent. . . . If he [Napoleon] thinks us disunited he will fall upon us.'<sup>450</sup> 'The confessions at the end of this despatch,' noted Nicholas with well-founded scorn,

‘serves to show the cowardice of the government. That’s the position in which England is.’

The Derby Ministry fell and their resignations were announced on December 20. By the 24th Aberdeen had formed a ministry, with Lord John Russell as temporary Foreign Minister, whom Clarendon, a more conciliatory person, was likely to succeed. Palmerston was a little in disgrace. He was given the Home Office, where he could not do much harm, and he was closely watched by the Queen. Nicholas thought he could impress Victoria, Aberdeen, Russell and Clarendon. If he could arrive at an understanding with the British ministers, they would manage the British parliament, press and public. Anyhow the parliament was an assembly of bagmen, who did not want war. Perhaps he could get their ministers to give him their word, if he spoke as one man to another. For he retained his touching belief in the word of an English gentleman. But he began the world-famous conversations with Seymour on January 9, just one day before he received the definite news that Aberdeen had formed his ministry. Thus the *rapprochement* was first made to England in general, though soon afterwards to Aberdeen in particular. Brunnow set to work on Aberdeen with considerable art. He knew Aberdeen suspected theories, so he emphasised the fact that France had sent the *Charlemagne* through the Dardanelles in defiance of the Convention of 1841. He also announced that the Czar had at last recognised the upstart and revolutionary kingdom of Belgium. He hinted that he had delayed recognition because he ‘was not unmindful of the impediments with which we had to contend under former administrations’ (*i.e.* when Russell was Premier and Palmerston Foreign Secretary). But it had been accorded now that Aberdeen was in power, as a mark of the Czar’s confidence in him and in his friendship for Russia. It was his opinion which would count with the Czar.\*

Now here is revealed the secret of the policy of the Czar. He and Brunnow thought that they could so manage Aberdeen as to make him their obedient instrument. So far they were right, or nearly so. Before they had even made their first demands Aberdeen commented, ‘whether right or wrong, we advise the Turks to yield.’<sup>451</sup> What they did not see was that Aberdeen, unlike the Czar, could issue no orders to his cabinet. Indeed, in intercourse with Brunnow, Aberdeen learned secrets that he did not always communicate, and thus

\* *Pte. Aber. MSS., Add. MSS. 43144, ff. 335-6.* Brunnow to Aberdeen of January 31, 1853. That is the tenor of all the correspondence.



aroused suspicion. 'These private and verbal communications with Brunnov,' wrote Palmerston later, '[were] not at all in accordance with the opinion of many of his colleagues . . . and irreparable mischief was thereby occasioned.'<sup>452</sup> Indeed perhaps war itself was the outcome of the misunderstandings. For Nicholas believed that, whatever happened, Aberdeen would prevent his colleagues from going to war. And that is exactly what he failed to do.

## CHAPTER XII

### HOW COUNT LEININGEN SUCCEEDED AND WHY PRINCE MENŠIKOV FAILED

#### I

AMBASSADOR : *May it please Your Majesty to give us leave  
Freely to render what we have in charge.*

HENRY V, Act I, Sc. 2.

THE victory of the French in the battle of the Holy Places had wounded Nicholas too deeply for him to accept defeat. He replied by an appeal at once to force and to persuasion, a move characteristic of his whole policy. He planned to attach England to himself and thus deprive Turkey of her only friend. He ordered the mobilisation of two army corps in South Russia on December 30, 1852, and set his forts and flotilla in order on the Black Sea. When these preparations were complete he could put pressure upon Turkey, at once isolated and menaced, and obtain the restoration of the religious *status quo*. Just at this moment Austria intervened and proved that vigorous action would bring Turkey to her knees. She ended the war on Montenegro, and convinced Nicholas that a threat of force would bring the Turks to their senses.

It has already been told how Omer pasha had provoked war and invaded Montenegro with five armies, and how Danilo had appealed for help both to Austria and to Russia.\* Neither of them was sorry to have the opportunity of wreaking vengeance on Turkey for her refusal to give up the Hungarian refugees. But the resolution and vigour shown by Austria are in themselves significant, for she did not often show either under Count Buol. Count Leiningen was now sent on a special mission to Constantinople, with instructions to demand redress on several points. He was to insist on a change of government in Bosnia ; to insist on an armistice between Turkey and Montenegro ; to prevent Turkish vessels from entering the Bay of Cattaro and using Sutorina as a port. If possible he was to secure to Austria the right of protecting

\* *Vide supra*, pp. 221-2.

Christian subjects in Bosnia. He was to demand categorical answers and to return in ten days of arrival unless satisfied. This was an ultimatum, and the more formidable since Russia was prepared to support it by arms. Austria was equally resolute. Her *chargé d'affaires* told Rose that her troops were massed on the border and ready. 'One act of indiscretion [by the Turks] . . . would be followed by a general engagement and a war.' <sup>453</sup>

Austria was warlike because she was terrified. She really feared that a Turkish attack on Montenegro would disturb her own Yugoslav subjects and again provoke not only Bosnia, but Serbia, to rebellion. 'The least incident,' said Count Colloredo to Lord John Russell, 'might be enough to light that which lies glowing beneath the cinders and might thus induce the Servians, even against the wishes of their government, to decide to aid their oppressed brethren [the Montenegrins]. I have no need to tell you that we shall use all the influence we possess on Serbia to preach patience, peace, and submission and to prevent a guilty or insolent decision to go to war. Yet, if the Porte were blind enough to persist in the unfortunate system pursued for over a year towards the Christians of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who can say whether it will be possible to calm the ardour of the Slav riverine populations [the Servians] enjoying, under Russian protection a happier lot than their brothers? Who can extenuate the acts and cruelties of functionaries like the renegade Omer pasha? Who can calculate the result of a spark thrown amid such combustible matter? All the powers interested in preventing such a catastrophe should insist on the Porte changing its attitude and doing what is necessary for the racial pacification of the provinces.' <sup>454</sup>

Even Lord John Russell was impressed. He stressed the need of preserving Turkey in the interest of general peace, but agreed to the maintenance of the *status quo* in Montenegro. He also aided the Austrians by a distinctly moderate speech in the Commons (March 3) and by refusing to lay papers before parliament on the subject of Montenegro. In point of fact the campaign had not been successful and the Turks perceived that the demands of Leiningen had better be accepted lest a worse thing befall them. Their time limit of ten days had subsequently been extended to twelve. Rather to the surprise of the diplomats they quietly accepted most of Leiningen's demands. On two points they proved uncompromising. They declined to give Austria any right of protecting Christians in Bosnia; they refused to abandon their right of access to the

Bay of Cattaro, via Sutorina. Leiningen prudently gave way on these points, while insisting on the others.<sup>455</sup>

By February 12 the matter was settled. Orders were sent to Omer pasha to sign an armistice, to evacuate Montenegro and to resign his command. On the 17th the settlement was announced to the world, and on March 3 Montenegro and Turkey signed a peace. Nicholas had promised to support Franz Josef in vigorous terms. 'If war by Turkey against Thee should result,' he wrote to his brother Emperor, 'Thou mayest be assured in advance that it will be precisely the same as though Turkey had declared war on myself.'\* Franz Josef replied, after the Turks had surrendered, expressing his 'deepest gratitude,' and Buol subsequently acknowledged that Russia's aid had been decisive. Austria's triumph was complete and served as a model for Nicholas to imitate and to surpass.

## II

*The profession of kindness, with that sword in his hand and that demand of surrender, is one of the most provoking acts of his hostility.*—BURKE, *On the Affairs of America*, 1777.

'To the indignation of the whole Greek population following the Greek rite, the key of the church of Bethlehem has been made over to the Latins, so as publicly to demonstrate their religious supremacy in the East. The mischief is done, and there is no longer any question of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it.'<sup>456</sup> Count Nesselrode sent this instruction to Baron Brunnow on hearing the fatal news. By January 13, 1853, there was activity in the Black Sea fleet and in the fourth and fifth army corps. But in announcing the fact on the same day Nesselrode explained that 'The [Russian] Emperor is very irritated with the Sultan and thinks it necessary to intimidate him to avoid being obliged later to come seriously and actually to war, which according to him must at all costs be avoided, whether in the East or West. On this subject he has been very angry with his son, the Grand Duke Nicholas, who had rejoiced at the prospect of a war with the Turks. The Emperor did not content himself with giving a rude lesson but ordered an inquiry to find out whence his son had derived the news of war.' The Czar himself confirmed this intelligence to the French ambassador. 'I wished to

\* Redlich, *Emperor Francis Joseph* [1929], 127-8. For the effect *vide* W.S.A. Weisungen nach Konstantinopel. Buol to Klezl, No. 4 of May 7, 1853. The evidence of Leiningen himself, based on his papers, has only just come into my hands and will be found in n. 455.

avoid war, in the East as in the West and, so as not to be obliged to undergo it, . . . I felt the necessity of speaking to these wretched Turks with firmness.' <sup>457</sup> Seymour said that the Emperor seemed pacific, though he was wearing a helmet and sleeping in a camp-bed. On learning of the success of the Leiningen mission the Czar relaxed his war preparations by countermanding the military sequestration of horses in the Black Sea districts. But Prince Menšikov went forward on a special mission to Constantinople.

The mind and will of the Czar determined the form of the mission of Menšikov. They are revealed partially in the conversations with Seymour, and completely in the document written by Nicholas after talking with his best military adviser. In reviewing the whole situation he makes no reference either to the Treaty of Kainardji or to the Holy Places. It can be proved that neither Nicholas nor Nesselrode nor Brunnow knew much about the treaty or the claim which it put forward. Their uncritical adoption of it seems in fact to have been due to a secret, and perhaps sinister, suggestion of Reschid pasha. <sup>458</sup> The Czar and his advisers ultimately went to war over a claim they had never troubled to examine. It would not be fair to say that the question of religious protection was a pretext, for Nicholas felt deeply about the Holy Places. He frequently declared that he had no political views on Turkey and desired only to satisfy the conscience of his subjects. But no religious claim, urged with threats and backed with force, can remain purely religious. The demand for a religious protectorate over the Orthodox subjects of the Porte had a political implication. The article in Menšikov's instructions, which authorised him to propose a defensive alliance to Turkey, had a direct political meaning. Thus the motives of Nicholas, even if purely religious to begin with, could not remain so. And for that reason, though he sought peace, he found war.

The Czar's idea of negotiating was to wave the olive branch in one hand and the sword in the other. This dangerous method seems to have been fully approved by his most trusted advisers. 'Si vis pacem, para bellum,' wrote Nesselrode (February 14). 'An article [in an agreement] more or less long, more or less severe,' replied Brunnow (April 2), 'will add nothing to the reality of our influence. That consists *in facts not words*. Russia is strong, Turkey is weak, that is the preamble of all our treaties. . . . This epitaph is inscribed already on the tomb of the Ottoman Empire.' \* These views only

\* Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, XII, 309-311. These views, though not corroborated, are probably correct.



encouraged the Czar in his worst tendencies. He really wished for peace, but he intended 'a show of force.' He thought it the way to impress orientals, and it had twice been successful of late. Napoleon had browbeaten the Sultan over Tripoli, as had Leiningen over Montenegro. But the weakest power will not always yield to force, and Turkey was less likely to surrender to Russia than to Austria or to France. If Turkey refused to yield, what was to happen? Nicholas could not tell. A power which threatens force may be driven to use it. 'A menace which is not intended to be executed,' wrote Canning once, 'is an engine which Great Britain should never condescend to employ.' Well indeed if Nicholas had followed the sage advice of Canning. It was peculiarly difficult for him to do so. Though simple in private life, he 'loves the theatrical on extraordinary occasions, and is subject to transports and sudden resolutions.' And again, 'his sentiment of right is weakened by his passionate and immoderate desire to succeed in everything.'<sup>459</sup> Of all things he loved most an outstanding and dramatic success. Now if Menšikov's menaces failed, the Czar's 'show of force' would be in vain. Could the haughty despot avow that he had been 'trifled with' or that he was powerless before 'these wretched Turks'? So war might be, and ultimately was, the result of bravado.

Prince Menšikov finally proceeded to Constantinople in February as ambassador on a special and extraordinary mission. It was a golden opportunity for a good diplomat. But fortune in selecting Menšikov as ambassador was as capricious as she had been in selecting Nicholas for Czar or Aberdeen for Prime Minister. Had Nicholas been weak, Aberdeen strong, or Menšikov tactful, there might have been no war. The Russian public forced Menšikov on the Czar much in the same way as the British public forced Stratford on Aberdeen. Nesselrode, whose advice was so seldom taken in this crisis, had hoped and prayed for Count Orlov. He would have been an admirable choice as he was courteous and conciliatory. He had displayed an easy mastery in handling Turkish statesmen of every kind and had brought them to sign the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi by a kind of effortless artistry. 'If you had been sent . . . to Constantinople,' said Seymour to Orlov at a later date, 'all that has occurred there would have been avoided.' 'And I really believe you are right,' rejoined Orlov.<sup>460</sup>

The reason Orlov was set aside is to be found in a petition, sent direct from Constantinople, signed by the patriarch of Jerusalem and others. They prayed for a special mission,

for a good Russian and a good churchman. 'Pure Russian as he is . . . he [Menšikov] has been selected for his present mission, especially to prove the sincerity of the religious zeal of the Emperor who is scarcely a free agent in the question of the Holy Places.' So, even in Russia, public opinion exercised its evil influence and Menšikov, who aspired to represent the will of the one, in reality represented the prejudice of the many. 'Menšikov is a very gentlemanlike and agreeable man,' so Clarendon heard, 'but of *tranchant* wit and liking to make jokes *et donner le change* upon serious matters.'<sup>461</sup> 'He is not considered a safe man in the relations of private life,' nor did he prove so in his public capacity. Orlov thought him 'a very clever man but reserved and suspicious and not a diplomat,—he does not know what he may do, he allows himself to depend too much [on], or to be too much restricted . . . by his instructions.' Now this may be true enough, but is not quite fair to Menšikov. His difficulties were the greater because of his instructions. They were vague in one part, peremptory in another. He was given 'full powers and latitude,' yet told to leave in three days if his demands were not granted. Also his allegiance was divided. He received his instructions from Nesselrode, but he was responsible directly to the Czar.

The five instructions given by Nesselrode<sup>462</sup> dealt with all sorts of extraneous matters, including information about the attitude of the Great Powers, and notes about the Turkish cabinet. Menšikov was to refuse to treat with Fuad, the existing Turkish Foreign Minister, who had induced the Sultan to break his word to the Czar. The existing Grand Vizier, Mehemet Ali, was said to repent his former behaviour. Reschid, the ex-Grand Vizier, had promised assistance secretly and suggested Russia's claiming privileges under the Kainardji Treaty. He was not perhaps to be trusted. In general, a new *firman* was to be obtained from the Sultan confirming the Orthodox privileges as they had existed in February 1852. Also repairs were to be executed to the dome of the church of the Sepulchre at Jerusalem. Next, and more ominous, a second *firman* was to be obtained from the Sultan granting and guaranteeing for the future full privileges to the Greek Christians of the Turkish Empire, and acknowledging Russia's right to protect them. Much was said about this right being granted under old *firman*s, but no specific arguments or instances given. The right itself was to be embodied in a *Sened*, or Convention, 'having the force of a treaty.'

The third and fourth instructions made clear that the religious influence of France must be checked. 'Other Christian religious communities seek to harm our secular influence.' This was an unfortunate admission, for Menšikov, like Nicholas, always asserted in public that he sought no political or secular rights for Russia in Turkey, but merely religious influence. If France showed opposition or was an obstacle to settlement, Russia would sign a secret defensive alliance with Turkey to protect her. The treaty was to be defensive, to be limited in point of time, and 'necessarily secret.' It was only to be offered if the Turks demurred to signing the *Sened*.

The instructions showed that Menšikov must not only obtain reparation as regards the Holy Places, but also must force the Turks to sign the *Sened* and thus get guarantees for the future. What was alarming was the method suggested. It is pretty clear that Fuad was to be expelled from the Foreign Office,\* and that Menšikov was to be peremptory in his demand in other ways. He was to quit Constantinople in three days after formally presenting his demands, if they were not granted. He brought with him an autograph letter from the Czar to the Sultan, which conveyed these demands in language of courteous menace. But it is remarkable that this letter, while blaming the advice of 'inexperienced or malevolent counsellors,' offers 'an entente between Russia and Turkey' to protect the latter's independence against certain (*i.e.* French) 'claims and pretensions.'<sup>463</sup> Such an *entente* could only be an alliance, and the Czar himself authorised the idea. Menšikov had entire discretion over the whole question of the defensive alliance against France. He was also ordered 'not to deny but to confirm the [rumours of] military preparations.' Now all this sounds like pure force and threats. Yet in the first draft of the instructions Nesselrode had suggested 'a wide latitude both as to language, by turns friendly and threatening, as upon the nature of terms possible to accept.' And, despite the hints of violence, Menšikov was told that 'the Ottoman Empire would dissolve at the first touch [of war] and that the Emperor does not wish to accelerate that catastrophe.' The net result seems to be that the Czar did not wish a war, but that it might result from the vagueness of the instructions and from the clumsiness of the negotiator. 'Jacob's voice and Esau's

\* Brunnow stated in a memo of May 25, 1853, 'Russia never required, as has been falsely asserted, the dismissal of this minister [Fuad],' but he admits Menšikov was given 'reasons which would prevent him from entering into negotiation with Fuad' (*Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1698], No. 191, p. 190).

hand were never more skilfully combined,' Stratford de Redcliffe wrote of one of Menšikov's official communications. The description applied equally well to his instructions.

### III

*You have done that you should be sorry for,  
There is no terror, Cassius, in your threats.*

JULIUS CAESAR, Act IV, Sc. 3.

Menšikov's show of force was at least splendid. Early in February he set out from St. Petersburg. He visited the Russian troops in Bessarabia and reviewed the Black Sea fleet in the harbour of Sevastopol. He sailed, with a prince and two personal adjutants of the Emperor on his staff, in a ship ominously called the *Thunderer*. He was followed to Constantinople at two days' interval by another man-of-war, and by a steamer bearing an admiral and a general, as if to suggest that their services might be needed if his failed. On the last day of February he reached the Bosphorus and, by a carefully arranged piece of stage management, landed in the presence of a crowd of Greek Christians who escorted him with shouts to the Russian Legation. Such demonstrations were unlikely to recommend Prince Menšikov to the Turks. The Grand Vizier was Mehemet Ali, the Sultan's brother-in-law. He was an even less 'safe man' than Menšikov 'in the relations of private life,' for he had murdered a Christian concubine. But this method of keeping order in his harem showed that he upheld old Turkish usage, good or bad. He was brutal and reactionary but, though a savage, brave. He had once quelled a mutiny by rushing on the soldiers sword in hand. He was in fact to prove the stoutest of all in his resistance. It was part of the fatal blindness of Menšikov that he failed to penetrate the duplicity of Mehemet Ali. The prince even had some hopes of winning him over, hopes which Mehemet Ali may have fostered but only (to do him justice) in order to betray.

The first point of Menšikov's attack was Fuad, the Foreign Minister. Fuad was far more amenable than the Grand Vizier, polished, westernised, conciliatory, graceful. But Fuad had caused the keys of Bethlehem to be handed over to the Latins and induced his master to break his word to Russia. Having sent in his credentials Menšikov demanded that the Grand Vizier should come outside the gates of the Porte to

receive him. Mehemet Ali, affronted by an unprecedented request, refused. On March 2 Menšikov accordingly appeared and entered the Porte on his visit of ceremonial to the Grand Vizier. But people noted with astonishment that the prince was not in a uniform covered with gold lace and stars, but 'habillé en bourgeois' with frock coat and round hat.\* To wear a civil costume was uncivil indeed, and Mehemet Ali was offended. A crueller humiliation awaited Fuad. His room was next to the Grand Vizier's. Its door was flung open wide and the 'Introducer of Ambassadors' was there to show the way. Menšikov, disregarding the 'invariable custom' of visiting the Foreign Minister, walked past the open door. In an instant the great concourse of Greeks assembled outside knew of the insult. Fuad waited two hours longer, but Menšikov appeared no more that day. The affront was palpable and designed, and the more galling because the prince's credentials had been sent direct to Fuad. And in the East an affront to the servant is always an affront to the master.

Incredible as it may seem, the prince thought that an insult of this kind could be forgotten and that it might even lead to an understanding. Fuad, thus insulted, resigned, as he was meant to do. The prince actually described Fuad's retirement as 'a part of that reparation' which he intended to exact. Fuad had indeed told Rose in December that 'he [Fuad] had only been too polite and considerate in all his communications with the Russian legation; that he had even offered to resign at once if that step would be in any way gratifying to them; that the Russian legation knew all this, but were determined to sacrifice him.'<sup>464</sup> This statement is probably true and, if it is, Fuad could not complain of having to resign. He might justly complain of the needless insults Menšikov had inflicted. But the prince's honour was satisfied with the wounding of his opponent, and thereafter he assumed a mild demeanour towards the Turks and even told the French *chargé d'affaires* [M. Benedetti] that he considered the question of the Holy Places 'secondary.' He also actually declared that, in contrast to Count Leiningen, he was 'a negotiator,'<sup>465</sup> not one who threatened war. One reason doubtless was that Menšikov was deceived by Fuad's successor. Fuad had been succeeded at the Foreign Office by Rifaat pasha. Now, according to Cowley, an ex-ambassador at Constantinople, 'Rifaat . . . was a regular Russian.' So the game seemed in his hands.

\* So Mollerus in *N.R.A.*, No. 24 of March 5, 1853. Russia subsequently denied it, but there is reason to suspect the denial.



Menšikov erred tactically by his alternate violence and conciliation. 'Against orientals,' says a military expert, 'it is no use keeping troops in reserve. The best cards should be played at once. A few hours always decide the fate of an engagement.' In diplomacy also forceful policy and bold strokes lose their value unless pressed home at once. 'If he [Menšikov] wished to succeed here,' said the Dutchman Mollerus, 'he had to carry the affair by assault before Turkey's auxiliaries, France and England, could intervene with effect. He did not sufficiently perceive the opportunity offered by the absence of Lord Redcliffe. They ought to have told him that the Turks, feeble and timorous after his [Menšikov's] arrival, would have granted even a more extensive demand than the *Sened*. But, once aided by the advice of Lord Redcliffe, they would follow no impulse but his.'<sup>466</sup> The British and French ambassadors were alike absent in March, but were both due to return in the first week of April. Menšikov was fully capable of shaking the confidence of Colonel Rose and of M. Benedetti. He was unwise to wait until Stratford, the man 'who had more pluck in his little finger than the whole *Divan*,' arrived on the Bosphorus.<sup>467</sup>

#### IV

*All yet seems well and, if it end so meet,  
The bitter past, more welcome is the sweet.*

ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, Act V, Sc. 3.

The resignation of Fuad in itself caused no small sensation. In this case 'an exception to the invariable rule was made . . . for the purpose of shewing that Fuad effendi's own will and not foreign intervention was the cause of his resignation. Hitherto it was not supposed possible that any Turkish minister could possess a will on any matter connected with the Sultan's prerogative.'<sup>468</sup> This pathetic attempt saved the Sultan's dignity and the diplomatic situation. Prince Menšikov was careful to explain that he had not demanded Fuad's dismissal, but his explanation proved too much for the French and British *chargés d'affaires*. Benedetti was afterwards the dupe of Bismarck, and Rose was now the dupe of Menšikov. Both men failed at the crisis. Benedetti telegraphed to Paris asking the government to send up the French fleet to the Aegean. Rose, even more excited, did not consult his government, but telegraphed direct to Malta asking Admiral Dundas to send the Mediterranean squadron at once to Constantinople.

France obeyed, but England disobeyed, these dramatic summonses from the Bosphorus. On March 19 Drouyn de Lhuys informed Lord Cowley at Paris of the French intention to send a squadron not indeed to Constantinople, but to the famous isle of Salamis in the Aegean. When Cowley remonstrated, Drouyn de Lhuys said 'that the French fleet had been ordered to the coast of Greece not with any immediate hostile intention, but to be prepared for any eventuality.' Cowley then used strong language: 'If the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire were menaced, whose fault was it? Conscientiously, I must say it was the fault of France and of Austria, of France in raising without consideration the question of the Holy Places, which had given Russia the pretext for the present proceedings, of Austria in setting the example of menace and intimidation.' To these home-truths Drouyn de Lhuys made no effective reply. He 'admitted, so far as his personal opinion was concerned, the error committed towards the Turkish Government, not only in the matter of the Sacred Buildings, but in the naval demonstration undertaken last year against Tripoli.' But he added, 'The Emperor would rather be pounded in a mortar (*brayé dans un mortier*) than submit to the dictation of Russia.'<sup>469</sup> In spite of these brave words, de Lhuys offered to stop the despatch of the fleet on the 20th on conditions. Cowley demurred for the moment, but showed signs of accepting them on the 21st. But the Emperor evaded an audience. Cowley was told that 'public opinion would not allow the Emperor to act otherwise.'<sup>470</sup> It was too late and the instructions had gone out. The French fleet sailed on the 25th for Salamis.

The British government had already taken a decision precisely opposite to the French one. On the 19th Clarendon, the new Foreign Secretary, received Dundas' despatch from the Admiralty. Dundas reported that, while with the fleet at Malta, he had received a summons from Rose, but had not acted on it. He therefore wished to take the orders of the Home Government.<sup>471</sup> The shrewd old Scotchman knew that a *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople ought not to control the British fleet or policy. The matter had to be decided, so Sir James Graham, first Lord of the Admiralty, summoned the chief men of the Ministry. Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell, the leader of the Commons, answered his call on the 20th at the Admiralty. At the last moment Clarendon induced the others to ask Palmerston as well. It was a fateful decision, for in future these four men constituted the effective cabinet on all

Eastern questions. Lord John Russell wrote to Clarendon before the meeting that 'in case of the invasion of Turkey by Russia on any pretence we ought to send a messenger to St. Petersburg to *demand* the evacuation . . . and, in case of refusal, to enforce that demand in the Baltic as well as in the Dardanelles. We should of course enter into concert with France.'<sup>472</sup> But Aberdeen and Clarendon prevented any rash move for the moment, pointing out that there was no *casus belli*. The action, or rather inaction, of Dundas was approved and the British fleet ordered to remain at Malta. The French Ambassador, who asked England to join in a demonstration on the 21st, went empty away. On the 22nd France was informed by Clarendon, in phrases with a Palmerstonian ring, that Rose had not been justified in sending for the fleet, and that the whole affair was due to 'street rumours, Russian gossip, Turkish alarm and diplomatic zeal.'\* In short, the despatch echoed Talleyrand's advice to diplomats: 'Surtout, point de zèle.'

The refusal of the British government to send the fleet at Rose's demand, or to co-operate with the French, was a decision of great importance. Napoleon's conduct the year before, in sending a squadron to Tripoli and the *Charlemagne* to Constantinople, had made war a possibility. Since that time Austria had menaced Turkey with war, and Russia had begun military preparations on the Black Sea. Napoleon ought not, therefore, to have acted on this occasion without reflection. Yet on the 25th Walewski, his ambassador in London, 'could not help admitting that his government have behaved foolishly for themselves and improperly towards us.' On the 29th Napoleon excused himself for having sent the fleet at all. He almost certainly would not have done so unless he had counted on England's joining him. Her refusal therefore acted as a restraint on France and deferred to a later date Napoleon's favourite scheme of a Franco-British alliance. It had been discussed in February. 'Last Saturday' (February 26) 'the Cabinet turned down the French proposition for an alliance with France against Austria and Russia,' said Aberdeen.<sup>473</sup> On March 21 he wrote to Clarendon, 'We desire the preservation of Turkey; but we must take special care to avoid entering into any engagement with France, either positive or conditional upon this subject.'<sup>474</sup>

A close connexion with France seemed needless, for the

\* F.O. 27/956. To Cowley, No. 52 of March 22, 1853. The draft of the despatch is in Clarendon's own hand and the quoted passage is suppressed in the published version.

recent conversations of Nicholas with Seymour had given confidence to both Russia and England. Thus the Emperor of Russia 'felt sure that Her Majesty's government would not labour under the same excitement as Her Majesty's *chargé d'affaires*.' He was overjoyed when he learned that the British ministers had finally disavowed Rose. They were not bound to France and refused to follow her lead. They had refused to be bound to Nicholas and had rejected his overture for a potential agreement in case of the dissolution of Turkey. But they had been so deeply impressed by his sincerity, that only Lord John Russell expressed doubts at this stage. Even so late as April 11 Palmerston was describing Nicholas as 'a gentleman' whose word could be trusted. Clarendon was bold enough to assert that 'we did quite right in showing confidence in the pledged word of the Emperor of Russia.' 475

## V

*The gathering cloud,  
And the little wind arising, which shall one day pipe so loud.*

WILLIAM MORRIS, *Sigurd the Volsung*.

The British good feeling towards Russia was undisturbed by the criticisms of Colonel Rose, by the early activities of Prince Menšikov or by the naval demonstration of France. Their goodwill is evident in the instructions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, drawn up in February 1853. Having taken a leave of six months Stratford had resigned his post at Constantinople in January. After some hesitation the government reappointed him to Constantinople. At a later stage Russell defended this action in his driest manner. On previous occasions, he said, Aberdeen and Palmerston had each had an opportunity of getting rid of Stratford, but had each reappointed him to Constantinople. He was only imitating them in reappointing Stratford a third time. There were other reasons too. The newspapers were calling loudly for 'the Elchi,' since there was a threat of trouble in the Balkans 'in the spring.' On previous occasions, when not serving as a diplomat, Stratford had made things awkward for the government of the day by going into parliament. Aberdeen thought he would not be formidable at a distance. It was a typical politician's error. Stratford was far more powerful on the Bosphorus than he could ever be at Westminster. The evil was aggravated because Aberdeen was weak and Clarendon

inexperienced, while the two strong men, Palmerston and Russell, were a great deal more bellicose than Stratford himself.

Stratford was a strong man, but not, in this instance, a warlike one. It has often been asserted that he wanted war between Turkey and Russia and ultimately got it. If that theory were true, the sending of Stratford to Constantinople would have been a fatal mistake. Aberdeen thought it was and repented in sackcloth. He and his colleagues were not sorry to escape the responsibility of the war. But contemporaries do not always select the right scapegoat. The Stratford legend, so attractively coloured by Kinglake, does not stand the criticism of later research. Stratford had no part in the military and naval demonstrations which did so much to produce war. There were three in 1852: the sending of the *Charlemagne* to Constantinople, the sending of the French naval squadron to Tripoli, and the Russian partial mobilisation on the shores of the Black Sea. In the first half of 1853 there were two serious diplomatic steps and two armed demonstrations. These were the Leiningen and Menšikov missions, the despatch of the French naval squadron to Salamis in March and of the Franco-British fleet to Besika Bay at the end of May. Over two of these Stratford had no control and the third was done against his advice. So much for three incidents. Over the fourth Stratford exercised a real influence by helping the Turks to reject Menšikov's mission, but that action was approved by his government. Until June the governments of England, France and Russia had proved more warlike than Stratford. After June, as will be seen, the situation got out of hand and neither Stratford nor anyone could stay the drift towards war.

Stratford's instructions were dated February 25 and actually signed by Lord John Russell. But he had asked his successor in office to draw them up, and the Blue Book gives them as Clarendon's. They were based on a memo written by Stratford and qualified by suggestions from Aberdeen. The Prime Minister's modification ran as follows: 'In [the] case of imminent danger to the existence of the Turkish government' (*i.e.* a Russian threat to Constantinople), Stratford was instructed to 'despatch a messenger at once to Malta, requesting the Admiral to hold himself in readiness, but you will not direct him to approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from Her Majesty's government.'<sup>476</sup> Stratford must not therefore call up the fleet without permission from home. The whole cabinet, even including Aberdeen, were prepared to defend Constantinople if attacked by Russia.



But they reserved to themselves the decision as to when the fleet should be sent up. The caution of this instruction was only emphasised by the March incident when Rose called up the fleet and was disavowed.

The instructions viewed only two problems as serious, those of Montenegro and of the Holy Places. The former question was settled before Stratford arrived, so the latter alone had claim to attention. The good feeling towards Russia, produced by the Seymour conversations, pervades the whole instructions and was certainly shared by Stratford himself. Thus Constantinople is mentioned as 'a favourite object of national [Russian] ambition.' But 'an attempt to cut the knot by Russia would unite against her all the powers of Europe. The Emperor Nicholas is conscious of this difficulty, and with a moderation at once magnanimous and wise is content to forego the prospect of this brilliant prize.'\* Then the question of the Holy Places is discussed, and Rose's pronouncement, in favour of France, is wholly set aside. The instruction even says that it was desirable to put pressure on France to settle 'this unseemly dispute.' The 'presumption' of Turkey must be rebuked and the 'moderation and superior claims' of Russia should be allowed.

Stratford was making his leisurely way to Constantinople via Paris and Vienna when Menšikov presented a long memorandum. This was on March 16. An 'arrangement,' which should include the Greek subjects of the Porte (and not ecclesiastics alone) must be made. 'It can no longer be confined to barren and unsatisfactory promises which may be broken at a future period. A solemn engagement [*i.e.* a *Sened* or Convention between Russia and Turkey] must henceforward attest the sincerity of the understanding.' Still more ominous was the suggestion that Latin encroachments 'with the assistance of the political support proceeding from the West have reached such a pitch as to threaten the Greek Church with a general assault, which would be at the same time a fatal blow to the sovereign rights of Turkey.'<sup>477</sup> It was hinted that these encroachments might be stopped by an alliance between Russia and Turkey. On the 22nd, after further talk about 'a more solid guarantee,' Menšikov produced the first draft of the Convention or *Sened*. This contained more drastic demands than the one put forward on May 5, for it claimed the election for life of the four Orthodox patriarchs in the Turkish Empire. This would have made the patriarchs irresponsible, irremovable and independent of the Sultan. As the patriarchs

\* Sentence omitted in Blue Book.

had civil powers, as well as religious ones, the demand was politically dangerous. Menšikov explained his proposals, and said, 'the face of Rifaat [the new Foreign Minister] visibly became gloomy, he appeared keenly affected and could not for some moments utter a word. . . . I left him out of countenance and troubled.' 478

The Porte showed such horror of the *Sened* that Menšikov could not go further with the alliance. On the 29th Rifaat said to an intermediary, 'it [the *Sened*] would give a foreign power the right of mixing in our internal affairs and protecting our subject peoples. He suspected Russia's fair words, he feared her increasing armaments. He did not understand this mixture of embraces and pistolshots. . . . He begged you [Menšikov] to desist from the idea of a treaty [*Sened*] and all would be arranged.' Finally he said, 'In the name of God be moderate.' 479 The sincerity of these protests was so obvious that even Menšikov was impressed. On April 10 he decided to postpone bringing matters to a head. 'This is the plan I have traced, to speak neither of *Sened* [Convention] nor of Convention [Treaty of Alliance] until the points of the questions of the Holy Places are decided between the three powers. The need of a guarantee for the future will be the object of my future aims. The *Sened* will probably be refused to me, so that they [the Turks] may not commit themselves with France and I shall then use my last efforts to obtain the Convention [Treaty of Alliance].' The Czar scrawled this despatch with approving comments, and advocated strong measures. 'Without a crisis of compulsion,' wrote the autocrat, 'it would be difficult for the Imperial Legation to recapture the influence it formerly exercised over the Divan.' \*

## VI

*As he passed, the nobles bended  
As to Jove's statue ; and the commons made  
A shower and thunder with their caps and shouts,  
I never saw the like.*

CORIOLANUS, Act II, Sc. 1.

Early on April 5 a steamer of war approached Constantinople with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on board. 'It was,' he wrote to his wife, 'a glorious morning, the domes and minarets towering above the mist, and over each the crescent

\* Zaiončovskii, I, No. 121, pp. 399-401. From Menšikov, April 10, 1853. The references respectively to *Sened* and Alliance are confusing and explanations are placed in square brackets.

glittering in sunlit gold.' 'The Elchi' was again in Constantinople. He was long past sixty, yet his appearance still struck all beholders. His hair, now silver-white, set off the finely-cut features, the stern blue eyes, the thin determined lips. His air of dignity and authority was the more impressive because perfectly natural and unassumed. As a matter of course he now received the honours of a potentate. He mounted a splendidly caparisoned horse sent by Rifaat and rode slowly to the British Legation, followed by his staff and a long train of admirers. 'The event,' says Kinglake, 'spread a sense of security but also a sense of awe.' That is true enough, but Stratford's was *not* 'the angry return of a king whose realm had been suffered to fall into danger.' When he landed he knew of no danger from Russia. The latest advice, whether from London or St. Petersburg, confined the dispute to the Holy Places. And in that matter Stratford, like the British cabinet, sided with Russia. He disregarded for a time the rumours about Russia, and urged 'large concessions' on the Turks in the matter of the Holy Places. On April 20 he had reduced the difficulties to a few points. On the 24th he declared the matter 'virtually settled.' He had carried out his instructions to the letter and in less than three weeks had arranged a dispute which had already lasted three years.

It has been absurdly suggested that Stratford deliberately separated the question of the Holy Places from the other disputes in order to put Russia in the wrong. But in this matter he acted strictly in accordance with British instructions and ideas. Nesselrode's assurance to Seymour that there were no serious demands beyond that of the Holy Places had reached Stratford before April 12. Lord John Russell declared that 'in all which passed between me and Brunnow here [London] as between Seymour and Nesselrode at [St.] Petersburg the question of the Holy Places was the only one insisted upon.'<sup>480</sup> Clarendon pronounced Stratford's action, in settling the Holy Places' dispute at once, to have been 'most judicious and pacific.'

The Turks had not dared to reveal the text of the Russian memo of March 16 even to Rose. Still less dared they reveal their humiliation to the more formidable Stratford. He never saw the text until after Menšikov had left Constantinople. He did not even claim that he had obtained the confidence of the Turks until the 15th, and in fact he did not get it fully till a month later. He still believed that he could satisfy Russia. He did not even hear of the *Sened* until April 9. On the 11th

he thought Menšikov 'considerably softened,' and that 'there was no question of a defensive treaty' between Turkey and Russia. When Menšikov sent in a menacing note to Rifaat pasha on the 19th he was not alarmed. After all it dealt chiefly with the almost adjusted question of the Holy Places. Even on April the 23rd he was still impressed by the prince's 'moderation.' He believed also in the Turkish will to resist any extreme pretensions. The Grand Vizier, Mehemet Ali, had given strong pledges to Rose. 'All possible preparations had been made to enable Turkey to withstand an attack should her refusal to comply with Prince Menšikov's demands leave Russia to make war upon her. Rather than submit they were prepared for the worst.' Stratford knew Mehemet Ali's statement to be true, because he could see from his palace windows evidence of naval preparations being quietly made to defend the Bosphorus.<sup>481</sup> They were pushed on with unusual energy owing to the intervention of Mehemet Ali himself. Stratford therefore forgot his old personal enmity towards the Grand Vizier. Not only that, but he gave a cold reception to his old friend Reschid pasha: 'I guess [he is] . . . itching to recover his place. . . . I must have large explanations with him and strong pledges before I can even wish to see him restored to office.' He wrote thus to his wife on April 27. On May 13 Mehemet Ali was dismissed and Reschid restored to office. Paradoxically it seems that Stratford not only did nothing to restore his old friend, but that he regretted the fall of his old enemy. For while he doubted as to Reschid's good faith, he could not doubt as to Mehemet Ali's opposition to Russia.

Towards the end of April Stratford began to suspect ulterior designs on the part of Russia. The Porte received a paper dated April 21 which, although not by Stratford, expresses his ideas. It dilates on the danger of Turkey signing a *Sened* with Russia about the privileges of the four Orthodox patriarchs. 'If a treaty were to be concluded concerning them, the spiritual supremacy over the members of the Greek church would be entirely transferred to the Emperor of Russia. [Their] functions not being limited to spiritual matters only, but extending also to temporal concerns, Russia would also interfere in all the temporal affairs of the members of that church.' The result would be a division of the Empire: 'such a thing might bring on the destruction of the Empire (which God forbid).' \* Whatever his suspicions, Stratford still thought

\* *F.O.* 195/406 contains a paper of this date loose in the book. It is entitled 'Paper on the demands put forward by Russia,' communicated April 21, 1853.

it possible to dissuade the Russians from their design, if he protested before it was too late. He was not even yet afraid about the *Sened*, for its worst article, that of creating the patriarchs for life, had been excised. He did fear the secret treaty of alliance. Mehemet Ali had said that was what Russia really wanted; Rifaat had said she demanded 'more than the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.' \* On April 26 Stratford sought out M. Ozérov, the Russian *chargé d'affaires*, an old friend, with whom he spoke more frankly than with the prince. He referred to the rumours. 'I know you [Russia] wish a more solemn *dénouement*, it is neither prudent nor just. . . . To say all, too strict a friendship between you and Turkey will give Europe as much umbrage as a rupture which led to war. . . . A league will form against you.' <sup>482</sup> Stratford thought that he had obtained a *démenti*, for he recorded complacently, 'I have also had the luck to receive from the Russian that he surrenders the worst features of a very ugly sort of treaty which he wants the Sultan to adopt.' <sup>483</sup> 'The shadows of mystery and indecision will soon be dispersed for ever,' he wrote on May 3. Two days later he learned, at last, the full measure of Russia's demands.

## VII

*I am clean beside myself.  
Jove hath heaped on me such a desperate charge,  
Which neither art nor reason may achieve.  
How loath I am to leave these Libyan bounds.*

MARLOWE, *Dido, Queen of Carthage*, Act V.

On May 5 the formalities, finally settling the dispute about the Holy Places, were completed to the very last comma. On the same day Menšikov reopened the controversy and entered on the most fateful stage of his mission. He sent a new note, admitting that the two *firman*s just issued represented a compliance with the first two demands made in his note of April 19. But his 'third and most important point, which requires guarantees for the future,' must now be granted. So he demanded a *Sened* or Convention to give to 'the Orthodox Eastern religion, its clergy and possessions the privileges and immunities . . . assured to them *ab antiquo*.' The Orthodox were to 'participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian sects. . . . The new explanatory *firman* respecting

\* *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1698], enclo. 1, No. 134; enclo. 2, No. 135. Mehemet Ali spoke thus on March 30 and Rifaat on the 28th.



the Holy Places of Jerusalem shall have the force of a formal engagement made with the Imperial Government.' <sup>484</sup> He agreed to wait five days for an answer. He fixed May 10 as the last day, but subsequently extended it to the 14th.

Menshikov had delayed his demand 'till the period at which our military preparations are nearly ready.' <sup>485</sup> The Russian forces were gathering on the Pruth, and could act at once in case of Turkey's non-compliance. The demands themselves appeared to place Russia on a par with France, by requiring the signature of an international instrument like the French treaty of 1740. This was quite all right if applying only to the clergy. But the covering note demands protection for the 'Orthodox religion' (*i.e.* the Orthodox lay-subjects of Turkey) 'as well as for its clergy and benefices.' The same distinction is more subtly drawn in Article I of the *Sened*.\* Now the French, in point of fact, had renounced all claim to protect Catholic lay-subjects of Turkey. They wished only to protect their own Catholic nationals in Turkey and the Latin monks and clerics. In any case a French claim to protect Catholic *rayas* would not have affected many subjects of the Sultan. The Russian claim to protect Orthodox *rayas* affected some twelve million of them. Nesselrode's instructions to Menshikov speak of 'our influence over the secular populations of the East,' <sup>486</sup> and he had even once written to the Czar of the possibility of 'stirring' (*de soulever*) the Christian populations to revolt in case of need. Obviously, therefore, 'new or more explicit engagements,' unless most carefully defined, might have the effect of sapping or shaking the loyalty of Greek subjects to the Sultan. And any such tendency must be resisted.

The real views of Prince Menshikov are recorded in his dialogue with Baron Mollerus on May 16. The shrewd Dutch representative began by saying that 'a question which concerned the Greek clergy [in the Turkish Empire] was much more important than one which concerned the Latin, since the former had civil powers whilst the latter had not.' The prince 'had no direct reasoning to oppose to this, but said that much more was made of this [proposed Russian] influence than it deserved, that the most formal declarations had been made, and that Russia had no intention of interfering in civil or domestic concerns; that she had no wish to exercise an influence like the British minister, who directed everything up to managing the police of the country. Russia claimed that

\* The distinction here seems to be between *les églises* (*i.e.* the laymen), *les institutions pieuses* (*i.e.* the monasteries), and *le clergé Orthodoxe* (*i.e.* the clerics).

she could not continue to lose her influence, as she had done for some years. Her honour exacted that this state of things should cease.' <sup>487</sup> Thus the prince did not, in private, deny that his demands affected *all* Orthodox subjects of Turkey.

Mollerus thought that Prince Menšikov sincerely desired peace, but that 'Russia's honour, Russia's self-love, is at stake and cannot permit the preponderance of England to continue here to the detriment of that of Russia.' It is the Czar's old complaint of the 'infernal dictatorship of this Redcliffe.' Russia, not Redcliffe, must dictate to Turkey. This ascendancy would be won by the *Sened* and maintained by Russia's hold on the twelve million Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Menšikov admits as much when he assures his auditor that Russia's ascendancy will be much less onerous and much less vexatious than that of 'this Redcliffe.' Menšikov thus confessed to secular aims and to a desire for Russian ascendancy. Whatever the Czar may have thought or said, the prince aimed at securing guarantees for the future political predominance of Russia at Constantinople. Menšikov's admissions are remarkable. Russia was publicly claiming equality with France at Jerusalem. She was secretly demanding, as the prince confesses, an ascendancy over England at Constantinople.

This naive confession on the part of Prince Menšikov shows that the real danger lay in the secret implication of his demands. For instance, the demand of 'guarantees for the future' is always dangerous in diplomacy. Such a demand was the prime cause of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. Most critics will admit that it was also a prime cause of the Crimean war. Even Aberdeen (and there could be no British statesman more favourable to Russia) said that Menšikov's demands were 'certainly unreasonable' in their latest form. Stratford described them as 'a form of guarantee which in principle, if not in practice, and probably in both, would eventually prove fatal to the Porte's independence.' The *Sened* did imply a political as well as a religious protection, and carried with it the suggestion that Russia could interfere to enforce the guarantee. This was an extension of the Treaty of Kainardji, obviously desired by Russia, and always previously denied by other powers. Also there was the proposal for the secret alliance, mentioned by the Czar in his letter to the Sultan, authorised by Nesselrode and more than once put forward by Menšikov. Stratford rightly declared *Sened* and alliance to be incompatible with 'the desire of maintaining the Integrity and Independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe, which Russia had joined with England,

Austria and Prussia in acknowledging in 1840. She [Russia] had again in 1841 pledged herself with those powers, and with France as well, to the inviolability of his [the Sultan's] sovereign rights.'

Stratford made an effort to see the prince direct on May 6, but the latter declined an interview on the plea of illness. Stratford addressed a remonstrance on the claims to him on the 8th. He was now absent in the country. Menšikov replied on the 9th, 'I must confess I had looked for frank co-operation on your side.' He added, by no means frankly, 'far from aiming at any right of superiority whatever, the Imperial Government only seeks to place its own sphere of action in the East on an equal footing with that which his Allies of the West here occupy.' Menšikov's assertion is disproved by his own secret admissions. Stratford declined to continue the correspondence, on the ground that 'it might lead to an irritating controversy.' Direct intercourse thus ended between the two men. The prince had refused his good offices, and only saw Stratford again at the moment of departure.

The Turks were so alarmed by Menšikov's demand of May 5 that they almost revealed the whole truth to Stratford. He saw at once the danger of 'a guarantee' in the *Sened*. He felt, rather than knew of, the demand for a secret alliance. On the 7th he saw Rifaat and suggested a conciliatory answer about the *Sened*, but advised him to reserve questions concerning 'the sovereign dignity and independence of the Sultan.' Stratford had asked Ozérov on the 6th to 'abandon the *terrain* of law and associate ourselves [*i.e.* Russia] with his [Stratford's] disinterested and constant efforts in favour of the Christians . . . and in the interests of humanity.'<sup>488</sup> But Menšikov demanded a settlement not for Europe but for Russia, not for humanity but for Orthodoxy. Stratford appealed to Ozérov in vain. Yet neither he, nor de la Cour, gave the Turks any hope of naval aid. Nor did they urge the Turks to resist a Russian occupation of the Principalities. Resistance, said Stratford, must be 'moral.' Rifaat was to promise 'to redress any grievances fairly made out on behalf of the Greek Church, and to confirm and carry into effect all the established rights and privileges already secured by imperial favours to the Christian religion.' The rights to all churches and Christians are to be confirmed by the Sultan's favour in justice to European powers generally. All this was a blow for the Turkish Ministers who had hoped for active aid. Stratford found the Sultan full of 'weakness as well as melancholy' on the 9th, mourning his recently dead mother and ready to

die himself. Stratford tried to encourage him. 'I concluded by apprising His Majesty of what I had reserved for his private ear, . . . that in the event of imminent danger I was instructed to request the commander of Her Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in readiness.'<sup>489</sup> It has been quite wrongly suggested that this was a promise of prompt naval aid. Stratford proved that it was not, for he advised the Sultan in this very interview to accept a Russian occupation of the Principalities without fighting. 'Imminent danger' meant an actual threat to Constantinople and in such case, as he told the Sultan, England would almost certainly protect him. But it was cold comfort to a proud oriental to be advised to admit a Russian army into his territory without resistance and without declaration of war. The British government 'entirely approved' Stratford's conduct on this occasion and pronounced his advice 'judicious.'

On May 10 Menšikov decided to act. Up to date mere words had been insufficient. His feeler for a secret alliance had been rebuffed by the Grand Vizier on the 4th. So he decided to ignore him altogether. He visited Namyk, the Minister of Finance (apparently on the 7th), and asked him to tell the Sultan that the dispute about the Holy Places was 'a secondary question and could easily be abandoned.' Russia really wanted a secret alliance and treaty. 'The aim was to close the Dardanelles to British and French men of war.' The Czar offered one hundred and fifty thousand men to defend the gate. Namyk declared such a message could only go to the Sultan through the Grand Vizier.\* But Menšikov's methods were always unconventional. He now approached the Sultan through a disgraced ex-minister. On the 10th Reschid received a private letter from Menšikov, stating the gravity of the crisis and asking him to lay Russia's grievances before the Sultan. The prince admitted that his application was unusual. Russia's secret relations with the ex-minister explain it. 'Despite his precarious position,' Reschid secured an audience.

On May 13 the Sultan, accompanied only by Edhem pasha, saw the prince and his interpreter for half an hour. Menšikov, by his own account, was as violent as ever. He demanded the resignations of the Grand Vizier and Foreign Secretary on the ground that they had misled their master by bad advice. The

\* F.O. 78/932. From Pisani, May 11, 1853. The authority is Mehemet Ali, who is not altogether reliable. But the prince had already raised the question of secret alliance with the Turks (as his instructions authorised him to do) and had proposed to do so again if the *Sened* was rejected; cp. Zaiončovskii, I, No. 121. Menšikov to Nesselrode, April 10, 1853.

Sultan was 'embarrassed' and indistinct in utterance. But he told Menšikov that 'there were no two opinions among all parties on the subject in debate.'<sup>490</sup> He tried to be 'friendly' and said that he had already dismissed the Grand Vizier. It was a forlorn attempt to save his dignity, for the Grand Vizier was not actually dismissed till after the interview. The prince pressed Reschid upon the Sultan. Having thus changed the persons, he tried to change the policies. Russia preached 'blind obedience' to subjects, and had no intention of interposing between Turkish *rayas* and the Sultan. He implored the Sultan not to treat the Russian arrangement as a 'European question.' Belgium, Greece and Switzerland, by becoming Europeanised, had lost their real independence. Turkey would do the same. He insisted on the absolute necessity of a guarantee between Russia and Turkey direct. After this whirlwind of reproaches, protests and pleadings, the Russian prince took his leave, in the full confidence of complete triumph.

The first signs were all in favour of the prince. Mehemet Ali was replaced by Mustapha pasha. Stratford, ordinarily so well informed, only learned very late in the evening of the fall of the Grand Vizier, which had taken place at 10 A.M. 'He had a fit of rage which resembled dementia.' Then came the equally surprising news of Rifaat pasha's dismissal and of Reschid pasha's return to the Foreign Office. Reschid's appointment 'took place to the great astonishment of all, yes even of Lord Redcliffe who, I know, has given his word of honour that he knew nothing about it and was as surprised as the rest of us.'<sup>491</sup> Such is the witness of the Dutch Minister, who could not understand how the prince could make 'the enormous mistake of asking for Reschid, the greatest enemy of Russia.' Nor could anyone else. Menšikov admitted that he had done everything. He confessed to having pressed Reschid on the Sultan 'in view of his enlightened opinions and pacific leanings' and 'despite his reputation of not being very favourable to Russia.' He reported and laughed over Stratford's 'dementia.' It was his last laugh. For he was soon, very soon, to be the dupe in a comedy, or tragedy, of disillusion such as could only have been played at Constantinople, that city sensitive with treachery, whose very shores are bathed in intrigue.

Menšikov had put his own nominees into the two chief offices of state, and had greatly shaken the Sultan. But there were one or two ominous signs. The commander of the guard was anti-Russian, so was Rifaat the expelled minister, now President of the Council. Mehemet Ali, though ceasing to



be Grand Vizier, had become *Seraskier*, or Minister of War. Through his office he ruled the army which the Sultan feared ; through his wife he ruled the harem which the Sultan loved. He held the keys both to ' the gate of delight ' and to the ' gate of war.' There were other signs upon the 14th, the date fixed for a reply from the new Foreign Secretary. Menšikov called and demanded an answer. Reschid put him off for the moment and then went to Stratford, asking for help, ' because from his recent return to office he had not yet possessed the necessary time for reading papers and making up his mind.' Stratford helped him to draft an evasive reply asking for a few days' further delay. He thought it ' desirable on every account that time should be gained not only in the interests of the Porte, but for the conveyance of information to friendly powers at a distance.' <sup>492</sup> Stratford thus began to regain his old ascendancy, which Menšikov had so sharply challenged. He was not, however, taking Reschid on trust, and during the night of the 14th he communicated with the principal ministers both old and new. He received ' nothing to shake my conviction as to their steadiness and that of the Sultan.'

On the night of the 14th Reschid was in a most painful position. He had told Stratford that he was anti-Russian, explaining that he only hesitated about asking for more delay for ' fear of exposing himself to a charge of raising expectations which must end in disappointment.' But Menšikov still believed him pro-Russian, and was told that Reschid made a long speech to the ministers' council on the night of the 14th, advocating submission.

Reschid later told Stratford that he had advocated resistance. At any rate he found only two supporters. Mehemet Ali and Rifaat successfully marshalled the majority against him. Stratford was still partially hoodwinked by him, for it was not till the morning of the 15th that he learned indirectly from one of the ministers that ' the late change of ministry was an intrigue created by a Russian partisan, . . . acting in concert with Reschid pasha.' Stratford expressed acute anxiety but thought, despite some evidence to the contrary, that Reschid's ' known character and opinions ' must prevent his surrender to Russia.<sup>493</sup> So indeed it proved. Reschid ultimately escaped from Russia's toils, but he only did so by flinging the blame on Stratford.

May 15 was a critical day in the history of the Ottoman Empire, of the Russian Empire, and of Europe. One might call it the ' Turkish Day of Dupes.' Menšikov still thought Reschid an obedient servant, who might yet swing round the

ministers to agreement with Russia. In the morning Reschid paid the prince a personal visit. His manner was 'undecided,' and he seemed 'intensely preoccupied with the keen opposition' he had already encountered from the ministers. 'I had to take a stern tone,' said the prince, but he thought that sternness would give him the victory. Reschid took his leave and late in the evening sent the prince the official answer he had concerted with Stratford on the 14th. It was politely evasive and asked for a further delay of five or six days. Menšikov replied at 11 P.M. declining to consider the communication as 'either satisfactory or consistent with the dignity of my august master.' He formally broke off relations until satisfaction was granted, and referred to the 'incalculable consequences' of disagreement, a very ominous phrase in diplomacy. But he actually put off his departure for two or three days in view of the vast calamities 'which might result therefrom.'<sup>494</sup> With these menaces ringing in his ears Reschid told the Sultan of the rupture and 'His Majesty resigned himself with much firmness to the necessity.' \* Mehmet Ali had doubtless been at hand to support his Majesty.

On the 16th Menšikov still hoped. 'Reschid seems to me of good faith in respect to us, in so far as a Turk is susceptible of it. . . . You will see . . . that with the co-operation of Ahmed Fethi . . . he has succeeded in modifying the hostile sentiments of part of the Council.' Both British and French ministers had refused to send for their fleets, and Stratford 'has been accustoming himself to the idea of an occupation of the Principalities and would consider it an inevitable result of the rupture.'<sup>495</sup> But the Grand Council had met on the 17th. This body was a newly created one, and was formed by adding ex-ministers, governors of provinces and *ulemas* to the normal council of ministers. It could be relied on to represent the most conservative and prejudiced instincts of the Turks. It was an organ of national feeling, or rather prejudice, and would not have been summoned at all unless a refusal of the Russian demands were desired. On the 17th Mehmet Ali spoke strongly in favour of resistance. Husrev, the ex-Grand Vizier, known as 'the master-strangler,' advocated concession, but Husrev was believed to have received the gold of Menšikov. Reschid later declared that he threatened to resign at this meeting, 'if it were necessary to sign an engagement on behalf of the religious privileges.'<sup>496</sup> But the statement is doubtful, for he seems to have temporised. Stratford is said to have

\* F.O. 78/932. From Stratford, No. 51 of May 15, 1853. This information is in a p.s. suppressed in *E.P.* I, No. 193.

canvassed a number of members beforehand, but the feeling was so general that even his influence made little difference. In the ministerial council of the 14th (a much smaller gathering) there had been two votes for Russia. In the grand council vote of the 17th there were only three for Russia and forty-two against. Baron Mollerus says that Reschid went off to Stratford after the decision and was closeted with him for two hours.

Reschid must have felt some anxiety when he paid a new visit to Menšikov on the 18th. The call was in itself a courtesy, for Menšikov had already broken off relations. Reschid began by verbally offering three proposals. The Sultan agreed to give (1) a supreme decision as to the Holy Places and to make no further change without the preliminary consent of Russia and of France. (2) A *firman* of assurances to the patriarch of Constantinople. (3) A *Sened* with the force and value of a treaty, conceding land for the construction of a Russian church and hospice at Jerusalem. Menšikov answered by 'a refusal dry, clear and strongly expressed.' He then asked to see 'the pieces' in which these concessions were embodied. These were in fact what Stratford had proposed and drafted on the 14th, but Reschid had to admit that the ministers' council had not yet authorised them. Menšikov then broke off negotiations and roundly declared that he would leave Constantinople at once. Reschid became 'dry, jerky' and 'a little verbose'; 'he seemed ashamed of the propositions he had to make, and confessed his inability to master the situation, which he had found cut and dried.' He had not had time to alter it, 'since he had only just taken office.' Once again Menšikov broke off relations and dismissed Reschid in violence and anger. He says that Stratford was waiting for Reschid on the Bosphorus in a caique, and sent off his dragoman to the Grand Council to announce the rupture.\*

Even now the prince could not bring himself to believe that Reschid had completely deceived him, or that Stratford had regained the old ascendancy. He was like the husband in a Venetian comedy. Everyone knows the infidelity of the wife and the name of her lover, but no one tells the husband. Menšikov remained in his fool's paradise, believing that Reschid would, in some way or other, bring round the council to his views. He brought his yacht to the Bosphorus and got steam up in the belief that the sight of his readiness to depart would produce Turkey's surrender. He waited in vain. 'Prince Menšikov and the Russian Legation,' wrote Stratford with

\* Zaiončovskii, I. From Menšikov, No. 142 of May 21, 1853. All the above quotations are from the prince's own words.

amused contempt on the 19th, 'are still here and it is not easy to divine why.'

On the 19th an event of considerable importance took place. Europe attempted to intervene in the Russo-Turkish dispute. Stratford summoned a meeting of the representatives of Austria, France and Prussia. Europe came to a decision. As Menšikov had refused Stratford's good offices, Klezl, the Austrian *chargé d'affaires*, agreed to convey a joint note to him offering their good offices and asking him if he was disposed to receive 'through a private channel the Porte's intended note.'<sup>497</sup> The prince listened politely to this overture on the 20th. He answered that Turkey must grant his demands in full, or that he would put to sea that night. As usual, he did not carry out his threat. He was alarmed by the intervention of Europe, and countered once more by an attempt to secure a purely Russian solution. He privately sent Reschid the draft of a note, which he wished the Turks to address to him. If they would sign and return this draft he promised to suspend his departure. That was his last desperate effort at negotiation.

The draft note differed in form from all Menšikov's previous demands. He offered now to accept a Turkish diplomatic note instead of a *Sened* (Convention) or Treaty. This concession had been sanctioned in anticipation both by Nesselrode and the Czar. It was quite illusory, for the form of a diplomatic document does not matter if the obligation is clear. The concession was not in the substance, only in the manner of presenting it. Moreover Menšikov was no longer ambiguous about the laity. He demanded a guarantee of the privileges, not only for 'the clergy and their possessions' but for the Orthodox religion (*i.e.* laymen) of the East, that is for twelve millions of men. Reschid asked the four foreign diplomats for their advice. They declared that the Porte alone could judge of its own action. Their reply had to be non-committal, for, if the ambassadors had urged Turkey to resist, they would have been compelled to defend her in case of attack.

Stratford, while refusing advice officially, put on paper some 'reflections' in private and sent them to Reschid. The *Sened* had indeed been abandoned, but in return for 'an engagement binding solemnly the Porte for its strict execution in perpetuity to Russia and giving that power a distinct right to call the Porte to account for any remissness in that respect.' The demand was for 'a deed of compliance with foreign dictation having for its immediate result the introduction of Russian influence, to be exercised with the force of acknowledged right.' That could not be granted, but Stratford advised that Menšikov's last proposals 'should be examined

with an earnest desire to make it an instrument of negotiation.' Reschid should thank Menšikov for his 'conciliatory' spirit and for withdrawing the *Sened* and express a hope that he 'would suspend his departure and negotiate upon the joint basis of the Porte's note [of the 18th] and the Ambassadors' note [*i.e.* the European one of the 19th].'<sup>498</sup>

Reschid was more conciliatory than the other Turkish ministers, but he could not be as conciliatory as Stratford. The Sultan had declared the demand 'inadmissible.' He had found courage at last, or Mehemet Ali had found it for him. The Turks were now really irreconcilable, and Reschid dared not adopt all Stratford's advice. He did send his son privately to the prince on the 20th, with a 'piece' or ultimatum, which repeated in writing the verbal offer he had made on the 18th. But the offer was as odious to Menšikov by letter as it had been by word of mouth. The prince declared he would not alter 'a single letter' of the draft he had himself put forward. He would leave on Saturday, the 21st, at noon, unless he should receive, 'some time before his departure, a communication to the effect that the principle of his demands was admitted.'<sup>499</sup> Reschid dared not send either a public communication or even another private negotiator. The dignity of the Sultan had been seriously compromised by the late negotiations. But he took care that a rumour reached Prince Menšikov that 'the Sultan intended to proclaim a guarantee for the exercise of the spiritual rights possessed by the clergy of the Orthodox Eastern Church.' The prince could not restrain his anger and, at the moment of departure, wrote a note saying that 'a guarantee of purely spiritual rights' invalidated the other rights, privileges and immunities granted to the Greek religion (*i.e.* laymen) and its clergy. And, having thus once more betrayed himself in his wrath, Prince Menšikov really did go. His commercial staff remained behind and erased the Russian eagle and arms from the door of the Legation. But he himself and the diplomatic staff steamed away up the Black Sea precisely at noon on May 21.

## VIII

*When I relate hereafter  
The tale of this unhappy embassy  
All Rome shall be in tears.*

ADDISON, *Cato*, Act II, Sc. 1.

Anger with Reschid pasha was the immediate cause of Menšikov's decision to leave Constantinople. His pawn had



turned against him, the pawn he had thought a purely Russian one. His own threat of departure was meant as a concerted manœuvre with Reschid for the purpose of terrifying the council. He kept putting it off because he expected that even the rumour of it would bring Turkey to her knees. There seem to have been fierce recriminations between him and Reschid alike on the 15th and on the 16th. Neither said much about them subsequently, but Reschid undoubtedly pronounced Stratford 'inexorable,' and blamed him for Turkey's refusal to accept either *Sened* or alliance. The legend of the 'inexorable Stratford' was accepted by Nesselrode and the Czar for the future. History has to determine whether it is true.

The character not only of Stratford, but of Reschid, is involved in this fascinating and complicated problem. One impartial Dutchman exonerated Stratford. Another one, three years later, declared that Reschid had negotiated with Russia in order to better himself, and with the full intention of betraying her from the start. But he refused to say that Stratford was 'responsible for all this.'<sup>500</sup> It is indeed evident that he was not. In 1852 Reschid had been in bad odour with Stratford because of his impotence over reform. Menšikov's own admissions leave no doubt that Russian influence was responsible for placing Reschid in power in May 1853. Both the rise of Reschid and the fall of Mehemet Ali took Stratford by surprise, though gossip naturally said that he had engineered both. In point of fact both events endangered his influence over the Porte. It was not until late on the 14th that Reschid sought his advice, or till the 15th that Stratford realised that Reschid had got into office by Russian support. He then appealed to old ministers like Mehemet Ali, and it was not until the 18th that he certainly regained his ascendancy over Reschid. The whole affair was a masterpiece of oriental intrigue, though Reschid was far from being the master. He began his secret relations with Russia in order to get back into office and because he was discredited both with Turks and with British. He was the first to suggest the *Sened* and an extension of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji. He may have done so with the sinister idea of discrediting Russia, once he was again in power. But he cannot have done this in league with Stratford. When his intrigue with Russia began, Stratford was not in Constantinople nor thinking of returning there. Reschid's return to office was engineered by Russia mainly through the cunning Greek Aristarchi who acted as Menšikov's adviser and recommended him. He perhaps took office in

good faith believing that he could really arrange a settlement. But Turkish national feeling had risen up against Russia, and it now disorganised all his plans.

Reschid was completely at a loss, once he was in office. He had to resort to Stratford for technical advice on the 14th. The forces moving the Porte soon became painfully clear to him. The new 'national or religious' feeling ran strongly against Russia. Reschid's attitude may have been for concession on the night of the 14th, but he was defeated then, and overwhelmed at the Grand Council on the 17th. After that, the cause of pro-Russianism was hopeless. On the 18th the Russian prince still believed that some agreement could be reached. Even after that date Reschid remained more conciliatory to Russia than any other Turkish minister and was always the readiest to entertain peace proposals. The reason is plainly that the traces of the secret understanding remained. He was more committed to Russia than anyone else and knew more of her secret intentions. One thing is quite certain. Reschid's own evidence is conflicting. His assertions, which Menšikov recorded at the time, conflict with his written admissions to Stratford a few weeks later.

It was suggested by gossip in Constantinople, and by Lord John Russell in London, that Stratford alone upset Mehemet Ali and brought back Reschid to power. The evidence of Menšikov himself refutes this society scandal. The sole question that remains, therefore, is whether Stratford was right in organising resistance to the Russian demands. Reschid undoubtedly accused him to Menšikov of causing the failure of his mission. But Reschid was in a position when he could only defend himself by accusing someone else. Stratford was suspicious of Reschid and had taken precautions beforehand to refute the charge which he knew would be made. During the critical days he only sought information as to the views of the Turkish members of the Grand Council, and did not use pressure. He probably knew well that it was needless. He refused, along with the other diplomats, officially to advise Reschid about Menšikov's last proposal of the 20th, and his private advice was rejected by the Turks. When accusations were made Stratford was able to quote Reschid himself. Reschid wrote that the Sublime Porte had already declared the Russian note 'impossible,' and this was 'without the communication . . . of any opinion which might have been entertained by your Lordship.' <sup>501</sup>

There seems, therefore, no reasonable doubt that Reschid lied when he told Menšikov that the Turks wished to accept

his terms but were prevented by Stratford. It is true that Stratford's arrival had a great moral effect on the Turks, but it did not create the opposition to Menšikov. Turkish feeling was already aroused and determined, and Stratford's advice merely enabled the Porte to take up the best diplomatic positions. The guns were loaded, but Stratford aimed them better. Even the overthrow of the Grand Vizier and of Rifaat pasha did not materially alter the situation, as Reschid soon discovered. The real cause of Menšikov's defeat is to be found as much in the insults to Turkish pride as in the menaces to Turkish independence. But the latter were, in themselves, sufficient to justify all opposition. The demand for a secret alliance was extremely menacing. It was indeed never put forward officially, though hinted at by the Czar himself in his letter to the Sultan. It was clearly incompatible with the European character of the Five Powers' attitude to Turkey outlined in the Treaty of 1841. The claims to guarantees for the future, and to what was a virtual religious protectorate, were officially put forward. They were equally incompatible with the obligations of 1841, or with the integrity or independence of Turkey. Even, therefore, if he had enforced Turkish resistance to these demands, it would be difficult to say that Stratford did wrong. From April to June his conduct was not only marked by great ability but by considerable restraint. If he is to bear censure it will assuredly not be for his conduct during the mission of Menšikov. To say that is to say much, for the consequences of Prince Menšikov's failure were writ large in the future history of Europe.

## CHAPTER XIII

### HOW PEACE ENDED

#### I

*'Tis time we should decree  
What course to take, the foe advances on us.*

ADDISON, *Cato*, Act II, Sc. 1.

IN the last days of May two great decisions were made. On the 27th the Czar in St. Petersburg ordered Russian troops to pass the Pruth and occupy the Principalities. On May 30 and June 1 the cabinet in London decided to send the fleet to Besika Bay, just outside the Dardanelles ; the Emperor Napoleon agreeing to support them with a French squadron.\* The British and the Russian decisions were taken simultaneously but independently of one another. But the effect of the British decision was seen first. On June 13 the British squadron arrived at Besika Bay in all its glory. The very names of the ships breathed of history and of victory. They were the *Albion* and the *Rodney* ; the *Vengeance*, the *Bellerophon* ; the *Britannia*, the *Trafalgar* ; and last of all ' the saucy *Arethusa*.' Next day, the 14th, three French three-deckers and five two-deckers arrived, two of them bearing the proud names of the *Friedland* and the *Charlemagne*. On July 2 the Russian troops crossed the Pruth and entered the Principalities. Thus a formidable fleet kept watch over a formidable army. Neither movement produced war ; each brought it nearer. The real danger of troops or fleets taking up advanced stations is the difficulty of retiring from them with honour. Evacuation or retreat is a confession of failure. And in these two cases the danger was great, for evacuation had to come soon, if it was to come at all. In this part of the world the weather breaks violently in October and affects movements both on sea and on land. The Russian army could not march back along roads which had become quagmires, so it would have to wait till the spring of the next year. The Franco-British fleet could not keep its station in the bay exposed to winter storms. It

\* *F.O.* 146/469 shows that the French were officially informed on June 3 ; but from *pte. Strat. MSS.*, *F.O.* 352/36, Clarendon to Stratford, June 1, 1853, it looks as if Clarendon told Walewski on the 1st or even earlier.

must seek safety either by entering the Dardanelles and thus violating the Treaty of 1841, or by retiring on Smyrna or Salamis with a loss of prestige.

The Russians always argued, and sometimes believed, that the advance of the allied fleet resembled their own occupation of the Principalities. But this theory was quite erroneous. When they occupied them in 1848 they had a basis of legality, which Palmerston himself had recognised. But there was no such defence for the occupation of 1853. The very terms of the manifesto admitted the illegality. 'We have found it needful to advance our armies into the Danubian principalities, in order to show the Ottoman Porte to what its obstinacy may lead.' Here is the comment of a neutral: 'The phrases are in the friendly and pacific style, with which in our age we are accustomed to do things (*accomplir des faits*) most opposed to law and reason.'<sup>502</sup> All the powers protested, but without effect. The presence of the Franco-British fleet at Besika Bay violated no treaty, for it had not attempted to enter the Dardanelles. It might be a demonstration against Russia, but it was in no way illegal. None the less the situation was dangerous. Besika Bay was exposed and the fleets could not remain there during the autumn gales. The three months of July, August and September gave the peacemakers a chance. In October decisions would be taken.

The pride of the Russian Czar had led him into his difficulties. Clarendon and the British cabinet understood and wanted to make his retreat easy. Up till now they had been substantially in agreement with Stratford. Several of them did not like him, but on the whole they had approved his resistance to Menšikov. It was almost the last thing about him they did approve. Their ways and his soon diverged, like the interests of London and of Constantinople. Stratford understood and tried to dominate the public opinion of Turkey. Clarendon and Aberdeen understood and failed to dominate the public opinion of London. What was possible and acceptable in London was not always possible and acceptable at Stambul. Stratford had his own ways of managing the Turks which he did not, and sometimes could not, explain. But the Foreign Secretary could see nothing but London, and the Ambassador could see nothing but Stambul. Had either Clarendon or Stratford had a free hand, there might have been no war.

During April and May the British cabinet became more and more alarmed at the proceedings of Prince Menšikov. Aberdeen was 'in reality our only friend,' reported Brunnow on



May 13. He asked Aberdeen whether 'it was worth while to involve Turkey into [*sic*] a quarrel about so *very little*.' <sup>503</sup> Was it so very little? He found Clarendon did not think so when he presented his draft of the *Sened* on the 16th. On the 18th the French ambassador told Clarendon that it was 'the opinion of de la Cour at Constantinople and his own that the Convention, if accepted, would be fatal to Turkish independence.' Palmerston expressed doubts of Russia's good faith on the 22nd. Lord John Russell went further on the 28th. '*Every privilege* of the Greek Church (not of all Christians) is to be made a matter of engagement with Russia, it is intolerable. It is the way of the bear before he kills his victim!' <sup>504</sup>\* Next day he thought it not impossible that the Emperor of Russia 'having failed with us, may offer Egypt and Candia to France as her part of the spoils of Turkey.' On the 30th, even Aberdeen admitted that Menšikov's demands are 'unreasonable and ought to be resisted. But I cannot yet believe that it will be necessary to do so by war.' The press was taking a different view. *The Times*, 'the Brunnow organ,' was still moderate. But the *Manchester Guardian* stressed Turkey's commercial importance to England. It had condemned Napoleon for despatching his squadron to Salamis, it now held him up to admiration for his firmness. If our fleet joined Napoleon's, said the *Daily News*, the Czar would give way and war be averted.

Public opinion was thus pressing hard for some vigorous stroke such as the movement of the fleet. The ministers knew that Menšikov had made violent demands on the 15th and broken off relations, and they knew that he had left on the 21st. They did not know of what had passed between those dates, nor whether there was any hope of negotiations being resumed. On May 30 the cabinet decided on two grave steps. They gave Stratford authority 'to call up' the Mediterranean fleet if necessary. Aberdeen protested it was 'a fearful power' to put into his hands, but the cabinet quieted him by saying that the fleet should only be called up to defend Constantinople. They also decided to remind the Czar of his promises. Next day a long argumentative despatch was sent off to St. Petersburg to be read to Nesselrode. On the same 31st Lord John Russell wrote to Clarendon demanding that the Mediterranean squadron should go at once to Vurla, that orders should be sent 'to-night or to-morrow at latest.' Lords Lansdowne, Clarendon, Palmerston and himself were 'very desirous of this measure. I know no-one who is against it except Lord

\* He adds the somewhat needless caution, 'Don't read this to Brunnow.'

Aberdeen.' Clarendon put up the matter to Aberdeen, and on June 1 the Prime Minister wrote, regretting but 'not objecting' to the wish 'of the cabinet, or at least a portion of it, . . . that the fleet should sail.'\* This settled the matter. Clarendon sent orders to the fleet on June 2. Admiral Dundas was not to go to Vurla, which is outside Smyrna, but to Besika Bay, which is just outside the Dardanelles.

Clarendon sent his orders on the 2nd, despite Aberdeen and despite a long despatch which came from Stratford on the 1st, declaring 'there is at least no threat of immediate war, no hint of an approaching occupation of the Principalities.' 'I gather,' wrote Clarendon privately in reply, 'that you don't expect a resort to the *ultima ratio*.'<sup>505</sup> This admission proves that Stratford made no demand for the British fleet and did not expect war. Clarendon had therefore not deferred to him but to popular clamour in England. He explained privately to Stratford on May 30, 'we [the cabinet] did not bring ourselves to believe, and can hardly do so now, that any resort to force will be necessary against a man so bound hard and fast by his promises as the Emperor of Russia.' Then comes the real reason for sending the fleet. 'Public opinion is strong against him [the Czar] and in favour of the Turks but there would soon be reaction if we really got into war and the commerce and finances of the whole world were suffering.'<sup>506</sup> Thus the despatch of the fleet to Besika Bay is thought to be a prudential measure. On the same principle Nesselrode had justified the despatch of the Russian army. The Sultan was to take warning from the army. The Czar was to take warning from the fleet.

Russia would occupy the Principalities unless she received satisfaction from Turkey within a week. That statement, written by Nesselrode on the 1st, was made known to the cabinet on June 8. They then agreed that the Russian occupation 'had better not be made a *casus belli*.' Palmerston had wished to make the Russian occupation a *casus belli*, but he was overruled at the cabinet on the 18th and gave way 'with a good grace.' Even Lord John, though full of wrath against Menšikov, did not support him. The cabinet 'agreed not to meet it [the Russian occupation] with a declaration of war, [and] also directed Lord Stratford not to bring the fleet to Constantinople.' They also decided unanimously that 'this country is not bound by any obligations of treaty, to take a part in the apprehended conflict.'<sup>507</sup>

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.*, Russell to Clarendon, June 1, 1853; Aberdeen to Clarendon, June 1. It appears that Graham, the First Lord, was another dissident. The Queen's assent seems to have been secured when the draft of Clarendon's despatch of May 31 to Stratford was sent her. *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1698], No. 194, p. 215.

‘The Emperor of Russia seems to have invented a new course of proceeding to announce officially that he means to have war without declaring it. The object of this “dust in the eyes” announcement is palpable . . . to wrench by force from the Turks the concessions he asks and on the other hand to keep the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus closed on the pretence that the Porte is still at peace.’<sup>508</sup> This was Palmerston’s complaint on the 19th, and the note of a lengthy memo of Lord John on the same day. He said that Menšikov’s demands were preposterous, that war was near, and that France must be our ally. During the next few days Aberdeen and Clarendon were violently attacked in the opposition press. Palmerston made a bold proposal on the 28th. ‘The best thing to be done for the moment is that England and France should declare to the [Russian] Emperor that his invasion of the Principalities, if it should take place or if it has taken place, necessarily suspends and interrupts that peaceful state of the Turkish Empire which by the Treaty of 1841 is the condition *sine qua non* of the closing of the Straits. That consequently the two Powers consider the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus open to their ships of war as long as the Russian troops shall remain within the Turkish frontier, and that the combined squadrons will accordingly proceed at once to the Bosphorus. That the future movements of those squadrons must depend on the course of events. I cannot but think that such a communication would make the Emperor pause, if when he received it he had not ordered his troops to march ; and would make him accessible to reason, if he had already ordered them to advance. Nothing is to be gained with the Russian government, or indeed with any other, by anything which looks like doubt, hesitation or fear, while on the other hand, a bold firm course founded on right, and supported by strength is the safest way of arriving at a satisfactory and peaceable result.’<sup>509</sup>

Here we have the case for action, stated in the forcible phrases of which Palmerston was a master. He brought the matter before the cabinet on the 4th and again three days later. ‘I tried again,’ he wrote on July 7 to Lord John, ‘to persuade the cabinet to send the squadrons up to the Bosphorus but failed. I was told that Stratford and de la Cour have powers to call for them.’<sup>510</sup> Some members of the cabinet, Russell among them, wished ‘entire discretion’ to call up the fleet to be given to Stratford. But none of them dared to support Palmerston’s bold measure. There was much risk in it, but it would have settled the matter one way or the other. Peace or war must have been decided at once. Would the Czar have surrendered? The Dutch Minister thought so at

the time. 'If only England and France had acted with more harmony and energy in declaring to the Russians beforehand that the passage of the Pruth would cause the entry of their fleets into the Black Sea, I think they would have avoided it and the Russians thought twice before taking such a step.'<sup>511</sup> That was what Napolcon and his ministers and the opposition leaders, Derby and Malmesbury, thought. It was what Clarendon himself was to think later in the year. Our 'anomalous and dangerous position . . .,' he wrote to Aberdeen, 'might have been avoided by firmer language and a more decided course five months ago.' That was what he thought in November, but it was not what either he or the cabinet thought in July.

The cabinet is often unhappy in its decisions on foreign affairs. Half a century later Lord Salisbury complained to the Queen of 'the necessity of adapting our foreign policy to the views of a cabinet of fourteen or fifteen members usually ignorant of it [foreign policy] and seldom united in their views.'<sup>512</sup> Disunion or ignorance usually ends in half-measures. There was, for once, not ignorance in the cabinet. The existing Foreign Secretary was a trained diplomat and there were three ex-Foreign Secretaries in a cabinet of fourteen. Nor was this cabinet usually disunited. In March Clarendon said 'he never saw anything like the union and harmony of the cabinet. No people could get on better together.'<sup>513</sup> Russell in March, Palmerston in June and July, submitted to be overruled with good grace. But the ministry, though neither ignorant nor disunited, clung to its half-measures. For in peace time a British cabinet rarely takes decisions involving a clear risk of war. They refused to send the fleet to the Bosphorus in July because they hoped peace would soon be made. Peace was to be made in two ways and by two peacemakers. Clarendon sought it at Vienna, Stratford at Constantinople. And now their ways diverged.

## II

SULTAN BAJAZET : *Tell him I am content to take a truce  
Because I hear he bears a valiant mind :  
But if, presuming on his silly power,  
He be so mad to manage arms with me  
Then—*

MARLOWE, *Tamburlaine*, Part I, Act III, Sc. 1.

The British cabinet's refusal to send the fleet to Constantinople in June or July was strongly supported by Stratford.

This fact in itself refutes the foolish legend that Palmerston and Stratford were in league with war for their object. In June and July Stratford wanted to keep the fleet at Besika Bay, and strongly opposed attempts (such as those of Palmerston) to bring it up to the Bosphorus. His watchword was still 'moral resistance.' Such a policy would avert actual hostilities, give the Turks time to prepare their army, and enable European diplomacy to come to their aid. But all the dice turned in favour of the Turkish war party. On April 23 one British naval captain had given it as his technical opinion that a Russian fleet, sailing to the Bosphorus, could seize Constantinople by a *coup de main*; by the end of June the advanced state of the Turkish defences rendered such an attempt impossible.<sup>514</sup> The Turkish war party knew this fact and were elated accordingly. They had just previously had two other incentives to resistance. The British naval squadron, despatched against Stratford's advice, reached Besika Bay on June 13; the French followed a day later. On the 20th the Sultan learned that both the Bey of Tunis and the Khedive of Egypt would send strong contingents to his aid. It was hard to preach peace when the flame of national and religious feeling burned so high, when Constantinople was safe and when reinforcements were coming up.

Stratford had taken a momentous step when he called the four ambassadors into conference on May 19. He had revived the old European pressure on Turkey. 'This kind of European confederacy, . . . acting on broad European lines,'\* was just the way to impress Constantinople. The personal touch, so irresistible in the East, was supplied by 'a European confederacy' sitting at Constantinople. It was much more likely to impress the Turks than to impress Europe. Foreign Secretaries seldom take their orders from their ambassadors. Europe in general was not inclined to submit to Constantinople, England in particular was unable to do so. Clarendon should have recognised this fact and clearly subordinated the ambassadors at Constantinople to the diplomatic conference which was soon to meet at Vienna.

On May 31 Nesselrode presented a sort of ultimatum to Turkey, indicating that Russia would occupy the Principalities if her terms were not accepted. Prince Menšikov's last draft note (of May 20) must be signed by Turkey 'without variation' and a week's grace given for reply. Russia assumed a Turkish refusal to be certain, for orders to the troops to cross the border

\* F.O. 78/932. From Stratford, No. 57 of May 22, 1853; passage omitted from *E.P.* I, No. 234, pp. 251-3.



had seen sent by the Czar on May 27. The Russian note arrived on June 10, just after the Sultan had granted far-reaching concessions to his Orthodox subjects. A *firman* to the Greek patriarch of June 7, issued under Stratford's influence, confirmed all the privileges and stated that 'the ancient conditions of the patriarch and [his] metropolitans must, in conformity with imperial will and solicitude, be for ever preserved from all prejudice.'<sup>515</sup> Russia's peremptory demand had just been anticipated by Turkey's spontaneous concession.

From the first Reschid seems to have had no doubt about rejecting the Russian note. He seems to have been encouraged to resist by the fact that Argyropoulo, Menšikov's dragoman, visited him and hinted at concessions from Russia.<sup>516</sup> Stratford's attitude was more conciliatory. On the 14th he advised Reschid to reply by a strong protest against the Russian threat to occupy the Principalities, as 'too much at variance with the principles of the treaty of 1840' and to say that 'it would be scarcely more offensive to the Porte than to those powers which took part in the Treaty. I have another suggestion to offer. Strong as the Porte undoubtedly is in its rights, and also in the sympathy of its allies, peace is an object of immense value, and one to which many sacrifices may be made with honour and advantage. No effort offering the slightest chance of maintaining or recovering it can be neglected without regret.'\* Turkey should send a special ambassador to St. Petersburg to renew relations and should communicate to the Czar the concessions made to the Orthodox patriarch in the recent *firman*.

It is difficult to read this plea for peace (which Stratford sent privately to Reschid and did not report fully to London) without believing in its sincerity. But Russia's attitude was beginning to make peace hard for even a conciliatory Turk like Reschid. It was harder still for him after the 15th, when he learned that the Franco-British squadron had reached Besika Bay. He could hardly believe now that the allies would desert him. On the 16th he sent a polite refusal of Russia's latest ultimatum to the Russian legation. In consequence its last remaining representatives left Constantinople on the 17th, taking with them the archives of the legation. The departure of an ambassador, or of the whole legation staff, does not necessarily produce war; the forcible occupation of

\* *Pte. Strat. MSS. summary, F.O. 352/36, Stratford to Pisani, June 14, 1853. This is only reported in brief in an official despatch home, F.O. 78/933, No. 100 of June 15, 1853. Unwisely from his own point of view, Stratford omitted his emphasis on peace from the summary.*

territory almost invariably does. But the rules of intercourse between civilised states did not apply to Turkey. That strange empire was an exception to all rules. There were still hopes of preserving peace even when Russia's legation staff was no longer in Turkey and when Russian warriors were encamped on her soil.

On July 7 the news came to Stambul that the Russians had crossed the frontier. On the 9th the Sultan added to the general confusion by suddenly dismissing both the Grand Vizier and Reschid pasha. The causes were stated to be purely personal. Stratford suddenly intervened on the 9th. He saw the Sultan, asked him 'whose mare was dead' and got the offending ministers restored. Clarendon promptly approved this step as a gain to peace. By restoring the ministry intact Stratford prevented the war party from gaining the ascendancy in the Sultan's cabinet. The Porte continued to act peacefully and refused to treat the Russian occupation as a *casus belli*. On July 14 appeared their formal protest. Russia's demands for the protection of the Orthodox in Turkey were needless, because two recent *firman*s of the Sultan had conceded every legitimate right. Turkey cannot contract 'exclusive obligations' to any power, and her refusal to do so has caused her territory to be occupied. She considers that occupation a violation of the Treaty of 1841, and appeals to the signatory powers in consequence. The whole paper, which is exceedingly moderate in tone, bears the impress of Stratford.

The policy of Stratford is quite clear, if we consider the public opinion of Stambul and disregard that of London, Paris and St. Petersburg. The tide of national and religious feeling was steadily rising there. It was desirable to conclude matters before it rose higher. Time was therefore all-important, and time was lost by a series of accidents. All business, as usual, was interrupted by fasting in the month of Ramazan and by feasting in the month of Bairam. Then came the palace intrigue, which displaced the ministry for a day and disorganised all business for a week. That week was an irreparable loss. Concessions from the Turks even a week earlier might have changed the situation. The Turkish offer would then have reached Buol while he still favoured negotiation at Constantinople, and before Vienna's conference had its proposals ready.

In mid-July the Turkish cabinet, 'with some trifling shades of difference,' were unanimous in opposing the Russian demands. There was more to fear 'from their rashness than from their timidity.' But Reschid was still for peace, and

Mehemet Ali was not yet for war.<sup>517</sup> Stratford had, however, to be very careful. If he pressed the cabinet too hard it would fall, and be succeeded by a Russian peace-party cabinet or by a Turkish war-party cabinet. The latter was the more likely, but either alternative was dangerous, so the best chance was to keep the existing cabinet in office and extract the utmost from it. This was what Stratford did. A 'Turkish ultimatum,' as it was most unfortunately called, was forwarded to the diplomatic conference at Vienna for transmission to St. Petersburg. It consisted first of a note from Reschid to Nesselrode, dated July 20. This referred to the peaceful attitude of Turkey in view of the Russian occupation. Copies followed of the *firman*s recently granted by the Sultan to the non-Mussulman religions of Turkey. 'The ancient privileges of the religion professed by H.M. the Emperor of Russia, and by the greater part of his subjects, have been fully confirmed in perpetuity; the Sublime Porte hopes that the Russian Government will learn this with pleasure.' It was formally stated that a conference of ambassadors at Constantinople had witnessed the solemn obligations undertaken by the Sultan to his subjects.

The first comment to be made on this 'Turkish ultimatum' is that it did not meet one objection of the Czar. A *firman* was not enough because it might be revoked by the Sultan. The Czar had demanded the exchange of a bilateral pledge between Russia and Turkey, from which Turkey could only be released with the consent of Russia. Buol himself thought that the spontaneous grant of *firman*s by the Sultan put Russia in the position of having to 'accept as a defeat what she could have claimed as a victory.'<sup>518</sup> The 'ultimatum' did afford securities to Russia because it placed the Four other Powers in the position of witnesses to Turkey's bond 'in perpetuity.' But the document itself was issued under the inspiration of Stratford, and the phrase 'Turkish ultimatum' was unfortunate. It was a bitter medicine for Russia to swallow. The suave diplomats of Europe thought they could brew a more acceptable draught at Vienna. They did not understand that Constantinople had now reached the end of all concession. 'The Porte,' wrote Stratford, 'will hear of nothing else [than the ultimatum] and the war-party is soon more likely to be in the ascendent [*sic*] than reduced to order.'<sup>519</sup> Turkey had reached the extreme limit of possible European coercion.

On July 29 Count Buol, as president of the conference at Vienna, received the 'Turkish ultimatum.' Two days before

he had begun working on a counter-project finally known as the 'Vienna Note.' On the day he received the ultimatum he stated to British, French and Prussian diplomats that 'his own proposals protected the honour and the best interests of the Porte as effectively as the measure Reschid had adopted.' The Four Powers concurred in rejecting the 'Turkish ultimatum.' They substituted the 'Vienna Note' for it on August 1, which they forwarded to the Sultan that day. On the 5th Nesselrode signified 'acceptation pure et simple' by the Czar of the 'Note.' There was general delight, for the crisis seemed to be over. Gladstone, turning from finance to foreign policy, wrote lyrically to Aberdeen: 'Whatever be the final issue you are the person to whom we owe its present state. There is plainly no other man in the cabinet who combined calmness, solidity of judgment, knowledge of the question and moderation of views in a manner or degree (even independently of your personal and official authority) sufficient to have held our course so nearly straight.'<sup>520</sup> But these bright hopes were soon dashed. Turkey's reply was as slow as Russia's was quick. Stratford remained ominously silent for some days, but found his voice on the 19th. He reported that the Turks practically rejected the 'Vienna Note,' and the news evoked general alarm. It was felt to be a step further on the slippery descent to war. Was it Stratford who had induced the Turks to take it?

### III

*An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another into Slavery.—*  
BURKE, *Speech on Conciliation*, 1775.

If we want to know why the 'Vienna Note' failed we must trace it back to its origin. In mid-June France and England asked Austria to summon a conference of the Five Powers signing the Convention of 1841, 'to take into consideration the questions at present in dispute before they should be resolved by one of these powers [Russia] by force of arms.' The Russian occupation of the Principalities only strengthened the purpose of the conference and caused Clarendon to submit a draft Convention, which he thus explains. 'The [Russian] Emperor appears to be rendered ungovernable by finding for the first time that Europe *can* have an opinion of its own and can express it tho[ugh] it be contrary to his. Austria and Prussia have both, *for them*, spoken boldly and his having asked for the good offices of Austria with the Porte is a proof that he

finds it inconvenient to isolate himself. . . . He is in a false position, get out of it as he may, backwards or forwards, he will have lost caste in Europe but our business is to spare his dignity as much as possible, always bearing in mind our main object of saving 'Turkey from his claws.'<sup>521</sup> On July 6 Clarendon stated that the government 'have no reason at present to think that war between this country and Russia will arise.' But only a day before he had written, 'Our pacific policy is at variance with public opinion so it cannot long be persisted in.' \* A remarkable confession indeed!

At the time Clarendon was not even disturbed by the news of the Russian occupation of the Principalities on the 7th. The Czar, he thought, 'would prefer recrossing the Pruth by a bridge made for him by his Allies' (July 8). Negotiations could be centred in Vienna, where the conference of diplomats was to assemble and where the Czar was likely to accept terms from his brother Emperor. The first article of Clarendon's draft convention 'simply recites . . . the Treaty of Kainardji. It then *adverts* to the recent *firman*s simply to show how the obligation has been carried out and then reviews and confirms the Treaty of Kainardji and others. This may . . . not be sufficient for Russia though it ought to be if there is *any* honesty in her professions but at all events it seems to me quite safe for 'Turkey and if she accepts and Russia rejects it the case against the latter will be complete.'<sup>522</sup> The underlying suggestion is exactly the same as that of Stratford in the 'Turkish ultimatum.'

Unfortunately for Clarendon, Napoleon intervened with a new version, on which he vehemently insisted. Clarendon gave way, since Napoleon was directly interested in the Holy Places. Ultimately Prussia and Austria accepted the French version and the Czar himself, to whom it was secretly shown, indicated approval. The 'Vienna Note' begins like Clarendon's draft convention. The Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople are referred to and the Sultan is described as considering himself 'bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudices now or hereafter' the spiritual privileges already granted to the Eastern Church, and 'moreover in a spirit of exalted equity to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement. . . .' Then comes the difference. 'The Sublime Porte, moreover, officially

\* F.O. 356/31. Clarendon to Bloomfield, *pte. Blo. MSS.*, July 5, 1853. The quotation of July 6 is in a draft to Mr. Duncan, July 6, from F.O. 96/73. This record has been destroyed since I copied it.



promises that the existing state of things shall in no wise be modified without previous understanding with the Governments of France and Russia and without any prejudice to the different Christian communities.' Also permission was given to build a Russian hostel and church at Jerusalem. There is an important difference between this and the 'Turkish ultimatum.' Russia and France, instead of the Four Powers, are made the witnesses and even the legal guarantors of Turkey's good faith. She could only be released from her obligations if she obtained the preliminary consent of these two foreign powers.

From the European point of view the 'Vienna Note' appeared (though it proved not to be) satisfactory. From the Turkish point of view it was quite inadmissible. The 'Note' emphasised rather obviously her sense of dependence and inferiority. The 'ultimatum' had saved Turkey's face by making the Four Powers witness of her 'spontaneous' promise to Russia. The formal, though secret, submission of the 'Vienna Note' to the Czar beforehand also injured Turkish pride. The Turkish minister and his dragoman at Vienna had been privately told about the 'Note' and had approved of it. 'They [the conference] had considered this to afford a strong presumption that it [the Note] would not be unpalatable at Constantinople.'<sup>523</sup> But Europe's diplomats did not understand Turkish psychology. A note could not be palatable if submitted formally to the Czar himself and informally to the Sultan's minister. The Sultan always thought his ambassadors were betraying him and naturally suspected any informal procedure. Reschid protested indignantly 'the [European] cabinets take upon themselves to draw up a note without the knowledge . . . of the party more immediately interested.'\* Turkey was not treated by the Powers as on an equality with Russia, and, in addition, received no pledge that Russia would evacuate the Principalities if the 'Note' were accepted. There was a last argument too. Turkey had accepted the 'ultimatum' at the bidding of Stratford and of his colleagues as the extreme limit of concession demanded from her. The 'Vienna Note' demanded yet further concessions, and at once aroused suspicion and provoked resistance.

The great question now was, would Turkey accept the

\* *F.O.* 78/937. From Stratford, No. 220 of August 14, 1853. Reschid here denies receiving knowledge beforehand. He is correct if he means 'official' knowledge. He may even have had no unofficial knowledge. It is quite likely that the Turkish minister at Vienna did not dare admit his previous knowledge of the 'Note.'

'Vienna Note'? On August 12 Stratford had demanded Turkey's acceptance. It was a date almost ideally unsuited for the purpose. For on that day the Egyptian fleet arrived at Constantinople and gave an enormous accession of strength to the war party. The white sails of Egypt's fleet crowded the Golden Horn, the green tents of her army dotted the hills of Asia. The Franco-British squadron, though not within sight, was within call. Stambul was safe. All believed that England and France would support Turkey. While the Turkish ministers were discussing the 'Vienna Note' Egyptian soldiers and sailors paraded the streets of Stambul and the war-fever grew under the influence of Mehemet Ali. At the Ministers' Council on the 14th amendments to the 'Note' were proposed by the two members most under Stratford's influence, Reschid and the Grand Vizier. Of the rest six were neutral, while eight, headed by Mehemet Ali, were for total rejection. By the 18th resistance had stiffened, but Stratford refused to accept any amendments. 'Perceiving my reserve the Pasha was deeply affected; his eyes overflowed with tears; forgetful for a moment of his rank he kissed my hand, and in the most moving terms implored me not to forsake his country in the midst of distresses and dangers which it could not avoid without an unworthy sacrifice. The scene was to me a most painful one.'\* Stratford remained silent and Reschid went away very sorrowful. None the less, he was resolute. On the 19th he indicated rejection of the 'Vienna Note' in its original form. The Grand Council made their decision absolute on the 20th, and inserted amendments which Russia was most unlikely to accept.

On August 20 the balance, hitherto swaying towards peace, sank heavily downwards towards war. What was the part that Stratford played in the tragedy? Two facts are known at the outset. He certainly disapproved of the 'Vienna Note' and favoured the 'ultimatum.' But he acted with complete official correctness and went through all the forms necessary to secure Turkey's adherence. He solemnly assured his wife and his confidant Alison, as well as Clarendon and Westmorland, that he had done his utmost to secure acceptance. His private assurances to his wife and his confidant might seem to be enough. Yet, with him as with Ponsonby in 1839 and in 1840, the sinister suggestion of Machiavellian intrigue must be considered. If true, it would prove Stratford to be the worst

\* *F.O.* 78/937. From Stratford, No. 222 of August 18, 1853; cp. self in *E.H.R.*, April 1934, 273 and n. 1. The passage is omitted of course in the Blue Book.

of intriguers and perjurers. He could easily be both in Constantinople. Evidence could be destroyed or fabricated at will. Like Ponsonby, Stratford could always cover his tracks if he wanted to. He officially supported the 'Note,' but his private verbal message could at any time have secured its rejection. With the fullest consideration of such possibilities, I believe the explanation to be a simpler one, and to be found in a glowing sentence of Kinglake's: 'It is not to be believed that, even if he strove to do so, Lord Stratford could hide his real thoughts from Turkish ministers. . . . If the thin disciplined lips moved in obedience to constituted authorities, men knew how to read the meaning of his brow, and the light which kindled beneath.'<sup>524</sup>

The presence of the Egyptian fleet and army emboldened the ministers to defy Europe. The 'Vienna Note' was not only insulting to Turkey, it was disastrous to Stratford. He had said the 'Turkish ultimatum' would be accepted by Europe. Europe not only rejected it but increased her demands. Either Stratford had betrayed them, or he was less influential with the Powers than they had supposed. In each case there were strong reasons for rejecting his new advice. Acceptance of the 'Vienna Note' really put Turkey in the hands of Russia and France, both of whom had menaced and humiliated her. In quieter times the Turks might have agreed to an arrangement which gave opportunities of playing one off against the other. But these were not quiet times. Over the Menšikov mission the national or religious feelings of Turkey had really been roused. The Grand Council, the quintessence of obscurantist prejudice, had become an organ of state and a channel of public opinion. It had caused the departure of Menšikov, it had accepted the Turkish 'ultimatum' on July 25, now on August 20 it unanimously rejected the 'Vienna Note.' The Sultan himself asked the Austrian Internuncio to help him to secure amendments. When Baron Bruck replied by insisting on the original version of the 'Note,' the Sultan broke off the conversation in wrath. To ask Vienna to amend its 'Note' was to court a rebuff, yet the Sultan did so and lowered himself by a vain appeal to a foreign diplomat. The utmost Stratford could secure from Reschid was a 'very imperfect attempt' at amendments. The Turkish national feeling had produced the Sultan's humiliation. Reschid, who had been reduced to tears by Stratford, was reported by de la Cour as 'looked on with suspicion as the representative of a pacific policy, and every effort made even by his colleagues to ensure his downfall.'<sup>525</sup> Reschid told

Stratford that no one in Constantinople favoured 'the Note.' That feeling, and not Stratford's influence, was the true reason for rejection. The Turks were in August what Clarendon said the Czar was in June, that is 'ungovernable.'

The news of the Turkish rejection of the 'Vienna Note' confounded the diplomats of Europe. Everybody had rejoiced at the Czar's acceptance of it *in toto*. No one knew what to do when the Sultan insisted on amendments. For Russia would certainly refuse them and the brilliant creation of Vienna would burst bubble-like. The first impulse was of indignation against Stratford as the chief architect of evil. Feeling ran high in the British cabinet. Stratford's old enemy, Graham, suggested on August 18 that he be superseded; John Russell advised 'positive orders.' On the 20th Clarendon informed the Queen of the possibility of Stratford's resignation, 'which,' he wrote to Aberdeen, 'I agree with you in thinking by no means improbable, and which she will not at all regret.'<sup>526</sup> On the 25th the fatal news of rejection arrived. Clarendon had thought all along that Stratford 'would allow no plan of settlement that did not originate with himself.' Aberdeen was heartbroken, as he thought we had 'no right' to ask the Czar to accept the Turkish amendments. A secret report came from de la Cour at Constantinople that Stratford was speculating on the disunion of the British Ministry and declaring that his name was Canning. But the cabinet did not dare to demand his resignation, though the idea had been already approved by Foreign Secretary, Premier and Sovereign. That would have evoked the opposition of the public and of Palmerston. Greville noted at the end of August that Palmerston's influence in Parliament is 'greater than ever,' and that public opinion favoured not only Palmerston but Stratford. So he remained.

The situation now became impossible. Stratford was not to be trusted. Yet he was not to be superseded, nor even to be informed of the distrust of the cabinet. Aberdeen spoke, and continued to speak, of his 'dishonesty.' Clarendon complained to him in private of the 'extreme annoyance and disappointment to us. . . . I can only infer from its [the "Note"] not being accepted that the Turkish ministers are desirous of war.'<sup>527</sup> But he did not openly blame Stratford, still less ask him to resign. He told Greville in private that Stratford 'has not *bona fide* striven' for the 'Note,' but the cabinet had no case against him. He told Henry Reeve, 'I believe that he [Stratford] honourably endeavoured to get the note accepted.'<sup>528</sup>

This was for the benefit of *The Times*. Thus Clarendon, a

sincere and honourable man, was being tangled in a web of deceit. His difficulties were increased by a violent explosion of public opinion. A newspaper indiscretion in Germany had thrown an ugly light on Russian policy. It revealed Nesselrode's private 'interpretation' of the 'Vienna Note,' an 'interpretation evidently' different from that of Clarendon or Buol or Napoleon. Brunnow made the best of a bad job and gave Clarendon the authentic text of Russia's 'interpretation' on September 16. Nesselrode commented on the Turkish modifications of the 'Vienna Note.' In doing so he 'interpreted' the text of the 'Vienna Note' as guaranteeing 'the maintenance of the privileges and immunities of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire.' Turkey must not only 'leave these immunities untouched' but must 'take account of Russia's active solicitude for her [twelve million] co-religionists in Turkey.' This astonishing 'interpretation' became public in Germany early in September, and was made the subject of merciless attack in the British press towards its close.

Clarendon said Nesselrode's interpretation was 'violent.' Only five weeks before he had vehemently condemned the Turks for rejecting the 'Note.' Now he admitted that rejection to have been right. He never gave up the idea that Stratford was 'dishonest,' but he admitted later that he was 'certainly right' in securing rejection. He thought that Russia had proved more dishonest still, and declared Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation' to be impossible. If that idea of the Treaty of Kainardji were accepted, 'Russia would, under the seventh article of the Treaty, be entitled to superintend all these privileges and immunities, which are of that peculiar character that she would be constantly able, if so minded, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects; and thus the religious Protectorate, which is abjured, and the new rights and extended influence, which are equally disclaimed, would be established. . . . It would now be highly dishonourable to press its [the Note's] acceptance on the Porte, when they have been duly warned by the Power [Russia] to whom the note is to be addressed that another and a totally different meaning is attached to it by that Power.' \* France and England abandoned the 'Vienna Note' on September 17. Turkey and Stratford were justified in their resistance, if not commended for the manner of it. Russia was rebuked. None

\* *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1699], No. 117, p. 124. Clarendon to Seymour, September 30, 1853. The views thus stated at length were already held by Clarendon on the 17th. For discussion over Kainardji, *vide* n. 445.



the less there was still a chance of peace. The Emperors of Russia and Austria were to meet at Olmütz at the end of September, and differences might still be adjusted there. But a settlement would depend on whether England and France remained quiet in the interval. They did not, and Aberdeen and Clarendon were the disturbers of the peace.

#### IV

*The old tricks were sprouting in the old atmosphere, like mushrooms in a dungpit.—*  
KIPLING, *My Son's Wife*.

During the month of September Stratford had to face the threat of a rebellion in Constantinople. The excitement directly resulted from the rejection of the 'Turkish ultimatum' by the Powers, which made the Turks suspect and resist Stratford's effort to force the 'Vienna Note' upon them. Reschid hit off the situation exactly. He could not accept the 'Vienna Note' now that it had become 'the cause of fanatical excitement and had been discussed in a hostile sense by every human being in Constantinople.' He could resign, but in that case there would be a ministry who 'would make terms direct with Russia; or else the old Turkish war-party would come in and the Sultan would then lose his throne if not his life.' If Reschid were to survive he must get an answer out of the Czar. But any answer would produce perils, as a well-informed Turk very secretly admitted. 'The kind of answer the Emperor of Russia would give, whether favourable to peace or enforcing war, was equally dangerous. For in the first place they [the Turks] feared the internal, and in the next place the external, enemy.'<sup>529</sup> It was in fact a balance of opposite dangers.

The internal enemy showed himself first. That enemy could only be restrained by the military masters of the state, who got control as war approached. Mehemet Ali, as Minister of War and head of the war party, now held the power. He used it in an unexpected and thoroughly oriental way. Direct methods were advocated by Omer pasha, who commanded on the Danube. 'Inaction was fatal to Turkey. . . . It is better at once to risk the chances of a war than to be sacrificed by slow degrees.'<sup>530</sup> Omer wanted to attack Russia direct, and did so in October. But in September Mehemet Ali preferred to stimulate 'the internal enemy.' He had only to stir the inflammable stuff around. 'The strangest figures

swarm in from the distant provinces to have a cut at the Muscovite. Turbans, lances, maces and battle-axes jostle each other in the narrow streets.' Mehemet Ali was not content with allowing turbulent provincials to demonstrate. He encouraged the *ulemas* to harangue the mob and, when crowds assembled, he withdrew police and soldiers from the critical points. He was in touch with the Sheikh-ul-Islam, who allowed a proclamation urging war to be printed in Turkish and posted up in a mosque. Between three and four hundred *ulemas* drew up a manifesto, bidding the Sultan draw the sword from the scabbard. This petition was sent both to Council and Sultan, a national and religious demonstration described by the Dutch minister as 'without example.' The plot succeeded. Riots and demonstrations took place on September 11 and 12. The Sultan and his Council were much disturbed, and a rebellion was feared.

Reschid, always physically timorous, was alarmed and the Council with him. 'Guess how the ministers were frightened,' wrote Stratford, 'one of them asked me to take care of his jewels.' In a panic they asked the foreign ambassadors to aid them 'to maintain the public tranquillity.' The French ambassador wished to accede to Reschid's appeal. He feared for the safety of foreign residents. On September 12 he asked Stratford to agree to bring the Franco-British squadrons up to Constantinople, and the Austrian representative sent a message to the same effect. Stratford refused. 'In the actual state of our information he declined to call up the Anglo-French fleet, or, even a substantial part of it.' He insisted on calling up steamers only. 'This limited plan could easily be executed under cover of steam communications continually plying between the squadrons and the capital.'<sup>531</sup> That would evade the Straits Convention of 1841, but it would not violate it as the bringing up of warships would. He had his way. On the 14th up came two British steamers, the *Niger* (13 guns), the *Furious* (16), and two French, the *Mogador* (8) and the *Gomer* (20). They were not enough to defend either Sultan or Europeans. Admiral Slade called them 'a mockery.' De la Cour says that they anchored in isolated places, 'au lieu d'avoir sous les yeux . . . en quelque sorte—une division navale.'\* But the moral effect of four boats steaming up to the Golden Horn was enough. The Grand Vizier and Sheikh-ul-Islam soon stated that all danger of revolution was averted. The guilty *ulemas* were exiled to remote parts of the empire.

\* *A.E.F.*, Turquie, 315. From de la Cour, No. 85 of September 15, 1853. The Frenchman is, of course, regretting the disposition.

Mehemet Ali disavowed his supporters and Stratford triumphed once again.

De la Cour's alarm was natural. He was inexperienced, a thousand rumours had been abroad, the mob had been frenzied and passionate. But in all their internal revolutions the crowds of Stambul had till then respected the property and lives of strangers. Stratford knew this well enough and was not alarmed either for Europeans or for the Sultan at the moment. He was more alarmed as to the ultimate situation, for he knew that summoning the squadrons to Constantinople meant war. He preferred risking internal disturbances to violating the Convention of 1841.<sup>532</sup> His policy triumphed, and it was the policy of peace, but it was the last time that peace prevailed.

## V

*Dum furor in cursu est,  
currenti cede furori—*

OVID.

*While fury gallops on the way,  
Let no man fury's gallop stay.*

SIR WALTER RALEIGH.

September, it was hoped, would be a month full of peace. 'My great care,' wrote Aberdeen to Gladstone on September 2, 'will be to prevent any decision necessarily leading to war without the opportunity of full consideration by the cabinet.'<sup>533</sup> He hoped not only to avoid cabinets but great decisions. But he reckoned without France. Throughout the period Napoleon had consistently favoured dramatic action, and the advance of the naval squadrons. He had increased the tension by sending the French fleet along to Salamis in March. His foreign minister had expressed his great regret that the Franco-British squadron had not gone up to Constantinople in June. In August, in strict obedience to this policy, de la Cour tried to get the French squadron alone passed up to Constantinople. This action, taken without Stratford's knowledge, provoked a sharp remonstrance from Clarendon. The French defence, that 'the idea originated with the Emperor,' was enlightening though unsatisfactory. On September 3 the French Ambassador disclosed that another idea had originated with the Emperor. This time he asked that both fleets should go up to Constantinople. Clarendon, Russell,

Aberdeen and Palmerston rejected this well-worn proposal. On the 3rd the efficient four decided to do nothing 'for the present,' and did not summon the cabinet.

On this same day (September 3) Lord John Russell circulated a memo 'in which Palmerston concurred.' Both men were ready for the fleet to go up at once, but thought it as well to wait until they heard whether the Czar had accepted or refused the Turkish modifications of the 'Vienna Note.' The Czar's refusal was known in London on the 13th. On the 16th Palmerston, Clarendon and Aberdeen met in the absence of Russell, and agreed that the Turks should be asked to accept the original 'Note.' It was to be backed by certain assurances from the Four Powers as to its meaning, which were called a 'guarantee.' Lord John wrote from the country objecting. 'I decline any responsibility for it.' In truth he was dissatisfied with Aberdeen, who had often talked about resigning the premiership in his favour but had never done so. Russell thought his own position 'a degrading one' and was inclined to cavil at the others. He probably would have resigned at this juncture, but on the very day of his protest Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation' of the 'Vienna Note' reached London.<sup>534</sup> This startling development caused Clarendon to withdraw the decision of the 16th and made him refuse to press the original 'Vienna Note' upon Turkey. Thus Russell triumphed and British policy took an anti-Russian turn.

Clarendon was faced with two dangers. There was an external danger from Russia's 'violent interpretation,' there was an internal danger from the violence of Russell and Palmerston. Even before he knew of the 'violent interpretation' Palmerston had written gaily, 'The Turks . . . with the co-operation of our squadron in the Black Sea would make an example of the red-haired barbarians, or as Gray politely called them, "the blue-eyed myriads of the Baltic coast."' This was on the 12th. On the 22nd Lord John wrote, '. . . I am not sorry the Czar has thrown off the mask. It is the honestest thing he has yet done.'<sup>535</sup> The British press had already redoubled its outcry against the Czar for his 'violent interpretation.' It wanted strong measures. The substance of the 'interpretation' was hinted at on the 22nd, and the storm was clearly on the way. The French ambassador brought a telegram about a revolt in Constantinople, and the need of sending up a fleet at once. Aberdeen and Clarendon both assumed that the French telegraphic report of the Constantinople riots was accurate and exact, though the French had an obvious interest in exaggerating the disturbances.

They did not wait for a despatch, they did not even wait for telegraphic confirmation from Stratford. They did not consult Palmerston or Russell. They did not summon the cabinet, though Aberdeen had promised other ministers and the Queen to do so before taking any important decision. They did not regard Stratford's opinion that ordering the fleet to Constantinople was 'crossing the Rubicon.' They crossed it.

Clarendon states that both he and Aberdeen heard Walewski declare that the French government thought the ordering up of the fleets 'indispensably necessary.' The two answered 'that under such circumstances as those reported by M. de la Cour . . . we would without hesitation take upon ourselves to agree to the proposal of the French government . . . to call up the fleets.' Aberdeen, writing on the same day, says, 'our main object is for the protection of British life and property, and, if necessary, of the person of the Sultan . . .,' and said we must explain at Constantinople that 'it is not intended as a menace or hostile movement directed against Russia.'<sup>536</sup> Clarendon later said the exact opposite. 'The date of the measure [September 23] of itself demonstrates that it was taken, not upon the demand of the French Emperor (which had twice before been refused) but because by the act of Russia [*i.e.* the 'violent interpretation'] a further step had been rendered inevitable.'<sup>537</sup> If his ten-year-old recollection is right Clarendon was anti-Russian, though Aberdeen was not. There were other differences too. Aberdeen thought that the decision would bring peace, Clarendon did not. 'The only real likelihood now is war,' he wrote to Stratford on the 24th. Thus a most grave decision was taken by two men who differed as to the motives and consequences of their act.

Clarendon's order to Stratford to summon the fleet went on September 23. It was received on October 4, but not obeyed till the 21st. During that interval the last act of the drama was played at Olmütz with Austrian and Russian Emperors as peacemakers. The violence of Constantinople disturbed but did not defeat the imperial negotiators. The Czar arrived at Olmütz in a chastened mood. He was still unwise enough to speak of the 'crumbling state of the Turkish Empire,' but he was disturbed at the proximity of war and most anxious to avert it. He was extremely conciliatory to England, even suggesting that her fleet might pass the Dardanelles to escape the storms of October at Besika Bay. He withdrew altogether from the previous position that he



would accept nothing but the original text of the 'Vienna Note.' He talked of evacuating the Principalities as soon as his terms were accepted, a thing he had never done before. He stood firm on two points. He desired first the maintenance of treaties and of the *status quo* in religious matters ; secondly, he was ready 'to give a further guarantee to the Porte,' making clear that he abandoned the 'violent interpretation.' He asked Austria to draw up a new proposal, the 'Buol project,' presenting the original text of the 'Vienna Note,' but explaining authoritatively the interpretation which all parties, including Russia, attached to it. In this manner the Czar would not only save his face, but avert war.

The 'Buol project' was a very serious effort at peace. It proposed the adoption of the 'Vienna Note,' with a further assurance from the Czar on these lines. 'The Cabinet of St. Petersburg gives a new assurance that it will in no way exercise [for] itself the protection of a Christian cult inside the Ottoman Empire, and that the duty of protecting this cult and maintaining its religious immunity has devolved on the Sultan and that Russia only reserves to herself that of watching that the engagement contracted by the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Kainardji be strictly executed.'<sup>538</sup> The Czar fully approved this statement, which thus abrogated Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation' of the 'Vienna Note.' (Nesselrode had already explained that it was unofficial.) The Czar indeed had never been clear on the interpretation of the Kainardji Treaty. But he could hardly extend it too far, after this explanation and in view of the fact that the Four Powers were witnesses to this fresh assurance of Russia to Turkey. Even Buol, who was opposed to any idea of guarantee by the powers to Turkey, said that 'the sympathy and support of the powers is assured to the Porte for the future.'<sup>539</sup> 'We,' said the Czar, 'are ready on our part.' Had his assurance been accepted in England, the old text of the 'Vienna Note' might have stood. Buol certainly wanted this done, though he was not an impartial witness. But it is interesting that Napoleon at first favoured accepting the overture. Clarendon boasted that he had prevented the French Emperor from doing so. Napoleon held out until October 5 and only rejected the 'Buol project' in view of England's insistence, and after he heard that the Turks had declared war on Russia.<sup>540</sup>

England's suspicions hampered the success of the Olmütz overtures. Palmerston wrote, 'Nicholas will propose a partition of Turkey to Austria.' Lord John Russell added that Westmorland, the British representative, was 'a cypher,' and

Aberdeen admitted his incapacity. So the British cabinet did little to help the negotiation to begin and a great deal to cause it to end. Clarendon recognised the sincerity of the Czar's desire for peace, but seems to have thought the 'violent interpretation' of Nesselrode a fatal objection to accepting other assurances from Russia. Even so early as October 1 he wrote, 'the project of note now proposed by Buol would not neutralize [it] nor would it afford any security to the Porte.' On the 3rd he wrote to his wife, 'The beastly Turks have declared war so there is an end of the Olmütz arrangement out of which something might possibly have been made.' Despite his words he had not really believed much in that possibility. For next day Lord John wrote to him, 'I do not believe in the note from Olmütz any more than you.'<sup>541</sup> Aberdeen faintly protested that 'the Olmütz note has taken away a considerable portion of the objection to Nesselrode's remarks' (October 5). He regretted afterwards that he had not insisted on its acceptance, and carried his regret to the grave. But his was not the view of any Englishman but himself. The Czar complained that British statesmen no longer thought him an 'honnête homme.' Nor did they. Clarendon felt strong enough on the 7th to tell the French ambassador, 'I knew enough of the opinion of my colleagues to say that the Olmütz overture would be rejected.'

The cabinet had not met for six weeks when they assembled on October 8. They began by overruling Aberdeen and rejecting the Olmütz overture. They authorised a despatch stating that the Russian assurance in the 'Buol project' did not convince them. The Czar might in future 'assert a protectorate over the Greek Church . . . and over twelve million subjects of the Porte.' The British cabinet submitted a counter-project, to which Clarendon thought Vienna 'would probably have agreed if the news of the [Turkish declaration of war] had not arrived at that moment.' To reject the Olmütz overture was to place future negotiations in the hands of Stratford, whom the Czar regarded as his personal enemy. But the cabinet were fairly united and their measures for once were not half-measures. The cabinet took a second strong step the same day and peremptorily ordered Stratford to bring the fleet up to Constantinople. The order of September 23 had left him little enough discretion; that of October 8 gave him none at all. Now the Czar was not likely to favour a peace proposal drawn up by Stratford in a hostile capital which the Franco-British fleet had arrived to defend. The advance of the fleet, thus ordered by the cabinet,

was in defiance of Stratford's known opinion. But the British cabinet were influenced by the French, and Stratford was instructed not to act separately from them.

The desire to have the fleet at Constantinople was unanimous. On October 2 even Aberdeen was apprehensive because it was not there. On the 8th he told the Austrian representative the reason in private. 'Public opinion would not allow it' (the abandonment of Turkey). England must prevent 'Turkey from being left to ruin.'<sup>542</sup> This was on the day of decision, when Clarendon wrote privately to Stratford, 'we should have been glad that the fleets were now at Constantinople . . . great care must be taken that they [the fleets] don't give too much encouragement to the Turks nor assume an aggressive position towards Russia with whom however much we may be displeased with her for her conduct towards Turkey, we have as yet no quarrel. . . . The alarm here about war is universal among the rational, and business, and educated portions of the community but of course there is at the same time a great outcry for war from a variety of motives but I am convinced that within six weeks after the first shot was fired by England against Russia there would be mighty few partizans of our war policy.'<sup>543</sup> Now here is the real truth. Clarendon admits that public opinion in London is too strong, and can only be calmed by a strong measure like the despatch of the fleet. But Russia is to be assured that the move is defensive and is not directed against her. The haughty Russian despot had just received Turkey's declaration of war and England's refusal to accept his overtures. He now learned that England and France proposed to violate the Treaty of 1841 and to send the fleet up to Constantinople. Conciliatory and pacific assurances thus arrived in company with a diplomatic rebuff, a violated treaty and a naval demonstration.

The peremptory order to the fleet to move to Constantinople was certainly an anti-Russian move. Even Clarendon admitted that the notice to be given to the Russian admiral would be 'rather a hostile proceeding.' But he did not admit that the fleet movement was a hostile act, any more than Aberdeen did. Under popular pressure men easily deceive both the public and themselves as to the motives and consequences of their acts. And the reason was that the decisions of the cabinet fell short of the wishes of its extremest members. Brunnow had just warned Aberdeen of 'the inevitable consequences of a demonstration into the Black Sea.' Palmerston and Russell proposed an advance to the Black Sea on the 8th. But Charles Wood resisted strongly, supported by Aberdeen

and by most of the cabinet. Aberdeen won a victory and reported the result to Brunnow on the 12th.\* Some two months later Aberdeen himself adopted the view that even an advance to the Black Sea was liable to 'no objection' if 'for defensive purposes.'<sup>544</sup> Even after that advance he continued to regard war as 'not inevitable.' It is hardly possible to illustrate better the gradual process of self-deception whereby a peace-loving man agrees to steps which rendered war certain.

On October 8 the cabinet reached and passed a decisive point. Sidney Herbert, a younger member of it, summed it up thus: 'We are all agreed as to the objects in view. We must have a power at the Bosphorus to hold the keys of the Mediterranean from the East, which shall not be Russia, and we cannot allow Russia to encroach upon or undermine the power which is there necessary to us. We are not bound by treaty to interfere but we are bound by our own interest and by European interests, not to allow Turkey to be overborne. We are further bound in honour not to abandon Turkey in difficulties consequent on a course taken with our sanction or by our advice.'<sup>545</sup> With this 'defensive' obsession the cabinet 'drifted' subconsciously towards war. Clarendon did his best to oppose the 'drift.' Russell, with occasional hesitations, encouraged it. Palmerston alone had neither doubts nor regrets. 'I am glad that our squadrons are fairly in the Bosphorus,' he wrote cheerily to Stratford on October 30, 'and should be equally glad to hear that they had taken a cruize into the Black Sea, to show that we do not stand in awe of Russian ire.'<sup>546</sup> He was all for intimidating the 'red-haired barbarians.' Peace, though no longer to be negotiated, might still be enforced. The answer seems to be given by Clarendon. A threatening movement by a fleet might have succeeded in June, it was not likely to succeed in November.

## VI

EMPEROR : *The cheerfulness of my soldiers gives assurance  
Of good success abroad ; if first I make  
My peace at home here.*

BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER, *The Prophetess*, Act IV, Sc. 2.

It was not until October 4 that Stratford received the order of September 23 which instructed him to move the British fleet

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* C. Wood to Clarendon, October 19, 1853, and references in my article, *E.H.R.*, April 1934, p. 290, nn. 6-7. Palmerston later wrote, 'Our chief has allowed himself to be bullied by Brunnow, who has threatened his own recall, if our squadron entered the Black Sea' (December 11, 1853, *pte. Clar. MSS.*).

up to Constantinople. By that time the sluice-gates had opened and carried the Sultan away on the tide of fanaticism. The threats of insurrection in mid-September had yielded to firm treatment. De la Cour had wanted to summon the Franco-British squadron from Besika Bay. Stratford had summoned four steamers only, and thus evaded the Convention of 1841 without breaking it. Their mere presence sufficed to emphasise the direct counsels of Stratford. 'My private advice to the Sultan induced His Majesty to send for his principal ministers and by their agency to restrain the enthusiasts or instruments of intrigue whose conduct had caused the prevailing alarm.' These few words were enough. The Sheikh-ul-Islam and Mehemet Ali either had to support the rebels or to disavow them. They chose the latter course. The Sheikh denounced the rebels against authority, Mehemet Ali suppressed all overt disorders. Vengeance fell on the '*muderris*, the theological students and professors' who had inflamed the mob. They were 'sent to Shumla where they will be gratified with opportunities for the display of their zeal in return for the relief which their departure affords to the capital.' But the rustication of the theological faculty of Stambul merely increased the religious zeal of laymen against Russia.

In mid-September Stratford's ablest adviser had written, 'The ministers are prepared to go to war rather than give way.' If the Sultan coerced them they would resign, 'leaving to His Majesty the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of replacing them by a more pacific administration. . . . The national will would thus, as in former times, be brought to bear in a flood tide on the hesitations of the palace.'<sup>547</sup> This is exactly what happened. Abdul Medjid, the weakest of men, feared to dismiss his ministers. Mehemet Ali, appealing to his love and his fear, mobilised the harem and the army for war. By declaring for it, the Sultan would at once recover his popularity and lead a national movement. He had always been dominated by a fear or a favourite, and easily submitted to the dictation of both. He girded himself with the sword of the Prophet and made a boastful speech to his ministers on the 23rd. He announced his decision to summon the Grand Council. This was obviously an anti-Russian move, and it was even more significant that the Padishah had belted on the sword. That ceremonial always meant war.

On September 24 Reschid received 'peremptory orders' to make no concessions to Russia. There were other signs of hostility. 'The tone in which Reschid replies to your [Stratford's] advice is somewhat new and by no means so deferential as



it ought to be to one who understands the interests of Turkey.'<sup>548</sup> The hatred felt towards Russia was extending to all foreigners. On the 25th Constantinople learned that the Czar had refused all the Turkish amendments to the 'Vienna Note.' The very next day the Grand Council met. Its members, mostly unemployed pashas and *softas*, passed to their deliberations through the streets crowded with soldiers flourishing modern weapons and with bravos flourishing ancient ones, with dervishes praying aloud for vengeance on the infidel. It was a fit preparation for an assembly unknown to the law, free from rules of procedure, and given over to bigotry and to prejudice. The *ulemas* first demanded a holy war (*Jehad*). Sarim and Reschid successfully opposed this measure. The chaplain of Abdul Aziz, who undoubtedly was inspired, caused great excitement by denouncing the danger from Russia. Everyone knew of Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation' of the 'Vienna Note.' The other Great Powers were thought to condone it. Stratford himself was suspect. As the debates proceeded the naked ugly face of fanaticism peered forth. Not a man dared oppose the general feeling. Even old Husrev, Russia's friend and, 'as rumour had it,' her pensioner, did not vote for her. He was too ill to attend the council, but signified his consent in writing. In the end with absolute unanimity 'a recourse to war has been declared indispensable.'

During the critical days of September 26 and 27 Stratford tried to damp down the excitement. He sent away one of the British steamers on the 26th and the other on the 27th. He complained bitterly because the French retained 'their extra force.' So long as the force was there, the Turks would disregard the remonstrances or threats of the ambassadors. The Prussian representative asked Stratford to try the effect of a personal appeal to the Sultan in the name of the Four Powers on September 27. Stratford agreed to send a strong protest in writing but refused the personal interview. His arguments were two. The first was that the so-called 'guarantee' of the 'Vienna Note,' though adopted by England and France, was still refused by Austria and Prussia. He could only offer the Sultan 'a vague promise of guaranty,' to which he could not pledge two out of the Four Powers he claimed to represent.<sup>549</sup> This objection of Stratford's seems to be unanswerable. For it is clear that in conversation the differences between the allies and the weakness of the promise might have been revealed. Stratford's second ground for refusal was also cogent. He knew that the issue was already decided. The Sultan himself had inspired or permitted the decisions of the

Grand Council. If he now wished to set them aside he would be dismissing not only his ministers, but 'placing himself in opposition to the chief notabilities of the Empire. Compliance might save him from immediate danger of war, but only at the risk of disturbing the public tranquillity and finally losing both his throne and his life.' This reasoning was sound. The Sultan had gone too far to draw back. He speedily assented to the decision of the Grand Council for war, to which the *fetva* of the Sheikh-ul-Islam gave legal sanction.\* Once the *fetva* had been issued it was irrevocable. The Sultan himself could not then have stopped the declaration. He might have delayed it. But he did not wish to do so. His throat might be cut by his own subjects if he showed hesitation. He preferred war to insurrection, and fighting foreigners to fighting his own subjects. On October 4 the Turkish declaration of war on Russia was solemnly proclaimed.

## VII

*Sic fatur lacrimans classicque inmittit habenas.*

VERGIL, *Aeneid*, VI.

Stratford had not formally opposed the decision of the Grand Council, the confirmation by the Sultan, and the Sheikh's *fetva* for war. That he knew to be useless. But he sought to emasculate the effect of the decision and to prevent hostilities from breaking out. It was not the first time in Turkish history that *fetva* for war had been issued without blood being shed. As long as Stratford did not openly try to get the *fetva* recalled, the Turks would not necessarily object to his neutralising its effects. This kind of policy, so alien to civilised practice, was quite in accord with oriental ideas. It was clearly Stratford's aim. On October 3 he sent to Reschid, 'I would strongly advise the Turkish Government to hold back its *manifesto* and *summons* as long as it possibly can. The decision of the General Council affords a considerable margin for the *time* and *form* of measures of execution, and any precipitation would not only diminish the Porte's chances of carrying the main point without the sacrifices and dangers of

\* The date of the Sultan's assent and of the *fetva* are not known with certainty, but were both granted before September 30. The *fetva* was always prepared beforehand and the Sultan probably knew of it on the 23rd when he put on the Prophet's sword. Otherwise he would not have dared to summon the Grand Council, and still less, to assent to their decision for war. *F.O.* 78/938. From Stratford, No. 281 of September 27, 1853, and *Life of Sidney Herbert*, I, 196-7, of October 17.

war, but increase the difficulty of looking with confidence to foreign sympathy and eventual assistance. . . . Tell the Pasha that I appeal with confidence to his good sense and good feelings.' \* Reschid answered that 'the decision of the General Council was irrevocably taken not to wait any longer, but run the hazards of war.' Next day, on the 4th, the Porte issued a long manifesto which explained that the Sultan was obliged 'officially to declare war.' Stratford's appeal to Reschid was never published in a Blue Book. If Stratford was purely a Machiavellian he could have nullified this earnest appeal by a secret verbal intimation to disregard it. But this hypothesis is improbable, for on the very day (October 4) on which the Sultan's declaration was issued, Stratford received Clarendon's despatch of September 23, which not only authorised, but instructed him, at once to summon the fleet to Constantinople. Its presence in Constantinople would encourage the warlike mood of the Turks. For it would have convinced Turkey that France and England would support her. Yet Stratford found pretexts for refusing to do so. He says himself that he delayed in order to see if the Olmütz overture would succeed. He did not yet know that Clarendon himself had caused that overture to fail.

On October 8 Reschid sent a formal request from the Sultan that the Franco-British fleets should enter the Dardanelles. Stratford had not yet heard the results of the Olmütz overture and so he put the matter off 'for a few days.' By the 15th he had learned of the failure, and consented in principle to summon the squadrons. On the 16th he informed Dundas of his decision. He knew that the summons was desired by Russell and Palmerston and Clarendon, and was the decision of the cabinet. Further, Clarendon had written privately on September 24, 'It is of great importance both there [Constantinople] and here [London] that we should act entirely in concert with the French.' Thus he had no choice. 'I might have preferred an additional delay of a few days,' wrote Stratford, 'but the instructions of my French colleague are according to his assurance so peremptory that, by longer postponing my decision I should have incurred the risk of separating from him to a degree which would not only have proved embarrassing to Your Lordship but prejudicial to the interests of our common cause, and also to the separate interests of Her Majesty's embassy.'<sup>550</sup> But he put off the actual movement until the 20th, and then (perhaps designedly)

\* *F.O.* 78/939, October 4, 1853, pte., Stratford to Clarendon, enclosing letter to and from Pisani of October 3. This did not appear in the Blue Book.

sent his despatch so late in the day that the admiral could not move his ships till the 22nd.

‘I wrote my requisition to the Admiral to bring in the squadrons on the anniversary of the battle of Navarino.’ In this same letter to his wife he said that ‘another effort for peace’ was likely to fail. ‘War is a decree of the fates and we shall surely have it.’ This utterance of Stratford has been most unwarrantably interpreted as suggesting that he wanted the war. It is indeed true that on October 22 he despaired of averting it. But others had given up hope a month earlier. On September 22 Russell had written breezily, ‘I have little doubt that the parties will be too much heated to give up the prospects of a good stand-up fight. I cannot share Lord Stratford’s sanguine anticipations.’ Clarendon had said on the same day, ‘there is apparently no chance of averting war.’ Palmerston chimed in on October 4, ‘thinking it almost certain that Turks and Russians are coming to blows.’<sup>551</sup> It needed a fortnight more before Stratford came to the same conclusion, and even in December his optimism for peace revived again and astonished the cabinet. But he had always held that summoning of the fleet was ‘crossing Russia’s Rubicon.’ He had delayed till delay became impossible. Yet when he gave the reins to the fleet, he was, like Aeneas, in tears.

During the mournful events of October Stratford’s influence had markedly declined. He had failed to prevent the *fetva* for war, he had even failed to delay the declaration of war on Russia. He had given way to Turkish and French pressure and consented in principle to call up the squadrons. This was on October 15, but he did not even write to the British admiral till the 16th, nor summon him till the 20th. On the 17th he had an audience with the Sultan, who thanked him for this great demonstration of British friendship. Stratford promptly told the Sultan that, ‘in order to secure the effects of such sympathy,’ he should ‘grant reform on just and liberal principles.’ The Sultan evaded the issue by referring him to his ministers. Thus Stratford had failed to extort the slightest concession for reform, even after he had consented to summon the fleet. As these reforms were the dearest object of his desire, it would be difficult to prove more clearly the decline of his influence. Within two days another proof was supplied. Stratford’s summons to the fleet coincided with his last and most desperate attempt to avert hostilities. By strenuous

insistence he had prolonged the suspension of hostilities from the 19th till the 23rd (or as some reckon, the 24th). On the 18th he received a telegram from Clarendon authorising him to negotiate once more on lines he had himself already suggested. De la Cour was willing to co-operate, but Baron Bruck, though twice asked, flatly refused to confer until he received his instructions from Vienna.\* It was, therefore, not until the 20th that the four ambassadors met in conference and demanded a further suspension of hostilities. The Turkish ministers sat in council through the whole afternoon and until 6 A.M. on the 21st. At the end of this lengthy session they agreed to suspend hostilities for a period of ten or twelve days, and the orders went out. Stratford thought it 'a close run' and a last-minute victory. But in reality Austrian delays and Turkish obstinacy had caused him to lose the race by a day.

## VIII

*King Danger came riding to Coward-land,  
To slay them all with a feather !  
But a bold man laughed, and gripped his hand  
And they rode on their way together !*

E. C. WINGFIELD-STRATFORD.

The peace-bubble was burst by Omer pasha. At the beginning of October his headquarters were at Shumla and his forces lay encamped at Tutrakhan on the right bank of the Danube, opposite the Russians. When hostile forces, inflamed by religious fanaticism, are in sight of one another for weeks the guns are likely to go off by themselves. Omer cared little if they did so. Even in September he had said that war was better than inaction. He was the one Turkish general bold and strong enough to provoke it. On October 7 he declared that 'war must inevitably ensue' and said the season would not prevent him from striking a blow.<sup>552</sup> On the 8th he assembled his troops at Shumla, had the declaration of war read out, and made his officers take an oath of fidelity upon the Koran. He had already summoned Gorčakov to evacuate the Principalities within fifteen days. On October 10 the Russian commander had replied politely that he was a mere soldier and had no diplomatic or political authority to accept such an ultimatum. Omer seems to have thought this reply pacific, for on the 19th he gave orders to defer hostilities until

\* Not in the Blue Book. F.O. 195/385, Dragomans' Reports, memo by Lord Pevensey, October 19, 1853.



the 27th.<sup>553</sup> But this was not the view at Constantinople. Reschid received Gorčakov's despatch on the 18th and declared it 'the beginning of war.' Next day (19th) Stratford learned that 'instructions had been sent to Omer pasha to begin hostilities without delay.'<sup>554</sup> (It was this news which stirred Stratford to his extraordinary exertions on the 20th and 21st in the last-minute race for peace.) Omer did not waste time. At dawn on the 23rd troops crossed the Danube at Tutrakhan by Omer's orders and killed a few Cossacks. At another point some enthusiastic Egyptians acted without orders, swam the wide stream in chill October, and killed nine Russians. Thus war began.

Omer began hostilities on the 23rd and defended his action by saying that he had received no news of the further suspension of hostilities. He admitted that the news reached Varna on the 22nd, but he says that the officer carrying it did not get on to Shumla that night. Even if he had, it would have been difficult to send a message in time to Tutrakhan, which is some seventy miles further on. Omer, however, changed his plans on the 21st or 22nd, for he had originally ordered the attack for the 27th. Now by the night of the 21st or morning of the 22nd Omer would have received Reschid's orders to begin hostilities.\* He seems to have passed them on to Tutrakhan at once and thus brought about hostilities on the 23rd. In such case he acted in good faith and obeyed orders. Stratford suspected his good faith and thought the Turkish officer could have been in time had Omer wished.<sup>555</sup> He accused Omer of attacking to force the situation. Omer certainly had the Nelsonian gift of turning a blind eye to an order he disliked. But even had he known of the peace proposals on the night of the 22nd, he could hardly have prevented the attack on the 23rd.† However that may be, he ended the chances of peace and was wildly praised for doing so by the ministers and mob at Constantinople. His bold action plunged two empires into war.

\* If Reschid's instruction went out from Constantinople late on the 18th, or early on the 19th, it could have reached Shumla on the 21st or 22nd. Omer probably ordered hostilities immediately on receiving it.

† The total distance from Varna would be over 120 miles, which even the best Tartars took 24 hours to do.

## CHAPTER XIV

### HOW WAR BEGAN

#### I

*Thus, in alternate uproar and sad peace,  
Amazed were those Titans utterly.*

KEATS, *Hyperion*, Book III.

IN the third week of October events reached a crisis in London as in Constantinople. On October 8 the cabinet had been almost harmonious, but a few days later Clarendon confessed himself nearly distracted with their troubles and differences of opinion, 'Aberdeen's excessive horror of pushing matters to extremities, and his fear of provoking or offending the Emperor, and on the other hand Palmerston's anxiety to go ahead and plunge into war at once.' Greville adds, 'Lady Palmerston grows crowing on at the blunders of the Government and the luck it is for Palmerston.' <sup>556</sup> It was bad luck for Clarendon. He had hitherto kept together the right and the left wings. Having now to choose, he was moving to the left. Aberdeen precipitated a crisis on the 18th. To a new peace proposal to Constantinople he proposed to attach this condition: 'The Four Powers would not permit themselves, in consequence of unfounded objections, or by the declaration of war, which they have already condemned, to be drawn into a policy inconsistent with the peace of Europe, as well as with the interests of Turkey itself.' This statement seemed indispensable to Gladstone, to Graham, and to Newcastle. Clarendon 'at first entirely agreed with me,' writes Aberdeen, 'but at present seems rather doubtful.' But by the 20th 'Palmerston and Lord John were determined to resist it to the utmost extremity,' so Aberdeen abandoned his proposal, not wanting 'an irreconcilable difference in the Cabinet.' <sup>557</sup> It was a further stage in the decline of his influence.

This despatch, over which Aberdeen had given way, was ultimately sent on October 24. It demanded a suspension of hostilities by the Turks and the taking up of further negotiations by the Four Powers. Three incidents connected with it deserve mention. To make the Turk feel the weight of public

opinion, the original draft stated that 'a desire for war on the part of the Porte . . . would be viewed with great displeasure by the people' (of England). 'The Queen was not at all pleased with the reference to the displeasure of the people,' wrote Aberdeen. 'I told her that the expression had already struck me, but I think it will do well enough if you omit [the people] and say . . . "this country."' <sup>558</sup> Victoria at least was not going to threaten another sovereign with the displeasure of the people, unless it was combined with her own. But the phrase 'this country' included both herself and her people. This correction Clarendon duly inserted. Victoria also advised Clarendon to disregard what was 'probably an attempt of Palmerston to bully.' The 'bully' had accepted the despatch at the cabinet, inserting an alteration of his own. But he now tried to prevent the despatch from being something which 'the Porte must either take as it is or reject.' The Queen advised Clarendon to send off the despatch despite Palmerston. He did, and received 'a good-humoured letter' from the 'bully' in reply to his explanation.<sup>559</sup> Palmerston was defeated in an attempt to amend the despatch, but Lord John was not. He made an addition of a sinister character. The despatch demanded a 'suspension of hostilities' by the Turks as a preliminary to negotiation. Lord John got Clarendon to add to 'suspension' the words 'for a reasonable time.' But the Turks' idea of what was 'reasonable' differed, as might have been guessed, from everyone else's. They subsequently took advantage of the phrase and interpreted it to mean 'less than a fortnight.'

The despatch of October 24 inaugurated the final stage of struggle in the cabinet. Aberdeen had been defeated over Olmütz, but had prevented the fleet going to the Black Sea. It was his last success and his colleagues were harassing his retreat. Palmerston, on the 24th, warned him ominously to make only vague and mysterious communications to Brunnów. On November 4, Clarendon, who had resisted Palmerston's recent 'attempt to bully,' wrote a particularly instructive letter. He informed Aberdeen that Palmerston made out 'a very good case for his views.' He (Clarendon) himself thought now 'that sending the fleet to Constantinople in June would have been a wise measure,' though he had not supported it at the time. 'We should profit by our experience and not flinch from declaring that we are determined to get Russia out of the Principalities. . . . You cannot be more averse to war than I am, but if our pacific determination is too clearly reckoned upon we may render war inevitable.' Aberdeen

replied feebly on the 8th by complaining of the 'dishonesty' of Stratford, a theme of which he never wearied. Odd tempers were getting odder and queer ways queerer. Aberdeen, conscious of having lost weight and importance, became so carping a critic that he caused even the suave Clarendon to lose his temper. 'Really this is too bad. You come now after it has all been settled in the Cabinet, where you let it pass, and make all sorts of objections. And this is the way you do about everything; you object to all that is prepared, and you never suggest anything yourself. What is it you want? Will you say what you would have done? Aberdeen had nothing to say and really knocked under.' So Greville on November 27. After this 'regular scene' it was no use Aberdeen making more objections. Clarendon had abandoned him and was leaning towards Palmerston and Russell. The 'sons of Zeruiah' were becoming too strong for the hapless Prime Minister.

## II

*The Eastern Question is not the condition of a few million subjects of the Porte. [It is] the Partition of the Empire of the Ottomans.—DISRAELI.\**

Here is the situation at Constantinople in the last days of October. Omer had attacked successfully on the Danube; the Franco-British fleet flaunted their colours on the Golden Horn. These were the two facts which really impressed the mind of the Sultan, or rather of those advisers who made up his mind for him. They were not much interested in the peace negotiation which Stratford now pressed upon them. They believed that the Franco-British fleet at the Golden Horn must support them. Aberdeen had shamefacedly admitted in secret that neither England nor France dared desert them. The Turks openly wished the last peace effort to fail. There was no clear issue. Peace negotiations were entangled with fleet movements and land battles, and the result was chaos and war.

It was on November 5 that Stratford received Clarendon's despatch of October 24. That morning he had threatened Reschid because of his inclination to make war; that evening he threatened him again because of his disinclination to make peace. He demanded that Turkey should suspend hostilities and accept the 'Vienna Note' along with the substance of the Turkish amendments to it. When the Porte finally replied,

\* *Pte. Dis. MSS.* Notes for a Speech [1877].

they were quite frank. They would have accepted this proposal two months ago ; they would not do so now. De la Cour's recall to Paris on November 12 added to the mountain of difficulties. Reschid offered to put all Stratford's arguments before the council, and even to let him argue the case in person. He offered to resign again on the 15th, adding, ' he [Reschid] cannot assure you that his successor will yield to the new proposal.' ' No peace as yet,' Stratford wrote on the 19th, ' . . . there is much to excuse, to explain and to justify this ; but I lament it in the conviction that all things considered peace is really best for the Porte on the terms which now appear to be within its reach.' The new French ambassador, General Baraguay d'Hilliers, arrived on the 15th and listened at his audience to a very bellicose speech from the Sultan. Stratford countered in a speech to the Sultan in presenting British naval officers, when he passionately pleaded for peace. This was on the 24th, and next day he expressed hopes ' of having at last detected symptoms of a change in Reschid Pasha's mind, tending towards an adoption of our views.' But even so ' nothing could be adopted without the Grand Council.'

While strenuously fighting for peace, Stratford struggled furiously to conduct the war. He entirely failed to stop the Turkish military activities. Omer threw large bodies of men across the river, won one success at Kalafat (October 28) and another at Oltenitzen (November 3). Thereafter the weather broke and campaigning ceased. Omer pasha had won all the honours, and, without winning great successes, irritated Russia just as a swarm of gnats in summer irritate a cow. On November 1 Stratford reported to Reschid that the largest part of the allied fleet was off the Golden Horn, and warned him against dangerous enterprises. Turkish admirals had been excited by the deeds of Omer. Stratford learned to his horror that the Turkish squadron, which included four line-of-battle ships and ten frigates, was about to enter the Black Sea, to cruise along the Asiatic coast, and return by the Crimea and the European coast. ' Should it fall in with the enemy's squadron an attack is contemplated.' By exerting very strong pressure, and refusing to order up the remainder of the Franco-British squadron, Stratford forced the Porte to abandon this obviously dangerous movement. He instructed Pisani to tell Reschid ' once for all, that we will not be drawn in the wake of the Porte ; and that if they want our support, they must be content to respect our opinions.'



## III

*Our fortune on the sea is out of breath  
And sinks most lamentably.*

ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA, Act III, Sc. 10.

Stratford was not happy in dealing with naval matters, but he was very far from being warlike. He began by objecting to Admiral Dundas sending six allied steamers into the Black Sea. But neither he nor the French or British admiral seem to have objected to the despatch of a Turkish flotilla to Sinope. The Turkish admiral Slade was absent. But he had pointed out its risk beforehand, and had said that the British and French admirals were 'both unacquainted with circumstances and localities.' The allied admirals had three arguments in reply to this warning. First, the Czar's circular of October 31 had said 'Russia will await the attack of the Turks.' Next, the orders to the commander of the Turkish flotilla were pacific. Thirdly, Stratford had prevented the Turks from including two-deckers in the flotilla, believing that their presence would provoke a Russian attack, while a light flotilla would not. It has been suggested that Stratford deliberately sent out a weak force to tempt the Russian fleet to attack it and thus to bring on the war. But this suggestion fails to consider that Stratford proposed on November 10 to send allied steamers to Varna. Their presence might have diverted or prevented a Russian attack on Sinope. Stratford only abandoned this design because the French refused to join with him. Important evidence as to his aims comes from an authoritative source. Sir Edmund Lyons arrived in Constantinople on November 24 to take up his duties as second-in-command to Dundas just after the first reports from Sinope had come in. 'Lord Stratford is all for peace,' he stated on the 25th.

According to Slade it was the Turks, and not Stratford, who sent the flotilla on its fatal voyage to Sinope. But they submitted so far to Stratford's influence as to make their purpose pacific. They had not any idea of 'attacking' Russian ships, as they had had in the abandoned cruise of November 5. Osman pasha, the new commander, had received orders not to fire unless attacked. He arrived at Sinope on the 13th and sent back a timid complaint on November 21. 'Six Russian sail of the line are off the port. If reinforcements are not sent to us, and our position continues the same for some time, it may well happen, may God preserve us from

them, that the Imperial Fleet may incur disasters.' This appeal was strangely ignored by the professional sailors at Constantinople. Sinope is only one hundred miles from Sebastopol and the guns of its forts could not defend the Turkish ships against a superior force. Osman was left to his fate. An overwhelming force of six Russian sail of the line stood in to the harbour on November 30. The forces were absurdly ill-matched. Osman pasha refused to surrender, but can hardly be blamed for firing the first shot. Except for a small steamer, every one of his ships was destroyed and at least three thousand men were overwhelmed under a burning torrent of grape and canister shot. Sinope was only a 'massacre' in the sense that the Turks were incapable of serious resistance, but it was a tragedy for Turkish sailors. 'Draining the sherbet of martyrdom, they gained eternal life,' said the *Official Gazette*.

The news of Sinope unloosed a storm of extraordinary violence against Russia. The wave of emotion was resistless in England and took no account of the true facts. The Turks had undertaken large-scale operations on the Danube, had crossed the Russian frontier in Asia and fought battles without any formal declaration of hostilities. To such action the naval engagement at Sinope was a perfectly natural reply. There was no justification, legal or moral, for calling it a massacre, yet the 'massacre of Sinope' it remains in history. But then fiction often triumphs over fact. The Turks had planned a provocative cruise at the beginning of November, to stir up Circassia, to sail in sight of Sebastopol, and to attack the Russian fleet if seen. They cancelled these orders and gave more pacific ones to the flotilla proceeding to Sinope. But the Russians had no knowledge of that fact. They did know that a Turkish army, without declaring war, had attacked them in Asia and had already fought three pitched battles. A Russian admiral might reasonably assume that the Turkish flotilla went to Sinope to excite a rebellion in Circassia or to throw supplies into Batum. That these were not, in fact, the Turkish intentions seems quite irrelevant. War cannot be made by halves. Could the Russian navy be expected to abstain from fighting the Turks at sea, when the Russian army was entitled to fight them on land? Certainly it could. That was the view gravely put before the world by the newspapers, by the people, and finally by the diplomats, of England and of France.

The argument that the 'massacre of Sinope' was 'a perfectly legitimate operation of war' is now generally accepted. It could not be so accepted at the time. The peculiar resent-

ment shown is explained by the Czar's pride, by Napoleon's impatience, by Aberdeen's weakness, by Palmerston's strength, by Stratford's firmness, by war fever at Stambul, at Paris, at St. Petersburg, at London. The deepest cause, however, lay in that simmering cauldron of evil passions in which public opinion is brewed. For nearly a year the agitation against Russia had continued alike in Stambul, in London and in Paris. Passions of this kind might have weakened or subsided had the fuel been withdrawn. But the stimulus of Sinope caused the flames to crackle and leap up and the already overheated cauldron to boil over.

## IV

*War has begun in earnest.*—THE TIMES, December 13, 1853.

On December 2 the news of Sinope reached Constantinople. The Turkish ministers received it 'in a cheerful cushioned apartment, with a panoramic view of the Bay of Sinope before them.' They listened, apparently unconcerned, 'to the woful tale . . . as if listening to an account and looking at a picture of a disaster in Chinese waters.' One incident alone occurred. It was reported that the pasha of Sinope had abandoned his post and fled. The pasha was a friend of Reschid's, who said naively, 'he could not be expected to remain in the way of cannon-balls.'<sup>560</sup> The Sultan at least marked his sense of the disaster by refusing to allow the Capudan pasha to come into his presence. Ministers were so incapable and so rash that two days later they sent orders to the Capudan pasha himself to proceed with only four frigates on another Black Sea cruise. Another disaster would have resulted, and it was only with difficulty that Stratford got the orders revoked. He at first thought of sending in the Franco-British fleet. 'It is painfully evident that the peace of Europe is exposed to the most imminent danger ; nor do I see how we can either with honour, or with prudence, taken in its larger and truer sense, abstain longer from entering the Black Sea in force at every risk, and thereby redeeming the pledge which has in fact, been given, not only to the Porte, but to all Europe, by the presence of our squadron here. God knows that we have carried forbearance and the love of peace to an extent productive of much embarrassment and fraught with perilous contingencies.' \*

\* F.O. 78/941A. From Stratford, No. 368 of December 4, 1853. Passage suppressed in *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1699], No. 335, pp. 743-4.

The French ambassador agreed, and the two consulted the allied naval men as to the purely naval possibility of an allied move into the Black Sea. They seem to have viewed the disaster with calm, and Lyons stated that the allied fleets could actually go into the Black Sea at once, though he doubted the wisdom on grounds of policy. For the time being this view was decisive. No further movement was attempted for a time. None was decided until the 17th. So we may now turn to St. Petersburg, Paris and London.

The effect of Sinope on the Czar was electric and immediate. Even a staid Russian diplomat like Meyendorff regarded it as the 'victory we needed and despaired of getting this winter.'<sup>561</sup> He was glad that the British parliament was not sitting, otherwise he would have feared 'the effect on wounded British pride, combined with the weakness of Aberdeen.' As it was, the British Ministry might fall and thus produce peace. The Czar was almost as indiscreet in public as his diplomat had shown himself in private. He published a letter rejoicing in the success of 'my brave seamen,' and expressing 'satisfaction' that the tradition of victory 'has not been forgotten in the Russian navy.' St. Petersburg was in ecstasy. A piece called 'La bataille de Sinope' was staged with music. On the first night of the representation every member of the Imperial family except the Emperor was present. Balls and illuminations succeeded one another for many nights. The news of this Russian exaltation shocked the British public, which was listening eagerly to accusations against the Czar. The 'Sinope massacre' proved that he had broken his pledge and attacked like a conspirator with knife in the dark. The Czar's circular of October 31 stated that he would remain on the defensive, despite Turkey's declaration of war. He had published it before he knew that Omer pasha had attacked on the Danube or that Abdi pasha had invaded Georgia. He had always said he would repel attacks. Once Turkey had attacked, acts of war on his part were fully justified. The public would not listen to reason. 'There were few men in England,' says Kinglake, 'who doubted that the onslaught of Sinope was a treacherous one.'

On December 9 Delane, the editor of *The Times*, came out fuming from an interview with Aberdeen. He saw Greville and told him all about it. The prime minister 'went off in a tirade against *The Times* . . . and said the [Russian] Emperor had done nothing that we had any right to complain of, and talked all the extravagant anti-Turkish and pro-Russian

language of which he has been so constantly accused, and which fully justify the taunts of the Tory and Radical press, although they don't know how right they are. Delane said it was impossible to endure such stuff as this, which was very likely to break up the government, and at all events *The Times* would be no party to such sentiments.' 'I sent him,' says Greville, 'to Clarendon whom he would find in a very different mind, but sadly bothered by the discordant news of Aberdeen and Palmerston, the one for peace at any price and submission to Russia, the other for immediate war.' \* Two days afterwards the news of the 'massacre' arrived. Delane had already decided to abandon his moderation, but the news of Sinope brought the 'Thunderer' into action. Peace was 'no longer compatible with the honour and dignity of the country . . .' but now 'war has begun in earnest' (December 13). *The Times* showed the way to the waverers, and soon brought them over in a body.

On December 11 the whole country had been thrilled by the news of Sinope. A second sensation came on the 16th with the news that Palmerston had resigned from the ministry. The Reform Bill, which he championed and Russell opposed, seems to have been really the cause. Palmerston had contemplated resignation over the Reform Bill before the news of Sinope arrived. He wrote at once to Clarendon, 'As an Englishman, to say nothing of being a member of the government, I am ashamed of the plight in which it places us.' <sup>562</sup> It was too good an opportunity to miss and he sent in his resignation on the 14th. Aberdeen, on receiving his letter, wrote to Clarendon saying that the press would not probably have it on the 15th. 'When they [the newspapers] speak, it ought to be made clear that it is Reform and not the East which has produced it.' That question has remained a little obscure ever since. Palmerston was, at any rate, not averse from hinting that lack of vigour in the Eastern policy had influenced his decision. The pressmen were only human, and some, though not all, were misled. But if they were divided as to the cause of resignation they were unanimous about the 'massacre.' Palmerston's organ, the *Morning Post*, said Sinope was 'a violent outrage' calling for 'immediate war' (December 16). The *Morning Herald* thought it 'a damning disgrace' calling for revenge. The *Globe* declared Russia not 'accessible to the ordinary motives of the rest of the human family,' and reproved even 'the regretted Lord Palmerston' for assuming that she

\* *Grev. unpublished Journ.*, December 10, 1853 (referring to 9th). I think this must be the first interview of a premier with an editor leading to war in England!



was. The laggards trooped into the fold where *The Times* had already shown them the way. The *Morning Chronicle* decided to 'strike down the aggressor,' and the hitherto detached *Manchester Guardian* said war would be 'precipitated' (December 21).

Few governments have ever been subjected to pressure so sudden and so severe, and few ministers would have dared to resist it. In fact most of them did not want to. Even Graham thought Russia had gone too far, and advocated some strong step. Clarendon, who had nobly controlled his excitement till now, finally gave way. 'You think I care too much for public opinion but really when the frightful carnage at Sinope comes to be known we shall be *utterly disgraced* if upon the score of humanity we don't take active measures to prevent any more such outrages.' <sup>563</sup> Aberdeen was shaken and Graham was wavering, but Gladstone and Argyll were still formidably pacific. Comments, like those of Disraeli upon the effect of Palmerston's absence, rang in the government's ears. 'As for lowering the tone of the cabinet, *that* we defy them to do,' wrote this master of invective in the *Press* of December 17. 'As to their energy, its evidence may be found in the Bay of Sinope.' The policy of Lord Palmerston had in the main been followed, 'but it has always been followed too late.' This article appeared on December 17, the very day that the cabinet met, and convinced them that they must not be 'too late again.' Palmerston was away, but the conclusion ultimately reached owed as much, if not more, to his absence than it would have done to his presence. Like Caesar, he was 'mighty yet.'

So early as the first week of December Clarendon had taken a grave step under the pressure of Russell. 'In writing yesterday [7th] to Seymour [St. Petersburg] respecting the military successes desired by Russia I said that we did not want to menace, but that on the contrary it was a friendly act to give due warning that, if Russian troops crossed the Danube, *Russian troops and Russian stores going from one Russian port to another would be intercepted by English ships* and I left it to him to convey this unofficially to the government in whatever way he thought best.' \* This was written a few days before news of the 'Sinope massacre' reached London. As soon as it did, all agreed to send the fleet into the Black Sea. Palmerston urged the despatch on December 11 and 13, and even Graham thought that Sinope 'authorizes' us to send it. Clarendon

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Lord John Russell to Clarendon, December 14, 1853, quoting Clarendon's letter of 8th. Italics my own.

could resist no longer. His despatch to Stratford of the 17th assumed (incorrectly) that the allied fleet was already in the Black Sea.

Lord John's proposition for intercepting the Russian fleet if the Turks crossed the Danube had not only been accepted by Clarendon. He had gone farther and had unofficially notified the fact to Russia. On the 18th Lord John Russell declared it must be officially notified. He had demanded this measure before Sinope; he now insisted. 'If you do not [accept this],' wrote Lord John on the 18th, 'I shall be much inclined to withdraw altogether from the government. I consider this measure was promised me by Lord Aberdeen and I have your letter affirming that you had agreed to my proposal. You only demurred to the official communication to Russia, but that is essential to fair dealing.' While Clarendon was hesitating he received an overture from Paris, which we will call the 'new French proposition.' It forced his hand and the crisis.

On the 17th Cowley had sent a warning. 'The French government think *the affair of Sinope and not the passage of the Danube* should be the signal for action of the fleets.' Napoleon thus took a hand. A very strong communication was received from France on the 19th.\* It demanded that Russia's warships and transports should be intercepted in the Black Sea and turned back to their ports to prevent another 'massacre.' Napoleon saw 'no certain means of controlling her [Russia's] action in the Black Sea' but by 'sweeping the sea of the Russian flag.' He told Cowley privately that he would be 'disappointed' if the scheme were not adopted. Clarendon had an interview with Walewski on the 20th. He agreed then that England would go into the Black Sea and protect Turkish territory if violated by Russia. He would so inform the Russian admiral. He wrote to Stratford that no further instructions were needed, but the cabinet, though 'filled with an unabated desire for peace,' was determined that the allied fleets should obtain 'complete command of the Black Sea.' The phrase about asserting 'the command' of the Black Sea was thus put in Clarendon's instruction of the 20th, because it had been agreed on with Walewski on that day. On the 21st Walewski wrote a threatening letter to Clarendon. England had agreed that the Russian admiral should be warned that the allied fleets would prevent or punish 'an aggression against Ottoman territory but not against the [Ottoman] flag.' Walewski argued that the Russians would in fact

\* Not the 18th as stated in *E.P.* II, No. 332. Italics in Cowley's letter my own.

reinforce their garrisons and thereby come into conflict with the Turks. Then he, Clarendon, might go a step further and support the 'new French proposition' as a whole. Clarendon was not quite convinced, but Lord John's pressure already weighed heavily on him. And he also learned from a private letter from Cowley that 'the Emperor is so convinced of its necessity that he is prepared, should it become necessary, to carry it out alone.'<sup>564</sup> That convinced Clarendon altogether and carried Aberdeen and the cabinet.

At the cabinet held on the 22nd Lord John was not present, because he thought that his policy had triumphed. But in fact events took a different turn. The cabinet now feared separation from France. A way of remaining with her had been telegraphed by Cowley from Paris. 'Offer [the] French government to send fleets into [the] Black Sea immediately for defensive purposes, and undertake to carry out the French proposition to the full if the present negotiations lead to nothing. I think that this will satisfy them.'<sup>565</sup> Aberdeen had at first been inclined to reject this suggestion, on the ground that 'we must surely know why the negotiations lead to nothing.' Subsequently he thought it might be accepted 'if concerted with other measures.' Some ingenious draftsman in the cabinet suggested that they could accept 'the new French proposition' for intercepting Russian warships and shutting up their fleet in Sebastopol, if Napoleon agreed to urge the latest peace proposals at Constantinople. As Aberdeen told the Queen, 'It was stated very unequivocally that the Emperor of the French would either execute the project alone or that he would withdraw his whole fleet to Toulon. . . . Unfortunately public opinion in this country would not permit the risk of dissolving the alliance at this juncture by the assertion of a little more independence.'\* The cabinet thought it could yield to Napoleon over the fleet, if they pledged him to urge on the peace proposals. This compromise delighted Gladstone and the pacifists. 'It fell short of war,' as Kinglake says, 'by a measure of distance which, though it might seem very small to people with common eyesight, was more than broad enough to afford commodious standing-room to a man delighting as he did in refinements and slender distinctions.' So the cabinet decided on a step which the pacifists hoped would lead to peace, and which the forward party thought might not end in war.

Aberdeen thus for the third time adversely influenced

\* Aberdeen to the Queen, December 22, 1853, quoted in part by Kingsley Martin, 176, and full text in App. VI, from *Roy. Arch.*

events. His accession to power had convinced the Russian Emperor that England would never go to war with him. The Russian Emperor was to find himself deceived. Aberdeen was himself deceived on the two other occasions. He had ordered the fleet to Constantinople in September on the strength of French information as to a sedition there. He now agreed to the move into the Black Sea on the strength of information equally dubious as to the views of the French Emperor. He had urged the cabinet to act because the strong man of France would act alone if they did not. But the strong man armed declared later that he had never meant to go forward alone.\* This was the admission of Napoleon himself. So here was a third tragic blunder in which Aberdeen had a share.

This final and fatal decision of the British government was contained in a despatch to Stratford on December 24. In its original form it had included Lord John's demand for interception of Russian warships in the Black Sea if the Russian troops crossed the Danube. But this was cut out and the final draft represented a real, though not an apparent, surrender to France. It adopted the 'specific mode of action proposed by the [French] Emperor. The Ottoman flag, as well as the Ottoman territory, should be protected by the combined fleets, and . . . all Russian vessels, other than merchant-men, met in the Black Sea, should be required to return to Sebastopol. . . . Her Majesty's Government do not disguise from themselves that it may at no distant period involve England and France in war with Russia.' This was offset by a suggestion that the Turks would not be 'allowed to be aggressive.' England and France would restrain 'national feeling' in Turkey, and take charge of the peace negotiations between her and Russia in the hope that a last-moment agreement might be reached.<sup>566</sup> Unfortunately peacemakers rarely succeed when they use a fleet as a means of negotiation. 'No one,' as Robespierre said, 'loves armed missionaries.'

## V

*I thank God it has been my lot to bring about the last offer of peace, and in such terms as to satisfy [our] Government and be thought acceptable to Europe.*—STRATFORD TO HIS WIFE, January 23, 1854.

Stratford had decided against an immediate move of the allied fleet into the Black Sea in the first week of December,

\* *Vide App. VII.*

though the British or French cabinets would have approved such action at any time after the news of Sinope. His delay in moving the fleet enabled him to make a last effort for peace. The Turks, who had been so warlike for two months, had a cool fit during the third one. In October they had rejoiced to escape from their terrible schoolmaster ; in November they were more submissive ; in December actually docile. Ashamed of their hot fit, they reverted mechanically to their old subjection, and Stratford regained nearly all his old influence.

Stratford had prepared a new peace proposal, the eleventh and the last. Baraguay d'Hilliers co-operated, and the two other ambassadors had accepted it by December 12. The terms superseded, though they resembled, a parallel project of Clarendon's. There was to be an armistice between Turkey and Russia, direct negotiations between the two, evacuation of the Principalities, and a renewal of existing treaties. The note of the Four Powers was added as a guarantee. By the 15th much progress had been made. On the 17th and 18th the Grand Council, doubtless at the bidding of a higher power, was decidedly pacific and actually accepted the proposed bases of negotiation. Mehemet Ali himself, and others of the war-party, voted for it, though with unmistakable 'signs of reluctance.'\* They soon showed that their consent was only feigned, for Mehemet Ali and the Sheikh-ul-Islam again stirred up the capital to revolt. On the 21st the religious students began violent demonstrations for war. Reschid, who was frightened out of his wits, ran away and hid himself, and the ministers showed signs of giving way. Stratford sought an interview with the Sultan and insisted on a firm front being shown. The Sultan replied by confirming the vote of the Grand Council and assenting generally to the allied peace proposal. Immediately after Stratford's departure the Sultan sent for the Grand Vizier, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and Mehemet Ali, told them of his intentions and ordered them to summon a council of ministers. As the council met a further message came from the Sultan, ordering them to take immediate measures for repressing disorders by arresting the ringleaders of the rebels. As in September, the two conspirators were caught in their own trap. 'The *Seraskier* [Mehemet Ali] was compelled to act against his own partizans and the Sheikh-ul-Islam to sanction by his presence the measures adopted for their suppression.' About one hundred and seventy *softas* were

\* This is what Stratford says in the passage omitted in *Accounts & Papers* [1854], LXXI [1699], No. 375. For this and other unpublished details *vide F.O.* 78/941. From Stratford, No. 393 of December 18, 1853.



arrested and shipped off to pursue their religious meditations in Crete. The soldiers, who behaved with perfect discipline, restored order, defeated Mchemet Ali's intrigues, and assured Stratford's triumph.<sup>567</sup>

A most significant notice appeared in the Turkish *Official Gazette* under the date December 22. The decisions of the two general councils of the 17th and 18th were that a peace capable of 'assuring the rights and territorial integrity of the Sublime Porte' should not be rejected. The matter of peace was under discussion; 'the present stage . . . is one of question and answer,' and 'the state of war is still in permanence.' But the *fetva* of the Sheikh-ul-Islam had confirmed the proposal. 'His Majesty's will has also been expressed in the same sense and the Four Ambassadors have been communicated with.' This notice proved quite clearly that peace was now possible. A *fetva* had been issued for the war; a *fetva* was now paving the way for peace. As usual there were pretexts for delay, and assertions that the unrest had not subsided. But all of the ministers had learned a lesson. As Kinglake says, 'The fury of the armed divines, insisting upon the massacre of worldlings, was less terrible to them than the anger of the Elchi.' On the last day of the year Stratford wrote home in exultation that the Turkish ministers, with the Sultan's sanction, had accepted his peace proposals. 'It now remains with the Four Powers to obtain the assent of Russia, and to set on foot the negotiation which they have expressed their desire to obtain and which, if the Court of St. Petersburg be sincere in its professions, ought to terminate at an early period in peace.' But it was to end in war, and war by decision of British and French cabinets.

## VI

*Would God that Argo ne'er had winged the seas  
To Colchis through the blue Symplegades.*

EURIPIDES, *Medea*.

While negotiating for peace Stratford had been arranging the despatch of the allied fleet into the Black Sea. For various reasons he and the French ambassador had shrunk from ordering that movement after the news of Sinope. But by the third week of December both agreed that the fleets must soon move up. The 'massacre of Sinope' proved that Turkish territory had not been defended from direct aggression. Stratford himself had told Reschid that the allied admirals had no

confidence 'in the fitness of the Ottoman squadron for service at sea in presence of an imposing enemy, and at this unfavourable season.' The Turkish fleet in the Black Sea could only be protected by sending up the Franco-British squadron. The movement was decided on in principle on December 15, but it was interrupted by the riots and not actually ordered until the 26th. Then rough weather caused a delay, a delay which, in fact, proved extremely important. For on January 3, 1854, Stratford received Clarendon's instruction of December 20 which specifically ordered the Black Sea move. Hence the fleet moved on an order from home. From first to last Stratford never ordered a fleet movement without the direct instruction of the Home Government. The fleet did not move into the Black Sea until the 3rd; it was not all there until the 5th.

It was a gloomy opening for the New Year. On the day the last allied ship entered the Black Sea, the French ambassador, Baraguay d'Hilliers, explained his views on the movement. 'He felt the gravity of the step . . . he understood that the departure of these fleets might temporarily irritate [Russia]. Still he always hoped that the Russian Government would understand that the interest *of all* was not to come to that extremity. Once that conviction was established, they could not fail to understand one another.' \* This grave and measured judgment represents the view of the situation taken by both British and French ambassadors, and corresponds to that contemplated in Clarendon's despatch of October 20. The advance of the allied fleet in the Black Sea might be a demonstration against Russia. But it was not war. And it is at least possible that the Czar would not have taken it as such. On January 2 Nesselrode had a talk with Seymour on the subject. Both assumed that the Franco-British fleet was already in the Black Sea. Nesselrode assured Seymour that 'the Russian fleet would in consequence of the advanced season be little likely to leave Sebastopol.' Seymour thought the allied squadron would restrain the Turks. They parted on good terms after 'an amicable conversation.'<sup>568</sup> The movement of the fleet ordered by Stratford and d'Hilliers was that contemplated by Nesselrode. It might not therefore have produced war. Moreover French and British admirals informed the Russian admiral that they wished to 'avoid any collision or event which might compromise peace.' Palmerston described this communication as 'milk and water,' adding

\* *N.R.A.* From Mollerus, No. 1 of January 5, 1854. The Dutchman was convinced his utterance was genuine.

‘and our ambassadors seem to have left out the milk.’<sup>589</sup> But Clarendon’s despatch of December 24 contained ‘the new French proposition,’ a brew infinitely stronger than Stratford’s. On January 10 it reached Constantinople, and Stratford at once conveyed this new and insulting intimation to the governor of Sebastopol. Clarendon’s brew was not milk. It was wine with the water left out, and it proved too strong for Russia’s stomach.

## VII

*If I had not known how to withstand public opinion, I should already have crossed my frontiers. My moderation is not without merit nor perhaps without danger.*—NICHOLAS TO CASTELBAJAC, December 12, 1853.

*England and France will declare war on us. It is sad that this is the end of my journey for I have always been an apostle of peace.*—NESSELRODE TO CASTELBAJAC, December 2, 1853.

On December 24 Palmerston withdrew his resignation; on January 2 he met his colleagues again in the cabinet. He was good humoured and cheerful, ‘just as if nothing had happened, which is exactly like him,’ said Graham. Even the summons to Russia did not cause him to be serious, and he wrote to Clarendon in his airy way, ‘As to our good cousin Nicholas I scarcely expect that he will declare war against England and France, for so polite an attention as a request that he will not expose his Black Sea fleet to the various dangers, which might beset their ships if they left their good anchorage at Sebastopol. But nevertheless it is not unlikely that the *month of May* will find us in active collision with him. I should say however that seeing that all autocrat as he is, he is yet a man, he will become reasonable in proportion as he finds that his difficulties and dangers will increase by his remaining unreasonable; and when he finds England and France in earnest and determined to defend Turkey, he may possibly feel that he has nothing to gain, and may have something to lose by the continuance of his war.’\* This letter makes one rub one’s eyes. Even the grand artificer of war doubts whether ‘the new French proposition’ would achieve that end. Perhaps he had forgotten the difference between milk and wine. Perhaps he was influenced, like the pacifists of the cabinet, by the old assertion that our requests were as conciliatory as our movements were defensive. Perhaps he thought that a menacing intimation like the French proposition would have no more effect on a haughty despot than a sharp parliamentary repartee

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, December 27, 1853. *Italics my own.*

would have had on an opposition orator. His delusion was shared by others in the cabinet. 'I doubt whether he [Nicholas] will decline the terms,' wrote Russell in January. 'I still say that war is *not inevitable*,' wrote Aberdeen most pathetically on February 12, 'unless indeed we are determined to have it, which perhaps, for aught I know, may be the case.' \*

On January 12, 1854, 'the new French proposition,' or the 'wine with the water left out,' was administered by Seymour to Nesselrode.<sup>570</sup> His manner of doing it showed that he understood the situation better than Palmerston or the cabinet. 'Her Majesty's ships, and those of the Emperor of the French as well, for there was an entire uniformity in the orders sent to the two fleets as in the intentions with which they were drawn up, will, I said, enter the Black Sea and will require every Russian ship which they may meet with to re-enter a Russian port. It is painful to me to . . . make such an allusion, but if the summons is not attended to it will be enforced (*l'on aura recours à la force*). . . . "Are you sure," Count Nesselrode said, "that this intention is expressed in your instruction?" I was, I replied, quite sure ; if I were not I should certainly not have made the statement.' Finally 'Count Nesselrode said that he felt obliged to observe that it was most unfortunate (*à regretter*) that Her Majesty's Government should have determined upon taking measures of so decided a character at the precise moment when strenuous efforts are being made at Vienna for coming to a peaceable arrangement.' Nesselrode gave no answer at the moment and said that he was awaiting news from Vienna.

Seymour thought that Russia was playing for time. She was hurrying on her war preparations, while trying to find out if England and France were really in earnest. During this period of waiting Nesselrode was 'dejected' and full of 'sadness,' always averring that he hated war, and sometimes coming near to an appeal *ad misericordiam*. The Czar alternated between fits of fury and clumsy attempts at conciliation. He encouraged theatrical representations of 'La bataille de Sinope'; he gave a new decoration to the French ambassador; he despatched his favourite Orlov on a special mission to Vienna. It was all in vain. The peace proposals accepted by Turkey failed to secure acceptance at Vienna, and the ever-resourceful Orlov returned to St. Petersburg in dejection. In mid-February the Czar ordered that Seymour and his French colleague should be handed their passports. For he

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston, December 27, 1853, italics my own; Lord John Russell, January 13, 1854; Aberdeen, February 12.

could not accept the allied methods of coercing him in the Black Sea. He himself had failed with Turkey when he took the sword in one hand and the olive branch in the other. He was not going to allow this method to succeed against himself. He did not keep Europe waiting long, and thus falsified Palmerston's prediction. It was the mad month of March, not the merry month of May, which saw the nations at war.



## EPILOGUE

DURING his later years Lord Aberdeen was often haunted by melancholy thoughts. Some of his actions seemed strange even to those who knew him best. Among these was his persistent refusal to rebuild an ugly and dilapidated parish church on one of his estates. To all requests he returned a steady refusal, saying always, 'I leave that for George' (his son). Everyone thought his conduct very unusual and no one guessed the true reason for it.<sup>571</sup> After his death a text was found, written and rewritten by him on scraps of paper, which supplied the key to the mystery.

*'And David said unto Solomon, My son, as for me, it was in my power to build an house unto the name of the Lord my God. But the word of the Lord came to me, saying, Thou hast shed blood abundantly and hast made great war: thou shalt not build an house unto my name, because thou hast shed much blood upon the earth in my sight.'* \*

Was there ever a more strange or a more touching confession?

\* 1 Chronicles, xxii, 7, 8; *vide* n. 571.



## SHORT LIST OF TURKISH AND OTHER FOREIGN WORDS AND OF ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS, WITH A NOTE ON TURKISH NAMES

THE spelling of Turkish words, like that of Turkish names, has been corrupted by popular and usually by mistaken usages. But in a history, in which diplomats invariably refer to Reschid and Abdul Medjid, etc., it would be absurd to give them their correct titles. The proper designations will easily be found in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Exactly the same principle can be applied to Turkish words and expressions. The popular or diplomatic usage is quoted here. For instance, *ulemas* is quite inaccurate as a plural, but was generally used by almost all diplomats and publicists. I have therefore given the normal or popular usage first, and sometimes added the correct usage in brackets. My friend Mr. R. Levy of Christ's College, Cambridge, has kindly advised me as to this list.

*Ayans* (correctly *ayan*). Turkish notables of provinces and municipalities.

*Berat*. Charter or patent. *Beratli* (*Beratti*, plur.), holder of a *Berat*, i.e. privileged person.

*Bey* or *Beg*. Honorary title.

*Beylerbeg*. Governor of a province.

*Cadi*. Judge.

*Derebey*. Holder by feudal tenure.

*Despotes*. Title given to a Greek bishop.

*Divan*. Council or Court held by high officials.

*Eyalet* (*vide* Province).

*Fetva*. Decision by a jurisconsult on a point of law. Official confirmation by the Sheikh-ul-Islam of the acts or decrees of the Sultan.

*Firman*. Sultan's edict.

*Gulhané*. Rose Chamber. Applied to the decree of reform issued in 1839. The name is derived from the Kiosk in the Seraglio where quantities of sweets were manufactured.

*Guslar*. Slav minstrel, who recites traditional folksongs. The *Gusla* is his stringed instrument.

*Haiduk* or *Haidud*. Robber, but often used in the sense of Christian patriot or rebel against Islam.

*Haratch* (corruption of Arabic *Kharaj*). Poll-tax on *rayas* exempting them from military service.

*Hat[t]* (writing). *Hatti-Sheriff* (correctly *Shérif*) (illustrious writing). *Hatti-Humayun* (august writing). An ordinance of the Sultan or document written with his own hand.

*Itizam*. Farming of revenue.

*Imams*. Preachers in the mosque.

*Jehad* (*Djihad*). Holy war.

*Kaimakams*. Deputy-governors.

*Kaza* (*vide* Province).

*Kislar-Agasi*. Chief black eunuch.

*Liva* (*vide* Province).

*Logothete*. Arch-Chancellor of Greek patriarch of Constantinople.

*Mejliss*. Council or Assembly.

*Millet*. Nation or community recognised by the Sultan. (Up to 1853 there were five: Armenians, United Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Latins.)

*Mollah*. A *cadi* or other person officially recognised as being learned in the law, and having power to interpret it.

*Mufti*. A Judge having power to grant a *fetva*. The Grand Mufti, *i.e.* the Judge or the Sheikh-ul-Islam.

*Nishan*. Official seal or decoration.

*Nizam*. Regular troops.

*Padishah*. Sultan or Emperor.

*Province*. Government fixed in 1834. The *Eyalet* or general government subdivided into *Livas* or *Sanjaks* or provinces, and these again into *Kazas* or districts.

*Rayas* (*Rajahs* or *Raiahs*, plural of *Rayet*, also *Raihssi*). Name for non-Mussulman subjects of the Sultan.

*Rediffs* (correctly *Redifs*). Reserve troops.

*Richvet* (correctly *rishvet*). Bribery.

*Sanjak* (*vide* Province).

*Sheikh-ul-Islam*. Chief or elder of Islam, interprets the law and issues the *fetva* sanctioning the Sultan's acts.

*Spahi* or *Sipahi*. Feudal cavalryman.

*Sultana Valide*. Queen-Mother.

*Tidjaret* (correctly *Tijaret*). Commerce.

— *Mehkemessi*. Commercial Court.

— *Odasi*. Chamber of Commerce.

*Timar*. Feudal fief.

*Ulemas* (correctly *ulema*). The learned. The body of Moslem jurists.

*Wakuf* (*Vacuf* or *Wakf*). Property set apart as endowment for Mosques or charitable institutions.

## LIST OF PREVIOUS ARTICLES AND WORKS BY THE AUTHOR DEALING WITH SPECIAL PHASES OF THIS PERIOD

(The following list may be useful in indicating certain phases less fully treated in the text or notes.)

‘Princess Lieven and the Protocol of April 4, 1826.’  
*E.H.R.*, January 1924.

‘The Unpublished Diary of Princess Lieven’ [1925].  
(‘The Eastern Policy,’ 1825–56.)

‘Foreign Policy of Canning.’ (Chapters XIV, XV deal with the Eastern Question, 1820–7.)

‘British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey’ (1830–1914). *Cambridge Historical Journal*, October 1933.

‘Stratford de Redcliffe and the Origins of the Crimean War.’ *E.H.R.*, Part I, October 1933 ; Part II, April 1934.

‘The Alleged Violations of the Straits Convention by Stratford de Redcliffe between June and September 1853.’  
*E.H.R.*, October 1934.

‘The Last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe’ (1855–58).  
*E.H.R.*, April 1932.

‘The Treaty of Paris and its Execution’ (1856). *Journal of Modern History*, Part I, September 1932 ; Part II, December 1932.

‘British Secret Diplomacy during the Palmerstonian Period.’ (Deals largely with the Czar’s overture to Clanricarde, 1840–1, in *Mélanges de Halvdan Koht*, Oslo [1932], 274–294.)

‘History of Serbia’ [1918].





# LIST OF MORE IMPORTANT NOTES



# LIST OF MORE IMPORTANT NOTES TO CHAPTERS

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# NOTES TO CHAPTERS I—XIV

# ABBREVIATIONS IN THE NOTES

## ABBREVIATIONS FOR OFFICIAL RECORDS, PRIVATE PAPERS, ETC.

(E.g. *Pte. Clar. MSS.*, *Pte. Strat. MSS.*, etc. ; for list of these, *vide supra*, pp. xxvii-xxviii.)

## GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS FOR BLUE BOOKS

*A. & P.*—*Accounts and Papers* are referred to under their respective years, e.g. *A. & P.* [1843], Vol. LX, Part II [456], No. 152.

In some cases so detailed a reference is unnecessary and the page only is referred to, e.g. *A. & P.* [1845], Vol. LI, p. 789. From Rose, Nov. 27, 1844.

## SPECIAL ABBREVIATIONS FOR BLUE BOOKS \*

*Lev. I and II. Accounts and Papers.* First Session [1841], Part I [304, 322] ; Part II [323], Vol. XXIX, pp. 1-1084. Correspondence relative to the affairs of the Levant.

*Lev. III. Accounts and Papers.* Second Session [1841], Part III [337], Vol. VIII, pp. 1-482.

*Hung. Ref. I.—Accounts and Papers* [1851]. Vol. LVIII [1323], pp. 1-406. 'Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Hungary,' 1847-9.

*Hung. Ref. II.—Ibid.* [1324], pp. 407-546. 'Correspondence respecting Refugees within the Turkish Dominions.'

*E.P. I.—Eastern Papers I* [1854]. Vol. LXXI [1698], pp. 1-416. 'Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey,' Part I.

*E.P. II.—Eastern Papers II.* Vol. (as before) [1699], pp. 417-810. Title as before. Part II.

*E.P. V.—Eastern Papers V.* Vol. (as before) [1736], pp. 833-62. 'Communications respecting Turkey made to Her Majesty's Government by the Emperor of Russia, with the Answers returned to them, January and April 1853,' Part V.

*E.P. VI.—Eastern Papers VI.* Vol. (as before) [1737], pp. 863-70. 'Memorandum by Count Nesselrode delivered to Her Majesty's Government, and founded on communications received from the Emperor of Russia subsequently to His Imperial Majesty's visit to England in June 1844,' Part VI.

*E.P. VII.—Eastern Papers VII.* Vol. (as before) [1744], pp. 871-964. 'Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey,' Part VII.

\* The numbered document is quoted unless otherwise indicated.

# BOOK I

## SULTAN MAHMUD

### CHAPTER I

#### THE REFORMS OF MAHMUD II

##### GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

*MS. Authorities.*—The British Foreign Office Correspondence, 1807–1839 (*F.O.*) contains a number of private letters from Lord Ponsonby. Sir Stratford Canning (de Redcliffe's) private papers are in *F.O.* The consular reports are also of value.

*Netherlands Rijks Archief (N.R.A.).* Correspondence, 1807–9, 1826, 1831–9.

*Wiener Staats Archiv (W.S.A.),* 1833–4, 1838–9.

##### SECONDARY BUT CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS.

*Tarikh-I-Enderun*, i.e. a history of the Imperial Household of Turkey under Mahmud II (1227–46 or 1812–30), Constantinople [1859–60]. This gives an account of what to the Turkish Court Chronicler, and doubtless to Mahmud himself, seemed the most important events of the reign. Most of it is concerned with the details of court progresses and the fall of ministers, but the destruction of the janizzaries takes a high place. It throws little light on the vexed question of the influence of Mahmud's French Creole mother.

A good contemporary account is contained in *Turquie*, Paris [1843], by J. M. J. Jouannin and J. van Gaver, chs. xxix–xxxi. It has much local colour and quotations from Turkish sources.

Sir A. Slade : *Travels in Germany and Russia* [1840] has a few Turkish references.

*Idem.* *Travels in Turkey, etc.* [new edition, 1854], was written in 1831. The author was a British officer in the Turkish navy, known as Mushaver Pasha. He gives an account of naval activities in the Russian war, and is a first-hand authority all round though not always accurate in detail. He is useful as being an apologist for the old Turkish conservatism and regards Mahmud as a dangerous innovator (*vide* especially chs. viii–ix). His work is criticised in David Ross, *Opinions of the Press on the Eastern Question* [1836], 300–23. Ahmed Vefyk considered Slade's the best account from the Turkish conservative standpoint. He expressed his own views in White, *Three Years [in Constantinople]*, Vol. I, 110 *sqq.* This invaluable work, based on Ahmed Vefyk's information, in three volumes [1845], is praised by Layard, but it deals with society and manners in 1844 and only retrospectively with Mahmud's reign. The ultra-conservative view is presented with mystic eloquence by David Urquhart, *Turkey and its*



*Resources* [1833], and again in the *Spirit of the East*, 2 vols. [1838]. Some of his arguments are ingenious but, as Ahmed Vefyk said, he is 'an advocate,' and he ascribes all the good in Turkish institutions to inspiration from Mecca and to the Arab spirit. Still the theory that Mahmud's innovations could have been avoided, or were disastrous to Turkey, is worth studying in Slade and Urquhart.

General impressions of the reign are to be inferred from or formed in the following contemporary works: Charles White, as mentioned. R. Walsh: *A residence at Constantinople* [1836] contains authentic details as to Mahmud and some of his chief agents. Charles Macfarlane: *Constantinople in 1828* [1829] is useful though slight and not always accurate. There is a good deal of information in James Porter, *Turkey, its History and Progress*, edited by Sir G. Larpent, 2 vols. [1854], but it is never quite clear whether the author is describing the eighteenth or nineteenth century. For this reason *The Turks*, translated from the French of A. L. Castellan [1821], is more valuable as an unquestionable contemporary view of manners under Mahmud II. The reign was essentially one of transition. Earlier works like d'Ohsson's are very questionable, and later ones, which have much merit for the reign of Abdul Medjid, have little for that of Mahmud. *Parliamentary Papers, A. & P.*, deal chiefly with diplomacy in Greece, and with Egypt until we come to the Commercial Convention of April 16, 1838, when abundance of information as to its working is supplied. *Vide* n. 62, *infra*.

Few authorities are quoted for Greece, Servia, the Principalities, Syria and Egypt, as these form special problems in themselves and were separated in name or fact from Mahmud's rule. A. Boué: *La Turquie d'Europe*, Paris [1840], 4 vols., is a valuable contemporary survey mostly of the Christian lands. John Barker, edited by E. B. B. Barker: *Syria and Egypt (under the last five Sultans of Turkey)*, 2 vols. [1876], has much inside value for the thirties and forties, as it is written by an ex-official and a permanent resident in the East.

*Asia Minor*, E. Cadalvène et E. Barrault, *Deux années de l'histoire d'Orient*, Paris [1840], 2 vols.

*Kurdistan, Letters from the East*, H. J. Ross [1902], gives a picture for the year 1839, as does Horatio Southgate, *Narrative of a tour through Armenia, Kurdistan, Persia, Mesopotamia* [1840], 2 vols.

The Asiatic narratives of Layard and Macfarlane, both great travellers, lie outside the reign of Mahmud. Two modern books, S. H. R. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* [1925], R. Coke, *Bagdad, the City of Peace* [1927], are secondary works dealing adequately with Mahmud's conquest of Iraq, and Longrigg's includes southern Kurdistan.

MODERN SECONDARY WORKS.—The best general ones are:

Sir George Young: *Constantinople* [1926], a useful general account.

Lord Eversley, *The Turkish Empire*, 2nd ed. [1923].

W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors* [1927]. Admirable on the Balkan States.

G. Rosen, *Geschichte der Türkei*, Leipzig [1866].

N. Jorga: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Gotha [1913], Bd. V, is still of much value.

Sir T. W. Arnold: *The Caliphate*, Oxford [1924], is a classic work, but hardly touches Mahmud except at 147-8.

B. A. Martin, *The Veiled Empress*, New York [1933], attempts to reveal the influence of Mahmud's French Creole mother upon him. But evidence is lacking, almost the only fact in the British records being notice of her

death. Such testimony as there is points to the impulse to Westernism being given to Mahmud by Sultan Selim while sharing his captivity, not by his mother in the harem.

R. Levy : *Sociology of Islam*, Vols. I-II [1931-3], is admirable, but general in character.

D'Ohsson : *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris [1788], is quite wrong about the Caliphate and in other particulars. It is also too early for our period. Two really important works, though hardly touching our period, are Barnette Miller, *Beyond the Sublime Porte*, Newhaven [1931], and *Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors of Sari Mehmed Pasha, the Defterdar*. Turkish text and translation, etc., by W. L. Wright [1935].

<sup>1</sup> P. 6. *N.R.A.* From van Dedem, No. 28 of July 23, 1808 ; No. 29 of July 25 ; No. 30 of July 30 ; No. 33 of August 10.

<sup>2</sup> P. 6. *N.R.A.* From van Dedem, No. 30 of July 30, 1808.

<sup>3</sup> P. 7. *The revolt of the janizzaries* under Selim needs to be carefully studied to understand the reasons of its success. The *Turkish Court Chronicle* is relatively slight on the subject. The quaint pamphlet written by Chelib Effendi to discredit the janizzaries is worthy of study. Its text is in W. W. Wilkinson, *Wallachia and Moldavia* [1820], 216-94. Another contemporary account deals with the Bairactar's deposition of Mustapha and loads the janizzaries with abuse. It is translated by Colonel T. Gordon, who suspects that it was written by a Turk of fame and learning. *Vide* Vol. II, sec. 3, of *Miscellaneous Translations from Oriental Languages* [1834].

A. Juchereau : *Révolutions de Constantinople en 1807-8*, Paris [1819], is of first-rate importance for the story, so are Jouannin and van Gaver, *Turquie*, 371-84. The *Annual Register* (1807-8) relies mainly on accounts from Vienna. There is great confusion as to what happened. Barnette Miller (*Beyond the Sublime Porte*, 209-10) says the Bairactar got up to the Gate of Felicity, and this is in itself probable. She says that Selim 'had been strangled some days previously,' which fact I think unlikely. Where accounts conflict I have relied on the account given in *N.R.A.*, 1807-8, by van Dedem, the Dutch representative. He was the only diplomat received by the Bairactar, and supplies other evidence of value.

<sup>4</sup> P. 7. *N.R.A.* From van Dedem, No. 33 of August 10, 1808.

<sup>5</sup> P. 7. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 5 of January 19, 1809 ; No. 11 of March 24.

<sup>6</sup> P. 8. Barker, I, 41.

<sup>7</sup> P. 9. Barker, II, 100.

<sup>8</sup> P. 9. Macfarlane, *Constantinople in 1828*, II, 378-83. Slade, *Travels in Turkey*, 115-6. Ross, *Letters*, 10-11.

<sup>9</sup> P. 10. *F.O. Turkey*, 78/256. From Ponsonby, Nos. 204-5, November 4-5, 1835, with enclo. a good general account by James Brant, who went to see for himself.

<sup>10</sup> P. 10. *F.O.* 78/277. From Ponsonby, No. 152 of September 8, 1836 ; No. 184 of October 12, enclo. reports of R. Wood of June 28 and September 3, an eye-witness.

<sup>11</sup> P. 10. Exploits in subduing Mohammed the Blind are described in R. Wood, Memo of March 28, 1853 (*vide* App. I), and differ a little from those quoted in n. 10. Rowanduz had been defended by guns cast on the spot, but to-day (1935) there is a road through its difficult gorge. Southgate (*Narrative*, II, 240-2, 267) attests the order in Sivas and Mosul (1840).

<sup>12</sup> P. 11. *F.O.* 78/256. Minute of Lord Palmerston, December 25, 1835, enclo. to Ponsonby, No. 204 of November 3.

<sup>13</sup> P. 11. *F.O.* 78/278. From Ponsonby, No. 221 of November 27, 1836.

<sup>14</sup> P. 11. Coke, *Bagdad*, ch. xiv. Longrigg, *Four Centuries*, chs. x-xi.

<sup>15</sup> P. 12. *F.O.* 78/273. Report by Colonel F. R. Chesney of February 22, 1836; for the views of Palmerston, *vide supra*.

<sup>16</sup> P. 12. Sir R. Wilson, *Private Journal* [1861], I, 123, July 10, 1812.

<sup>17</sup> P. 13. Details from *Annual Register* [1826], 126-8.

<sup>18</sup> P. 15. Nassau Senior, *Journal kept in Turkey and Greece* (1857-8). London [1859], 176, reminiscences of Calvert.

<sup>19</sup> P. 18. Macfarlane, *Constantinople in 1828*, II, 379-80. Journal of Mr. Starbuck. This is a useful and vivid narrative. There are a few good touches also in White, *Three Years*. [Stratford (*de Redcliffe*)], *Life*. [Lane-Poole [1888] was an eye-witness and his evidence is valuable. *The Annual Register* [1826] is also useful.

<sup>20</sup> P. 21. August 12, 1826. Poole, *Life of Stratford* [1888], I, 423-4.

<sup>21</sup> P. 21. Macfarlane, *Constantinople in 1828*. *Vide supra*, n. 3.

<sup>22</sup> P. 21. R. C. Mellish, June 28, 1829, in Poole, *Life of Stratford*, II, 75.

<sup>23</sup> P. 22. *The destruction of the janizzaries*. The *Turkish Court Chronicler's* account is on the whole followed. A valuable record is supplied by R. Walsh, *A residence at Constantinople* [1836], II, 264-6, and more particularly his App. VII, 502-25, which is based on evidence of eye-witnesses.

Poole (*Life of Stratford*, I, 424-5) gives some details from Hussein himself, as does Nassau Senior, *Journal in Turkey and Greece* of 1857-8 [1859], 186. Hussein perhaps embroidered his exploits. Other authorities are mentioned in note 11, *supra*. On the whole Walsh and the *Turkish Court Chronicler* are the most detailed and agree fairly well. The chief discrepancy is as to the number of janizzaries killed. Senior (*Journal*, 137) reports Ahmed Vefyk as saying 'few were killed,' and only 800 executed. White (*Three Years*, III, 124), influenced by Ahmed Vefyk, gives 5,000; Stratford gives 6,000, and this figure is confirmed by Jouannin and van Gaver, *Turquie*, 405, 'five or six thousand.' The *Turkish Court Chronicler* puts the slain 'without the least exaggeration at 30,000,' but figures are never a strong point with orientals. Much would depend on how many janizzaries were in the Et-Meidan. Most people think about 20,000 were there; Walsh suggests that 30,000 were at one time there, but that some of these retired before the conflict. *N.R.A.* Baron de Nyevelt, No. 109 of July 10, 1826, puts slain and executed at 15,000 in all. All agree that very few were slain in the provinces.

<sup>24</sup> P. 22. *Moniteur Ottomane* of February 10, 1838.

<sup>25</sup> P. 22. The text is in Cadalvène et Barrault, II, 343-8. *Vide* remarks in Slade's *Travels*, 152-3. Deportation was a classic way of killing Armenians, and was used on an unexampled scale in the late war. *Vide* Grant and Temperley, *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* [1932], 571-80.

<sup>26</sup> P. 23. *Moniteur Ottomane* of February 10, 1838.

<sup>27</sup> P. 24. *F.O.* 78/252. From Ponsonby, No. 17 of January 25, 1835; *F.O.* 78/273, No. 28 of March 14, 1836.

<sup>28</sup> P. 24. *F.O.* 78/278. From Ponsonby, No. 218 of November 18, 1836.

<sup>29</sup> P. 24. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 331 of April 19, 1837; *F.O.* 78/305. From Ponsonby, No. 213 of September 13, 1837; No. 216 of September 16. The last account is, with one intermediary, from Halil himself.

<sup>30</sup> P. 25. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 369 of September 20, 1837.

<sup>31</sup> P. 25. *The murder of Pertev.* This matter is mysterious and typical of an oriental Court intrigue. Franz Babinger, *Die Geschichts-Schreiber der Osmanen und Ihre Werke*, I, 40 ; Leipzig [1927], 357-8. Slade (*Travels in Germany and Russia*, I, 228-35), who knew the inside of the palace, details the intrigues of Halil and particularly stresses Pertev's objection to the Sultan's portraits. Testa, *N.R.A.*, No. 369 of September 20, 1837 ; No. 377 of November 7 (also No. 368 of October 13), connects the whole matter with Ponsonby's struggle for power. The Dutch Minister did not realise that Ponsonby liked Pertev because he was anti-Russian (*F.O.* 78/305. From Ponsonby, No. 216 of September 16, 1837), and would hardly have desired his fall. Moreover, Ponsonby does not seem to have known of the intrigue until Pertev had fallen. No one, except Testa, mentions Mahmud's resentment against Pertev on account of the plot in Constantinople during his (the Sultan's) absence. It is clear that the Sultan took a serious view of this, for he disgraced Pertev's son-in-law as soon as he returned to the capital (*N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 346 of June 28, 1837). But Mahmud waited for three months, and evidently reflected much, before disgracing Pertev himself. It would seem therefore that Halil only took advantage of Pertev's imprudences over the plot, the army, and the Sultan's portrait, to achieve his fall. The whole seems to have been an intrigue by Husrev and Akif, and Halil was their ignorant but useful pawn. It is, however, extremely probable that Ponsonby worked with Reschid in May 1838 to overthrow Akif. He had been on very bad terms with him, though he was too discreet officially to admit his share in his downfall. E. J. W. Gibb (*History of Ottoman Poetry* [1905], IV, ch. ix) gives Akif's own account and estimates him as a writer.

<sup>32</sup> P. 26. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 399 of March 14, 1838 ; No. 401 of March 21.

<sup>33</sup> P. 26. *The Turkish Press under Mahmud.* Vide White, *Three Years*, II, 218-25. Walsh, *Constantinople*, II, 279-84. Crawley, *Greek Independence* [1930], 94-5 n. Under Mahmud the first newspaper to appear in the Turkish Empire was a Greek sheet known as the *Salpinx Hellenicon*, which was published in 1821. It was followed by a pro-Turk journal from Smyrna, *Le Spectateur Orientale*, edited by a Frenchman called M. Tricot, who had once been attached to the French consulate at Constantinople. It was succeeded in 1824 by a better journal, *Le Smyrnéen*, edited by M. Roux. The *Courier de Smyrne* appeared in 1828, edited by M. Blaque, who was under both French and Austrian influences. Through its means Prokesch-Osten advocated concessions by Turkey to avoid worse evils. Mahmud seems to have noted this journal and issued a kind of official account of his campaign against Bagdad in 1830. This led on to the idea of a general official chronicle. Its prospectus was issued in October 1831, as about to be printed both in Turkish and French under the title 'Tablet of Events.' The aim was officially stated to be to correct 'false reports and idle speculations,' and to give a record of domestic and foreign policy, and of new inventions and commercial progress. The French version known as the *Moniteur Ottomane* was edited by M. Blaque, formerly of the *Courier de Smyrne*. He was succeeded on his death by M. Franceschi, and he (1841) again by M. Rouet, a follower of Reschid. The Turkish editor was a *mollah*. Both were controlled by Mahmud, who sometimes wrote articles himself and inserted details of the Turkish budget, as well as all sorts of other information. At Smyrna the *Journal de Smyrne* and the *Echo de l'Orient* also appeared under Mahmud, but these were French. Vide *supra*, pp. 244-5, and *infra*, n. 368, for press (1841-53).



- <sup>34</sup> P. 26. *F.O.* 78 273. From Ponsonby, private to Palmerston of January 10, 1836.
- <sup>35</sup> P. 26. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 487 of July 10, 1839.
- <sup>36</sup> P. 27. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 316 of February 1, 1837; No. 328 of March 22.
- <sup>37</sup> P. 27. As to Mahmud's share in introducing sanitary reform, *vide* Walsh, *Constantinople*, II, 300-6.
- <sup>38</sup> P. 27. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 453 of November 19, 1838.
- <sup>39</sup> P. 27. *Moniteur Ottoman* of May 19, 1838.
- <sup>40</sup> P. 28. Nassau Senior, *Journal in Turkey and Greece*, 143-4.
- <sup>41</sup> P. 28. *F.O.* 78 276. From Ponsonby, No. 143 of August 20, 1836; *F.O.* 78 277. No. 153 of September 11.
- <sup>42</sup> P. 28. *F.O.* 78 191. From Sir R. Gordon, No. 77 of September 22, 1830; No. 83 of October 26.
- <sup>43</sup> P. 29. *F.O.* 78 304. From Ponsonby, No. 139 of July 4, 1837.
- <sup>44</sup> P. 29. These quotations are from *F.O.* 78 431, No. 70 of February 21, 1841, enclo. a report from Col. Hugh Rose of February 20, who had just visited both Ibrahim and the Turkish army in Syria.
- <sup>45</sup> P. 30. *F.O.* 195/145. To Ponsonby, No. 8 of January 1838, enclo. rep. of November 8, 1837.
- <sup>46</sup> P. 30. *F.O.* 78 309. J. B. Fraser, July 20, 1837, puts them at 40,000.
- <sup>47</sup> P. 30. *F.O.* 78/300. To Ponsonby, No. 24 of May 11, 1837.
- <sup>48</sup> P. 30. *The Turkish Army under Mahmud* (cp. *infra*, n. 248, pp. 437-8). This question is full of difficulties. In the text I quote Chrzanovski's report. There is another useful one in *F.O.* 78/309. J. B. Fraser, July 20, 1837. He puts the available *Rediffs* at 40,000, while Chrzanovski suggests only 13,000. It must be recollected that it was not till 1843 that conscription produced reserves in any quantity, and that Syria and Adana were closed as recruiting grounds till 1841. The books are almost wholly useless on military matters, but there are a few points in White, *Three Years*, III, 124-5. Moltke (*Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia, 1828-30*, 12-13, 16, 21 [1854]) wrote too soon after the destruction of the janizzaries, but he reckoned the army of regulars at 80,000 (of which 60,000 were infantry and 48,000 from the new army). Irregulars he put at about 100,000. He praises the courage of the common soldier and criticises the Turkish generals. H. v. Moltke, the Field-Marshal, has some useful comments in *Briefe . . . in der Türkei* (1835-9), Berlin [1876]. The military reports of 1841, though written just after Mahmud's reign, enable us to see what his army was like. The best is in *F.O.* 78/431. From Ponsonby, No. 70 of February 21, 1841, enclo. report of Col. Hugh Rose of February 20. There are also a number of reports from Capt. R. Williams, who was trying to organise the artillery and engineers. The best is *F.O.* 78/434, private. From Ponsonby of June 8, 1841, enclo. Capt. Williams of June 7; cp. *infra*, n. 248.
- <sup>49</sup> P. 30. *F.O.* 78/427. To Ponsonby, No. 52 of March 23, 1841.
- <sup>50</sup> P. 31. *The strength of Russian and Turkish fleets*, 1838, according to return. *F.O.* 78/332-3. From Ponsonby, No. 203 of September 18, 1838; No. 235 of November 10, 1838.

<i>Ships of line.</i>	<i>Russian.</i>	<i>Turkish.</i>
Over 100 guns . . .	1	3
Over 90 guns . . .	—	4
80 guns and over . . .	9	1
70 guns and over . . .	1	3
	—	—
	11	11
	—	—



In frigates the Russians had a slight superiority. This was in 1838. Moltke (*Russians*, 29, 282) puts the Russian Black Sea fleet at 16 ships of the line, and the Turkish at 6 during 1828-9. So Mahmud had made up the leeway in ten years. For position 1839-53, *vide supra*, ch. vi, n. 250.

<sup>51</sup> P. 31. *F.O.* 78/191. From Sir R. Gordon, No. 92 of November 11, 1830.

<sup>52</sup> P. 31. *The Wakufs* is a difficult question. *Vide F.O.* 78/191. From Sir R. Gordon, No. 92 of November 11, 1830. The best account, though a little later in date, is in White, *Three Years*, I, ch. vii; *vide also* Sir G. Larpent, *Turkey*, II, 205-6. There is a useful historical survey in d'Ohsson, *Tableau Général de l'empire Ottoman*, Paris [1788], Tome II, Book III, ch. v, though this last is a doubtful source.

<sup>53</sup> P. 32. *Finance in the reign of Mahmud.* *F.O.* 78/309. July 20, 1837. Memo of J. B. Fraser contains a report of finance. It is sketchy in the highest degree. The only certain item was the *haratch*, or Christian tribute for exemption from military service, which he put at £500,000. The customs he reckoned at £3-4,000,000. Other items were tithe, land-tax and tribute. He estimated that in Europe Bosnia paid nothing, but that Bulgaria and Rumelia yielded something. In Asia there was substantially no yield from Diarbekir, Malabra, Samosata and Orfa.

He put the total revenue at £8,000,000, but others reduced it to £6,000,000. The difficulties are increased by the fluctuations in the value of money. These may be summed up as follows:

*Average value of piasters to the £ exchange on London:* 1814, 23; 1815, 25; 1816, 29; 1817, 30; 1818, 29; 1819, 33; 1820, 35; 1821, 36; 1822, 37; 1823, 41; 1824, 44; 1825, 47; 1826, 57; 1827-8, 59; 1829, 69; 1830, 77; 1831, 80; 1832, 88; 1833, 96; 1834, 97; 1835, 99; 1836, 100; 1837, 109; 1838, 106; 1839, 104; 1840, 107; 1841, 110; 1842, 117. White, *Three Years*, II, 74-6. The fluctuations were partly due to experiments in re-coinage and to debasing the coinage, partly to political events.

The exchange was not, of course, the same in different parts of the empire. Thus in Syria the piaster had been about the same value as in Constantinople, but rose in 1839 to 110; in 1840 to 115; in 1841 to 125; in 1842 to 135. *Vide* Werry's reports from Aleppo and *F.O.* 78/431. From Ponsonby, No. 48 of February 20, 1841.

The ratio of 'purse' to piaster may be calculated as follows: 100 piasters to the pound and 500 piasters to the purse, with *variations* according to the ratio of piaster to pound. Ubicini [A.] (*Letters on Turkey* [1856], I, ch. xiii, 266) puts the revenue about the end of Mahmud's reign at £7,310,000, but his figures and money values differ from those above.

<sup>54</sup> P. 32. *Monopolies and the Iltizam.* The iniquitous character of the *Iltizam*, denounced in the *Gulhané*, is shown in Sandison's report from Brusa of June 2, 1840, *A. & P.* VIII [1841], 2nd Ser., 512-3.

The operation of monopolies is difficult to trace; *vide* Slade, *Travels*, 141, and Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, II, 257-8. *A. & P.* XLIV [1840], 541 *sqq.*, gives *Correspondence on the continuation of the Monopolies*. But this deals with the situation just after 1838.

<sup>55</sup> P. 32. *F.O.* 96/17. Minute by Palmerston, November 30, 1833. The date is important, as some suggest that his remonstrances began much later.

<sup>56</sup> P. 33. *Monopolies and Mehemet Ali.* *F.O.* 78/328. To Ponsonby, No. 21 of February 6, 1838; April 14. *F.O.* 78/329, No. 112 of June 6. *F.O.* 78/330. From Ponsonby, No. 96 of April 16.

The relation of Egypt to the Convention is an important subject,

hardly touched here. Mehemet Ali made less resistance than might have been anticipated because as the State was the chief merchant and universal monopolist in Egypt, a few adjustments sufficed. It does not seem to have been the prime cause of strife in 1839. For a good examination of the whole question, *vide* the French report of December 29, 1841, Driault V, No. 116.

<sup>57</sup> P. 34. *F.O.* 78/330. From Ponsonby, No. 101 of April 21, 1838. *F.O.* 78/331, No. 119 of May 10.

<sup>58</sup> P. 34. *F.O.* 78/274. Secret, from Ponsonby, April 8, 1836.

<sup>59</sup> P. 35. White, *Three Years*, I, 303.

<sup>60</sup> P. 36. *F.O.* 78/304. From Ponsonby, No. 160 of July 30, 1837; No. 169 of August 7.

<sup>61</sup> P. 36. *F.O.* 78/331. From Ponsonby, No. 119 of May 10, 1838.

<sup>62</sup> P. 36. *Commercial Agreements and Treaties from 1838 to 1844*. The important documents, such as the text of the Original Capitulations of 1675 and the Commercial Treaty of 1809, are in E. Hertslet, *Treaties and Tariffs in force on the 1st January, 1875*. Turkey [1875], 1-40.

It should be remembered that under the British Navigation Laws certain restrictions on the trade both of Russia and of Turkey existed, though these were mostly removed in 1821. *Vide* Wallace, *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, New Ser. V, 1294.

The preparatory work for the *Convention of 1838* had been going on for some time, and Urquhart probably deserves some credit for this, as also Cartwright, the Consul-General, to whose knowledge everyone bears witness. But there is not much evidence in the Foreign Office files of the work of either. It is certain that Ponsonby did not give Palmerston enough information until the latter demanded it. *F.O.* 75/309 contains a useful report of J. B. Fraser, July 20, 1837. *F.O.* 78/332 has a report by Bulwer of July 18, 1838, enclosed in From Ponsonby, No. 174 of July 25. This is the best summary of the situation and much more accurate than Bulwer's account of the negotiation in his *Life of Palmerston*, II, 257-65. As pointed out in the text his vanity led him into several errors. It is clear, for instance, that the Sultan himself had indicated approval, as had Nouri the Minister of Commerce, before Bulwer's influence had time to operate. (*Vide F.O.* 78/305. From Ponsonby, No. 199 of September 5, 1837.) He also most unjustly ignores the share of Urquhart in preparing the *terrain*. Again, his story about the French Treaty being concluded the day after the British one is fictitious (*vide supra*, pp. 36-7). The French Treaty was not signed till November 25, and phrases were inserted by the Turks to prevent the French agreement from coming into force as early as the English. (*Vide F.O.* 78/517. From Sir Stratford Canning, No. 60 of March 18, 1843.) The text of the English Convention of Balta Liman (usually miscalled a Treaty) is in L. Hertslet, *Complete Collection of Treaties, Commerce, etc.*, V [1840], 506 *sqq.* There is a good brief summary of its contents in *F.O.* 78/332. From Ponsonby, No. 190 of August 19, 1838.

Testa, the Netherlands Minister, who was much interested in commerce, has some useful comments. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 314 of January 31, 1837; No. 427 of August 1, 1838, No. 431 of August 22, No. 433 of September 5, No. 440 of October 24, No. 450 of November 5, No. 453 of November 19; No. 467 of March 20, 1839; No. 472 of April 17, No. 536 of March 31, 1840; No. 537 of July 1.

His general view is important, for he discounts the French criticism and Russian jealousy of the Convention, and plainly regards it as a great step forward and England as setting an example and giving an opportunity to all other western nations. P. E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the*

*Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838-9*, Harvard Univ. [1934], is slight on commerce (98-103). V. J. Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits Question, 1844-56*, California [1931], 120, n. 140, has useful comments and mentions the treaties made with other countries.

There is an exhaustive collection of reports on the working of the Convention in its first years.

F.O. 78/431. From Ponsonby of February 20, 1841, enclo. four reports from Constantinople, and six from other centres, of 1840. F.O. 78/438. From C. Bankshead, No. 45 of November 17, 1841, gives further reports. Nearly all these are published in *A. & P.* [1841, 2nd Ser.], VIII, pp. 483-516. *A. & P.* [1842], XLV, pp. 261-96. Also *A. & P.* [1843], LVII, p. 487 *sqq.*; LI [1844], p. 197 *sqq.*

The special question of Russian advantages attained by not coming into the arrangement is dealt with in *A. & P.* [1844], LI, pp. 197-321. *Correspondence respecting the operation of the Commercial Treaty with Turkey* of August 16, 1838 (in continuation of the previous Parl. Pap. of 1842). Some important despatches are omitted, which are mentioned below under n. 68, and modify the advantages gained by Russia. In one respect she profited heavily, because Turkish *rayas* found it paid to export goods under a Russian cover, thus escaping the export duty of 9 per cent. levied on goods exported by Turkish subjects. Cp. F.O. 78/434. From Ponsonby, No. 186 of June 7, 1841. *A. & P.* [1844], LI, pp. 256-7, 274-5, 316-9. Puryear, *Straits*, 118-21.

There is a very useful *Report on the Turkish Commercial Treaty of 1838* by the Bradford Committee [Bradford, Frith and Field, 1856]. It was produced under the influence of Urquhart, but contains a good summary with references to Blue Books and the practical experience of traders.

<sup>63</sup> P. 36. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 427 of August 1, 1838; No. 431 of August 22.

<sup>64</sup> P. 37. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston* [1870], II, 263-4.

<sup>65</sup> P. 37. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 440 of October 24, 1838; No. 450 of November 5.

<sup>66</sup> P. 37. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 433 of September 5, 1838; No. 453 of November 19; *vide* also No. 467 of March 20, 1839; No. 472 of April 13; No. 536 of March 31, 1840.

<sup>67</sup> P. 37. F.O. 78/332. From Bulwer, July 18, 1838, enclo. in From Ponsonby, No. 174 of July 25. In No. 190 of August 19 Ponsonby gives the credit to Reschid and the Sultan.

<sup>68</sup> P. 39. *David Urquhart*. In connexion with the Commercial Convention it is perhaps best to mention the criticisms of David Urquhart. His general line is that the British Convention was altered during the negotiation to the advantage of Russia and to the detriment of England; *vide* ch. ii of *David Urquhart*, by Gertrude Robinson [1920]. As has been mentioned, some advantage did accrue to Russia, but this would have accrued to any nation standing out of the Treaty. Urquhart also avers that Palmerston was guilty of 'intentional falsification,' truckled to Russia, and was a traitor who influenced Ponsonby to the disadvantage both of Urquhart and of his country. *Vide* *How Russia tries to get into her hands the supply of corn of the whole Empire* [1859], ch. iii, and the House of Commons *deb.* in 1848, *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, 3rd Ser. XCVI, pp. 1161-1180, 1230-41; XCVII, pp. 71-6, 86-7, 232-4.

Urquhart was an experienced oriental traveller who became secretary to the Embassy at Constantinople during part of 1836. While on the way out at Paris he received an official rebuke from Palmerston for his indiscretions to the Turkish Ambassador there. He was subsequently dismissed (March 1837). It was quite wrong to assume, however, as he subse-

quently did, that Palmerston had instigated Ponsonby against him. On the contrary, Ponsonby, who tolerated great independence in Bulwer, Urquhart's successor as secretary, wrote to Backhouse privately that he thought Urquhart 'mad' and demanded his removal (*F.O.* 78/301 of February 10, 1837). Palmerston, however, warned him that he could not make private letters a basis of public action.

It does not seem that Urquhart was removed until the extraordinary affair of the *Vixen* came to light. This is related in Robinson and also in *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, 3rd Ser. XLIII, June 21, 1838, pp. 903-59, where Palmerston and Stratford Canning discussed the matter. It seems to be quite clear that Urquhart induced a ship, the *Vixen*, to go to the Circassian coast as a trading arrangement, and claimed that Palmerston approved. This was a most serious matter as it involved Russia. It seems equally clear that Palmerston had not approved and that this was not the only cause which led to Urquhart's removal. Even then Urquhart was not actually dismissed but given leave of absence (March 1837). Palmerston in all the discussions maintained that it was the right of the Crown to remove a servant from the diplomatic ranks without reason assigned.

Quite apart from this Ponsonby had demanded Urquhart's removal, and on good ground. The Secretary of the Embassy hardly ever dined there. Indeed he practically claimed to have the powers and privileges of a plenipotentiary. A fact not often mentioned is that he was indiscreet, if no worse, with English newspaper correspondents. And his intimate relations with them as well as with various Turks made his indiscretions rather dangerous. He dressed and lived as a Turk. All Turks did not, however, approve of him. For instance Hulusi, the Foreign Minister, described him as 'un fou, ou simplement comme un étourdi et comme un intrigant' (*F.O.* 78/301. From Ponsonby, No. 14 of January 24, 1837). His conduct in sending the *Vixen* to Circassia was alone sufficient to justify his removal. Miss Robinson (*Urquhart*, 53) candidly admits 'neither then nor at any other period of his life did Urquhart shine in a subordinate position.' There is no question either of his ability, of his fantastic imagination, or of his extreme unsuitability as a secretary of embassy.

Urquhart's claims that he was the originator of the English Convention are better founded. Credit was publicly given him in this respect by Palmerston (*Hans. Parl. Deb.*, 3rd Ser. XCVII of March 1, 1848, pp. 71-4). Bulwer is certainly disingenuous in omitting all mention of his name in his *Life of Palmerston*. Urquhart undoubtedly knew much about Turkish economics and commerce. But even here the claim he put forward is mixed up with many fantastic details (*vide* Robinson, *Urquhart*, 59, 60 n.). It is practically certain that no more concessions could have been obtained than were ultimately got. Urquhart is right in stating that the details of the treaty were altered during negotiation, but the best defence of Bulwer and Ponsonby is that they obtained all the concessions demanded by the Foreign Office except over the transit duty (*vide* Palmerston, *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, 3rd Ser. XCVII, March 1, 1848, p. 76). Urquhart was unacquainted with certain factors in the case. It is true that there were differences between the British and Turkish ratified copies, but these turned out in the end to be purely grammatical (*F.O.* 78/480. From Stratford Canning, No. 227 of October 27, 1842. *F.O.* 78/482. From Stratford Canning, No. 264 of December 30). Also, and this is an important fact omitted from the Blue Books, Sir Stratford Canning obtained concessions in individual instances over the attempts to maintain monopolies or special privileges. Thus he obtained a relaxation of the salt monopoly at Salonica in favour of British merchants. As he said, 'redress' in special instances could be



obtained by 'perseverance,' though it offended the dignity of the Porte for England to trumpet such success abroad (*F.O.* 78/515. From Stratford Canning, No. 7 of January 17, 1843; *F.O.* 78/523, No. 243 of November 17. *F.O.* 78/513. To Stratford Canning (Dft.), No. 21 of February 13). For these reasons the respective advantages of British and Russian traders were not fully revealed to the public.

The figures of trade with Turkey are given in *Tables of Revenue*, etc. During the years 1839-41 they show an actual decline of trade owing to conflict and unrest on the Egyptian and Persian borders. But in 1842 trade conditions became normal again and the next three years saw the trade figures of 1838 greatly exceeded. After 1845 the effect of Free Trade was seen in an immense increase of shipping and commerce, and even the grain imported from Turkey was more than half that imported from Russia.

V. J. Puryear (*England, Russia and the Straits Question*, Univ. of California [1931]) produces a great deal of useful evidence from MS. sources and shows how the British trade with Turkey actually became twice as large as that with Russia in 1851.

Commercial statistics from 1849 to 1853 for Turkey are in *A. & P.* [1854-5], LI, pp. 221-6; LII, pp. 374, 391; corresponding Russian statistics are in *A. & P.* [1854-5] LII, pp. 545-623.

All that can be said in defence of Urquhart (and a good deal more than I can personally endorse) is in Puryear, *Straits*, ch. ii, *passim*. Urquhart's most elaborate defence and arraignment of Palmerston is in a privately printed work, *The Foreign Affairs of Great Britain as administered by Lord Palmerston* [1841]. This is almost certainly by Urquhart, and describes Palmerston as 'the Minister of Russia.'

<sup>69</sup> P. 40. *The Rayas and Mahmud*. *Vide infra*, ch. vi, n. 227.

Cp. F. S. Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey,' Pt. I (1830-9), *Journal Mod. Hist.*, December 1929; Pt. II (1839-41), June 1930.

<sup>70</sup> P. 40. *N.R.A.* From Nyevelt, No. 120 of August 25, 1826.

<sup>71</sup> P. 40. *Moniteur Ottomane* of January 17, 1833; October 20; January 4, 1834.

<sup>72</sup> P. 41. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 334 of May 10, 1837; No. 339 of May 17; No. 342 of May 24.

<sup>73</sup> P. 41. *F.O.* 78/330. From Ponsonby, No. 67 of March 15, 1838.

## CHAPTER II

### THE GREAT POWERS AND MAHMUD (1808-39)

<sup>74</sup> P. 43. *England's Policy to Turkey, 1660-1790*. The period from 1660 to 1762 is very neatly summarised by A. C. Wood, *E.H.R.*, October 1925, 533 *sqq.* The summary in the text is in general correct, though several of our diplomatic representatives fulminated as well as slumbered. But in either case the result seems to have been equally futile; *vide* also Wood on the *Levant Company*, Oxford [1935]. Between 1762 and 1790 there was a period of transition, and the parliamentary debate of 1791 is the first real discussion of principle on the Eastern question.

<sup>75</sup> P. 44. For the speeches in the text see *England's Policy to Turkey, 1791*. *Parl. Hist.*, XXIX of March 29, 1791. Pitt, pp. 70-5; Burke, pp. 75-9. There was another debate on April 12, and in this Burke desired, but was unable, to speak, though seen labouring 'under great emotion.'

<sup>76</sup> P. 44. *The British defensive alliance with Turkey, 1799-1807*. A defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey had already been signed to



which Great Britain acceded. The Treaty between Turkey and Great Britain of January 5, 1799, was published by Canning in 1808. The guarantee clause in Article II makes Turkey and Great Britain mutually guarantee their possessions to each other. It defines the Turkish territory guaranteed as 'all the possessions without exception which it held immediately before the invasion of Egypt.' The guarantee was limited to eight years, that is to January 5, 1807, but was abrogated on November 14, 1806.

<sup>77</sup> P. 44. *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, New Ser. XXII. Mr. Peel, February 5, 1830, p. 142.

<sup>78</sup> P. 45. *Russia's Treaties with Turkey, 1798 and 1805* (*vide Hans. Parl. Deb.*, New Ser. XXII, Lord Aberdeen of February 12, 1830, p. 428). He had clearly the best of the dispute with Lord Holland as to Fox's views. For the full details of the negotiation with Russia, *vide Shupp, European Powers and the Near Eastern Question*, New York [1931], 120 *sqq.* For the Treaty of Turkey with Russia (December 23, 1798), *vide F.O.* 352/36, Clarendon to Stratford, April 26, 1853. It is described probably by Hertslet in a paper, following from Stratford No. 41 of May 6, 1853 (*F.O.* 78/932). 'The Treaty of 1798 between Russia and Turkey has been examined. It is simply a Treaty of Defensive Alliance between the two countries and contains nothing with reference to religious protection or indeed to any internal matters. It contained a mutual guarantee of territory for eight years. It also opened the Straits to Russian merchant ships.' A further treaty was signed between Turkey and Russia on September 23, 1805. It also was to last for eight years and Article VII gave Russian warships access to the Mediterranean. It was abrogated when Lord Howick on November 14, 1806, addressed peremptory demands to Turkey in view of Napoleon's designs on Dalmatia and Albania.

<sup>79</sup> P. 46. *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, 1st Ser. X, Canning of February 3, 1808, p. 274; XI of May 20, pp. 485-6; Castlereagh of June 15, p. 895. The Parliamentary Papers [1808] dealing with the Dardanelles have been supplemented from MS. sources by J. Holland Rose, *Indecisiveness of Modern War* [1927], ch. x, Admiral Duckworth's failure at Constantinople in 1807.

<sup>80</sup> P. 46. *Paget Papers* [1896], II, 290. Canning to Sir A. Paget, No. 1 of May 16, 1807.

<sup>81</sup> P. 47. *Paget Papers* [1896], II, 324. Canning to Sir A. Paget, August 15, 1807.

<sup>82</sup> P. 47. *F.O.* 195/1. Canning to Adair, Nos. 1 and 2 of June 26, 1808.

<sup>83</sup> P. 47. *F.O.* 195/1. Canning to Adair, No. 1 of June 26, 1808.

<sup>84</sup> P. 48. Sir R. Adair, *Negotiations for the peace of the Dardanelles* [1845], I, 58.

<sup>85</sup> P. 48. Sir R. Adair, *Negotiations for the peace of the Dardanelles* [1845], I, 122-3. This gives the Treaty, but not the secret article, which provided for £300,000 to be handed over to Turkey if she entered the war on England's side. Adair gives nearly all his own despatches but not Canning's despatches to him, which are more important.

<sup>86</sup> P. 48. *F.O.* 195/1. Canning to Adair, No. 1 of June 26, 1808. Canning ratified the Treaty on April 25, 1809.

<sup>87</sup> P. 48. *F.O.* 195/4. Bathurst to Adair, November (no other date), 1809. (Bathurst was acting temporarily as Foreign Secretary.)

<sup>88</sup> P. 48. *Napoleon's Oriental designs for Egypt*. Cp. A. L. P. Dennis, *Eastern Problems at the close of the Eighteenth Century*, Cambridge, U.S.A. [1901], ch. iii; in general, *vide* A. Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I*, Tome I, Paris [1898], chs. iv-viii, and the exhaustive treatment of Driault.

<sup>89</sup> P. 51. *Vide* Lane-Poole, *Life of Stratford*, I, ch. iv, Treaty of Bucharest.

<sup>90</sup> P. 52. *Vide* Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh* (1815-22), ch. vii.

<sup>91</sup> P. 53. *Vide* my *Foreign Policy of Canning*, chs. xvii-xviii.

<sup>92</sup> P. 54. *Parliamentary debates of 1828-30*. The views of Peel and Aberdeen are in the text. *Vide* also speech of Aberdeen, *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, New Ser. XIX of July 16, 1828, 1728. Holland got the worst of it in an encounter with Aberdeen on the views of Fox, XXII of February 12, 1830, p. 427. He protested against the Turk being called 'our ancient ally,' XXI of June 19, 1829, p. 1801. For Grey and Palmerston's views, *vide* n. 98, *infra*.

<sup>93</sup> P. 54. *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, New Ser. XXII, of February 5, 1830, p. 142. Palmerston, *ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>94</sup> P. 55. F.O. 78/819. From Stratford, No. 131 of April 24, 1850. Contrast Moltke, *Russians* [1854], ch. v. This is not the field-marshal. For Mustapha, *vide supra*, pp. 55-6, 206-7.

<sup>95</sup> P. 57. *Russian Eastern policy as decided by Czar Nicholas, September 16, 1829*. The conclusions of this most important committee are described in T. Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I*, Berlin [1908], II, 367 and nn. But he is brief and declares he could not find the protocols of the committee. F. Martens, in *Traité conclus par la Russie*, St. Petersburg [1878], IV, 437-41, gives the memoranda of both Nesselrode and Daschkov and the conclusions of the committee. In *ibid.* [1895], XI, 412-13, he quotes a letter of Nesselrode to Lieven of September 22, 1829. This agrees with a letter of his to Diebitsch quoted by Schiemann. The views of Daschkov are also confirmed by Goriainov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, Paris [1910], ch. vii. Martens is not always accurate and does not agree in all points with Schiemann, but the general impression here given is doubtless correct.

Goriainov (27-8) shows that Nesselrode had a project for inserting a secret article in the Treaty of Adrianople securing the access of Russian warships into the Mediterranean (*vide infra*, n. 107).

<sup>96</sup> P. 57. Nesselrode to Lieven, September 22, 1829. Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, XI, 412-3, St. Petersburg [1895].

<sup>97</sup> P. 58. F.O. 181/172. Aberdeen's Instructions to Stratford de Redcliffe, No. 2 of October 30, 1841.

<sup>98</sup> P. 59. *Palmerston and Grey on Greece*. In the Oczakov debate in 1791, Lord Grey was anti-Turkish, but he thought the battle of Navarino 'unfortunate,' January 29, 1828 (*Hans. Parl. Deb.*, New Ser. XVIII, 30). He may have been influenced by his hatred of Canning. He told Princess Lieven (see my edition of her *Unpublished Diary* [1925], 159) that he wished the freedom of Greece but not 'her dependency on Russia.' He was strongly in favour of the extension of the frontier to Arta and Volo, which was indeed known as his 'boundary' (*Lieven Diary*, 161). In principle he seems to have been always in favour of expelling the Turks from Europe (*vide Lieven Diary*, 133 n.), but he saw the danger to England and advantage to Russia as soon as he was in office.

Lord Palmerston was a Canningite and therefore approved of Navarino. There is no evidence that he ever wished the Turks expelled from Europe, though he was not unfriendly to Russia. He supported the Tory ministry in not fighting Russia in 1828-9, but said that pressure by them on Turkey to make timely concessions to Russia would have averted war (*vide Hans. Parl. Deb.*, New Ser. XXII of February 5, 1830, p. 146). He advocated giving Crete to Greece as well as Arta and Volo (*ibid.*, XXII of February 16, 1830, pp. 559-64).

<sup>99</sup> P. 60. *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, New Ser. XXI, Palmerston of June 1, 1829, p. 1668.

<sup>100</sup> P. 60. *Hans. Parl. Deb.*, 3rd Ser., Palmerston of August 2, 1832, p. 1045; contrast my *Foreign policy of Canning* [1925], 457-9.

<sup>101</sup> P. 62. *Palmerston and the French in North Africa* (1826-38). The whole question of the French seizure of Algeria has been revised during the last few years. The best older work was that of Rousset, *La Conquête d'Alger* [1879]. The Wellington *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda*, Vols. VI-VII [1877-8], are still the best British source. Dodwell, *Founder of Modern Egypt* [1931], shows insight into the East and is a valuable comment. Most of the French work is very biased and the documents are not always well used. But the various works of Douin—especially *Mahomed Aly et l'Expédition d'Alger*, Cairo [1930]—are an exception to this rule, and quote documents objectively. It appears that the French project of taking Algeria originated in 1826 and that Mehemet Ali was ready to co-operate. But I do not think either Dodwell or Douin has established that the attack on Algiers was really a part of Polignac's plan of upsetting Europe. Mehemet Ali seems to have abandoned the idea of supporting France because he feared an alliance with a Christian power would compromise him with Mohammedans. The British diplomacy of the period still awaits elucidation, but there is no doubt that Aberdeen and Wellington thought they had got some kind of promise out of France of no permanent occupation of Algiers.

The fact that this promise was not kept made Palmerston (and subsequently Aberdeen) resolute to admit no further French advance against Tunis or Morocco. Palmerston denied French sovereignty over Algiers till 1854. Palmerston's whole policy in North Africa awaits treatment. The controversy is summed up in *F.O.* 195/145: To Ponsonby, No. 24 of February 6, 1838; and To Granville, No. 72 of February 9, 1838, with Molé's reply of February 22.

<sup>102</sup> P. 62. *F.O.* 78/190. From J. Barker (Alexandria) of March 25, 1830; *F.O.* 78/192 of June 2, 1831.

<sup>103</sup> P. 62. *F.O.* 78/192. To J. Barker, January 29, 1830. From Barker, No. 9 of March 8.

<sup>104</sup> P. 65. *F.O.* 96/17. Minute by Palmerston to Mr. Aston, No. 78 (1833?).

<sup>105</sup> P. 67. *W.S.A.* Berichte aus St. Petersburg. From Ficquelmont, No. 234, A.C. of February 13/25, 1833. The interview was on the 18th.

<sup>106</sup> P. 69. *Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi* (July 8, 1833). Text is in Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty* [1875], II, 925-8. It includes the secret article and the British protest. The despatch of Ficquelmont in the text throws a good deal of light on the situation just before Orlov's mission. *N.R.A.*, From Testa, No. 105 of May 24, 1833, explains Orlov's tactics. The account here given is based on Schiemann, *Kaiser Nikolaus I*, III, 219-22, which is admirable but brief, and serves as a check on Martens. Professor Webster will doubtless throw new light upon the private papers of Palmerston. *F.O.* 78/472: From Bligh (St. Petersburg), No. 139 of December 27, 1833, quotes Orlov as saying he had no knowledge of the Defensive Alliance before leaving St. Petersburg. From Bligh, No. 134 of December 21, says Czar Nicholas himself said that the Turkish courier asking for the Treaty crossed Orlov on his way to Constantinople, and 'on my honour, there was nothing before.' The Czar once again 'disclaimed any wish to extend his Dominions.' All these statements may be true. But according to Schiemann (III, 221 and n.), based on a paper of Nesselrode, Orlov carried a sketch of a Defensive Alliance with him

to Constantinople. So Orlov was prepared to negotiate an alliance, though not perhaps definitely instructed to do so. If the Czar's statement about the Turkish courier is true (which it may well be), Schiemann (III, 221) is mistaken in thinking the Turkish proposal for an alliance was suggested by Orlov's 'indirect influence.'

The meaning of Unkiar Skelessi seems to me correctly stated by P. E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the opening of the Eastern Question in 1838-9* (20): 'Russia's real aim was therefore to secure recognition from the Porte of her paramount interest in Turkey and of her previous right of intervention,' to the exclusion of other Powers. But (23) 'It was only a potential advantage' which gave 'the right to interfere as friend.' He adds (22-3) some curious evidence as to the Czar having possibly had the intention of fortifying a strong point on the Bosphorus in 1833.

<sup>107</sup> P. 71. *Russian entry into the Bosphorus*. The quotation is from F.O. 195/109. To Ponsonby, No. 23 of December 6, 1833. The view that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi closed the Dardanelles to the warships of all countries but allowed the Russian ones to pass into the Bosphorus appears in Rosen, 186-9, and is copied by Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* [1913], V, 372. It seems to be admitted by Goriainov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, Paris [1910], 43-4, 89.

*Russian entry into the Mediterranean*. Major John Hall (*England and the Orleans Monarchy* [1912], 165) asserts that both Broglie and Palmerston held the view that Russia gained access to the Mediterranean by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. But theirs were only suspicions. The view is put forward also by Goriainov (43-4). But Nesselrode certainly denied this interpretation to Palmerston (F.O. 78/472. From Bligh, No. 138 of December 21, 1833. To Bligh, Nos. 23-4 of December 6, 1833). Nesselrode's denial is of weight, though Goriainov either does not know, or does not accept, it. The final conclusion of Goriainov (43-5) is that the right of access to the Mediterranean rested not on the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi but on a reaffirmation of old treaties, and is therefore based on Art. VII of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of September 23, 1805 (*vide supra*, n. 78). That article unquestionably does give Russian warships access to the Mediterranean. But it lasted for eight years only, and was actually abrogated by war in one year. It seems rather difficult to assert that a right, actually abrogated and in any case limited to a period of eight years in 1805, could be confirmed for an indefinite number of years by a general clause renewing all past treaties. It is suggested by Mosely (13) that Goriainov was influenced by politics. Goriainov quotes no actual document showing that Nesselrode asserted that he had secured the principle of access to the Mediterranean at Unkiar Skelessi. Nesselrode had previously tried and failed to secure it in the Treaty of Adrianople, and he argued strongly against it to the Czar in 1838 (*vide Mosely*, 15-7).

<sup>108</sup> P. 71. F.O. 7/272. From Sir F. Lamb [Vienna], No. 72 of September 3, 1838.

<sup>109</sup> P. 71. *The closing of the Dardanelles*. The references to Russian documents by Mosely (*vide* 15-18) seem to me to prove that Russia meant to close the Dardanelles to all warships at Unkiar Skelessi. The fact that Russians, including the Czar, sometimes thought of evading this does not alter the case. F.O. 7/243: From Sir F. Lamb, No. 155 of October 1, 1833, makes Metternich say that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi excluded *all* warships from the Dardanelles, including those of Russia, whether coming down from the Bosphorus or up from the Mediterranean. Palmerston (F.O. 195/109. To Ponsonby, No. 24 of December 10, 1833)



was suspicious because in June 1833 a part of the Russian Mediterranean squadron came up to and entered the Dardanelles at the same time as the Russian Black Sea fleet descended to the Bosphorus. He therefore demanded a guarantee that the Porte would close the Straits at both ends. Despite repeated demands the Porte refused to sign a declaration that 'in case of war between Great Britain and Russia the Porte would close the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus against both Belligerents.' Ponsonby says that the Russian Minister caused this refusal by claiming the execution of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (*vide F.O.* 78/252. From Ponsonby, No. 11 of January 12, 1835).

My final conclusion would be that the Bosphorus was, or at least might be, thrown open to the Russian fleet, but that entry into the Mediterranean was not granted.

<sup>110</sup> P. 72. *F.O.* 195/109. To Ponsonby, No. 15 of August 7, 1833.

<sup>111</sup> P. 75. *F.O.* 96/17. Minutes by Palmerston, March 30, 1834; *F.O.* 96/18 of April 2, 1836; *F.O.* 96/19. The last is undated, but written on Sir F. Lamb's Nos. 78-9 of November 2, 1837.

<sup>112</sup> P. 75. *F.O.* 78/306. Note by Melbourne, November 21, 1837, on Ponsonby's No. 235 of October 6.

<sup>113</sup> P. 75. *F.O.* 78/274. From Ponsonby, No. 52 of April 24, 1836.

<sup>114</sup> P. 76. *F.O.* 78/301. From Ponsonby, No. 28 of February 18, 1837.

<sup>115</sup> P. 76. *F.O.* 78/237. From Ponsonby, Nos. 115-6 of August 16, 1834; *F.O.* 78/251. To Ponsonby, No. 39 of November 4, 1835.

<sup>116</sup> P. 76. *F.O.* 78/234. To Ponsonby, March 10, 1834, secret; appd. W. R. Most of this in C. W. Crawley, *Camb. Hist. Journ.*, III [1929], 61.

<sup>117</sup> P. 77. *F.O.* 78/251. To Ponsonby, No. 5 of March 16, 1835. Appd. W. R. The draft appears to be written in Wellington's own hand.

<sup>118</sup> P. 77. Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 165.

<sup>119</sup> P. 78. *The Anti-Russian Panic in England*. C. W. Crawley, 'Anglo-Russian Relations, 1815-40,' *Camb. Hist. Journ.* [1929], and Cobden, *Russia*, 1836; David Ross, *Opinions of the European Press on the Eastern Question* [1836]. For the important Asiatic side, *vide* Sir John McNeile, *Progress and present position of Russia in the East* [1836], and C. C. Davies, *Problem of North West Frontier*, Cambridge [1932], chs. i and ii, and Bibliography, App. A.

<sup>120</sup> P. 79. Schiemann, *Kaiser Nikolaus*, III, 235.

<sup>121</sup> P. 80. *The Convention of Münchengrätz, September 18, 1833*. The monograph Ernst Molden, *Die Orientpolitik Metternichs* (1829-37), Wien [1913], gives a careful study from the Vienna archives and the text of the Treaty. Schiemann, *Kaiser Nikolaus*, III, ch. vii, is based on Russian archives and admirable but short. The text is also given with some other interesting matter in F. Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, IV, 435-49. He quotes (442-3) an account of an interview between Nicholas and Count Ficquelmont, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, of February 13, 1833, which is also referred to above in the text (*vide* pp. 67-8).

<sup>122</sup> P. 81. *Views of Palmerston and Metternich on the Eastern Question, 1834*. *Vide* documents and short discussion by F. S. Rodkey, *E.H.R.*, October 1930, 627-40. These should be compared with other sources. For the development of the *Four Power Concert*, *vide F.O.* 7/241: From Lamb, No. 54 of April 13, 1833, which he quotes. Webster, *Palmerston, Metternich and the European System, 1830-1841*, Brit. Acad. brochure [1934], is very good.



<sup>123</sup> P. 81. *F.O.* 120/144. Palmerston to Lamb, No. 46 of October 16, 1834.

<sup>124</sup> P. 81. *F.O.* 7/249. From Sir F. Lamb, No. 103, pte., November 2, 1834; cp. C. K. Webster, *Palmerston, Metternich and the European System, 1830-41*, Brit. Acad. brochure [1934], 15-18.

<sup>125</sup> P. 82. *F.O.* 78/273. From Ponsonby, pte. of January 10, 1836.

<sup>126</sup> P. 82. *F.O.* 195/147. To Col. Campbell, No. 21 of July 7, 1838, communicated to Mehemet Ali.

## BOOK II

### MEHEMET ALI

#### SOURCES AND GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY FOR CHAPTERS III AND IV.

The aim of Chapter III, as of IV and V, is limited to certain points. No attempt is made to deal with the internal history of Mehemet Ali's rule before 1830, and between that date and 1838 his activities in the Red Sea and Iraq valley, which brought him into conflict with England, are the only points noted.

Similarly the struggle between France and England is only emphasised in its direct bearing on the Near East. Much of the struggle in British and French cabinets and almost all of the movements of public opinion in both countries are ignored or briefly summarised. The extraordinarily important Russian negotiation of Brunnow and the diplomacy of Neumann I leave to be elucidated by Professor Webster from Palmerston's private papers. The chief points I emphasise are the military opinion of Wellington as to the way of dealing with Mehemet Ali, Palmerston's hostility to him, and above all the course of events in the East after France's isolation. The campaign of Stopford and Napier is not only important in itself, but can only be understood by reference to local conditions in the Lebanon and Syria. Indeed such originality as the chapters contain is less due to a study of diplomatic history than to the explanation of external events by the internal policy of Turkey and Egypt. Ponsonby's attitude both to Palmerston and the Porte is still a problem, but it is easier to understand when studied with regard to Syria and the Lebanon. Mehemet Ali's refusal of the offers of territory is only intelligible by a special study of Syria, of Adana and its resources. The activities of Stopford and Napier gain greatly from a consideration of the local *terrain*. The events of 1841 are relatively simple to describe, though my estimate of the importance of the Straits' Convention differs from that of most other people in certain particulars. One of these is the extent to which Europe was committed to intervention in Syria.

#### MS. SOURCES FOR 1839-41.

In addition to *F.O.* Diplomatic and Consular, the British archives include the Admiralty papers (for once ample), the *pte. Bey. MSS.*, which give the valuable private papers of Wood and Moore. The *pte. Gr.* and *Russ. MSS.* contain useful materials. The *pte. Blo. MSS.*, *F.O.* 356/29 give letters of Palmerston and Bloomfield in 1840 showing Nicholas and Palmerston in friendly and confident moods. *W.S.A.*, *N.R.A.*, *A.E.F.* have also been used.

## SECONDARY SOURCES FOR MEHEMET ALI, 1830-41.

H. L. Hoskins in *Journ. of Mod. Hist.* of March 1932 gives a good critical study of recent works on this subject. The two most general are P. M. Sabry, *L'Empire Égyptien sous Mohamed Ali et la question d'Orient*, Paris [1930]. It is based on considerable research, but is marred by an anti-British bias and has to be used with care.

H. Dodwell: *The Founder of Modern Egypt: a study of Muhammad Ali*, Cambridge University Press [1931], has the great merit of being a balanced survey and has considerable insight into men and manners in the East. It is stronger on the administrative side than on the diplomatic, but is, on the whole, an admirable summary all round.

He sees, as no previous writer has done, that Mehemet Ali's threats to Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Euphrates valley were the real cause of Palmerston's hostility. This particular aspect has been further elucidated by H. L. Hoskins in *British Routes to India* [1928], a work based on a very thorough study of printed materials and distinctly original in outlook.

Another specialised side of Mehemet Ali, his activities in North Africa, has been elucidated by Georges Douin in a series of admirable and exhaustive monographs. He touches on the growth of the fleet, but does not supply the key to Mehemet Ali's policy in building it. The most important monograph is *Mohamed Ali et l'Expédition d'Alger (1829-30)*, Cairo [1930]. British policy in repelling French influence from Tunis and Morocco is touched upon in the text, but the treatment is not complete. As regards the local activities of Ibrahim in Syria and the Lebanon, and the intrigues which led to rebellion, there is an abundance of uncritical accounts. But the most serious attempt is that of A. J. Rustum in his Vols. I-II of a series of *Materials for a Corpus of Arabic documents relating to a history of Syria under Mehemet Ali pasha*, Beyrouth [1930-1]. I have also used magazine articles by him and had the benefit of his opinion at first-hand. App. I, *infra*, gives an account of Ponsonby's contribution to the Lebanon revolt.

For the naval and military side of the struggle the *Memoirs* of Jochmus and Napier and Codrington have been used along with the *pte. Bey. MSS.*

Napier is characteristically arrogant and inaccurate, and Codrington is a useful corrective. Stopford's life has not been written, but the Admiralty records (*vide infra*, App. III) vindicate him, and are, for once, fairly full.

As regards the purely diplomatic side the works may be arranged as follows:

(1) *American*. V. J. Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits Question*, Univ. of California [1931]. This work has a good deal of originality and quotes from several different archives. But it covers too wide a field and many of its positions have been undermined. It contains an admirable bibliography.

F. S. Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian question in the relations of England, France and Russia, 1839-41*, 2 vols., Urbana, U.S.A. [1924]. This is a good summary of printed materials, with extracts from the American archives. Professor Rodkey has since published a number of documents and studies from the British records in various periodicals.

(2) *Austrian*. The great work of H. v. Srbik on *Metternich* is unfortunately rather scanty on this question. Molden's book deals only with Münchengrätz. *The Private Diary of Philip von Neumann*, ed. E. B. Chancellor [1928], unfortunately does not throw much light on his diplomatic activities. Metternich's *Mémoires* are not always ingenuous or complete.

(3) *British*. J. Hall, *England and the Orleans Monarchy* [1912]. This

was pioneer work from the records when published and is still of some value.

G. H. Bolsover in the *Slavonic Review*, July 1934, has an article on Ponsonby and the Eastern Question (1835-9). The work is valuable, but Ponsonby has not yet yielded his secret to any investigator.

C. K. Webster, *Palmerston, Metternich and the European System*, Brit. Acad. brochure [1934]. This is an admirable introduction to the subject, and will doubtless be supplemented from Palmerston's private papers.

C. W. Crawley, *Greek Independence, 1821-33* [1930], has valuable comments on Mehemet Ali.

The *Greville Memoirs* contain first-hand materials of real value for the period, with revelations of some important particulars, notably that of the differences of the Cabinet (*vide* App. II).

The *pte. Gr. MSS.* is occasionally valuable for the period, and has some private letters of Palmerston.

The *Russell Correspondence*, 2 vols., ed. G. P. Gooch [1925], can be usefully supplemented from the *pte. Russ. MSS.* Melbourne's papers, ed. by Sanders [1889], give some useful letters of the period. Bulwer's *Life of Palmerston* is dubious both in inference and citation, and I seldom quote it unless it is corroborated from other sources.

(4) *France.* Raymond Guyot, *La première Entente Cordiale*, Paris [1926]; chs. v-vi deal with the period. This is an admirable summary noting the effect on British and French policy of the Commercial Treaty of 1838 as well as of the routes to India. He is more friendly to England than most historians of the period.

Guichen, *La Crise d'Orient de 1839 à 1841 et l'Europe*, Paris [1921], uses both British and French archives and is valuable but rather severe in his views on British policy.

E. Driault, *L'Égypte et l'Europe—La Crise de 1839-41*, Cairo [1930-4], Tomes I-IV. Masterly introductions and a very complete collection of Franco-Egyptian documents up to 1841. He is a little too friendly to Mehemet Ali and rather hostile to Palmerston and Ponsonby.

Driault and Lhéritier: *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce*, Paris [1925], Tomes I-II, is useful in its special sphere.

(5) *Russian.* There is something of value in Zaiončovskii's great work for this period, though it does not deal primarily with it.

S. Goriainov: *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, Paris [1910], is a work of originality and merit. But it has grave defects. The author makes almost an affectation of consulting nothing but his own archives. But no man to-day can safely disregard other archives and historians. His interpretation of Unkiar Skelessi and certain other episodes in this period is dubious and it is impossible wholly to rely on his accuracy either here or in relation to the Convention of 1841. On the whole his work is valuable but must be cautiously used.

This dictum applies even more strikingly to Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, St. Petersburg. The actual Treaty documents quoted there are usually correct, but the introductions and extracts from records there quoted are open to a good deal of criticism. It is not usually safe to rely upon them without corroborative evidence. Cp. my article in *E.H.R.*, October 1934, 663, 664-5, 671-2.

*Lettres et Papiers du Comte de Nesselrode, 1760-1856*, par le Comte A. le Nesselrode, Paris [n.d.], are useful, Tomes VIII, IX; Tome XI contains private correspondence of the Czar and Nesselrode for 1840.

P. E. Mosely: *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question, 1838-9*, Harvard Univ. [1934], is a good study with new material from

Russian archives. But he treats both Martens and Goriainov with more reverence than I can do.

T. Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Nikolaus*, Berlin [1904-19], Bde. I-IV. Though written a good many years ago, this is still of much value and my chief complaint is that it is too short.

## CHAPTER III

## THE YEAR OF VICTORY (1839)

<sup>127</sup> P. 89. *Pte. Gr. MSS. G.D.* 29/14. Palmerston to Granville, June 10, 1839.

<sup>128</sup> P. 90. *Pte. Gr. MSS. G.D.* 29/14. Palmerston to Granville, May 27, 1839.

<sup>129</sup> P. 90. *F.O.* 65/250. To Clanricarde, No. 108 of July 9, 1839.

<sup>130</sup> P. 91. *F.O.* 78, 192. From Barker (Cairo), No. 9 of March 8, 1839; No. 11 of June 2, reporting *ipsissima verba*.

<sup>131</sup> P. 91. *Wellington's military opinion on the way to deal with Mehemet Ali*. The quotation is from *W.S.A.*, *Berichte aus England*, 296. From Esterházy of November 15, 1839, quoting Wellington to Brunnow of October 15. The Duke's views, as often, were communicated to foreigners before Englishmen heard of them. Wellington expressed views to Brunnow. *Vide F.O.* 65/253. From Clanricarde, No. 119 of November 5, 1839. These were reported back by Nesselrode to Palmerston from Russia. The despatch is printed *Lev.* I, No. 377, but Wellington's name is omitted.

'If a fleet should intercept the communications between Syria and Egypt and act offensively against Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim pasha would not dare to attempt a move upon Constantinople and that he would even have great difficulty in maintaining the army, because a hostile army can make no progress and can have no security in Syria, without support and communication from without by sea.'

Wellington was, in fact, opposed to Mehemet Ali (*W.S.A.*, *Berichte aus England*, 290. From Esterházy, November 15, 1839). But, from a purely military view, he held strongly to the opinion that Mehemet should not be left with the fortress of Acre in his possession. Leopold, the King of the Belgians, reported 'Wellington does not love Mehemet Ali, or think he ought to have Acre, but the maintenance of peace and the need of an Entente with France are, in his eyes, the dominant interest' (*A.E.F.*, *Angleterre*, 655. From Guizot, No. 84 of August 21, 1840).

As regards the Straits question the Duke was for absolute closure and was against admitting a Russian squadron into the Bosphorus or a Franco-British one into the Dardanelles (*W.S.A.*, *Berichte aus England*, 288. From Esterházy, No. 35, *Litt. B.* of July 24, 1839, and *ibid.*, 294. From Neumann, *lettre partre* of January 18, 1840).

As regards the Russian expedition to Khiva Wellington expressed the view that it was 'perfectly natural. We have nothing to fear as to the Indies. Deserts, mountains, passes render distant expeditions very difficult. One can only act with great armies, and the more the line of operation is prolonged, the weaker it becomes. The climate destroys those who are not destroyed by the enemy' (*W.S.A.*, *Berichte aus England*, 294. From Neumann, January 18, 1840, *partre*). Wellington's view, incidentally, is like that of Kitchener on the advance of Russia into Persia.

A very extreme statement of Wellington's antipathy to Mehemet Ali, but desire not to break with France, is in *Grev. Journ.* of August 24, 1840.

It is worth mentioning that Wellington was considered by foreigners

as a kind of independent sovereign. In the days of Canning foreign diplomats had communicated information to him which they and he withheld from the British Foreign Secretary. There is at least one instance in this period when Neumann showed him a copy of a letter to Brunnow, which he did not give to Palmerston (*W.S.A.*, *Berichte aus England*, 294. From Neumann, No. 8, Litt. B. of March 24, 1840).

<sup>132</sup> P. 92. *F.O.* 78/256. From Ponsonby, No. 230, enclo. R. Wood, November 14, 1835, with pencil note by Palmerston.

<sup>133</sup> P. 92. *F.O.* 195/147. To Ponsonby, No. 141 of July 20, 1838, enclo. No. 21 of July 7 to Col. Campbell (Cairo). This despatch was communicated to the Turks.

<sup>134</sup> P. 93. *Pte. Gr. MSS. G.D.* 29/14. Palmerston to Granville, July 8, 1839.

<sup>135</sup> P. 93. *F.O.* 78/192. From J. Barker (Cairo), No. 9 of March 8, 1830, italics as in original; part quoted in Dodwell, *Founder of Modern Egypt*, 105.

<sup>136</sup> P. 93. *F.O.* 195/109. To Ponsonby, No. 23 of December 6, 1833.

<sup>137</sup> P. 94. *F.O.* 120/169. From J. B. Milbanke, No. 2 of November 20, 1838.

<sup>138</sup> P. 94. *F.O.* 96/18. Minute by Palmerston, June 1, 1835, on Ponsonby's No. 116.

<sup>139</sup> P. 95. *F.O.* 96/17. Minute by Palmerston on Mr. Aston's No. 78 (1833).

<sup>140</sup> P. 95. *British Routes to India*. This subject has been very well treated by H. L. Hoskins [1928] in chs. i-xiii of his book with this title from printed sources. But some points need to be corrected from MS. sources, especially in regard to his ch. xi. The question of the Suez Canal hardly arises in this period.

<sup>141</sup> P. 96. *Vide* Dodwell, 149-51, and *F.O.* 78/343 to Campbell (Cairo), No. 18 of June 8, 1838.

<sup>142</sup> P. 96. The quotation in the text is from Palmerston to W. Temple, March 21, 1833. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, II, 145.

MEHEMET ALI, THE CALIPHATE AND THE PAN-ARAB MOVEMENT (1830-60).

(a) *Mehemet Ali as Caliph.*

There is no doubt that Mehemet Ali did not favour Pan-Arabism or a revival of the Caliphate. As Dodwell points out in *The Founder of Modern Egypt* [1931], 126-8, Mehemet Ali 'found himself obliged to pose as the champion of the Muslim "nation," not of an Arab nation, which indeed he could not even imagine.' \*

On the other hand, Ibrahim did show signs of wishing to encourage a crude form of Arab nationalism (Dodwell, 256-7) and called himself an Arab. But these views of his only show his lack of political insight, in comparison with his father. The Syrian Arabs hated the Egyptians and were driven into rebellion by their methods. These are the facts, but, none the less, a project was devised in the year 1833, which is thus described in 1838 by Colonel Campbell, the British Consul-General in Egypt. He says he had known of this Caliphate project for four years, but did not think it was important enough to report.

\* There are one or two hints that Mehemet Ali played off Arabs against Turks in Driault, V, No. 8.



‘ I have already on many occasions, mentioned to Your Lordship the very great moral weight which Mehemet Ali derived in the eyes of all Mussulmans from the possession of the Holy Cities : but I am not aware that he ever intended, at least since my arrival in Egypt, to assume the Khalifat.\*

‘ I have heard that some years ago, he entertained such an idea after the subjugation of the Wahabees, and in consequence of his having at his own sole expense, wrested from them the Holy Cities, which would otherwise have been entirely lost to the Sultan ; but that was previous to my arrival here, and I have, in vain, searched the archives of my Predecessors for any traces on this subject.

‘ But the suggestion had been made to the Pasha, and that from a Quarter which gave him strong reasons to believe that the Government of Austria was favourable to it. This idea came from Colonel Prokesch von Osten, at present Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Austria to Greece, who as Your Lordship will recollect arrived here on a Special Mission on the 2nd of April 1833 and was the Colleague of Baron Bois Le Comte and myself, in the negotiations for peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

‘ The inclosed note is copied from a document existing in the possession of Monsieur de Laurin Consul General of Austria, who also assured me that he had a rough map traced by Colonel Prokesch of the countries to compose the new Khalifat, and which included a large portion along the Euphrates, now subject to the Pashalic of Bagdad. Your Lordship will perceive that the date of Colonel Prokesch’s note is of 17th of May. He arrived here on the 2nd of April, and left this [?] on 29th of June 1833 loaded with antiquities and rich presents from the Pasha (*vide* my No. 32 of 1st July 1833).

‘ Colonel Prokesch is said to enjoy great influence with Prince Metternich.

‘ The copy in my possession of the note of Colonel Prokesch, is in the hand-writing of Monsieur de Laurin, and shall be sent if Your Lordship desires to have it.

‘ I have reason to believe that the late Monsieur Minaut, Consul General of France, also held out very flattering hopes to Mehemet Ali, and which the acts and communications of the French Government were not by any means calculated to destroy or to weaken, and it is a notorious fact that Monsieur Minaut and almost all French Travellers took every opportunity of comparing Mehemet to Napoleon Bonaparte, and citing the coincidence of their having been born in the same year. . . .

Enclosure      *Extrait d’une Note.†*

Datée Alexandrie <sup>17</sup> 1833.  
5

‘ En soudoyant l’Insurrection de l’Albanie Son Altesse pourra mettre à couvert la sienne. Dès lors la combinaison la plus naturelle et la plus solide serait :

‘ La construction de l’Empire Arabe, l’Égypte, la Nubie, le Senaar, Darfour et Cordofan en Afrique, toute l’Arabie jusqu’au Golfe Persique et le long de la rive droite de l’Euphrate, y compris toute la Syrie, devraient en faire part.

‘ Son Altesse parviendra à se faire valuer comme le vengeur des Khalifs

\* F.O. 78/343. From Col. Campbell (Alexandria), No. 69 of October 1, 1838.

† F.O. 78/343.

comme homme appelé par Dieu pour relever la gloire Mussulmanne. L'Arabe la regarde déjà comme centre de sa noble race.

'L'enthousiasme religieux et politique a tourné contre la Dynastie de Constantinople. Le Cheriff de la Mecque est l'Administrateur le plus prononcé de la grandeur et de la puissance de Son Altesse ; l'opinion publique l'accompagne et l'appuie de ses meilleurs vœux ; la supériorité de ses moyens sur ceux de la Porte est immense.

'Il faudra commencer par négocier avec les Primats de Bagdad et avec les Chefs des Tribus sur la Rive droite de l'Euphrate. Les Anglais ne s'opposeront point à un rapprochement avec les Imams sur l'Océan et dans le Golfe Persique. Son Altesse parviendra à y établir son pouvoir et son Credit en protégeant le Commerce, l'Industrie et la religion, en flattant les passions, en soudoyant ceux qui pourraient être nuisibles.

'Une catastrophe à Constantinople est inévitable, elle est imminente. L'Angleterre et la France ne pourront l'empêcher, l'Autriche et la Russie ne le voudront pas.

'Dès lors Son Altesse prendra une attitude défensive. Elle abandonnera la Turquie Européenne et même les Provinces au delà du Mont Taurus aux arrangements des Puissances.

'Il paraît certain que la Porte voudra tenter de reconquérir la Syrie. C'est précisément ce qu'il faut pour mettre Son Altesse à même de pouvoir hâter la Catastrophe dont elle a besoin [*sic*].

'L'armée de la Syrie, manquant de moyens d'offensive, devra être pourvue de 20 Batteries, deux équipages de Pontons, 300 Ambulances, un nombre suffisant de Médecins et pour un état effectif de 130 m[ille] hommes des troupes de toutes espèces, outre un nombre suffisant de Bedouins.

'L'Intelligence avec Rechid Mohamed Pasha, ainsi que avec les autres Gouverneurs des Provinces limitrophes doit être maintenue à tout prix.

'Une Guerre Européenne serait le moment le plus favorable pour jeter le masque et pour proclamer, Mehemed Ali Chef de l'Empire Arabe.'

According to Prokesch-Osten this was a French trick (*Mach-Werk*), but not officially authorised, and it was not until 1839 that he thought that Mehemet Ali contemplated anything.\* Prokesch-Osten does not admit that he himself fathered the scheme.

The matter was eventually cleared up in this manner by Milbanke, the *chargé d'affaires* at Vienna, in his despatch (*F.O.* 7/280) No. 30 of March 23, 1839. He acknowledges the despatch of Lord Palmerston to Lamb (Vienna) † and states he has interviewed Prince Metternich on the subject of the Caliphate. The Prince stated that Colonel Prokesch-Osten had not been charged with any mission to the Pasha in this connexion, and that his views were his own, not those of the Austrian Government. It appears that the question came up again, for Prince Metternich (*W.S.A.*, *Weisungen nach England*. To Esterházy, Res. ad. No. 2 of February 3, 1841) states that he demanded explanations of Prokesch-Osten, enclosing his letter (December 27, 1840) in which he regretted the whole affair.

There is no evidence that the scheme of Prokesch-Osten, or any other intriguer, had made any impression on Mehemet Ali. None the less, Palmerston still retained his suspicions. Early in 1840 he declared, 'if we

\* *W.S.A.*, Prokesch-Osten in his letter to Metternich of February 3, 1841. *Vide* *Weisungen nach England*, 305, and enclo. to No. 2 res. To Esterházy.

† *F.O.* 7/270. To Lamb, No. 150 of November 30, 1838, enclo. Campbell, No. 69 of October 1, 1838, and enclo.

(the Great Powers) do nothing he (Mehemet Ali) will declare himself the independent King of Arabia.' \*

(b) *The Grand Sheriff as independent Caliph.*

Palmerston's belief that Mehemet Ali wanted to make himself an independent King of Arabia with the title of Caliph was an error. It was, however, a perversion of what may have been a truth. During the years 1833-4 Wood, while in Iraq, produced 'a report on the then plan of Mehemet Ali, encouraged by France, to erect the peninsula of Arabia into an independent kingdom.' † It may be true that a plan of making the Grand Sheriff of Mecca Caliph, and independent of the Sultan, floated through Mehemet Ali's head. At any rate the Grand Sheriff came under suspicion at Constantinople in the forties, as is testified by Ahmed Vefyk. But there is not enough evidence to prove that the suspicion was well founded even then, and there is still less proof in the thirties. Mehemet Ali's part in the matter is not clear, though it may be taken as reasonably certain that the Grand Sheriff would have lent a willing ear to any suggestion of revolt against the Sultan.

The Grand Sheriff of Mecca, being of the tribe of the Prophet, at once hated and despised the Turks. But it was not until 1860 that the project of using the Grand Sheriff as a kind of Caliph to counteract French influence in Egypt was seriously discussed. Lord John Russell then decisively vetoed any such project (*vide F.O.* 78/1514 of December 12, 1860). In all probability the idea was, even then, premature. The Pan-Arab movement owed much to the models of western nationalism, to the press, to public opinion, and to developed communications. None of these was sufficiently evolved until the decade before 1914 to permit any serious development of the Caliphate idea. And none of these factors was influential under Mehemet Ali.

<sup>143</sup> P. 98. *F.O.* 78/354. From Ponsonby, No. 18 of January 27, 1839.

<sup>144</sup> P. 98. *F.O.* 78/347. From Palmerston, December 18, 1838.

<sup>145</sup> P. 98. *Reshid's negotiations for a Turco-British Alliance* (1838-9).

The details about this Treaty are mysterious and scanty. *F.O.* 78/354: From Ponsonby, No. 59 of March 7, 1839, proves that Reshid was negotiating with Palmerston in February. The text of the Draft Treaty is in *Lev.* I, No. 26 encl. This, which we may call Draft No. 1, got out to Constantinople and was rejected by April 21. But Nouri accompanied his refusal by suggesting that 'the affair is not yet decided.' Ponsonby had 'no reliance upon his veracity.' But some time before Nouri had in fact instructed Reshid to make a last effort with Palmerston. This resulted in Draft No. 2, referred to in Palmerston's letter to Reshid of May 6. Draft No. 2 is there described as nearly finished and it is also mentioned on April 27. I have not found its text, nor do I know why it was not proceeded with. Ponsonby's No. 99 of April 22 described the failure of negotiations referring to No. 1. But this news only arrived on May 16, and could not therefore have affected decisions before that date.

It may be that, during this negotiation, Palmerston discussed or even inspired Reshid in the direction of reform. Stratford, then in England, claims to have done so, but evidence is lacking.

\* *W.S.A.*, *Berichte aus England*, 294. From Neumann, No. 5, Litt. B., as here February 9, 1840.

† *F.O.* 78/961. Consul Wood, March 28, 1853, Memo of Services; cp. App. I.

<sup>146</sup> P. 99. *F.O.* 78/355. From Ponsonby, No. 88 of April 6, 1839. *Vide* also A. Lev. I, Treaty Text in No. 27 and Hall, 240 n.

<sup>147</sup> P. 99. *F.O.* 78/355. From Ponsonby, No. 99 of April 22, 1839.

<sup>148</sup> P. 99. PONSONBY'S ATTITUDE. (a) *Did he want war in 1839?*

There can be little doubt that Ponsonby's violent Russophobia made him exceed his orders at times. But no one, except Hall, has seen that he was profoundly convinced that Russia was stirring up both Persia and Mehemet Ali to attack Turkey. To Ponsonby this eventuality seemed very dangerous because Mehemet Ali might have joined hands with the Shah in Iraq, and there is definite evidence that Ponsonby thought that Bagdad—not Brusa or Constantinople—was the objective of Ibrahim and the Shah and that Russia might attack Diarbekir. *F.O.* 78/354: From Ponsonby, No. 18 of January 27, 1839, states his suspicions that Russia is urging on the Sultan to hostilities against both Mehemet Ali and Persia. He says he has tried to get the Sultan to await the results of Reschid's mission to London before committing himself. On February 8 (No. 24) he states that he has recommended 'the greatest prudence' to the Sultan himself, and the Sultan replied he would 'do nothing precipitately.' On March 7 (No. 59) he repeats his Russian suspicions and says he has again urged 'moderation.' *F.O.* 78/355 tells the same story. On March 18 (No. 67) he warned the Porte against provoking hostilities. On March 23 (No. 76): 'I am sure of the action of the Russian agents to excite to war as I before stated,' and that was, with Ponsonby, the strongest motive for opposing it. Again, during April, he was certainly trying to get the Turks to accept the Reschid-Palmerston Draft Treaty, and this attempt was incompatible with offensive action by the Turks.

*F.O.* 78/356: From Ponsonby, No. 120 of May 20 says 'Nobody here doubts of war' and repeats the view that Russia had caused it. In No. 122 of May 22 he reports that Nouri had informed him of the decision for war. Ponsonby states that he not only disapproved of the war but shows that he had not shared the Porte's councils beforehand. If these despatches are not to be taken at their face value Ponsonby deliberately deceived Palmerston during the first half of 1839. I do not think we are justified in such an assumption on the evidence. In No. 120 of May 20 Ponsonby asserts his own opinion that 'he (Ibrahim) will take the Pashalic of Bagdad, Orfa, Diarbekir, etc., and that the Russians will mediate and reduce the Sultan to confirm the possession of these conquests to Mehemet Ali. . . . Such an arrangement will go far towards the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.' Now war alone could bring about this arrangement. We are asked to believe that a scheme devised by Russia was urged on by Ponsonby, the notorious anti-Russian!

The view of G. H. Bolsover in the *Slavonic Review*, July 1934, is as follows (112): 'Though Ponsonby received repeated instructions to restrain the Sultan he privately encouraged him, in the belief that Turkey could be saved from Russia only by destroying the peace of Kutaya.' F. S. Rodkey (*Journ. Mod. Hist.*, December 1929, 591-2) supports a similar conclusion. Both historians seem to me to have been too much influenced by Palmerston's despatch of August 15, 1839. This criticised Ponsonby for not being able to decipher the London instruction of March 15, and hinted that he did not believe the explanation of not having a cipher. But Palmerston may have been only scolding Ponsonby for his carelessness, which was notorious. The fact is that, if Ponsonby had wished to betray Palmerston or to urge the Sultan to war, it would have been unwise to do it by pretending not to have a cipher and so delaying the communication



of Palmerston's instruction. It was easier and safer to do it by another way well understood in Constantinople. He could have formally remonstrated with the Sultan and his ministers, and then sent secret messages to tell them to disregard his communications. Both Ponsonby and Stratford de Redcliffe have incurred suspicions of employing such methods, and both unquestionably had secret sources of access to the Sultan. It seems to me that Ponsonby was not likely to have tried a clumsier method which, incidentally, did not impose on his employer. I, therefore, give Ponsonby the benefit of the doubt. In the section which follows I explain what I believe his views to have been, and I think that this explanation accounts for the views put forward by Messrs. Bolsover and Rodkey.

(b) *Did Ponsonby foment rebellion in the Lebanon and Syria in 1839 or at other times?*

While not accepting the view of Messrs. Bolsover and Rodkey that Ponsonby wanted war during the first half of 1839, I should agree with their view in general that he did not want the *status quo* indefinitely to continue. The *status quo* established by Kutaya left Mehemet Ali in possession of Adana and Syria, and therefore opened the prospect to a further invasion of Turkish territory by an attack on Diarbekir or by inciting Iraq to revolt. Ponsonby felt the situation of the *status quo* to be unsafe and had wished to terminate it ever since it had existed. But he never intended to do so when the situation was unfavourable to Turkey, and he thought that it was in the first half of 1839.

In the early thirties (*vide* App. I) Richard Wood was sent out by him as an agent. His functions appear to have been vague. He was certainly meant to ascertain whether there was unrest in Syria or discontent with Ibrahim's rule. It is not clear what more he was to do. Wood himself took care to foment that unrest, and to hold out promises of support to possible rebels when the time came. As the grand prince of the Lebanon was unwilling to contemplate rebellion, Wood persuaded his nephew the Emir Beshir Kassim to be prepared to do so when the time came. He also held out hopes to some of the Druse chiefs of a similar kind. Ponsonby does not appear to have disapproved of Wood's actions, though it is not certain that he had authorised them beforehand. Wood neither proposed nor stimulated any immediate rebellion by his activities. All he did was to lay a train of gunpowder which might ultimately be fired.

There does not seem to me any evidence that Ponsonby definitely approved of, or directly stimulated, the outbreak of any risings before 1839. It is true that he incurred that suspicion during that year. But he does not appear to have sent Wood on a new mission to Syria until the end of June 1840. Wood, therefore, only arrived long after war had begun.

His instructions are not clear, but it is a fair inference that Ponsonby now wanted him to stir up rebellion. Wood tried to get Admiral Louis to send a few ships to the coast of the Lebanon, but Louis refused. These ships were doubtless intended either to stimulate the revolt direct or to offer a refuge to the ringleaders if the revolt failed. The project was defeated by Louis' refusal. Meanwhile Wood was intriguing in the Besharré district with a view to keeping the unrest alive.

What then was Ponsonby's object in this case? He seems to have abstained from stimulating active revolt up till June 1840, because that might produce war. And war, as he held, had been desired both by Russia and Mehemet Ali. As soon as it existed he had no scruple about embarrassing Mehemet Ali. And for that purpose a revolt in the Lebanon, and among the Druses, was clearly most useful, and indeed had long been



prepared by Ponsonby. Hence he tried to stimulate it (though not very successfully owing to the failure of Louis' naval co-operation). There was actually some unrest, and in July came the date of the signature of the decision at Constantinople which was the first move of Europe against Mehemet Ali.

The conclusion appears to be this. Ponsonby did his best to maintain unrest and potential revolt against Mehemet Ali's rule in Syria at all times. But he took no active steps to make it break into flame until after the Sultan had actually made war on Mehemet Ali in May 1839. Even if it should subsequently be discovered that Ponsonby took more active or earlier steps to stir up rebellion than I have been able to find, this fact would in no way imply that he desired war. The promotion of unrest or the stimulation of rebellion in the provinces of an enemy power were favourite oriental weapons. They by no means implied war because the stimulation was secret. Russian agents were always using gold for the purpose alike in Asiatic and in European Turkey. Mehemet Ali had done the same. Ponsonby saw no reason why he should not imitate them. So far as I can judge he laid the train, but refused to give the signal till June 1839, *i.e.* till after war had broken out. But even the active promotion of unrest or rebellion in Syria or elsewhere by Ponsonby by no means implied that he wanted war or expected war to result from it. In peace time a rebellion was a good way of preventing Ibrahim from going to war by interfering with his recruits and with his communications. In war time (as after May 1839) it was a good way of embarrassing his direct military operations against Turkey.

(c) *Ponsonby and the surrender of the Turkish fleet.*

France at the time came under grave suspicions of having stimulated the Turkish admiral to treason. There does not seem any doubt that Soult and the French government entirely disapproved the step (*vide* Guichen, 98-100 and nn.). Ponsonby transmitted a story from the dragoman of the Capudan pasha, which stated that Admiral Lalande and the Prince de Joinville encouraged the admiral in his treason. But Ponsonby refused to believe that an 'honourable' officer like Lalande could behave in this way. Palmerston made no official protest at the time, evidently not thinking the evidence good enough.

The Prince de Joinville's account in his *Souvenirs* is not necessarily compromising, but an article published under his influence in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, August 1, 1852, certainly suggests that Lalande incited the Turkish admiral to surrender from motives of jealousy towards England. It is certainly very curious that he confirms the allegations of the dragoman, though it is after an interval of thirteen years.

M. Driault (*L'Égypte et l'Europe*, I, p. xlvii and n.) seems to think Pontois' denial of Lalande's complicity was 'purement diplomatique,' and this view is supported by his documents (*vide* Nos. 16, 24, 33, 36, 38 and 51).

<sup>149</sup> P. 101. Professor A. J. Rustum, *Mehemet Ali and Sultan Mahmud. Compte Rendu du Congrès intern. de Géographie*, Cairo [1926], Tome V, 44-66.

<sup>150</sup> P. 102. *Vide* Driault, *L'Égypte et l'Europe* [1933], IV, pp. x-xvii.

<sup>151</sup> P. 103. Pte. letter of Werry (Aleppo) quoted in *F.O.* 78/374. Campbell to Palmerston, No. 36 of May 28, 1839.

<sup>152</sup> P. 104. Driault, I, 51, gives the text of the instruction.

<sup>153</sup> P. 104. *F.O.* 120/180. From Lord Beauvale, No. 61 of July 17, 1839. The enclo. containing Austrian information says Ibrahim received

the order on June 15. This seems impossible, but he acknowledged receipt on the 19th.

<sup>154</sup> P. 104. Report of the Austrian consul. *F.O.* 78/374. From Campbell, No. 48 of July 6, encl. of June 26, 1839. Driault, I, 11, gives the peremptory instruction of Soult of May 28, 1839.

<sup>155</sup> P. 105. *F.O.* 64 222. From Lord William Russell (Berlin), No. 93 of September 4, 1839. Moltke (*Briefe aus der Türkei*, Berlin [1876], No. 64) gives full details on the Turkish side, as does Driault, *passim*, on the French.

<sup>156</sup> P. 106. *A.F.F.* Angleterre, 652. From Bourqueney, No. 69 of July 27, 1839. This refers to the news of the loss of the fleet.

<sup>157</sup> P. 106. *W.S.A.* Berichte aus England, 288. From Esterházy, No. 35 Litt. F., of July 24, 1839, with Metternich's minute. This refers probably to the news of the Sultan's death.

<sup>158</sup> P. 107. *W.S.A.* England Varia. 29. Palmerston to Lord Beauvale, private, August 25, 1839.

<sup>159</sup> P. 107. Campbell to Ponsonby, etc. July 16, 1839. *Lev.* I, No. 194, encl. No. 4. To Campbell, No. 27 of August 13, September 11, separate.

<sup>160</sup> P. 108. Cp. *F.O.* 78/357. From Ponsonby, No. 192 of July 26, 1839; No. 193 of July 29. The willingness of the Turks to yield is confirmed from Russian sources. *Vide* also *F.O.* 65/252. From Clanricarde, No. 86 of August 15, 1839.

<sup>161</sup> P. 109. *F.O.* 78/353. To Ponsonby, No. 95 of July 13, 1839. *F.O.* 78/357. From Ponsonby, Nos. 201, 207 of August 7.

<sup>162</sup> P. 109. *F.O.* 78/375. From Campbell, No. 74 of September 26, 1839. Driault, I, No. 82.

<sup>163</sup> P. 109. *F.O.* 78/358. From Ponsonby, No. 256 of September 22, 1839, encl. of September 19 to Stopford. *F.O.* 78/359, Nos. 262-3 of September 24. Secret from Palmerston to the Admiralty. The part published in *Lev.* I, No. 356, obscures the real meaning.

<sup>164</sup> P. 109. *F.O.* 146/210. Palmerston to Admiralty, October 29, 1839.

<sup>165</sup> P. 110. *F.O.* 78/377. To Col. Hodges, No. 2 of October 14, 1839. *F.O.* 78/359. From Ponsonby, No. 299 of October 30, 1839.

<sup>166</sup> P. 110. Cochelet to Soult, October 16, 1839, carrying out his instruction of September 27 in Driault, I, No. 91.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE YEAR OF DEFEAT (1840)

<sup>167</sup> P. 112. *The prelude to Brunnow's overture of 1839-40. Duke of Wellington and Palmerston on the opening and closing of the Straits, 1835-9.*

According to Guichen (62-3 and n.) Palmerston expressed the following opinion to Bourqueney in 1839: 'He [Palmerston] had told the Duke of Wellington in 1835' (doubtless on taking over the Foreign Office from him in that year) 'that the East was called on to play a great part in the affairs of Europe and that he wished to know his opinion on the two possible systems of British policy (i) Opening of the Sea of Marmara to our fleets and consequently to those of other Powers or (ii) Closing of them to all, including ourselves. The Duke answered without hesitation: "Close them, we are in those areas (dans ces parages) too far from our resources, and Russia is near hers." This dictum, continued Palmerston, struck me as reasonable and full of common sense.'—Bourqueney to Soult (July 12, 1839).

One day later Palmerston wrote similar advice to Lord Beauvale,

though not saying that he had received it from Wellington. The passage, suppressed in the public version of his despatch, is here given: 'Now with reference to strategetical [*sic*] considerations it may be doubted whether it is not most for the advantage of Western Europe that those Straits should be closed to all parties. For though the closing of them protects Southern Russia from hostile attacks by sea, yet it paralyzes the left arm of Russia as a Naval Power and secures all the military, naval, and commercial interests of Western Europe in the Mediterranean from molestation by the Black Sea Fleet of Russia and though England or France might be able to have a fleet in the Black Sea which would be stronger than the Russian fleet, yet the British or French Squadrons would then be in a sea dangerous to navigate, and without any good harbours and they would be far away from their own resources in case of any accident or damage.'

'But viewing this question solely with reference to its bearing upon Turkey it must be remembered that if the Straits were a thoroughfare for all parties, the Russian Fleet would get into the habit of frequently visiting Constantinople and that it would do so much easier, and oftener, than the British or French Fleet could; and it is needless to point out the many inconveniences which might arise from visits of that kind at critical moments, if they were sanctioned by established usage; and if therefore the Western Powers could no longer be entitled either to object to them, or to consider them important measures warranting serious steps on their own part.' \*

In an interview with the Austrian Minister on July 12 Palmerston referred to Wellington's opinion against admitting a Russian Squadron into the Bosphorus or a Franco-British into the Dardanelles. But he introduced qualifications. 'He himself leant to it [Wellington's view] but yet more than one motive militated equally in favour of a contrary decision. Nothing was yet definitely settled in this way.' †

<sup>168</sup> P. 113. *A.E.F.* Angleterre, 654. To Guizot, No. 18 of April 14, 1840; *ibid.*, 655. From Guizot, No. 42 of April 16. To Guizot, No. 19 of April 20.

<sup>169</sup> P. 113. Part of this in Guizot's *Mémoires* [1861], IV, 553-5. *A.E.F.* Angleterre, 653. From Sebastiani, No. 94 of October 3, 1839. This account agrees fairly well with *F.O.* 146/209, Palmerston to Bulwer, No. 38 of September 23 (*Lev.* I, No. 313), and *F.O.* 146/210, No. 348 of October 29. To Granville (*Lev.* I, No. 358). There is dispute as to whether Palmerston or Sebastiani initiated the offer, and if it was officially declined.

<sup>170</sup> P. 117. Driault, II. From Cochelet, etc., No. 94 of April 17, 1840; No. 103 of May 6; No. 111 of May 26.

<sup>171</sup> P. 118. *Ady.* I, 5503. From C. Napier, July 8, 1840 (stamped August 8); July 20.

<sup>172</sup> P. 120. *Ady.* I, 5503. From Stopford, August 26 and September 20, 1840.

<sup>173</sup> P. 121. *Ady.* I, 5503. From Napier, September 16, 1840. From Stopford, September 20.

<sup>174</sup> P. 123. Napier, *War in Syria*, I, 125. Cp. also ch. vii, *infra*.

<sup>175</sup> P. 125. *Ady.* I, 5503. From Stopford, October 13, 1840, recd. November 28.

\* *F.O.* 7/279. Palmerston to Lord Beauvale, No. 57 of July 13, 1839. Passage suppressed in *Lev.* I, No. 111.

† *W.S.A.* Berichte aus England, 288. From Esterházy, No. 35, Litt. B. of July 24, 1839.

176 P. 125. Napier, *War in Syria*, I, 139.

177 P. 126. *Adj.* I, 5503. To Sir C. F. Smith, September 10, 1840.

178 P. 126. *Note on the authorities for the campaign of 1840 and on its geography.*

Sir W. Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy*, VI, ch. xlv [1901].

W. P. Hunter, *Narrative of the late Expedition to Syria*, 2 vols. [1842].

*Letters of Sir Henry Goddington*, ed. Lady Bouchier [1880], privately printed, with a letter of Stopford, December 14, 1840 (199-200), condemning Napier (*vide infra*, n. 191).

Sir C. Napier, *War in Syria*, 2 vols. [1842].

Maj-Gen. E. Napier, *Life and Correspondence of Sir Charles*, II [1862].

Baron A. Jochims: *Syrian War [and the decline of the Ottoman Empire]*, with maps, Berlin [1883], consists mostly of despatches. The maps in Jochims are extremely inaccurate and the names differ from the modern ones. However, there seems to be no doubt that the Ardali heights end at [Q] Ornet Chahouane (Omachajouan). This was the position of Napier. The Calet Meidan heights, described as separated from them by a deep gorge, seem to be points 502 and 706 on the French Staff map, 1923 (revised 1926).<sup>\*</sup> The roads also have been altered. But the movements seem clear. One battalion plus mountaineers attacked from point 442. Two were in reserve in the centre; four stormed point 706, two of them moving by the road. This last movement when completed cut the road to Brummana, and put Napier in touch with the flying column of Emir Beshir Kassim. Meanwhile Omer Bey had arrived and been engaged with the rear of Ibrahim at some point about a mile west of Bikfaya. Ibrahim's troops were thus thrown into a gorge west of Bikfaya.

No one has described the campaign from the point of view of Stopford, the most important personage in it. But *Adj.* I, 5503-4, and the *pte. Bey. MSS.* supply a fairly full account of naval and political activities and correct the errors of Napier. There are some useful comments on the siege of Acre from Colonel Schultz, a Polish engineer at the Egyptian side, in Driault, IV, No. 388.

179 P. 126. *The mystery of the captured standard.*

Ponsonby presented a flag to the Sultan indicating that it had been captured from Ibrahim on the heights of Ardali on October 10. Napier, on hearing of it, protested that the flag was a bogus one. The flag that he captured at Ardali mysteriously disappeared (*War in Syria*, I, 149). Napier fumes about it in his memoirs, ending with the characteristic dictum (I, 195), 'To this day it is a mystery. . . . Someone has bamboozled the Ambassador, or the Ambassador bamboozled the Sultan.' It is a mystery which the records easily resolve. *P.O.* 78/397: From Ponsonby, No. 242 of October 19, announces that Colonel Hodges has brought him from Sir Charles Smith 'the sacred standard, as it is called, of Ibrahim pasha, taken in the field on the 10th instant.' But the note enclosed from Sir C. Smith of October 12 says something different: 'I send the flag of Beyrouth and the standard of the troops that surrendered to me yesterday morning' (*i.e.* the 11th). This first flag was taken in the Beyrouth fighting and not by Napier. It was the flag of the town. The second, 'the standard,' was almost certainly a flag belonging to Suleyman's troops. These were intercepted in their retirement from Beyrouth and surrendered on the 11th to Sir Charles Smith, who had succeeded Napier. So neither of the flags sent to Constantinople was taken by Napier. Ponsonby, however, presented only one flag to the Sultan. He referred to it 'as taken in the glorious combat of the 10th of October,' and in the

<sup>\*</sup> 1/50,000, *vide* also map opposite p. vii.

covering letter to Palmerston as taken 'by the Ottoman troops acting under the orders of Commodore Napier.' Both statements were wrong and Ponsonby is wholly responsible for the blunder. But then he was notoriously casual.

It does not appear that Ponsonby ever acknowledged his mistake, but his own records prove that he was responsible for his own 'bamboozlement.' If any further proof is needed the correctness of the above facts can be proved from *F.O.* 195/171. From Sir C. F. Smith of December 5, 1840.

<sup>180</sup> P. 127. *Ady.* I, 5503. Palmerston to Admiralty, July 25, 1840; Instructions to Stopford, October 5; Stopford to Admiralty, October 31. *Vide* also App. III.

<sup>181</sup> P. 128. Napier, *War in Syria*, I, ch. xvii.

<sup>182</sup> P. 129. *Ady.* I, 5503. From Stürmer, November 11, 1840. From Admiral Bandiera, November 4.

<sup>183</sup> P. 129. *Ady.* I, 5503. From Stürmer, November 11, 1840. *Vide* also App. III.

<sup>184</sup> P. 130. *F.O.* 195/171. From Sir C. F. Smith, No. 12 of November 24, 1840. *Vide* also App. III.

<sup>185</sup> P. 130. *N.R.A.* England, CIV. From Verstolk, No. 111 of October 10, 1840.

<sup>186</sup> P. 131. *F.O.* 78/391. To Ponsonby, No. 214 of October 27, 1840.

<sup>187</sup> P. 131. *F.O.* 78/396. From Ponsonby, No. 191 of September 1, 1840.

<sup>188</sup> P. 132. *F.O.* 78/415. Palmerston to Sir C. Smith, Nos. 12-13 of November 15, 1840; cp. App. III.

<sup>189</sup> P. 132. C. K. Webster, *Brit. Acad. brochure* [1934], 32-3.

<sup>190</sup> P. 133. *N.R.A.* England. From Verstolk, No. 595 of December 9, 1840.

<sup>191</sup> P. 134. *Ady.* I, 5504. Stopford to Napier, March 23, 1841; and *supra*, n. 178.

<sup>192</sup> P. 134. *Ady.* I, 5504. From Jochmus, January 28, 1841. *F.O.* 78/415. From Michell, December 21, 1840; December 31.

<sup>193</sup> P. 134. *Losses of Ibrahim's army*. A French return of March 1841 (Driault, V, No. 1) gives 32,000 as returned to Egypt from Syria. If we strike a balance between the estimates of Werry and Jochmus, the army that left Damascus numbered 51,000—leaving about 18-19,000 missing on the way. Estimates in the East are always uncertain (cp. *infra*, n. 248).

<sup>194</sup> P. 135. *F.O.* 78/431. From Sir Hugh Rose of February 20, 1841, enclo. in Ponsonby, No. 70 of February 21; also in *Lev.* III, No. 190.

<sup>195</sup> P. 135. *Submission of Mehemet Ali*. Driault, Tome IV. Nos. 1-50 contain much valuable new material on this subject, and the negotiations of Napier and Fanshawe (who appears as 'Flanshaw'). Ponsonby comes in for much criticism, but the British documents in his defence are not quoted.

<sup>196</sup> P. 136. *Omissions and suppressions in Blue Books, 1839-40. The Levant Correspondence*, Pt. I,\* *A. & P.* 1st Session [1841], XXIX [322 and 304], 1-735. As regards Russia, then generally regarded as the enemy of England, the omissions are numerous. Suggestions by Ponsonby from Constantinople that the Russians have stirred up Mehemet Ali to attack the Sultan are deleted from various despatches (*Lev.* I, Nos. 9, 16, 18, 26). *Lev.* I, No. 5 of February 12, 1839, omits evidence. Next, all

\* In this compilation I have been aided by Miss Lillian M. Penson. For omissions, etc. in Blue Books for 1841-5, *vide infra*, ch. vii, n. 297.



references to Russia's inability to undergo a war are omitted (*Lev.* I, Nos. 50, 122). Interviews with the Russian Emperor are cut out of the part of the despatch published, or omitted altogether, as in a despatch (*Lev.* I, No. 419) from Clanricarde of November 30. As the Emperor expressed himself as pro-British and anti-French, and more so in each case than Nesselrode, the effect is misleading. An important despatch of Palmerston to Granville (*Lev.* I, No. 82) of June 29 has the crucial passage omitted, which declares that the object of Russia is to weaken Turkey. The passage showing that Marshal Soult was anti-Russian is also omitted (*Lev.* I, No. 101). An important incident at the end of June 1839, when Beauvale wrote from Vienna (in conjunction with Metternich) to advocate the introduction of a Russian squadron into the Mediterranean is much obscured by omissions (*Lev.* I, Nos. 107-10). Palmerston's refusal, as yet, to admit this suggestion, is much minimised (*Lev.* I, No. 111).

The good influence of Austria and Metternich in trying to unite Russia with England and England with France is, on the whole, rather depreciated (*Lev.* I, Nos. 28, 107, 109, 202, 207). On the other hand, a despatch of August 2, in which Lord Beauvale declares that Metternich has 'escaped' him, is omitted altogether. A published despatch (*Lev.* I, No. 288 of August 22) omits the great credit ascribed to the Austrian representative at Constantinople for promoting the European aspect of things with the Turks. Finally a published despatch (*Lev.* I, No. 393 of November 16) omits the passage declaring that Metternich believes that no settlement with Mehemet Ali will be more than a truce. This is an important light on Austrian policy.

Prussia is not much mentioned, and the fact that she is described as 'a satellite of Austria' is not disclosed in one despatch referring to her (*Lev.* I, No. 304).

The treatment of France is of course the most important, and the test as to omissions. Most references to King Louis Philippe are omitted, particularly an important one reported on January 27, 1840. When his views are quoted they are described, with some inaccuracy, as those of the French Government. They omit Bulwer's hints (August 30) as to Soult's ignorance of the East and on the weakness of his Ministry (*Lev.* I, No. 270). The fact that the King is more pacific than the Ministry is obscured by omissions (*Lev.* I, Nos. 313, 315, 317). The extreme friction between Russia and France is largely concealed by omissions (e.g. *Lev.* I, No. 357).

A good many of the despatches of Ponsonby are devoted to the internal difficulties of Turkey and intrigues at Constantinople. But, as he invariably ascribes the disturbances to Russian influence, it was difficult to insert many of them in the Blue Book. Generally speaking it may be said that Russia came to terms with Palmerston from November 22, 1839, onwards (*Lev.* I, No. 401), and thereafter Anglo-Russian relations were good. Palmerston therefore exerted himself to keep anything anti-Russian out of the Blue Books, but was less solicitous about offending France.

The crucial question, however, is whether the Blue Book gives an accurate account of the breach with France. Guizot remarked later that 'France would not have quarrelled about the treaty of the 15th July (1840) if they had had *fair warning* that it would be signed without them if not with them. Guizot assured him (Cowley) that the warning was not given.'\* Palmerston wrote a private letter on this subject, using *Levant*

\* Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, III, 425-33. Letters of Hobhouse, July 7, 1843; of Palmerston, July 27.

*Correspondence* for his text. He quotes first (*Lev.* I, No. 281) to show that he warned Sebastiani on September 4, 1839, that we would, if necessary, 'act in concert with a less number than the four' Great Powers to check Mehemet Ali. He desired that Soult should see the despatch in which this conversation was recorded. A similar warning was given on September 23 and, though the published version omits references to the French King, it preserves the warning.\* Also the French Ambassador was asked to repeat the conversation to Soult. In an instruction to Granville of October 29 (*Lev.* I, No. 358) obscure hints on the same subject are given. Palmerston states in his letter that a copy of this despatch was given to Soult, but there is no instruction to that effect in the despatch itself. A letter from Palmerston of January 5, 1840 (*Lev.* I, No. 430), informed Sebastiani that Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia had come to agreement and hoped for the concurrence of France. A sketch of the proposed Four-Power (or Five-Power) Convention was given by Palmerston to Sebastiani, as is shown by a reference in Granville's despatch of January 24 (*Lev.* I, No. 458), and as is still more clear in the unpublished version. In March Sebastiani was recalled and Guizot came to London as French Ambassador. Palmerston recorded a conversation with Guizot in a despatch to Vienna of March 12, 1840 (*Lev.* I, No. 512), in which he intimated that England would act with other Powers if necessary,† and even discussed the possibility of war with France. On April 3 (*Lev.* I, No. 533) Granville reported that no change in French views was to be expected, and on the 15th (*Lev.* I, No. 546) he repeated that France would never agree to coerce Mehemet Ali. On April 17 (*Lev.* I, No. 547) Granville reported Thiers as declining to join a Conference of Five Powers, the object of which was to drive Mehemet Ali out of Syria. The reason he gave for refusal was that a French refusal to join in coercion, after the Conference met, would be a more marked separation than a refusal beforehand. After this Palmerston did not think it necessary to consult France further and did not do so. On July 15 he concluded a Four-Power Treaty to drive Mehemet Ali from Syria. This aim was successful and was executed by the British fleet before the end of the year. France was humiliated because she was left out, and thought of going to war. At such a time she naturally complained that she had not been consulted.

In his rather lengthy survey Palmerston argued that France had had fair warning that the Four-Power Treaty would be signed without France and that she would be left out of the European Concert. That is a matter purely for diplomats or historians to settle. But what is of real interest for our purpose is that Palmerston relied solely on a Blue Book to prove his case. There were serious omissions in this Blue Book, which have already been mentioned. Much was omitted in deference to national susceptibilities. Ponsonby's Russophobia, Austria's timidity and Prussia's subservience to her, are all glossed over. They were friends, so this deference was paid to them. But the great essential facts as to the quarrel with France and Palmerston's justification for it are made clear. Reference to the original documents does not show any new arguments of substance or omissions that really mattered from the point of view of this conclusion. It was not the first time that a Blue Book was used to reveal the facts as to

\* *Lev.* I, No. 313. This is one of the rare cases in which a material change is made on publication and the fact not indicated by the paper being described as an extract.

† The argument is slightly misrepresented in the Blue Book. In a passage omitted from it Palmerston expressed the fear that Austria may not act with the others.

British policy in a great diplomatic crisis. That had been done under Canning and against France. But it is not often that a Blue Book stands the test so well as this of Palmerston's *Levant Correspondence* does. Certainly neither the origins of the Crimean War, nor the diplomatic crisis of Agadir, are so fully shown in the Blue Books of their day.

## CHAPTER V

## THE YEAR OF EUROPE (1841)

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE FOR THE STRAITS QUESTION (1841-53).

*Foreign Office views* are summed up in a Memo on the right of the Sultan of Turkey to exclude Foreign Ships of War, and to restrict the passage of Foreign Merchant Vessels through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. E. Hertslet, November 12, 1877. This is not altogether satisfactory, as the situation was very different before 1841 and after 1856. Nearly all the International Law views are based on this memo., directly or indirectly. I have tried to follow the documents of the time, of which some were unknown to Hertslet. The statements of Russian historians, as Martens, Jomini and Goriainov, are inaccurate (*vide infra*, n. 218). F. P. Graves, *Question of the Straits* [1931], chs. vi-vii, is worth consulting, and Sir J. Headlam Morley, ch. viii, in *Studies in Diplomatic History* [1930].

<sup>197</sup> P. 138. F.O. 78/427. To Ponsonby, No. 14 of January 26, 1841.

<sup>198</sup> P. 138. W.S.A. Weisungen nach England, 305. To Esterházy, January 7, 1841, partie, Nos. 2 and 3 of January 22.

<sup>199</sup> P. 139. W.S.A. Berichte aus England, 305. Charles Napier to Lord Napier, February 17, 1841.

<sup>200</sup> P. 140. A.E.F. Angleterre, 656. From Bourquency, No. 107 of November 13, 1840; No. 109 of November 18. Driault, IV, Nos. 8 and 9, gives an important despatch and private letter to Paris of November 8.

<sup>201</sup> P. 140. A.E.F. Angleterre, 656. From Bourquency, No. 2 of January 7, 1841. The reunion was from January 2 to 6.

<sup>202</sup> P. 141. A.E.F. Angleterre, 657. To Bourquency, No. 5 of February 13, 1841.

<sup>203</sup> P. 141. A.E.F. 657. To Bourquency, No. 6 of March 7, 1841; No. 8 of March 13. From Bourquency, No. 16 of March 9; No. 18 of March 11.

<sup>204</sup> P. 141. F.O. 27/623. From Granville, No. 87 of March 12, 1841.

<sup>205</sup> P. 142. F.O. 78/427. To Lord Ponsonby, No. 77 of April 10, 1841.

<sup>206</sup> P. 142. A.E.F. Angleterre, 657. No. 31 of April 13, 1841. From Bourquency, reporting Esterházy and Brunnov.

<sup>207</sup> P. 142. W.S.A. 305. Weisungen nach England. To Esterházy, partie, March 31, 1841, and No. 2 of March 31. F.O. 7/298. From Lord Beauvale, No. 79 of April 22, 1841.

<sup>208</sup> P. 143. F.O. 78/433. From Ponsonby, No. 132 of April 14, 1841; No. 138 of April 21, with enclos., both recd. May 17.

<sup>209</sup> P. 143. A.E.F. Angleterre, 657. From Bourquency, No. 45 of May 24, 1840. F.O. 27/620. To Bulwer, No. 76 of June 11, 1841.

<sup>210</sup> P. 144. F.O. 27/620. To Bulwer, No. 77 of June 11, 1841.

<sup>211</sup> P. 144. A.E.F. Angleterre, 658. From Bourquency, No. 56 of June 24, 1841.

<sup>212</sup> P. 144. A.E.F. Angleterre, 658. To Bourquency, No. 29 of July 1, 1841.

<sup>213</sup> P. 144. *W.S.A.* Weisungen nach England, 306. Metternich to Apponyi, September 2, 1841.

<sup>214</sup> P. 145. *The Straits Convention of 1841 and Brunnow's abrogation of Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.*

The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi actually expired in autumn 1841. Palmerston, as seen in the text, claimed in 1853 that Brunnow promised before the signature of the Convention to see that this would take place. It is difficult to find a document giving the promise in 1841, though many could be quoted for 1839-40 which promise to abrogate the treaty. The most specific statement is in a despatch from Nesselrode to Medem at Paris of December 26, 1839. It was actually reproduced in the Blue Book in April 1841. After referring to the exclusive protection of Russia it says, 'Is not France aware that, far from taking advantage of that instrument, we have spontaneously declared ourselves ready to forego it, if we could obtain in exchange for it the recognition of the principle of public European law, which, in truth, would indeed close to foreign flags the entrances into one of the two Straits of Constantinople, but which would prohibit to our own vessels entrance into the other. Finally . . . we had still spontaneously proposed that, if it should become necessary to advance our fleet and our troops to the succour of the Sultan's capital, that measure should be deprived of all appearance of isolation, that it should not be exclusively Russian but solemnly announced as an European measure.' These 'facts' are described as 'notorious.' This document was published as *Lev.* I, No. 446. *F.O.* 65/277 shows that Palmerston submitted some of the papers of this Blue Book before publication to Brunnow on March 16, 1841. Brunnow returned them on April 10, with requests for the omission of the drafts of the Convention of 1840, which Palmerston accorded. Brunnow made no objection to the publication of the above, or of any other, statements abrogating Unkiar Skelessi. It is quite clear that he could have used the opportunity of doing so. The Blue Book was published in April 1841, *i.e.* before the Convention of July was signed.

In his letter of 1853 Palmerston strongly affirms that Brunnow promised some time after the Syrian campaign, *i.e.* early in 1841, 'to let the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi expire' (it would do so in the autumn of 1841) 'without attempt at renewal.' He adds, 'I am sure that Brunnow will not deny this understanding. I cannot undertake to say whether there is any written record of it in the Foreign Office.' \* I have not found any written record save the correspondence about the proposed Blue Book, but that seems sufficient. Brunnow certainly allowed statements to be published in April 1841 (*i.e.* two months before the signature of the Straits' Convention) affirming that Russia is 'ready to forego' the 'advantage' of Unkiar Skelessi, in return for an agreement closing both Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all foreign flags. This permission seems to be a sufficient pledge. In fact the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi expired without Russia making an attempt at renewal in the autumn of 1841. Chekib had described it as 'a slow poison' in June 1840,† and Turkey took the opportunity to get rid of it a year later.

<sup>215</sup> P. 145. *Brunnow on 'guarantee' not being in the Straits Convention of 1841.* A discussion between Brunnow and Aberdeen is reported by the former on June 15, 1853. Brunnow said a guarantee had been proposed by Austria but struck out by Palmerston in 1841. 'The preamble of the

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, April 10, 1853.

† *W.S.A.* Berichte aus England, 295. From Neumann, No. 14 Litt. C. of June 10, 1840.



Treaty expresses the *desire* for the maintenance, but contracts no *obligation* for it. 'This reflection is no engagement in strict law ; it is the preface to a stipulation relating solely to the closing of the Straits in time of peace.' Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, XII, 322-3.

This interpretation is confirmed from other sources.

<sup>216</sup> P. 147. *Violation of the Straits Convention of 1841 by passage of a single ship.* Palmerston wrote in private that the Convention confined the admission of even single vessels to light vessels destined for the use of the embassies and missions at Constantinople. It was not for 'heavy ships of war' (Palmerston to Bloomfield, *pte. Blo. MSS. F.O.* 356/29 of November 25, 1849).

There is, however, one instance in which the *Charlemagne*, a French 'heavy ship of war' of 90 guns, passed up. This was, however, by express permission of the Sultan, and England and Austria both stipulated that no precedent should be established. This is well known, but there was another in 1853. In August the French warship *Friedland* (120 guns) grounded in Besika Bay. It was in serious danger, was got off and towed to Constantinople for repairs (my article, *E.H.R.*, October 1934, 662). No protest seems to have been made by Russia and the circumstances are obviously very exceptional. None the less there is a case for supposing that a sovereign or his representative could be allowed to pass up in a warship.

<sup>217</sup> P. 147. *Article II of the Straits Convention of 1841. Passage of light vessels through the Straits.* The whole question of the meaning of this clause has been examined by me with the expert aid of Admiral Richmond and Mr. H. H. Brindley (*vide E.H.R.*, October 1934, 657-72). The conclusion is that the Convention put no limit on the number of light vessels, provided that they received a proper *firman*. Similarly the term 'light vessel' was never defined (*id.* 661) even by the Turks. The Russians tried to argue in 1856 that the term 'light vessels' covered frigates of over 30 guns. If this be so, there is no known violation of the Straits up to August 1853 under the cover of 'light ships,' for the heaviest 'light vessel' that passed was H.M.S. *Retribution*, a sixth-rate of 1,641 tons and of 28 guns. Under special circumstances (*vide* my articles, *E.H.R.*, April 1934, 277-8; October 1934, 670-2) two French and two British mail-steamers passed up in company in September 1853, but this was an evasion, not a violation, of the Convention. For the limit of numbers depended not on the treaty but on the Sultan's will, and he assented to the four thus simultaneously passing the Straits.

<sup>218</sup> P. 147. *Violation of the Straits Convention of 1841 by the passage of a substantial portion of a fleet through the Straits.* From 1841 to 1853 there is no real example of this. In 1849 Admiral Parker brought his squadron past the Outer Castles and anchored between Sestos and Abydos. He acted thus on his own responsibility, after receiving advice from Stratford. But this was not intended to be a violation of the Convention, for it was argued that this station was the narrowest part of the Straits, and that the Straits were not passed unless ships had gone beyond it. This contention was not accepted and Palmerston abandoned it for the future. The whole argument is set forth in App. IV.

There was no other violation of the Straits by a portion of a fleet, unless we suppose that the passage-up of the Franco-British squadrons on October 22, 1853, was such a violation. Stratford thought that it was and tried to delay the passage until hostilities had actually begun with Russia, which they did the next day (October 23). But, as the Turks had actually declared war on October 4, it might be argued that the state of war termi-



nated all treaties, and that the Straits Convention was really in abeyance on that day. In any case the evasion on the 22nd was almost purely technical if it anticipated hostilities by one day. The statements of Russian historians, as Goriainov, Martens and Jomini, are inaccurate and misleading (*vide* my article, *E.H.R.*, October 1934, 663-5).

<sup>219</sup> P. 148. *F.O.* 195/171. From Capt. W. F. Williams, R.A., April 3, 1841.

<sup>220</sup> P. 148. Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, XII, 154, gives Nicholas' view, which is confirmed by a good deal of evidence from other sources. Nesselrode, *Lettres et Papiers*, Paris [n.d.], X, 6-7.

<sup>221</sup> P. 148. *F.O.* 78/429. To Ponsonby, No. 193 of August 6, 1841. App<sup>d</sup> by the Queen; quoted by me in *E.H.R.*, October 1934, 667.

<sup>222</sup> P. 149. *A. E. F.* Russie, 208. From a memo on the Menšikov mission, March 19, 1853. *Vide E.H.R.*, October 1934, 667.

<sup>223</sup> P. 149. *Pte. Russ. MSS. G.D.* 22/11, Aberdeen to Russell, September 22, 1853; *pte. Glad. MSS.*, Aberdeen to Gladstone, September 24.

<sup>224</sup> P. 151. Report in *Morning Post* of August 26, 1841.

<sup>225</sup> P. 151. Peel in the Commons, August 27, 1841.

<sup>226</sup> P. 153. *F.O.* 78/735. From Stratford, No. 92 of September 2, 1848.

## BOOK III

### THE FRUITS OF REFORM

#### CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST PHASE; REFORM FROM THE 'ROSE CHAMBER'; RESCHID (1841-2).

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE FOR CHAPTERS VI TO IX.

*MSS. Sources.* *F.O.*, *W.S.A.* and *N.R.A.* *A.E.F.* are added at certain points. But the others are used as under Mahmud (*vide supra*, pp. 399-400, *Bibliographical Note*). But the *private Strat. MSS.*, *F.O.* 352/28-35, are useful. Unfortunately they do not contain private letters to Aberdeen (1841-6), with whom Stratford was not friendly, but there are other papers of importance during that period.

CONTEMPORARY AND SECONDARY ACCOUNTS.

The most important general accounts are A. Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, 2 vols. [1856], a valuable study at first-hand almost exactly covering the period and dealing with every phase. Vol. II is important on the provinces. Sir G. Larpent, *Turkey*, borrowed a good deal from both. White, *Three Years [in Constantinople]*, is of first-class importance except for the provinces. *Stratford Canning, Life*, by Lane-Poole, II, is of high value. Macfarlane, *Turkey*, 2 vols. [1850], is a narrative of journeys both to Constantinople and the provinces during the years 1847-8, and is important as showing the failure of reform.

Sir A. H. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters* [1903], 2 vols., is useful as regards the provinces from 1839 onwards. Vol. II, chs. iii, iv are important for the years 1842-5, when he was associated with Stratford. For a penetrating study of the reform, *vide* II, 82-101.

Jorga is still excellent as a survey, and Ed. Engelhardt, *La Turquie et*

*Le Tanzimat, 1826 jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris [1882], 2 vols., gives a good general account, but is scanty in detail.

<sup>227</sup> P. 158. *Reshid and Reform*. It is difficult to sum up Reshid. Poole, *Life*, II, 101-14, gives Stratford's rather favourable impressions. But he does not distinguish between the reforms due to Reshid direct and those inspired by Stratford. F. S. Rodkey has a useful article on 'Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey,' Pt. II (1839-41), *Journ. Mod. Hist.*, June 1930, and adds Reshid's memo on reform of August 12, 1839. Macfarlane, *Turkey*, II, chs. xix and xxv, dwells on Reshid's bad points, but Layard's *Autobiography* is more favourable and denies that his financial laxity was injurious to the public interest. Lord Clarendon was a great opponent of his and wrote to Stratford in *pte. Strat. MSS.*, F.O. 352/42, that, if corrupt persons were ineligible for office, 'Reshid would stand but a poor chance if that rule were rigidly applied' (September 22, 1855).

*Pte. Strat. MSS.* F.O. 352/49. Alison to Stratford, February 9, 1858, was severe on his private vices. Stratford wrote grimly (F.O. 78/516. From Stratford, February 18, 1843, separate) that you could only succeed in promoting reform 'by overlooking many unpalatable proceedings.' And, among these were not only Reshid's private life, but his public character.

Reshid is believed to have been for a parliamentary regime and to have foreshadowed it by his promotion of local *mejlisses* or representative councils. F.O. 78/773. From Stratford, No. 84 of March 14, 1849, enclo. his memo laid before the Sultan, says 'There is no question of transferring any portion of power from the Sovereign to his subjects.' It does not appear that Stratford ever wished for a parliamentary regime or even for local representative councils. *Vide* my article in *Camb. Hist. Journ.*, October 1933, 159-60.

<sup>228</sup> P. 158. F.O. 78/431. From Ponsonby to Palmerston, *pte.* of June 12, 1841.

<sup>229</sup> P. 159. *Christians in navy and army*. *Vide* F.O. 78/336 as regards Christians in the navy. F.O. 78/331. From Ponsonby, No. 119 of May 10, 1838. He says he pressed on Reshid a plan of enlisting Christians in the navy, 'of which he appeared to approve.' Later on he did actually introduce Greeks into the navy. It must be remembered, however, that it would have been almost impossible to get Turkish seamen. As regards the army Mahmud is declared to have considered the advice of 'a distinguished diplomat' to introduce Christian soldiers into the army and to have refused. C. Macfarlane, *Turkey*, II, 278. This policy is said to have been discussed in the last days of Mahmud at a council. *Vide* F.O. 78/354. From Ponsonby, No. 20 of February 6, 1839.

<sup>230</sup> P. 160. F.O. 78/359. From Ponsonby, separate, October 22, 1839.

<sup>231</sup> P. 160. The text of the *Gulhané* decree is given in E. Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, II, 1002-5. The story in the text is from N.R.A. Testa. Other accounts of the ceremony are in Jouannin et von Gaver, *Turquie* [1843], 445-9, and in *Memoirs of Prince de Joinville* [1895], 140-3.

<sup>232</sup> P. 161. N.R.A. From Testa, No. 54 of November 13, 1839. F.O. 78/360. From Ponsonby, No. 301 of November 5, 1839.

<sup>233</sup> P. 162. N.R.A. From Testa, No. 54 of November 13, 1839.

<sup>234</sup> P. 162. F.O. 78/360. From Ponsonby, No. 334 of December 17, 1839, enclo. of December 3.

<sup>235</sup> P. 162. F.O. 78/360. From Ponsonby, No. 301 of November 5, 1839, F.O. 78/353. To, No. 181 of December 2.

- <sup>236</sup> P. 163. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 548 of May 27, 1840.
- <sup>237</sup> P. 163. *F.O.* 78/430. From Ponsonby, No. 28 of February 1, 1841, with Palmerston's minute and his despatch. *F.O.* 78/427. To, No. 40 of March 2; unnumbered of March 24, initialled V.R.; To, No. 64 of April 1.
- <sup>238</sup> P. 163. *F.O.* 78/432. From Ponsonby, No. 117 of March 29, 1841. *F.O.* 78/433, No. 128 of April 7.
- <sup>239</sup> P. 164. White, *Three Years [in Constantinople]*, I, 159-67.
- <sup>240</sup> P. 164. *F.O.* 78/359. From Ponsonby, No. 263 of September 24, 1839; separate and secret of October 8.
- <sup>241</sup> P. 165. *F.O.* 78/476. From Stratford, No. 47 of March 9, 1842; *F.O.* 78/476, No. 67 of March 27 with attached Memo.
- <sup>242</sup> P. 165. *F.O.* 78/523. From Stratford, No. 260 of December 13, 1843.
- <sup>243</sup> P. 165. *F.O.* 78/478. From Stratford, No. 125 of June 9, 1842.
- <sup>244</sup> P. 165. *F.O.* 78/516. From Stratford, separate of February 18, 1843.
- <sup>245</sup> P. 166. *F.O.* 78/433. From Ponsonby, No. 159 of May 11, 1841. *F.O.* 78/476. From Stratford, No. 67 of March 27, 1842, Memo.
- <sup>246</sup> P. 166. *F.O.* 78/434. From Ponsonby, pte. June 12, 1841.
- <sup>247</sup> P. 166. *F.O.* 96/25. Minute by Palmerston, March 18, 1856.
- <sup>248</sup> P. 167. *Turkish Army, conditions and recruitment* (cp. *supra*, ch. i, n. 48, p. 30). *F.O.* 78/434. From Ponsonby, private of June 8, 1841, enclosing letter of Capt. Williams of June 7. Both sum up strongly against employing Christian officers. *F.O.* 78/476. From Stratford, No. 65 of March 27, 1842, encl. General Jochmus of March 21, gives a detailed report on the unfitness of the forces in this year, and these agree generally with the report of Rose in 1850.

The recruitment was a difficulty everywhere and the Albanian revolt against it was very serious (*F.O.* 78/519. From Stratford, No. 124 of June 16, 1843; *F.O.* 78/520, No. 159 of July 31). It was got under. Recruits could not of course be raised from Syria and Palestine with ease after the departure of Ibrahim. In 1860 Fuad sent hundreds of recruits from Damascus handcuffed to Constantinople because for many years the supply had been inadequate. Recruitment in Kurdistan was small, and it was never attempted before the Crimean war in Iraq or Arabia. Anatolia produced the largest supply; Macedonia, and ultimately Albania, the rest. But in Albania the recruiting was voluntary. A very unfavourable description of the effects of conscription in Asia Minor is given in C. Macfarlane, *Turkey*, ch. xxiii.

*Turkish Army. Numbers.* *F.O.* 78/554. From Stratford, No. 35 of February 29, 1844; *F.O.* 78/557, No. 57 of May 6. These figures do not quite agree with two later returns. *F.O.* 78/882. No. 275 of September 7, 1850. From Stratford, encl. report of Col. Rose of July, and *F.O.* 78/891. From Stratford, No. 78 of April 19, 1852.

*Army Statistics.*

Rose (1850).	Stratford (1852).
156,000	<i>Nizams</i> 140,000
95,000	<i>Rediffs</i> 113,000
	Militia 20,000
<hr/> 251,000 <hr/>	<hr/> 273,000 <hr/>

The published works are scanty and almost useless.

There are some details in Tarpent and in Ubicini. Urquhart, *Military Strength of the Turkish Army*, written in 1852 and published in 1868, contains some details of value as well as some fantasies.

J. H. Skene, a consular official of experience, in his *Three Eras of Ottoman History* [1851], 62, puts the *Nizams* as 123,000, a little too low, and the *Redifs* at 335,000, a great deal too high. But his pamphlet is worth reading.

<sup>249</sup> P. 167. *F.O.* 78/552. Aberdeen to Stratford, No. 9 of January 20, 1844. Palmerston to Ponsonby, *F.O.* 78/427, No. 27 of February 10, 1841; No. 52 of March 23. *F.O.* 78/771. To Stratford, Nos. 238-9-40 of October 5, 1849.

<sup>250</sup> P. 168. *Turkish Navy*. *F.O.* 78/890. From Stratford, No. 38 of February 18, 1852. The Turkish fleet in 1852 numbered 4 sail of the line in commission, 4 laid up and 1 building. There was, however, an increase of steam vessels as frigates. The total is slightly less than in Mahmud's day (*vide supra*, ch. i, n. 21, p. 402). The return above is that of Admiral Slade. There is an account in *F.O.* 78/430. From F. W. Calvert, No. 2 of January 1, 1841, and B. W. Walker, January 11, 1841, of the delivery by Mehemet Ali of the Turkish fleet. There is a report by Sir G. Webster in *F.O.* 78/773, No. 52 of February 20, 1849, and also encl. in Sir Stratford Canning's No. 63 of February 28. *F.O.* 78/854. From Stratford, No. 123 of April 18, 1851, encl. a memo of Admiral Slade. There are severe criticisms on the navy in 1847-8 in C. Macfarlane, *Turkey*, II, ch. xxiii.

## CHAPTER VII

### REVOLT IN THE LEBANON AND SETTLEMENT BY EUROPE (1841-5)

<sup>251</sup> P. 170. *Morning Chronicle* of August 9, 1845. The same expression was used by Rose, No. 73 of July 23, 1841, dated July 24 in *F.O.* 78/456, and *Bey. MSS.*

<sup>252</sup> P. 172. *The Druses*. The *pte. Bey. MSS.* give a good deal of general information, but it needs checking from other sources. The religion and customs of the Druses were very little known until Ibrahim broke into their strongholds and captured some of their sacred books. The best general work is that of Silvestre de Sacy, *Exposé de la religion des Druses*, 2 vols., Paris [1838]. But this is quite antiquated. The accounts in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* and P. K. Hitti, *The origins of the Druze People and Religion with extracts from their sacred writings*, Columbia Univ. [1928], are the latest attempts to solve the problem, but neither is entirely accepted by Professor A. J. Rustum or other authorities. The account in the text tries to steer between extremes with the advice of Professor R. A. Nicholson. David Urquhart, *Lebanon*, 2 vols. [1860], records travel in 1849, but is fantastic. Col. Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 1842-52, 3 vols., 3rd ed. [1853], and the *Druzes and the Maronites*, 1840-60 [1862], give a very anti-Turkish view. They are not always accurate, but convey a good deal of information from a first-hand observer, whose daughter married a Sheikh. A good French contemporary account of the Druses and their chiefs in the forties is that of Henri Guys (*vide infra*, n. 293).

<sup>253</sup> P. 175. *Reminiscences of Daniel Bliss* [1926], 145.

<sup>254</sup> P. 175. 600 Maronite nobles in 1856 as against 164 Druses; *Bey. MSS.* From Moore, August 6, 1856.

<sup>255</sup> P. 175. *Bey. MSS.* From Rose, No. 97 of November 24, 1845; cp. *F.O.* 78/620.

<sup>256</sup> P. 176. *Bey. MSS.* Rose to Stratford, No. 97 of November 24, 1845; *vide F.O.* 78/620, and *pte.* to Wood, October 23, 1843.

<sup>257</sup> P. 176. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Cowley, November 18, 1847.

<sup>258</sup> P. 178. *Bey. MSS., pte.* H. Rose to R. Wood, June 6, 1844.

<sup>259</sup> P. 179. *Bey. MSS.* From Rose to Stratford, No. 24 of April 30, 1843; *vide F.O.* 78/536.

<sup>260</sup> P. 180. *Bey. MSS.* Moore to Ponsonby, No. 1 of February 1, 1840.

<sup>261</sup> P. 180. *The British connexion with the Druses, 1840-6.* The suggestion that the Druses were supported and favoured by the British Government and its agents is invariably made by French contemporary writers and has been repeated by historians. A few sentences from Roquemonteix, *Le Liban et l'expédition française en Syrie*, Paris [1921], will show the general nature of the charges. (26-8) 'The English, who observed with displeasure that the Maronites relied on France (c. 1840-2) and France showed itself friendly to them, began to shake the independence of this country. They addressed themselves at first to the Maronites, but failed in their attempts to detach them from France; they then turned to the Druses and conducted intrigues with them, in which the Protestant missionaries acted as intermediaries. They armed them and promised them a special and vigilant protection.' In this way massacres arose and the Turkish and British Governments opposed themselves to the Shehab dynasty. '. . . In consequence the Porte, with England's support, suppressed the Emirate, placed all Lebanon under one man—the pasha of Sidon—and divided the country into two regions—the Maronite and Druse Kaimakamates, etc.' Hence, runs the argument, the massacres of 1841 and of 1844-5, and ultimately of 1860, were directly due to British support of the Druses.

One suggestion it may be well to meet at once. There is no evidence that British Protestant missionaries acted as agents of their Government. They were occasionally asked or encouraged to provide teachers for schools.

The facts are as follows: Commodore Napier in his operations against Ibrahim in 1840 was aided by Maronites as well as by Druses, and the British Government certainly recognised the value of that support. The Druse chiefs, who of course hated the Maronites and the French, had already petitioned to be under British protection. This had been answered as follows: 'Mr. Wood to say, that all that could be expected of the British Government was the exertion of their influence to obtain security for the Syrians that they should be well governed' (*F.O.* 78/472. From Ponsonby, No. 47 of March 3, 1840).<sup>\*</sup> The first hint that England should support the Druses comes from Moore. 'I feel convinced . . . that the French are seeking to form a party in Lebanon. As the protectors of the Roman Catholic religion, they possess considerable influence among the Maronites. It would however not be difficult to create a counter interest, through the Druses and other sects not under, or opposed to that influence.'<sup>†</sup> The last sentence proves clearly that England had undertaken no obligations at this time. Wood, Ponsonby's agent, arrived in July and established good relations with the Maronite Patriarch, who called him his 'dear son.' So did Napier on landing in September. But

<sup>\*</sup> Quoted, along with some other despatches, in Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston and Rejuvenation of Turkey,' Pt. II, *Journ. Mod. Hist.*, June 1930, 211.

<sup>†</sup> Passage suppressed in *Lev.* II, No. 30 (*vide F.O.* 78/412). From Moore, No. 11 of June 24, 1840.



arms were distributed impartially to both Druse and Maronite. The appointment of the Emir Beshir Kassim as Grand Prince, which was really due to Wood, was a concession to the Maronites and deeply displeased the Druses.\*

Napier's intervention with Mehemet Ali in favour of certain Druse prisoners in December 1840 doubtless impressed the Druses, and it is quite likely that he made them indiscreet promises. In May 1841 Rose reported that the Druses had petitioned England for protection. They wanted it everywhere in the Lebanon, in the Hauran, and in their remotest stronghold, Djebel-Druse. They had a tradition either that they were English ('though not one Druse could speak the language') or that the English were Druses. 'Ah nobody,' said one of them, 'could have taken Acre in four hours but the Druses.' They wanted schools and education and were willing to become Protestants. 'All Druses look forward to a connection with England.' Rose replied on his own authority that 'nothing could add so much weight to my representations on this subject to my Government, as my assurance that the Druses had determined to continue to be faithful subjects to the Sultan and to use their influence to preserve peace and uphold his authority.'† The Druses were lavish in all sorts of assurances. But, just about this time, they began plotting the rebellion against the Turks which actually burst out in October 1841. It will be noticed that the initiative as to protection came from the Druses, and that the missionaries were not originally used as intermediaries, though they would doubtless have aided in converting the Druses to Protestantism,‡ and taken part in the educational work.

First, let us give the private thoughts of Palmerston. 'It is vain for the British Government to hope to establish any useful influence over the Maronites. That people will always through the agency of their priests lean upon France rather than upon England. . . . But England may establish among the Druses an influence useful to England and serviceable to the Porte.'§ Here are his official instructions to Rose. 'Your despatch no. 39 of the 22nd May, respecting the friendly feeling entertained by the Druses towards Great Britain, and their desire to form some connection with the British Government . . . the British Government will gladly establish that connection and that system of communication with the Druses, which the Druse chiefs desire; it being always clearly understood that the basis of that connection must be, that it is in no degree to interfere with, or to weaken the connection of the Druses with their Sovereign the Sultan; but that, on the contrary, the object and intention of the British Government must be, by exerting its good offices and its' [*sic*] just influence at Constantinople in favour of the Druses, to prevent differences between the Druses and the Sultan, which might loosen the Bonds which ought to exist between a Sovereign and his subjects.

'Her Majesty's Government duly appreciate the many fine qualities which distinguish the character of the Druse Nation; and Her Majesty's Government must specially admire the wish manifested by the Druses to establish some good system of Education for their children' [details follow

\* Wood was a Catholic and may have been influenced accordingly.

† F.O. 78/455. From Rose, No. 39 of May 22, 1841; No. 54 of June 6.

‡ F.O. 78/456. From Rose, No. 87 of September 16, 1841. The Druse Sheikh Hussein there says, 'The agents of other governments come frequently and secretly to me, endeavouring to establish a connexion with the Druses . . . I keep them off . . . But you have never come but once, [probably refers to Napier's landing] and then you came openly, and we ran to meet you.'

§ F.O. 78/429. Draft and private letter to Ponsonby, August 16, 1841.

in which the British Government promise to consider the matter and also 'to encourage commercial intercourse'].\*

The acceptance of this overture was ultimately followed up by various other measures. Palmerston sought to promote the education of the Druses by sending Mr. Nicolayson, a missionary, on a mission of inquiry and defraying his expenses from the Treasury.† In conjunction with Sheikh Naaman Jumblatt he worked out a scheme of education with British instructors, with inspectors, and control by the Bishop of London. The Sheikh himself sent his brother to be educated in England, 'a great proof of his confidence.'‡ None of these schemes succeeded. The brother, after three years' education, returned to Lebanon a hopeless imbecile. The Druses, disregarding Rose's conditions, revolted in October 1841. The Jumblatts promptly had all their property confiscated 'for their supposed attachment to Great Britain.' England was involved in negotiations for the release of certain Druse chiefs, and her success confirmed their belief in her attachment to their cause. But during the autumn of 1842 Aberdeen began to see the very dangerous consequences of too much support of the Druses and of too much interference. On January 1, 1843, he instructed Rose that Druse and Maronite should be treated alike. This instruction was not wholly adhered to, and the Druses continued to receive a certain amount of protection from the British. But it was, in no sense, the British policy to encourage the Druses to revolt, their policy was exactly the contrary. The French activity with the Maronites tended to encourage revolt, because the Maronites and the Catholic cause would have benefited by a Shehab dynasty. The British idea was to keep the Druses quiet and make them acquiesce in the *status quo*. After the revolt of 1844 England did not wish to disarm either party, and certainly did not approve of disarming only the Maronites.

To sum up the evidence :

(1) Moore's letter of June 24, 1840, shows there was no official British connexion with the Druses previous to that date.

(2) The movement arose from a spontaneous desire on the part of the Druses to establish a connexion with the British.

(3) It was only in response to this desire that Palmerston in his instruction of July 16, 1841, proposed to establish a connexion by British instruction in schools and also by commerce. For the former purpose missionaries were to be used, but no real results came from this owing to the revolt in October.

(4) The dangers of interference made Aberdeen endeavour to treat Druses and Maronites alike from January 1, 1843.

(5) His endeavour was only partially successful and a connexion remained. The chief reason of it was that the Druses considered the French the enemies of the British, and trusted to the latter to support them against the Maronites.

(6) The interest of the British was, however, to support the Turkish *status quo* of 1843, whereas for different reasons both the Turks and Druses really wished to upset it. British policy in 1845 was strongly opposed to disarming either Maronites or Druses. The Turkish method of disarming the Maronites was strongly disapproved by Aberdeen and Stratford.

\* F.O. 78/454. Palmerston to Rose, No. 8 of July 16, 1841. Appd. Victoria, R.

† F.O. 78/454. Palmerston to Rose, No. 11 of July 26, 1841. Appd. V. R. Cp. Rodkey, *Journ. Mod. Hist.*, June 1930, 211-2.

‡ F.O. 78/456. From Rose, No. 86 of September 7, 1841; No. 93 of September 24.

(7) In result England, while endeavouring to tranquillise the Druses, frequently found them escape her influence. But she was usually prepared to do her best for them, after each successive revolt, in lessening their sentences. There is no evidence that the British ever encouraged the Druses to revolt except against Mehemet Ali. There is no doubt that in 1841 and in 1845, as indeed on other occasions, the influence of British agents was all against revolt. The Druses were ultimately supported by the British as a counterpoise to the Maronites, who were supported by the French. The British tended to get into a false position when the Druses revolted, just as the French did when the Maronites rose. But the British support of the Druses was much less constant and active than the French support of their opponents. Ultimately the British policy was pacific, for it aimed at producing an equilibrium between Druses and Maronites in 'the Mountain.' So long as that equilibrium existed, the French-Maromite demand for a Shehab prince, and the Porte's demand for the direct rule of a Turkish pasha, were impossible. It was therefore a Turkish and French interest to disturb the *status quo*, and a British interest to maintain it. (Cp. *infra*, n. 293.)

Allowance must be made for the fact that the French case has not been wholly presented. Permission to examine their consular archives at Beyrouth was refused to me. Most of them are believed to have been accidentally destroyed.

<sup>262</sup> P. 180. *F.O.* 78/394, June 11, 1840. From Moore, enclo. in Ponsonby's No. 127 of June 23, 1840.

<sup>263</sup> P. 181. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Hugh Rose to H. Wellesley, December 2, 1846.

<sup>264</sup> P. 181. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Hugh Rose to H. Wellesley, October 19, 1847.

<sup>265</sup> P. 182. The Sultan's *firman* is dated September 2. Wood is said by some authorities to have proclaimed the successor on October 4, *i.e.* the night of the battle. When the matter was raised at a later date Wood said he did so on the 8th (*vide Bey. MSS.* No. 40 of December 2, 1841. Cp. also App. I). But there is some authority for the 9th (*vide supra*, p. 123).

<sup>266</sup> P. 183. *A. & P.* [1845] LI, p. 789. From Rose, November 27, 1844.

<sup>267</sup> P. 184. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Wood, March 22, 1842.

<sup>268</sup> P. 184. *Nejib Pasha in Syria and in Bagdad.* Nejib governed Damascus from 1841-2 and Bagdad from 1842-9. Whether he was at Damascus or Bagdad he remained a *persona grata* at Stambul. This fact is the more singular because in neither case was he really successful. He was regarded rather absurdly as the person who applied reform both to Syria and to Iraq. In each case he won the favour of his government by applying as little of it as possible, and by his hatred of all foreigners. In Bagdad as at Damascus he appears to have been accessible to bribery and a grasping financier.

As director of commerce he was greatly condemned, at any rate in retrospect. 'The rapacity and corruption of Nejib pasha, who held the province in pawn for about 6 years, not only arrested all progress, but actually forced trade backwards, led to general impoverishment and in some cases to the depopulation of districts.' \*

One of the last notices of Nejib pasha is too characteristic to be omitted. A Christian in Bagdad had become a Mohammedan and again reverted to Christianity. Nejib sent the apostate to Constantinople. The British consul at Bagdad took care that the apostate *should not have an accident on*

\* *F.O.* 195/379. From Col. Rawlinson (Bagdad), No. 14 of July 21, 1852.

*the way*.\* On his arrival at Constantinople he was released owing to British pressure. The whole story is significant of Nejib's reactionary ideas, for, by this time, apostates were habitually released by the local pasha without reference to Constantinople. Nejib had probably arranged for an *accident on the way*.

Both in the Lebanon and in Iraq Nejib alienated foreigners, but retained the unwavering confidence of the Porte. In both he was regarded as haughty, aristocratic, exclusive and intolerant. His attempt seems to have been to introduce direct Turkish rule into Iraq as into the Lebanon. But the tribes of Iraq were at once more numerous and more elusive than Druses or Maronites. Hence his attempts to detribalise Iraq resulted in a great display of energy, a great waste of money and almost no advantage.† He was throughout a sincere, though ineffective, advocate for introducing direct Turkish rule into outlying provinces. None the less his reputation at Bagdad is better than it is at Damascus, and a comparison between his two periods of rule would repay study.

<sup>269</sup> P. 184. Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites* [1862], 57.

<sup>270</sup> P. 185. *A. & P.* [1843] LX, Pt. II [456], No. 152.

<sup>271</sup> P. 185. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Wood of November 8, 1841.

<sup>272</sup> P. 185. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Wood, October 26, 1841.

<sup>273</sup> P. 186. Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites* [1862], 50.

<sup>274</sup> P. 186. *F.O.* 78/428. To Ponsonby, No. 92 of April 21, 1841.

<sup>275</sup> P. 186. *British Policy in Palestine, the British Bishopric and Zionism, 1840-1856*. The British connexion with the Druses has been explained. It was not primarily sought by Palmerston and was not resolutely pursued. But his operations in Palestine were of a different nature. The establishment of the joint British Bishopric in 1841 need not be here mentioned in detail. It was due largely to Baron Bunsen and was a product of sentimental Protestant connexions with Germany.‡ The first Bishop Alexander was a converted Jew of Prussian birth and English doctrines. He was not particularly successful, but circumstances were against him. The Turkish refusal to permit a church to be built in Jerusalem was persisted in until 1845. Generally speaking, the Bishopric was a failure. Its most memorable effect was, as is explained in the *Apologia pro Vita sua*, to drive Newman from the Anglican Church.

Palmerston, though not exactly hostile to the Jerusalem bishopric, was aiming at a more durable ascendancy, and had anticipated the ecclesiastical scheme. He had established a vice-consulate at Jerusalem in 1838, a sure sign of his interest. In 1839 the vice-consul reported the Jews as numbering 9,690.§ Then in 1840 Palmerston listened with sympathy to Lord Shaftesbury, who exhorted him to repatriate Jews into Palestine, and helped a little in that direction.|| Palmerston next proposed (and it was a daring suggestion) that England should take charge of Jewish interests in Palestine. He suggested that the Jews of Palestine should 'be allowed to transmit to the Porte, through British authorities, any complaints which they might have to prefer against the Turkish authorities. . . . It would be highly advantageous to the Sultan that the Jews who are scattered through other countries in Europe and Africa, should be induced to go and settle

\* *F.O.* 78/730. From Alison, No. 94 of June 1, 1848.

† Cp. S. H. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* [1925], 281, 283, 287 *sqq.*, 290 *sqq.*, 311; R. Coke, *Bagdad* [1927], 269, for a general account of his rule in Iraq.

‡ And the King of Prussia; *vide* Bunsen, *Memoirs* [1868], I, ch. x.

§ Cp. Rodkey, *Journ. Mod. Hist.*, June 1930, 214.

|| Sokolov, *History of Zionism*, I, 126-7, 159, 161; II, 229-37.



in Palestine ; because the wealth and habits of order and industry which they would bring with them, would tend greatly to increase the Resources of the Turkish Empire, and to promote the progress of civilization therein.' England could avert ' the violence, injustice, and oppression to which the Jews have hitherto been exposed . . . and especially in Syria ; . . . unless the Sultan will give the Jews some real and tangible security, he cannot expect the benefit which their immigration into Palestine would afford him.' \*

The schemes of British protection and British repatriation of the Jews were bold ones, and they were approved by Queen Victoria. Had they been accepted very large powers would have fallen into England's hands. For the Jews, if protected by England in Palestine and Syria, would obviously have benefited her trade and extended her influence against the whole of the rest of Europe. This attempt to place Jewish interests in England's hands alone was the aim of Palmerston.

Palmerston was saved from the consequences of his action by the immovable obstinacy of the Porte. The reactionaries viewed every attempt of foreign powers to secure a special status with equal disfavour. Palmerston's services in repelling France from Syria in no way induced the Porte to favour his attempts to secure a special British position in regard to the Jews. Palmerston, after a first rebuff, attempted to secure the British protection for ' a time limited in duration.' But Turkish obstinacy prevailed and the whole project fell to the ground. It looks, too, as if Palmerston wished ultimately to protect the Jews throughout Turkey. That was a strong step to take and would have given England that special right to protection of Jews throughout Turkey, such as the Czar was to claim for Turkish subjects of the Orthodox Greek faith. The Czar's claim was ultimately contested by Palmerston and the attempt to enforce it led to war between Russia on the one side and Turkey, France and England on the other. Palmerston's own attempt, even if confined to Syria and Palestine, must have provoked great jealousy from France and from Russia. If extended to the whole Ottoman empire it might have led to war.

Interest in Palestine did not wholly cease on the failure of Palmerston's project and on his fall. But from 1843 onwards Aberdeen took steps to limit the ' meddlings ' of British consuls, and in particular prevented them from exercising influence in the direction of converting Turks or Catholics to Protestantism. The visits of Sir Moses Montefiore to Palestine, which were an anticipation of Zionism, were favoured by the British. After one in 1843 Rose commented, ' They consider him as a sort of prince. This fact alone gives to Great Britain influence also with the Jews, not a circumstance to be lost sight of.' † The fact that Montefiore was a knight greatly enhanced his reputation and connexion with England. Stratford's support of the project of building a church in Jerusalem finally forced the Porte to yield on that head in 1845. But Aberdeen was careful not to use the bishopric to extend British political influence. The British consul had declined to give British protection to two foreign clergy assisting Bishop Alexander, and Aberdeen approved limiting ' consular protection to British subjects, or agents, alone.' ‡ It may be said, therefore, that the two points of a British religious establishment in Jerusalem, and a certain encourage-

\* F.O. 78/427. To Ponsonby, No. 33 of February 17, 1841. Rodkey, *Journ. Mod. Hist.*, June 1830, 215-6, refers to this and quotes from two previous instructions of 1840, anticipating it.

† F.O. 78/535. From Rose, No. 28 of March 29, 1843.

‡ F.O. 78/540. Aberdeen to Young, No. 16 of November 15, 1843. From Young, No. 23 of April 24.



ment to Jews, had been secured by that date. But the whole policy was still in the embryo stage. During the Crimean war Palmerston, when again in power, considered further plans. But, in reality, nothing much was done. All that one can say was that a favourable atmosphere was created. But it was not until after the massacres of 1860 in Syria that the Jewish problem received further attention.

<sup>276</sup> P. 187. *F.O.* 181/172. Aberdeen to Stratford, No. 2 of October 30, 1841.

<sup>277</sup> P. 187. Jochmus, I, 47. To Ponsonby, December 8, 1840.

<sup>278</sup> P. 187. *F.O.* 78/535. From Rose, No. 9 of February 6, 1843.

<sup>279</sup> P. 187. *F.O.* 78/477. From Stratford, No. 76 of April 7, 1842; enclo. of April 6.

<sup>280</sup> P. 188. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Moore, May 4, 1842.

<sup>281</sup> P. 188. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Moore, October 31, 1842, and previous quotation.

<sup>282</sup> P. 188. *F.O.* 78/474. To Stratford, No. 93 of July 21, 1842.

<sup>283</sup> P. 188. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Stratford to Wood, date not clear, but before March 17, 1842; probably 16th. Cp. *F.O.* 78/476. Memo by Stratford separate and confidential, March 16, 1842.

<sup>284</sup> P. 189. *F.O.* 78/474. To Stratford, July 21, 1842. Stratford was suspected by the Dutch Minister (Testa) of opposing a Christian prince but wanting a Shehab as Maronite *kaimakam* (vide *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 708 of August 23, 1842). This is probably unfounded.

<sup>285</sup> P. 189. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Wood, February 9, 1842.

<sup>286</sup> P. 190. *F.O.* 78/537. From Rose, No. 41 of September 6, 1843, referring to the 1842 period.

<sup>287</sup> P. 190. *F.O.* 78/537. From Rose, No. 44 of October 5, 1843.

<sup>288</sup> P. 191. *F.O.* 78/537. From Rose, No. 44 of October 5, 1843.

<sup>289</sup> P. 192. C. Alison, September 8, 1844, reprinted in *F.O.* Memo of August 9, 1860.

<sup>290</sup> P. 192. *F.O.* 78/535. From Rose, No. 1 of January 1, 1843, passage suppressed in *A. & P.* [1845], LI [662], No. 1.

<sup>291</sup> P. 192. *F.O.* 78/537. From Rose, No. 67 of October 9, 1843, sentence omitted in *A. & P.* [1845], LI [662], No. 24.

<sup>292</sup> P. 193. *F.O.* 78/455. From Rose, No. 55 of June 22, 1841. *F.O.* 78/456, No. 91 of September 23, No. 96 of September 26; *F.O.* 78/457, No. 115 of October 28.

<sup>293</sup> P. 193. *The Maronites and French action in Syria and the Lebanon.* The French consular records are not open to inspection; the British ones, and in a few cases the Austrian, have been searched and quoted. But there are a number of French contemporary works of some importance even on the events of the forties, while there is a whole library on the events of the sixties. The regular French historians are, however, almost useless owing to their imperfect knowledge of the Near East. Lamartine, in his celebrated *Voyage en Orient*, produced a series of brilliant travel pictures with a strongly prejudiced outlook. Renan, in his various works, has fewer references to 'the Mountain' but a more scholarly and detached position.

Among informed contemporaries is M. Poujade, who was a French agent in Syria. He is described by Rose as indulging in actions 'most unsuited to his character as a foreign agent and detrimental to the interests of the Porte.\*' But his work, *Le Liban et La Syrie*, Paris [1867] (dealing with the years 1845-60), has merit. His description of the election of

\* *F.O.* 78/577. From Rose, No. 39 of August 2, 1844, suppressed in *A. & P.* [1845], LI [662], encl. 1, No. 46.

the new Maronite patriarch (120-5) and of his escape after the election from the disappointed masses is highly interesting. He practically admits the assertion made by Rose that the patriarch was nominated by French influence. He accuses the Turks in the same year of doing their best to egg on the Druses and to restrain the Maronites. He makes a specific charge that the Turks encouraged Said Bey Jumblatt 'to fall on' the Maronites (247-8). He lays stress on the Druse *mookatajis* (landlords) hounding on their followers into revolt (245).

Henri Guys, *Relation d'un séjour de plusieurs années à Beyrouth*, etc., Paris [1842], is invaluable for a fairly detailed description of the Druse society of the day and of its chiefs.

R. Edwards, *La Syrie*, 1840-62, Paris [1862], also gives useful information from men on the spot.

On the whole (and it is interesting), the tone of these informed contemporary writers is a good deal less hostile to England than that of the newspapers and of the writers of the boulevards. Specific evidence as to the British connexion with the Druses is singularly scanty. And I confess that I get the idea that it was Turks and Druses (and not British) who disturbed the Lebanon. This is a view derived from certain French testimony on the spot. The British view, of course, is that the Maronites by persisting in their demand for a Shehab, precipitated revolt.

<sup>294</sup> P. 194. *F.O.* 78/759. To Wood (Damascus), No. 1 of February 28, 1843, No. 3 of September 19. Rose carried out these instructions strictly. *Vide* To Werry (Aleppo), May 8, and To Young (Beyrouth), February 12, 1844. *Vide supra*, note 261 to this chapter: *British connexion with the Druses*, 1840-6.

<sup>295</sup> P. 194. *Bey. MSS.*, *pte.* Rose to Wood, July 6, 1844.

<sup>296</sup> P. 195. From Stratford, May 17, 1845, *A. & P.* [1845], LI (661), No. 56.

<sup>297</sup> P. 195. *Omissions and Suppressions in Blue Books*, 1841-5.\*

*A. & P.* [1841], XXIX. *Levant Correspondence*, Part II; and VIII. Second Session, Part III (*Lev.* II-III), conduct us to the agreements of July 1841. As might be expected, in view of a tense diplomatic situation, the omissions relate chiefly to the misbehaviour of other powers such as France, and occasionally Austria and Russia. In general, these parts are less full than Part I. It is curious to note how some despatches, *e.g.* some of Stopford's, are not published in the Blue Books and are to be found only in the *London Gazette*.

*A. & P.* [1843], LX, contains *Correspondence on the Affairs of Syria*, I-II, in pursuance of Address of the House of Commons of February 28, 1843. Part I [455], pp. 1-138, consists of despatches to and from Ponsonby and Stratford Canning from May 1841 to January 1843; Part II [456], pp. 139-486, contains similar despatches to and from Colonel Rose and Mr. Wood.

The omissions follow a general rule.

(1) The worst misdeeds of the Turks are generally softened down or omitted. (2) The intrigues ascribed to French and Austrian agencies in the Lebanon are almost wholly cut out. Typical omissions are as follows:

(1) *Omission of Turkish misdeeds.* *E.g.*, *F.O.* 78/449. From Moore, No. 15 of March 22, 1841. 'The conviction I feel that the Turks, *left to themselves*, are incompetent to govern this country.' Cp. also *ibid.*, No. 25 of May 4, 1841.

\* For similar omissions in *Lev.* I, 1839-40, *vide supra*, ch. iv, n. 196.

(2) *Intrigues of French agencies*, Part II [456], No. 54. Omitted part in F.O. 78/457. From Rose, No. 115 of October 28, 1841. 'We know positively that the French have intrigued to incite the Christians to revolt' (details then given).

A. & P. [1845], LI, contains *Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Syria*, Part I [661], pp. 545-663; Part II [662], pp. 665-843, and presented to both Houses of Parliament, July 1845.

Part I consists of despatches to and from Sir Stratford Canning, February 1843 to June 1845. Part II of similar documents from and to Colonel Rose, January 1843 to June 1845. Similar examples may be given here.

(1) *Turkish actions, id.*, Part II [662], encl. 1 to No. 33. The omitted part is in F.O. 78/576. Rose to Stratford, No. 14 of March 23, 1844. The Turkish government 'has intrigued for the sake of ulterior political views to prevent the execution of both the one (the new form of government) and the other' (Druse payment of indemnities).

(2) *French and Austrian intrigues, ibid.*, Part II [662]. F.O. 78/577. Rose to Stratford, No. 27 of May 3, 1844. 'The circumstance which had caused more uncertainty and evil than even the intrigues of the Shehabites, I mean the belief that the Austrian and French Consular Agents and consequently their governments sympathized with discontent, remained unremedied as regarded the people.'

Similar omissions are to be found both as to the misconduct of Druses and Maronites. Some instances of these are given in the text.

*The Memorandum on the Affairs of Syria, 1841-5*, printed for the use of the Foreign Office, August 9, 1860, is a useful confidential paper based on the four Syrian Blue Books above mentioned.

<sup>298</sup> P. 195. F.O. 78/618. From Rose, No. 24 of March 29, 1845. This passage is so altered in A. & P. [1845], LI, Pt. II [661], No. 65 encl., as to destroy its meaning.

<sup>299</sup> P. 196. A. & P. [1845], LI [662], No. 68. From Rose of May 13 1845.

<sup>300</sup> P. 196. F.O. 78/619. From Rose, No. 47 of June 1, 1845.

<sup>301</sup> P. 196. F.O. 78/618. From Rose, No. 35 of April 29, 1845. *Vide* also A. & P. [1845], LI [662], encl. 3 to No. 69.

<sup>302</sup> P. 197. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Stratford, November 12, 1845.

<sup>303</sup> P. 197. *Bey. MSS., pte.* Rose to Hon. H. Wellesley, September 26, 1846.

<sup>304</sup> P. 197. *Pte. Strat. MSS. F.O. 352/29.* Stratford to Pisani, October 25, 1845. Cp. Aberdeen to Stratford, F.O. 78/593, No. 99 of October 6.

<sup>305</sup> P. 197. *W.S.A. Türkei.* From Prokesch-Osten, XII, 71, No. 27B of April 12, 1861. On information of Bourée.

<sup>306</sup> P. 198. *Pte. Strat. MSS. F.O. 352/29.* Stratford to Rose, September 9, 1848.

<sup>307</sup> P. 198. F.O. 78/819. From Stratford, No. 127 of April 19, 1850; 78/823, pte. of October 2.

<sup>308</sup> P. 198. F.O. 78/816. To Stratford, No. 321 of December 18, 1850.

## CHAPTER VIII

THE INSURRECTION IN BOSNIA; THE WAR IN MONTENEGRO (1848-52);  
AND THE AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION

## GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

MSS. SOURCES, 1848-52.—The chief authorities are *F.O.* 78/678; *F.O.* 78/685; *F.O.* 78/816; *F.O.* 78/819; *F.O.* 78/825; *F.O.* 78/891; *F.O.* 78/337.

*W.S.A.* London and Constantinople, 1851-3.

*N.R.A.* 1831, 1848-53.

## SECONDARY SOURCES.

*General.*

J. De Asbóth, *An official tour through Bosnia and Herzegovina* [1890], gives useful information, and pp. xiii-xx valuable bibliography.

A. J. Evans, *Illyrian Letters* [1878], gives valuable impressions at first-hand for 1876-7, with surveys of the past.

L. Ranke, *Servia, Bosnia*, English translation [1847, 1853], is valuable because based on the recollections of Vuk Karadžić for Hussein and the pre-1848 system, and presents evidence from his vast knowledge of folk-songs.

Robert Cyprien, *The Slave Provinces* [same edn.], has useful extracts from Montenegrin songs.

J. A. Helfert, *Bosnisches*, Vienna [1879], good brief account.

V. Klaić has written the standard history of Bosnia, but it has only a summary after the fifteenth century. *Geschichte Bosniens*, German translation, Leipzig [1885]. It is too Croatian in feeling.

<sup>309</sup> P. 200. *Haiduks and the frontier system.*

(a) For the *haiduks* and their influence see the detailed study of Dušan J. Popović, *O. Haiducima*, Belgrade [1930], 2 vols. The value of this study is that it shows that there was a real polity among the *haiduks* with customs and manners of their own.

(b) *The frontier.* The famous study of F. J. Turner on the significance of the frontier in American history is well known. The frontier is even more significant in the history of Bosnia and Croatia. There is the same advance by bold and determined men on the border, who push the frontier forward at the expense of a weaker neighbour, and are able to dictate their policy to their more civilised and conservative governors. Little has been written upon it, but important details are to be found on the Servians in H. Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*, Cambridge [1908], and Evans, *Illyrian Letters*, portrays many of the characteristic results.

<sup>310</sup> P. 202. *The man who saved Austria*, by M. Hartley [1912], 101.

<sup>311</sup> P. 202. *The Spahi system in Bosnia.* There is not space for a detailed description of the *spahi* system in Bosnia. Asbóth (135-6 and ch. viii) has a valuable description of agrarian conditions. The point to grasp is that each *spahi* received a *timar* in return for military service. He did not receive land, but only certain rights over it, of which the most important was the tithe. But within his own territory he practically superseded the state authorities.

<sup>312</sup> P. 203. *Mohammedan and Servian literature in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* The Mussulman poems, though little studied from the scholarly point of view, are to be found in many popular editions. The one here chiefly

quoted is *Narodni Junak Lički-Beg Mustaj-Beg* (*Muslimanska junačka pjesmarica*), Serajevo [1927], but many others have been consulted. The Herzegovinan and Montenegrin poems (*vide infra*, n. 318) have many resemblances to them, and the Slav quality is evident in all three. Mohammedan prose literature, dealing with and arising from Bosnia, is more difficult to find. But Omer Effendi, *The War in Bosnia, 1737-9*, translated by E. Frazer [1830], has very many of the qualities that a Christian prose account of the kind would have, and the same characteristic Slav touches.

<sup>313</sup> P. 205. *Mohammedan customs*, etc. A great deal has been studied and is in evidence in monographs. Anton Hangi, *Die Moslims in Bosnien, Hercegovina, Ihre Lebensweise Sitten und Gebrauche*, Serajevo [1907], is a useful summary.

<sup>314</sup> P. 205. *Vide* Evans, *Illyrian Letters*, 50-2, 108.

<sup>315</sup> P. 206. *Hussein, the Dragon of Bosnia*. For this campaign *vide* Ranke, *Bosnia, passim*; Helfert, *Bosnien*, ch. iv; and there are useful hints in Asbóth. Both for this revolt and Omer (*vide infra*, n. 323) read Pavlević, *Pokret in Bosnii u Albaniji protivu reforama Mahmuda II*, Belgrade [1913].

<sup>316</sup> P. 207. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 48 of May 25, 1831.

<sup>317</sup> P. 207. *N.R.A.* From Testa, No. 81 of October 11, 1831.

<sup>318</sup> P. 208. *Herzegovina*. The most valuable sources are songs, of which a great number have been studied. Mažuranić, *Smrt Smail age Čengića*, published 1846, is an admirable imitative poem. I have used the edition published at Split [1918], with valuable notes by Professor K. Šegvić. There is a useful translation by J. W. Wiles [1925]. For some other Herzegovinan as well as a number of Montenegrin poems I have used the popular edition *Junaštva Tsrnogoraca i Herzegovaca*. The songs of Herzegovina differ in important respects, both of mentality and outlook, from those of Montenegro.

<sup>319</sup> P. 213. *F.O.* 78/678. Report of Goring, Austrian Consul-General, February 2, 1847. *F.O.* 78/891. Alison's report of April 27, 1852. *F.O.* 78/1354. H. A. Churchill, January 25, 1858.

<sup>320</sup> P. 213. *F.O.* 78/891. Alison's report of April 27, 1852.

<sup>321</sup> P. 213. *F.O.* 78/683. From Cowley, No. 228 of July 15, 1847.

<sup>322</sup> P. 214. *The Jugoslav or Illyrian Question during 1848-51*. Cp. *infra*, ch. x, n. 372 e.

For general treatment :

A. Fischel, *Der Panславismus bis zum Weltkrieg*, Stuttgart u. Berlin [1919]. A good collection of materials.

A. Musset, 'Slav Solidarity in the Balkans.' *International Affairs*, November 1934. This is a useful summary.

R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy* [1911], is usually admirable.

For 1849, apart from the general histories, consult Wachsmuth, *Geschichte des Illyrismus*, Leipzig [1849]. It contains extracts from Jugoslav newspapers and poems.

Hermann Wendel, *Der Kampf der Sudslawen. Freiheit und Einheit*, Frankfurt a/m [1925]; chs. iv-vii are valuable.

The first 'real promoter of the idea of Slav Solidarity' was certainly the Dalmatian Gundulić in poetry and the Croat Catholic priest Yura Križanić, both in the seventeenth century. But in the nineteenth century Napoleon's Illyrian schemes and his sending Marmont to administer Dalmatia and part of Croatia were the first practical efforts at 'Illyrian' unity. Ján Kollár, *Slavy Dcerá* [the daughter of Slava], which began to appear in 1821, had the greatest effect on Panslav sentiment from a literary point of view.



The Yugoslav or Illyrian movement was a special case of Panslavism and a branch from it, grafted on the southern Slav tree. It developed great journalistic and public activities during the thirties and forties. Ljudevit Gaj, the Croat patriot, had much influence (*vide Pisma* [1909] and a life by Deželić [1910], both published in Zagreb). His chief literary works were published from 1851 onwards, but he showed a good deal of journalistic and political activity earlier. He began in 1834 as a journalist; from 1836-9 he was definitely pro-Austrian and looked to the Habsburgs to unite Bosnia, Herzegovina, etc., to other Yugoslav lands. After that he dallied with Russia and made offers to the Czar (*vide infra*, ch. x, n. 372, p. 457). *Vide also Am. Hist. Rev.*, July 1935, pp. 704-16; P. E. Mosely, *A Pan-Slavist Memorandum of Ljudevit Gaj in 1838*, with valuable bibliographical additions. During 1848-9 the Yugoslav sentiment was triumphant everywhere for a time.

*Separate statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, 1851 and 1910 (hundreds omitted).\**

		1851.				1910.		
		Cath.	Greeks.	Turks.		Cath.	Greeks.	Turks.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,380	160	470	750	1,898†	434	825	612
Turkish Croatia. Herzegovina.								
Montenegro	100	100			250	(includes additions of 1913)		
Total	1,480	260	470	750	2,148			

Total, Bosnia, etc., 1851 : 1,480.

1910 : 2,148.

*Jugoslav statistics of all countries for 1851 (hundreds omitted).*

The Foreign Office memo gives :

		Cath.	Greeks.
Jugoslavs in Austrian Dominions	. . . 3,171	2,407	733
Servia Principality.	. . . 1,000		
Turkish Croatia, etc., Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro	. . . 1,400		
Total—1851 :	5,571.		

Total (hundreds included) Jugoslavs of all countries, 1851 : 5,571,000.  
Ditto for 1931 : 13,930,918.

<sup>323</sup> P. 216. *Omer pasha*. The best, though a partial, authority is his physician, J. Koetschek, *Aus dem Leben Serdar Ekrem Omer pasha*, Serajevo [1885].

Two English works are useful. G. Arbuthnot, *Herzegovina or Omer pasha and the Christian rebels* [1862]; chs. viii and ix deal with the Omer period. *The Frontier lands of Christian and Turk, 1850*, though anonymous, is by J. H. Skene, a British consul in the Levant [1853]; chs. ii, ix-xiii give descriptions of the campaign and impressions of Omer and his officers.

J. A. Helfert, *Bosnisches*, Vienna [1879]; ch. v deals with Omer.

<sup>324</sup> P. 218. *F.O.* 78/891. From C. Alison of April 5, 1852.

\* The interesting Foreign Office Confidential print on *the Plans of the so-called Illyrian party in Croatia* of October 16, 1851, is chiefly valuable for its attempt at statistical accuracy. Austrian statistics are accepted as correct and those for the Turkish dominions are based on an average of English, French (Boué) and German (Berghaus) authorities. Its substance is reproduced above.

† Some miscellaneous elements make up the balance of this total.

<sup>325</sup> P. 218. *F.O.* 78/825. From Stratford, No. 373 of December 18, 1850.

<sup>326</sup> P. 219. *F.O.* 30/122. From Lord Cowley, No. 10 of January 3, 1849.

<sup>327</sup> P. 219. *W.S.A.* Weisungen nach Konstantinopel, an Klezl, March 30, 1852, quoting report of Consul-General at Serajevo; *vide* also Weisungen nach England, No. 1 of February 13, 1853, with *précis historique* of grievances against Omer. *F.O.* 195/379. From Westmorland, No. 172 of July 13, 1852, gives 3-4,000 refugees, and From Howard, No. 8 of August 3, who gives 5,000.

<sup>328</sup> P. 220. *F.O.* 78/891. From Pisani, April 3, 1852; *vide* especially *W.S.A.* Varia de Turquie, April 9, 1852, von Hammer; Berichte aus Konstantinopel, April, *passim*; *vide* also references to Count Leiningen's mission, *infra*, ch. xii, n. 455.

<sup>329</sup> P. 220. *F.O.* 78/816. Palmerston to Stratford, No. 321 of December 18, 1850.

<sup>330</sup> P. 220. *F.O.* 352/35. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* *F.O.* 195/378. Malmesbury to Stratford, No. 42 of May 24, 1852. *F.O.* 195/379. To Rose, No. 29 of August 27. *F.O.* 196/36. From Stratford, No. 68 of April 5, 1852.

<sup>331</sup> P. 221. *The boundaries of Montenegro and Turkey* were always uncertain. *F.O.* 78/895. From Rose, No. 168 of December 26, 1852, quotes from A. A. Paton, *Highlands and Islands of the Adriatic* [1849], I, 104-5, which runs thus: 'The districts of Piperi and Kooch (Kuć) which are the most easterly and furthest from the Adriatic had in consequence of the failure of the harvest of 1846, which was not more than a third of the usual quantity, sent their elders to the pasha of Scutari and professed their acknowledgement of the superiority of the Porte.' They received in consequence red cloaks and a donative. The news was conveyed to Cetinje. On learning it the Cettignotes laughed and said, 'wait till the first good harvest, and you will see that we have not lost, and the Porte not gained, a single goat's browsing.'

This is very much to the point and illustrates really the uncertainty of the boundaries. From the Turkish point of view this transaction made no difference, for all Montenegro was subject to them. But from a civilised standpoint it makes a good deal. It is greatly to the credit of Danilo that he tried to get the boundaries definitely delimited. 'The Prince wishes to get this done and then he promises to make peace with Turkey.' Letter from Graham, June 29, 1856, sent by Palmerston to Clarendon, August 3, 1856 (*pte. Clar. MSS.*). Had he succeeded in his design the battle of Grahovo (1858) would not have been fought. This is, in fact, one of the many proofs of the moderation of Prince Danilo.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE SECOND PHASE; REFORM IN THE 'DUST HOLE'; STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

<sup>332</sup> P. 222. *W.S.A.* Weisungen nach Konstantinopel, Buol an Klezl No. 4 of May 4, 1853, *infra*, and ch. xii, n. 455. *The Leiningen Mission.*

<sup>333</sup> P. 222. *Pte. Lay. MSS.* *Add. MSS.* 38981, f. 224. From J. A. Longworth, February 1853.

<sup>334</sup> P. 223. *F.O.* 78/476. From Stratford, No. 67 of March 27, 1842; *F.O.* 78/480, No. 227 of October 27; *F.O.* 78/474. To Stratford, No. 149 of November 24.

<sup>335</sup> P. 225. *The Apostasy Question*. For Abdul Medjid's refusal to execute a blasphemer in 1841, *vide* White, *Three Years*, I, 123, and for apostasy, *vide ibid.*, II, 110. The narrative in *A. & P.* LI [1844], pp. 153-196, requires careful handling. Some of the suppressions have been indicated in the text (*vide* p. 226 and n.). All reference to Stratford's dispute about the Koran is omitted, as are Aberdeen's attempts at moderation and his complaints of the scanty information supplied during the negotiation. *F.O.* 352/33, *pte. Strat. MSS.* contains a few details, such as a paper on the Interpretation of the Turkish Law on Apostasy. Poole, *Life*, ch. xviii, has a valuable but too partial account. There is no doubt that the views of the Sultan were an opinion without legal validity. The *fatwa* of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, which could alone legalise the process, was apparently not asked and would certainly have been refused. R. Levy, *Sociology of Islam*, I, 392, and n. 5, shows that in early days apostasy was one of the most heinous of crimes. 'The legists demand that the apostate be given three chances to repent, and he is not to be killed until he has definitely refused.' Rauf therefore gave a correct account of the law. See also the Koran, II, 214.

<sup>336</sup> P. 225. *F.O.* 78/521. From Stratford to Pisani, August 23, 1843, for submission to the Porte.

<sup>337</sup> P. 226. *F.O.* 78/555. From Stratford, No. 41 of March 3, 1844.

<sup>338</sup> P. 227. *F.O.* 78/554. From Stratford, No. 36 of February 29, 1844, omitted in Blue Book. *Vide* also Poole, *Life of Stratford*, II, 97.

<sup>339</sup> P. 227. *Stratford, the Koran and the Death Penalty*. Stratford's views on the Koran were politically adroit, but the argument in Poole's *Life*, II, 97, is not really convincing. Stratford reads the Koran to mean that apostates are punished by damnation in the next world, not by decapitation in this. This assumption means that the Prophet's word is law. But it is not the only law. As Mr. Levy points out, circumcision is a part of Moham-medan law though it is not enjoined by the Prophet. The death penalty for apostasy had equally become a part of the law. It is not at all likely that the *ulemas* were convinced by the religious argument.

<sup>340</sup> P. 227. *F.O.* 78/555. From Stratford, No. 57 of March 30, 1844. *F.O.* 78/552. To Stratford, encl. of May 18 in No. 77 of May 20.

<sup>341</sup> P. 228. *F.O.* 78/552. To Stratford, No. 10 of January 20, 1844; No. 58 of April 19.

<sup>342</sup> P. 229. *F.O.* 78/554. From Stratford, No. 27 of February 10, 1844. For the cases cited below, *vide F.O.* 78/557, No. 8 of April 28; also of May 16, Monastir; *F.O.* 78/561, No. 191 of September 1; No. 201 of September 17.

<sup>343</sup> P. 229. *F.O.* 78/554. From Stratford, No. 35 of February 29, 1844; *F.O.* 78/555, No. 41 of March 3.

<sup>344</sup> P. 229. For the *Protestants* see Lanc-Poole, *Life of Stratford*, II, 100, 102-3, 144; and *Accounts & Papers* [1851], LVII [1392], pp. 271-380; [1854], LXXII [1752], pp. 587-99. *F.O.* 352/33, *pte. Strat. MSS.*, contains two interesting documents, a rebuke as to the treatment of Protestants in a letter from Stratford to the Armenian patriarch at Smyrna, June 6, 1851, and an instruction by Aali enjoining toleration to the Protestants, issued to the Interpreters of the Porte, October 3, 1851.

*Protestant statistics*. There were no Protestants enumerated in the Turkish census of 1843. But *pte. Lay. MSS. Add. MSS.* gives a memo of May 15, 1877, which estimates that there were 40,000 Protestants, mostly Armenians, in that year. The first time a Church of England Bishop visited

Constantinople was when the Bishop of Gibraltar arrived there in 1843 (*vide F.O.* 78/518. From Stratford, No. 107 of May 17, 1843). It was thought wiser in view of Turkish prejudices not to get him to consecrate a chapel. That was not done until 1858. Only one Catholic chapel had then been consecrated in Constantinople. The situation of the Protestants is discussed in Ubicini, II, ch. ix, 392-408, with note by translator.

<sup>345</sup> P. 231. *For the Penal and Commercial Codes, vide* George Young, *Corps de Droit Ottomane, passim*, and Ubicini, I, chs. vii and viii. The great point in both cases is to find out the practice not the theory, and for these MSS. references are quoted in the text. *Vide* also Macfarlane, *Turkey*, II, ch. xxxii.

<sup>346</sup> P. 232. *F.O.* 78/557. From Stratford, No. 79 of May 2, 1844.

<sup>347</sup> P. 232. *F.O.* 78/800. From N. Moore (Beyrouth), No. 53 of October 26, 1849.

<sup>348</sup> P. 233. *F.O.* 78/854. Memo by J. B. Bidwell, June 1851, endorsed P[almerston], 20/6/51.

<sup>349</sup> P. 234. *Education. Vide* Ubicini, I, ch. ix is good, and information on Greek schools is in II, ch. iii, 189, 193-211.

<sup>350</sup> P. 235. *F.O.* 78/821. From Stratford, No. 213 of July 5, 1850.

<sup>351</sup> P. 236. *F.O.* 352/55. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* Journal of Sari Pasha, January 1851.

<sup>352</sup> P. 236. *F.O.* 78/820. From Stratford, No. 152 of May 11, 1850, encl. report of April 15; *F.O.* 78/821, No. 229 of July 19.

<sup>353</sup> P. 237. Barker, II, 314-5.

<sup>354</sup> P. 237. Macfarlane, *Turkey*, II, 38-9.

<sup>355</sup> P. 238. Urquhart, *Lebanon*, II, 158-9, 225. *F.O.* 195/350. From N. Moore (Beyrouth), No. 50 of December 31, 1849.

<sup>356</sup> P. 238. J. Barker, I, 145, 147-8.

<sup>357</sup> P. 240. *F.O.* 78/854. From Stratford, No. 138 of April 29, 1851, transmitting C. Biliotti's report of December 31, 1850.

<sup>358</sup> P. 240. *The Provinces* (1841-53). (a) *General.* Cp. Ubicini, II. Macfarlane, *Turkey*, II, chs. xvi, xvii-xxx, whose travels were during 1847-8. Urquhart's were during an earlier period, except *Lebanon* [1860], 2 vols., which was based on travel in 1849. Moore (Beyrouth), *F.O.* 195/351 of December 31, 1849, reports that he had not met one person who did not think Urquhart 'visionary.' A man who could believe in the efficiency of the *Mejliss* as an instrument of provincial government was certainly an idealist. Ad Boué, *Turquie d'Europe*, 4 vols., Paris [1840], has a good deal of value on the provinces. White, *Three Years*, is always an admirable guide for the capital but not to be trusted for the provinces. Thus the consul of Monastir wrote privately to Layard (*pte. Lay. MSS. Add. MSS.* 38981, f. 73. From J. A. Longworth of July 1, 1852): 'The pasha of this place, Djemail pasha, one of those White eulogizes in his book, is the most slippery and corrupt rogue I have ever had to deal with.'

*Turkey-Sketches from Life*, by 'The Roving Englishman,' has a good deal of miscellaneous information (the 1854 edition is best). This was by E. C. Grenville Murray, a whimsical attaché who had a chequered diplomatic career and retired early into private life. But he had a good knowledge of the provinces and of the relation of *raya* to Turk. Layard's *Autobiography* is of high value when it deals with the provinces; Slade and some of the other works dealing with Mahmud (*vide* bibliographical note prefixed to ch. i) are useful. Kinglake's celebrated *Eothen* [1844] is hardly serious but has insight at times.

(b) *The Monteschi Province.* C. Biliotti's report of December 31, 1850, is in *F.O.* 78/854, but the original is in *F.O.* 198/11. Biliotti adds that the population was 200,000, though 1,000,000 could have been supported, and that the majority 'rarely partake of animal food.' The total taxes were about £100,000, or 10s. a head, and the rate of interest 30 per cent., while there were no exchanges.

<sup>359</sup> P. 240. *Pte. Lay. MSS. Add. MSS.* 38981, f. 22. From J. A. Longworth (Monastir) of April 12, 1852; of July 1, f. 73.

<sup>360</sup> P. 240. *Pte. Lay. MSS. Add. MSS.* 38981. From C. Blunt (Salonica) of November 4, 1852, f. 136; of June 3, 1853, f. 345.

<sup>361</sup> P. 241. These expressions were used at a secret audience between the Sultan and Pisani. *F.O.* 78/822. From Stratford, No. 291 of September 18, 1850, encl. *pte.* of September 16.

<sup>362</sup> P. 242. *F.O.* 78/852. From Stratford, No. 40 of February 4, 1851; *F.O.* 78/853, No. 46 of February 19; No. 68 of March 6.

<sup>363</sup> P. 242. *F.O.* 196/34. From Stratford, No. 44 of February 7, 1851. This despatch is missing from the Archives copy and the Foreign Office file, and is here recovered from the Register. *F.O.* 78/848. To Stratford, No. 69 of March 13, contains Palmerston's reply. *F.O.* 78/854. From Stratford, No. 134 of April 21.

<sup>364</sup> P. 243. *F.O.* 196/36. From Stratford, No. 144 of June 15, 1852. He actually left on June 21.

<sup>365</sup> P. 244. *F.O.* 78/858. From Stratford, No. 307 of October 16, 1851.

<sup>366</sup> P. 244. *Pte. Lay. MSS. Add. MSS.* 38981, f. 345. From C. Blunt, June 3, 1853.

*Failure of the Reform Movement.* In this survey I dissent from Lane-Poole's estimate in his *Life of Stratford*. He is plainly afflicted with the *lues biographica*, and II, 213-6, passes over very lightly the failure of reform as confessed in 1851 and Stratford's responsibility in connexion with it. Had Stratford been less insistent on religious justice to Christians and Jews, and confined himself to rigorous insistence on financial and administrative reform, he would certainly have been more successful. Also Stratford chivalrously concealed, and his biographer has not perceived, the weakness and corruption of Reschid himself, which were in no small degree the cause of failure. One cause not perceived at the time, but strongly insisted on by Mr. R. Levy, is the immense distance between the Turk and *raya*, which was a social, as well as a religious, distinction.

<sup>367</sup> P. 244. *F.O.* 78/557. From Stratford, No. 97 of May 21, 1844; *F.O.* 78/818, No. 61 of February 19, 1850.

<sup>368</sup> P. 245. *The Turkish Press* (1841-53). The account in the text should be compared with that of the Press under Mahmud, *supra*, ch. i, n. 33, p. 403. A. Emin, *Development of Modern Turkey as measured by its Press*, Columbia Univ., N.Y. [1914], contains useful information as to printing and publicity methods of the period.

<sup>369</sup> P. 246. *F.O.* 352/35, *pte. Strat. MSS.* D. Revelaki to T. N. Black, October 5, 1852; E. Pisani to Stratford, October 9.

<sup>370</sup> P. 247. *F.O.* 78/854. From Stratford, No. 134 of April 21, 1851.



## BOOK IV

## THE FRUITS OF DIPLOMACY

## SOURCES AND GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY FOR CHAPTERS X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV

## MS. SOURCES FROM 1841 TO 1854.

The diplomatic history hardly touches anything but the years 1841, 1849-54. For these the British *F.O.* records, along with the Admiralty papers [*Ady.*], have been used, and illustrations have been taken from *N.R.A.* and *W.S.A.* *W.S.A.* are invaluable for 1852-4 and the Leiningen mission; *A.E.F.* and *N.R.A.* have some important revelations for the same years. The *pte. Lay. MSS.* and *Strat. MSS.* bring one behind the scenes at Constantinople. The *pte. Blo. MSS.* are useful for the 1849 crisis. The great collection of *pte. Clar. MSS.* is invaluable for the whole diplomatic situation for the years 1853-6, as it has full private letters from all the leading statesmen, Palmerston, Aberdeen, Russell, Graham, etc. Cowley is particularly important as giving the views of Napoleon III. The *pte. Blo. MSS.* give some views to and from Berlin. The *pte. Russ. MSS.* and *pte. Gr. MSS.* are both very useful at times, though many extracts have been already published from their correspondence. The *pte. Aber. MSS.* are invaluable for the correspondence of Brunnow from 1842 to 1853. The *pte. Glad. MSS.* have one or two important letters in 1853. There are a few important passages in the unpublished part of the *Greville Journal*. The *Roy. Arch.* supply an invaluable document; *vide* App. VI.

## SECONDARY SOURCES.

B. E. Schmitt, 'Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War,' *Am. Hist. Rev.* XXV, Jan. 1919, 33-67, is still one of the best surveys.

There is a very good bibliography in V. J. Puryear, *Russia and the Straits Question*, Univ. of California [1931].

For ch. x, Nicholas' interviews in 1844 and 1853, *vide* G. B. Henderson in *History*, October 1933, pp. 243-7; and an addition made in conjunction with me in June 1934, 38. Dr. Henderson has a useful note on the bibliography of the subject.

For ch. xi, as regards the Holy Places references are given in the text and notes; *vide* especially n. 429.

For chs. xii-xiv most of the diplomatic authorities mentioned in the survey prefixed to chs. iii and iv, *supra*, pp. 416-8, are valid for the later period. But a few further accounts may be mentioned.

For *American views* I have used V. J. Puryear, who has produced much new information, though I usually differ from his conclusions.

L. J. Gordon, *American relations with Turkey*, Univ. of Pa. [1932], has a few figures on the period.

There are two good *Austrian* sources: Hübner, *Neuf Ans d'un Ambassadeur à Paris*, Paris [1904], Tome I; Vitzthum von Eckstädt, *Embassy at St. Petersburg and London*, 2 vols. [1886].

On the British side there have been many publications of memoirs and letters of all the principal actors, but these revelations have all been partial revelations and the *pte. Clar. MSS.* and *pte. Strat. MSS.* alone supply the complete information necessary to judge the British Foreign Office and the Embassy at Constantinople. Most printed sources, and

a few MS. ones, have been most ably used by C. Kingsley Martin, *The Triumph of Lord Palmerston* [1924], to explain and account for the movements of the press and public opinion, which he delineates admirably.

Kinglake's famous *Invasion of the Crimea* is well written and in many respects a careful study. It is based on the Blue Books, which are somewhat twisted to suit his purposes, and is rhetorical in treatment. His bias against Napoleon III is well known, but his prejudice against Stratford, because less recognised, is even more serious.

Miss E. F. Malcolm Smith [1933] has produced an interesting recent corrective of Lane-Poole's valuable *Life of Stratford*, 2 vols. [1888].

H. E. Howard has published some interesting documents on Aberdeen and Brunnow in *Camb. Hist. Journ.* of October 1934. F. A. Simpson in his *Napoleon III and the Recovery of France* [1923], ch. vii, sums up against Stratford.

*The French* secondary works are on the whole disappointing. Ollivier and de la Gorce are too general, Maurain hardly touches the matter, but there is a certain amount of value in the memoirs and periodical literature. L. Thouvenel, *Nicholas et Napoléon III*, Paris [1891], is valuable, but is mostly concerned with events after 1853. E. Bapst, *Les Origines de la Guerre de Crimée, 1848-53*, Paris [1912], is the best, with useful extracts from French documents.

*The Russian* side contains a great deal of very questionable material. The blunders of Goriainov, Martens and Jomini, *Étude diplomatique sur la Guerre de Crimée*, St. Petersburg [1878], have been pointed out by me in *E.H.R.*, October 1934, 663 and n., 664-5. They are such as greatly to impair their reputation for accuracy, thoroughness and impartiality. On the other hand, Zaiončovskii, *Vostochnaia Voina, 1853-6*, St. Petersburg [1908-13], is of immense value. Volume I has two parts, a narrative and an attached volume of documents (both referred to as Vol. I), which is extremely important and throws light on many dark places in connexion with Reschid, Menšikov and Nesselrode. The latter's *Lettres et Papiers* are useful but rather slight. More informing is the *Correspondence of Meyendorff*, 3 vols. (1826-63), ed. Hoetzsch, Berlin [1923]. He was the Russian representative at Vienna.

Schiemann, *Kaiser Nikolaus IV*, Berlin [1919], is still good, though brief.

*The Turkish* side. Professor Marcel Handelsman has a curious study in *Czartoryski, Nicolas I<sup>er</sup> et la question du proche Orient*, Paris [1934], and promises a larger work, in which Polish sources reveal Turkish activities. He also informs me that he has a number of documents from Sadyk pasha, which make charges against Stratford de Redcliffe of inciting the Turks to war. His evidence is entitled to some respect, but Stratford had so many enemies at Constantinople that I suspect such evidence against him. In general Turkish sources are not entitled to much respect. In this period Reschid, Mehemet Ali and Aali can all be convicted of lying, and there is universal agreement that the Porte received worse information from the provinces than did any of the diplomats of Constantinople. In the instances where I have seen their documents at first hand, their value is small and the written work is not impressive. Jorga gives the best general account of tendencies and of Turkish internal movements.

## CHAPTER X

### HOW CZAR NICHOLAS NEGOTIATED (1840-53)

<sup>371</sup> P. 252. *Vide* my article in *Mélanges* to Professor Koht, Oslo [1933], 277 sqq. ; and *vide* also F. S. Rodkey, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, January 1931, 343-9.

<sup>372</sup> P. 253. *Czar Nicholas and encouragement of the Balkan nationalities.*

*Czar Nicholas.* It has been shown in the text that Nicholas finally decided to try to separate England from France. But it is a fair question why he did not prefer to appeal to the nationalities in the Balkans, and use their revolutionary tendencies for his own purposes. Nesselrode had said it might be necessary 'de soulever' these nationalities, but the promotion of a revolutionary agitation in peace time was alien to the purpose and the conscience of the Czar.

'The creed of the Emperor Nicholas is, in European affairs, the common action of the Five Powers [in favour of conservatism]. It is the separate action of Russia and Austria in the Turkish European provinces, and in Asia the sole action of Russia.' \* His opposition to the French and his support of Palmerston against Mehemet Ali were influenced by this idea. 'The Emperor thinks that it is precisely because the Pasha of Egypt is a subject in revolt against his sovereign that the French people will incline to support him, and that the French government, founded as it is, upon revolution; will not dare to act contrary to the popular feeling.' † For the same reason he was against both popular movements and revolutions.

There were, however, occasions when Nicholas was brought into contact with revolution or encouraged the growth of Balkan nationalities, which may be grouped as follows.

(a) *Greece*, favoured in 1833 as a possible heir to the European possessions of Turkey, was abandoned by 1840. Moldavia and Wallachia were looked on with disfavour as having escaped from the Russian orbit. Russian propaganda, though active, achieved no results there.

(b) *Bulgaria*. There was a continuous Russian propaganda for church and school purposes here, but the serious revolt, which broke out in 1841, was not favoured by Nicholas. He also discountenanced a plot in 1842.‡ Though Nesselrode favoured increasing Russian influence by propaganda the Czar seems to have refused to do this in 1846.

(c) *Montenegro*. Like all Russian rulers Nicholas displayed sympathy with Montenegro and gave aid to her. During the difficult period 1838-42 he approved of the activities of a Russian officer there, which had excited Austrian suspicions (*vide* P. E. Mosely, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July 1935, 712-3), and finally intervened to restrain Turkish aggression in 1842 (Schiemann, IV, 39 and n.). In 1852 during the crisis of the Leiningen mission Nicholas was prepared to support Austria by arms if she could not force Turkey to make peace with Montenegro, but this was to preserve the *status quo*.

(d) *Servia*. This is too special a problem to be here considered. But Nicholas may be held to have tried to maintain the *status quo* rather than to excite the nationality against the Sultan. He was conspicuous in doing this during 1848-9.§

(e) *Jugoslav and Illyrian movement*. (*Vide supra*, ch. viii, n. 322.) This movement involved difficulties for Nicholas, since many of the Croats and Serbs in the Austrian empire were allied with their brethren under the Turk. In Nicholas' eyes rebellion against the Sultan could be explained, but rebellion against the conservative Austrian Emperor was a different matter. Ljudevit Gaj was in St. Petersburg in 1838 and tried

\* F.O. 7/280. From Lord Beauvale (Vienna), No. 10 of May 8, 1839.

† F.O. 65/253. From Clanricarde, No. 96 of August 28, 1839.

‡ *Vide* Schiemann, *Kaiser Nikolaus*, IV, Berlin [1919], 41, and A. Hajek, *Bulgarien unter den Turken-herrschaft*, Berlin [1925], 155-64, 168.

§ Stratford reports an overture from the Servians of Austria to throw in their lot with Servia or with Russia. To Palmerston, November 3, 1848. Sproxton, *Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution* [1919], 17 and n.

to appeal to Count Benckendorff, the head of the secret service and intimate of the Czar, in the month of September, 1838 (*vide* P. E. Mosely, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July 1935, pp. 704-16, for all details), and sent him two memoranda. The second, dated November, contemplates war between England and Russia, and asks for Russian aid and gold to form a secret Yugoslav agency in Hungary strong enough to resist amalgamation by Magyars, and to make a 'focus' of resistance outside of Yugoslav elements in Bosnia, Turkish Croatia, Herzegovina and Albania. This project was opposed to Gaj's normal pro-Austrian policy. It in fact suggests that Nicholas is to promote conspiracy in Austria and rebellion in Turkey. In 1839 one of Gaj's agents was turned away from St. Petersburg, and though he collected money next year from Pan-slav sympathisers, Count Benckendorff refused any further overtures.

Nicholas does not seem to have favoured the activities of Gaj. He read a report on Western and Southern Slavs 'with pleasure' in 1840. But in June of that year Nesselrode is supposed to have warned Metternich against Illyrian revolutionary tendencies. In December 1842 Nicholas, in response to inquiry from Metternich, denied any desire to encourage the Croat nationalists.\*

Nicholas does not seem to have lent any countenance to Nesselrode's suggestion 'de soulever' the nationalities. He was aware that in war time the subject nationalities of Turkey might revolt. But he claimed that during the war of 1828-9 he had restrained his soldiers from exciting rebellion in Turkey. But, when faced with the Crimean war, he appears to have drawn up a memo in which he proposed to anticipate England, and to emancipate the Christians of Turkey, and establish the 'real independence' of Moldo-Wallachia, and of Serbs, Bulgars, Bosnians and Greeks. He hoped in this way to prevent England from siding with the Turks against Christians.† This was in November 1853, but the project was strongly combated by Nesselrode and ultimately abandoned.

This statement by Martens needs some confirmation. But it is at any rate certain that Nicholas' abandonment of the project was real. He said to Castelbajac on December 12, 1853,‡ 'If the deadly and fatal direction of events brings about the rising of Christians (which I shall always try to prevent)—it is impossible for Christian nations to replace Christians under the Mohammedan yoke and for my part I never would permit it.' A few months later, on March 27, 1854, when war was already certain, he wrote to the King of Prussia. The Greek subjects of the Turk had already taken up arms in Thessaly and Epirus. He thought it improbable that these Christian rebels would be induced 'to lay down their arms and again take up the Turkish yoke. Is it possible that Christian powers would lend or offer their help [to Turkey] to compel them to do so? That would be too infamous. For my part I should never consent to it.'§ But he further states that, if the Slav provinces emancipated themselves from

\* This is on the authority of Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, IV, Pt. I, 501-2, and is a case in which I think his statement may be accepted, as it accords with other evidence. There is some curious and interesting information in M. Handelsman, *Czartoryski, Nicolas I<sup>er</sup> et la question du proche Orient*, Paris [1934].

† Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, XII, 343-7.

‡ *Pte. Clar. MSS.* From Castelbajac, December 13, 1853, in Cowley of December 25.

§ Curiously enough Aberdeen agreed with this (*pte. Clar. MSS.* Aberdeen to Clarendon of April 4, 1854), in referring to the possibility of allied troops being sent to subdue this movement: 'I feel bound to say that I could not bring myself to employ British troops against the Christian subjects of the Porte.'



Turkish rule, he (Nicholas) will give a guarantee to the Austrian Emperor, not only for himself but for his successors, 'that Russia will never permit any attempt on the part of these provinces to extend or aggrandise themselves at the expense of Austria' (Schiemann, IV, 426-7).

On the whole Nicholas exhibits a good deal of consistency and disinterestedness in regard to these Slav nationalities. He countenances no subversive Slav movement inside the Austrian empire, and he favours a peaceful propaganda, not an aggressive one, inside the Turkish. Apart from some human sympathies in war time Nicholas is practically a supporter of the *status quo* in regard to the growth of Slav nationalities in the Balkans. It must be remembered, however, that the Panslav party and the Orthodox church promoted a strong educational and church propaganda among all the Slav nationalities of the Balkans. In general, Nesselrode favoured these activities more than Nicholas did, and the public and the press outdid both. The Czar was in fact unable to restrain the propaganda, and the Russian agents in the Balkans, whether official or secret, were influenced and affected by it.

<sup>373</sup> P. 254. *Pte. Aber. MSS., Add. MSS.* 43144, f. 41, where the correspondence makes it clear Nicholas took the initiative. See also a letter of the Czar of January 23, 1849, in *pte. Blo. MSS., F.O.* 356/29.

<sup>374</sup> P. 254. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 16, p. 129. Brunnov to Orlov, August 20, 1844; No. 17, Nesselrode, September 19.

<sup>375</sup> P. 255. *Zaiončovskii*, I, Nesselrode, No. 18; No. 19, p. 136; Nos. 21, 22, pp. 141-2; and *E.P.* VI.

<sup>376</sup> P. 255. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 23, pp. 143-4. *Vide also pte. Aber. MSS. Add. MSS.* 43144, f. 235.

<sup>377</sup> P. 255. *F.O.* 78/552. To Stratford, No. 9 of January 20, 1844.

<sup>378</sup> P. 256. The quotations are from *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 17, pp. 130-1; No. 19, pp. 135-6.

*Nesselrode on the agreement of 1844 in 1849.* The following extract is from a private letter of Bloomfield to Palmerston (December 19, 1849) in the *pte. Blo. MSS. (F.O. 356/29)*: 'I asked Count Nesselrode this afternoon with reference to an allusion of the Emperor on the occasion of my audience (December 17) what the understanding was to which he came with Her Majesty's Government in 1844 . . . ; and he said that it was simply this, that in the event of the Turkish Empire falling to pieces, England and Russia should bind themselves not to act separately; he said that no Act was drawn up but that these opinions were exchanged between him and the Government of that day.'

<sup>379</sup> P. 257. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 17, p. 131.

<sup>380</sup> P. 257. *F.O.* 78/728. From Cowley. Most confidential of March 26, 1848.

<sup>381</sup> P. 258. *F.O.* 65/360. To Buchanan, No. 102 of April 20, 1849.

<sup>382</sup> P. 258. *F.O.* 78/773. From Stratford, No. 84 of March 14, 1849.

<sup>383</sup> P. 258. Self in *E.H.R.*, October 1933, p. 619. Hertslet, *Europe by Treaty*, I, 753-8; II, 824-8.

<sup>384</sup> P. 259. The expression of Orlov. *F.O.* 195/323. From Buchanan, No. 88 of March 14, 1849.

<sup>385</sup> P. 259. *F.O.* 65/346. To Buchanan, No. 62 of December 2, 1848.

<sup>386</sup> P. 259. *F.O.* 65/361. To Buchanan, No. 141 of May 17, 1849.

<sup>387</sup> P. 260. *F.O.* 78/728. From Cowley, No. 116 of March 21, 1848. *F.O.* 78/733. From Stratford, separate and confidential, July 1, 1848.

*F.O.* 78/735. From Stratford, No. 105 of September 11, 1848.

<sup>388</sup> P. 260. *F.O.* 78/732. To Stratford, No. 126 of September 20, 1848. *F.O.* 195/322. To Stratford, No. 27 of February 26, 1849.



<sup>389</sup> P. 262. *F.O.* 78/779. From Stratford, No. 267 of September 3, 1849; rest of the despatch in *Hung. Ref.* I, No. 3.

<sup>390</sup> P. 262. *W.S.A.* *Berichte aus Konstantinopel*, XII, 70. From Stürmer, Nos. 38-9 of September 12, 1849.

<sup>391</sup> P. 263. *F.O.* 78/770. To Stratford, pte., September 26, 1847.

<sup>392</sup> P. 263. *Warnings to Russia and to Austria as to British support of Turkey, October 1849.* (For authorities: W. Alter, *Die auswärtige politik der ungarischen revolution*, *Deutsche Revue*, 1911-2, is wholly untrustworthy. E. Bapst, *Origines de la Guerre de Crimée*, Paris [1912], chs. ii-iv; C. Sproxton, *Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution* [1919], are good for French and British records respectively.)

On October 2 Palmerston gave a strong hint to Brunnow in London. 'With regard to our doing nothing I said that we could not take that course, because the Turkish government had officially asked us for help in their embarrassment' (*F.O.* 65/374. Note by Palmerston of October 2, 1849). This must have reached St. Petersburg by the second week of October, *i.e.* well before Nicholas decided not to attack Turkey. It helps to explain why he accepted Fuad's excuses. Palmerston's despatch of October 6-7 to Bloomfield (*Hung. Ref.* II, No. 19, pp. 30-2) was accompanied by a private letter (quoted in Sproxton, *Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution*, 126-7) making clear England's purpose 'to support by arms as well as by the pen.' The whole private correspondence in *pte. Blo. MSS.*, *F.O.* 356/29 of Palmerston is most uncompromising in its resolution.

There was also a warning to Austria sent at an early date from London. An unnamed member of the cabinet sent a private letter to Stürmer through the Austrian Consul-General, which, while giving the fullest approval of Turkish action, expressed the hope that he (Stürmer) would not leave Constantinople. *W.S.A.* *Berichte aus Konstantinopel*, XII, 70. From Stürmer, No. 48B of October 24, 1849.

<sup>393</sup> P. 264. *Hung. Ref.* II, No. 18, pp. 440-2. The despatch is dated 7th in original, not 6th as in the Blue Book. The draft despatch in *F.O.* 78/771 is endorsed with V.R. in pencil.

<sup>394</sup> P. 264. *F.O.* 195/325. To Stratford, No. 241 of October 7, 1849, endorsed 'Recd. Oct. 24, Waring.'

<sup>395</sup> P. 264. *W.S.A.* *Berichte aus Konstantinopel*, XII, 70. From Stürmer, No. 48B of October 24, 1849. The interview with Aali was on the 22nd.

<sup>396</sup> P. 266. *Hung. Ref.* II, No. 82, p. 72. The rest of the controversy is in Nos. 85, 87-8, 91, 95, 102-9, 111, 116, 130; *vide* also App. IV.

<sup>397</sup> P. 267. *F.O.* 65/376. From Bloomfield, No. 34 of January 23, 1850; *vide* also Nesselrode to Nicholas, November 20, 1850.

<sup>398</sup> P. 267. *Lettres et Papiers du Comte de Nesselrode*, Paris [n.d.], X, 6.

<sup>399</sup> P. 268. Sproxton, *Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution*, Cambridge, 133.

<sup>400</sup> P. 268. *F.O.* 65/376. From Bloomfield, No. 37 of January 24, 1850, quoted by Puryear, 179 and n.

<sup>401</sup> P. 269. *F.O.* 78/782. From Stratford, No. 363 of November 26, 1849; November 30, 1849, pte. *Vide* also Puryear, 182-6.

<sup>402</sup> P. 270. *F.O.* 65/376. From Bloomfield, No. 37 of January 24, 1850.

<sup>403</sup> P. 270. *F.O.* 195/324. To Stratford, No. 134 of June 1, 1849.

<sup>404</sup> P. 271. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 97 of December 20, 1853, p. 357.

<sup>405</sup> P. 272. *F.O.* 65/424. From Seymour, No. 26 of January 22, 1853. This was exactly the sentiment of Aberdeen.

<sup>406</sup> P. 273. *F.O.* 65/424. From Seymour, No. 88 of February 22, 1853.

<sup>407</sup> P. 274. Gooch and Temperley, *British Documents on Origins of the War* [1928], III, 184. Lord Sanderson is the writer.

<sup>408</sup> P. 274. The Czar's comments, here italicised and placed in round brackets, are in Zaiončovskii, I, No. 99, pp. 359-62. Russell's despatch also in *E.P.* V, No. 4 of February 9, 1853.

<sup>409</sup> P. 275. *Pte. Russ. MSS. G.D.* 22/10. Seymour to Russell, February 9, 1853.

<sup>410</sup> P. 276. THE THREE PARTITION PLANS OF NICHOLAS IN CASE OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE, 1833, 1840, 1853.

(The summary of different projects may be useful here, as also the differences between the Czar's views as expressed to Seymour and to Paskiević.)

(1) 1833. (Conversation with Ficquelmont, February 25, 1853; *vide supra*, pp. 67-8.) 'A Greek Empire' based on an enlargement of independent Greece.

(2) 1840. Russia to garrison the Bosphorus, Austria and England to hold the Dardanelles (Nicholas, 1840. Martens, *Traité*s, IV, pt. i, 496).\*

(3) 1853. *The Czar's conversations with Seymour, January-February*, designated as (S); *the Czar's memo to Paskiević, January*, designated as (P).

*Constantinople.*

(a) Not to be a permanent possession of Russia, but might be temporarily occupied (S).†

(b) To be a free port but no annexation (P).

*Moldo-Wallachia.*

(a) Independent under Russian protection (S).

(b) 'Not independent but Russian' (P).

*Servia.*

(a) Independent under Russian protection (S).

(b) Independent (P).

*Bulgaria.*

(a) Independent (S).

(b) Northern part and Constanza to be Russian (P). Most of Bulgaria to be independent (P).

*Greece.* Not to be enlarged (S).

*Straits.* Russia to garrison Bosphorus, and Austria to garrison the Dardanelles (P).

*Turkish coasts of Adriatic and Archipelago.* To go to Austria (P).

*Crete.*

(a) Crete and other isles to go to France. England to have Cyprus or Rhodes (P).

(b) Crete to go to England, if she wanted it (S).

*Egypt.* Egypt to England (S and P).

<sup>411</sup> P. 278. *Pte. Russ. MSS. G.D.* 22/10. Westmorland to Russell, January 30, 1853.

\* This agrees with the Russian plan of garrisoning the Bosphorus in 1833, indicated by P. E. Mosely, 22-3, 41.

† Castelbajac reports in a private letter of February 1, 1853, that Nicholas said to him, 'I do not desire Constantinople: but if another power wished to seize it I should be there before her' (Bapst, *Origines de la Guerre de Crimée*, 322 and n.).

## CHAPTER XI

## HOW LATINS AND GREEKS DISPUTED ABOUT THE HOLY PLACES

<sup>412</sup> P. 280. The opinion of Granville, *W.S.A.*, *Berichte aus England*, VIII, 85. From Beust, No. 73A of October 24, 1873, f. 673.

<sup>413</sup> P. 281. W. Wittman, *Travels in Turkey, etc., 1799-1801* [1803], 159, 174, 180.

<sup>414</sup> P. 281. *F.O.* 78/932. From Doria to Rose, April 1, 1853.

<sup>415</sup> P. 282. *Bertram-Young Report*, Oxford [1926], 25, 51-2.

<sup>416</sup> P. 282. *The position of the Orthodox Patriarchs.*

(a) *The patriarch of Jerusalem.* The best contemporary study of Jerusalem is *The Holy City*, by George Williams, 2nd edn. [1849], 2 vols., mostly topographical but has useful details on modern Jerusalem, II, ch. vi and Additional Notes 4. There is an important original letter of May 27 (O.S.) of 1845, describing the election of the patriarch Cyril (II, 544-6), which makes the influence of Russia plain.

J. M. Neale, *A History of the Holy Eastern Church*, London [1850], 2 vols., is mainly liturgical. But there are important details about the modern patriarchate, I, 161-2, and the numbers of Orthodox Christians in the Eastern Church, I, 162.

J. A. Finn, *Stirring Times* (in Jerusalem), mainly 1853-6 [1878], has useful sidelights, as of course has Curzon's famous *Monasteries in the Levant*. On the patriarch of Jerusalem there are two classic works: the *Bertram-Luke Report*, Oxford [1921] and the *Bertram-Young Report*, Oxford [1926]. These reports, though primarily legal and modern, are erudite and impartial. They have high critical value and are a mine of information on past history, particularly from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards.

(b) *The patriarch of Constantinople.* The position of the patriarch of Constantinople is best seen in G. Papadoulos, *Les privilèges du Patriarcat Œcuménique dans l'Empire ottomane*, Paris [1924]. This work is partisan but has a good deal of valuable information. There is much impartial information in the Bertram-Luke and Bertram-Young reports.

<sup>417</sup> P. 283. Father Géraumb, *Pèlerinage à Jérusalem*, Paris [1839], I, 153-4. *F.O.* 78/962. From J. Finn (Jerusalem), No. 22 of October 5, 1853.

<sup>418</sup> P. 284. *Greek and Latin Pilgrims to Jerusalem.* Figures are difficult to obtain. But there were certainly 'Popish pilgrims' in 1697; *vide* H. Maundrell, *Journey to Aleppo and Jerusalem of that year* [5th edn. 1732], 92. These seem to have died out altogether in the eighteenth century. A detailed census of pilgrims present in May 1815 appears in W. Turner, *Tour in Levant* [1820], II, 175-6. He gives 4,705 in all, of whom there were 2,000 Greeks, 1,655 Armenians, 500 Copts, 50 Syrians, 500 poor persons. There seem to be no Latins except the friars, or monks in the Latin convents. Father Géraumb, *Pèlerinage à Jérusalem*, Paris [1839], I, 153-4, says that, at Christmas 1831, he found 4 Latin pilgrims out of 4,000, and was told that at Easter there might be 20 out of 10,000.

Consul Finn in *F.O.* 78/962, No. 22 of October 5, 1853, reckons the number at 15,000, and says 'the majority' of them 'are not Roman Catholics.' The terms 'Latin' and 'Greek' cover a wide variety of races. Thus in 1831 Father Géraumb found three Poles among his four Latin pilgrims. The 'Greeks' were mostly Russians, but John Carne, *Holy Land* [1836],

86, mentions 'a poor Servian and his wife' who had made the tour 'from their own Country.' Greeks from either Greece or Turkey and Rumanians were not usually pilgrims, but both made heavy contributions towards rebuilding the Holy Sepulchre and maintaining the patriarch.

<sup>419</sup> P. 284. *F.O.* 78/540. From W. T. Young (Jerusalem), No. 28 of July 24, 1843, No. 29 of July 29, No. 37 of August 24, No. 39 of September 15; *F.O.* 78/581, January 8, 1844.

<sup>420</sup> P. 285. J. A. Finn, *Stirring Times* (in Jerusalem), 1853-6 [1878], 30, 45, 49.

<sup>421</sup> P. 285. A. H. Hore, *Eighteen Centuries of the Orthodox Greek Church*, 663-5.

<sup>422</sup> P. 285. *F.O.* 195/292. From Finn, No. 17 of April 5, 1847; No. 35 of December 2.

<sup>423</sup> P. 285. *F.O.* 195/292. From Finn, No. 16 of April 26, 1848; No. 4 of January 29.

<sup>424</sup> P. 286. *F.O.* 195/292. From Finn, No. 19 of September 25, 1850.

<sup>425</sup> P. 286. FRENCH RELIGIOUS PROTECTION IN TURKEY, 1528-1853.

(a) *French diplomatic intervention, 1842.* (As indicated *supra*, pp. 284, 286, the first hint of French claims being actively put forward is in 1842, and here is the document.)

*F. Pisani on Baron Bourqueney's demand of permission to repair the Church of Jerusalem.*

'The cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre wants repairing. The Greeks applied for a *firman* to repair it at their own expense, and obtained it some time ago. The French claim the right to repair the dome, and they offer to do it at their expense. The French make this demand, says Sarim Effendi, by giving an erroneous interpretation of the 82 article of the Capitulation; this article says: "Lorsque les lieux que les religieux, dependant de le France, possèdent à Jerusalem, exigent des réparations afin de prévenir qu'ils ne tombent en ruines, les commandements nécessaires seront données."

'Mais la Porte dit: "cette article n'est pas applicable au cas dont il s'agit." The Church, says the Porte, is common to all the Christians. It is a Holy Place even for the Mussulmen [*sic*]; so much so, that if the Church wanted really repairing and no nation among the Christians could afford to make the expense, we would pay the expenses ourselves. Now the Dome is not a part of the place the French possess in the Church, and according to the Capitulation, their right to demand a *firman* is only when the places in their possession want repairing and this is not the case presently. The Cupola of that Church, a Church common to all sorts of Christians, is not French property, and while our subjects, says Sarim, offer to make the expenses of repairing that Cupola we cannot allow Foreigners to make the reparation.

'Baron Bourqueney has referred the matter to his government, and the Porte has sent an adequate person to Jerusalem to take care that under pretext of making repairings the Greeks should not encroach upon the French property.

' (Signed)

' F. PISANI.' \*

\* *F.O.* 78/475, February 21, 1842, enclo. 2 from Stratford, No. 38 of February 26, 1842 (recd. March 21).

(b) *British Views on French Religious Protection in Turkey.* (The following extracts from a Foreign Office memo of July 30, 1918, give the British standpoint.\*)

'Historically, French protection of the Latin Church in Turkey dates from 1528, when official action was taken by Francis I of France in defence of Catholic interests in the Ottoman Empire. The first Capitulations were concluded with France in 1535, and until the Capitulations with England in 1583, France was the official protector of all Europeans established in Turkey. In 1604 the French Ambassador at the Porte obtained a Hatt-i-Sherif confirming and extending the privileges already granted to Catholics, and promising immunity to all pilgrims to Jerusalem travelling "sous le nom et la protection de l'Empereur de France" (*Le Régime des Capitulations dans l'Empire Ottoman*, G. P. du Ransas, II, 90). On the renewal of the Capitulations with France in 1607 it was stated that the subjects of all nations not represented at Constantinople by an ambassador should be under French protection. Since the Koran was both the religious and civil code throughout the Ottoman Empire, it was eminently desirable that the members of the European Christian communities in Turkey should be under separate jurisdiction. At this period France was the only Power that had sufficient influence with the Porte to secure such privileges for her co-religionists.

'The chief treaties on which the French base their claim to exercise a religious protectorate in Turkey are the Capitulations of 1673 and 1740, of which the former (*Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie*, A. Schopoff, 1, 2) confirmed the privileges already granted to bishops or "autres religieux de secte latine, qui sont sujets à la France, de quelque sorte qu'ils puissent être," and to pilgrims to Jerusalem under French protection. The Capitulation of 1740 (Foreign Office Confidential Print: Turkey, No. 9675) gave permission to all members of "Christian and hostile nations" to continue as before to visit Jerusalem under the protection of the French flag, and guaranteed certain rights to Roman Catholics (the French text contains the words "de quelque nation ou espèce qu'ils soient," but the correct translation of the Turkish text is "de quelque *genre* ou espèce," signifying religious order). From these treaties France claimed a monopoly of the protection of Christians in Turkey; but the wording of the Treaty of Karlovitz (1699) (Sir G. Young's *Corps de Droit Ottoman*, II, 129), the Treaty of Passarovitz (1718) and the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) would appear to place Austria in an analogous position with regard to Roman Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. Most-favoured-nation treatment was conceded to Great Britain by Article XVIII of the English Capitulations, and to the Netherlands by Article XL of the Capitulations of 1680. The Republic of Venice was granted certain rights of protection in 1718. By the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 (*Protection des Chrétiens*, 8, 11) promises were made to Russia corresponding to those made to France regarding Christians in Turkey.

'The law of the Tanzimat (*Protection des Chrétiens*, 20) in 1839 declared perfect equality between all Ottoman subjects, thus abolishing the need for an external protectorate over any one section of the community. In 1850 (*F.O.* 78/930. Colonel Rose, No. 72 of March 6, 1853), however, France attempted to revive the Treaty of 1740, and demanded certain rights as to the Holy Places, which involved her eventually

\* In the original all references are in the margin. I have put these into the text, enclosed in round brackets, and added the volume of each document, e.g. *F.O.* 78/930, or the Blue Book, e.g. *E.P.* I.



in a quarrel with Russia. It was at this time that Russia made the claim (*E.P.* I, Colonel Rose, No. 154) that the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji gave her the right to protect all members of the Orthodox Church in Turkey, whether foreigners or subjects of the Sultan, on the analogy of the French protectorate of the Latin Church. It would appear that the force of the analogy was recognised, for in the course of the dispute the French Government strongly disclaimed all right to protect Roman Catholics in Turkey other than the Latins of the Holy Land (*F.O.* 27/968. Lord Cowley, No. 376 of May 31, 1853), and declared that they held such protection as derogatory to the sovereign rights of the Sultan and to the independence of the Porte, which was guaranteed by the Five Powers in the Treaty of London, 1841 (see *F.O.* 7/419. The Earl of Westmorland's despatch No. 247, June 21, 1853). The question of protection was solved by the Sultan himself undertaking to maintain and enforce the privileges of the Christian churches and their respective clergy throughout his dominions (*F.O.* 78/933. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, No. 90 of June 7, 1853). All efforts to avoid war were however unavailing. The Treaty of Paris signed on March 30th, 1856, between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, included a *firman* of the Sultan.'

[The French political side of the Holy Places dispute is hardly touched by Jean Maurain in *La politique ecclésiastique du second Empire de 1852-69*, Paris [1930]. But he leaves no doubt that the inspiration was Catholic and Jesuit (91-2).]

<sup>426</sup> P. 286. *F.O.* 195/377. From Cowley, No. 22 of February 25, 1852. Callimachi is the authority for Napoleon's first statement, but it is confirmed in Zaiončovskii, I, No. 88, pp. 333-4; the second is in *F.O.* 146/465. From Stratford (Paris), of March 14, 1853, and partly quoted in Simpson, *Napoleon*, 226.

<sup>427</sup> P. 286. *F.O.* 78/893. From Rose, No. 40 of August 5, 1852, confirmed by Aali pasha.

<sup>428</sup> P. 287. *A.E.F.* Russie, 210. From Castelbajac, No. 82 of December 1, 1853.

<sup>429</sup> P. 288. *The Greek Orthodox and Russian Claims*.

Archdeacon A. C. Stewart of Jerusalem thinks that the account in the text favours the Latin side of the dispute, and I ought therefore to try to redress the balance here. Whether the 'Traité du Khalif Omar' was genuine or not there is no doubt that it represents practical concessions enjoyed by the Orthodox Greeks during the Dark and Middle Ages, long before the Latins claimed anything. It is unquestionable too that Saladin in 1188, and Sultan Selim, after his conquest of Palestine in 1515, both accorded the predominant position to the Orthodox at Jerusalem. Selim recognised the validity of Omar's *traité*, though not technically a treaty.

In fact, the position acquired by the French and other Latins from the sixteenth century onwards was due to treaty, whereas Orthodox rights rested on prescription. That seems to be the crux of the whole matter. The Sultan certainly held that what he or his ancestors had granted, that he could revoke. He added, however, that he meant to do nothing of the kind. But the French took the view, quite reasonably from the point of international law, that a treaty could not be abrogated by one signatory to it. The Sultan did not really admit this claim though he pretended to. There are good contemporary works on the subject. F. Eichmann, *Die Reformen des Osmanischen Reiches*, Berlin [1858], 1-137, touches most points in the controversy. C. M. Basili, the Russian Consul-General in Syria and Palestine, drew up a good *Notice historique sur les Saints lieux de Jérusalem*

of December 5, 1851, printed in *Papiers et lettres du Comte de Nesselrode*, Paris [n. d.], X, 81-118.

Apart from the older prescriptive rights of the Orthodox there is another weak point in the French case. Their privileges under the treaty rights of 1740 were, in fact, mostly abandoned in 1757. The Orthodox resumed their old position and the Latin claims dropped. The attempt to revive them ninety years later was dangerous. For, if obsolete or abandoned claims can thus suddenly be revived and enforced, there is an end to all diplomacy and to prospects of peace.

As regards the specific Russian rights under treaty, as distinguished from the Orthodox Greek claims in general, these are open to real dispute. The Russian view that the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji gave them the rights of a religious protectorate is certainly too extreme and the whole question is examined in n. 445 below. The Orthodox claim to occupation of the Holy Places is stronger from prescription than from rights claimed by Russia under treaty. It should also be borne in mind that the Sultan claimed that he was upholding prescription and was not trying to diminish Orthodox privileges. This contention was not wholly true, because he actually took away the keys the Greeks had formerly held, and gave them to the Latins. The fact is that the French Treaty of 1740 had disturbed the *status quo*. It was subsequently in fact abrogated for the most part in practice. When the French demanded the execution of the Treaty, the Sultan professed to meet their claim, and at the same time to maintain the existing *status quo*. But he could not do both things, and the result was a bad compromise, leading to war.

<sup>430</sup> P. 289. *E.P.* I, No. 20 of November 24, 1851.

<sup>431</sup> P. 289. *F.O.* 78/893. From Rose, No. 55 of August 18, 1852.

<sup>432</sup> P. 289. Zaiončovskii, I, No. 88, p. 333, *précis historique*, January 1853.

<sup>433</sup> P. 290. 'The French note' and the 'Greek firman.' The texts of these are in *E.P.* I, No. 37 and No. 40, encl. 2, respectively. It is impossible to read them without coming to the conclusion that the account (*supra*, pp. 290-1) is true and that the ambiguity shown both in the *firman* and the 'note' was deliberate.

<sup>434</sup> P. 290. *F.O.* 195/377. From Cowley, No. 22 of February 25, 1852, on the authority of Callimachi. *F.O.* 195/377. From Cowley, No. 27 of March 8; passage suppressed in *E.P.* I, No. 38.

<sup>435</sup> P. 290. *E.P.* I, No. 51. *Vide* also *F.O.* 78/895. From Rose, November 20, 1852.

<sup>436</sup> P. 291. *F.O.* 78/893. From Rose, No. 55 of August 18, 1852.

<sup>437</sup> P. 291. *F.O.* 195/385. From Rose, No. 72 of March 8, 1853, and *vide* also *F.O.* 146/464. From E. Pisani of February 26.

<sup>438</sup> P. 292. *F.O.* 195/379. From Cowley, No. 401 of July 8, 1852.

<sup>439</sup> P. 293. *F.O.* 181/273. From Cowley, No. 333 of July 1, 1852; cp. *ibid.*, No. 400 of July 8.

<sup>440</sup> P. 293. *Pte. Aber. MSS., Add. MSS.* 43144, f. 336. Brunnow to Aberdeen of January 31, 1853.

<sup>441</sup> P. 294. *F.O.* 78/895. From Rose, No. 140 of November 20, 1852; cp. *F.O.* 78/894, No. 76 of September 7.

<sup>442</sup> P. 294. *F.O.* 78/893. From Rose, No. 55 of August 18, 1852; No. 70 of August 30.

<sup>443</sup> P. 294. Zaiončovskii, I, No. 88, p. 338; *vide* also *E.P.* I, No. 49. One or two suppressed details in this account are quoted from *F.O.* 78/913. From Finn (Jerusalem), No. 11 of October 27, 1852.

<sup>444</sup> P. 295. *F.O.* 78/895. From Rose, No. 170 of December 28, 1852.

<sup>445</sup> P. 296. *Article VII of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji and its interpretation.* The 7th Article of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji of July 10, 1774, runs as follows :

VII. La Sublime Porte promet de protéger constamment la religion Chrétienne et ses églises ; et aussi elle permet aux ministres de la Cour imperiale de Russie de faire dans toutes les occasions des représentations, tant en faveur de la nouvelle église à Constantinople, dont il sera mention a l'article XIV, que pour ceux qui la desservent, promettant de les prendre en considération comme faites par une personne de confiance d'une Puissance voisine et sincèrement amie.

(a) *Interpretations of Canning and Metternich.*

It does not appear that this article confers any very special rights of interference, it is merely a general promise by the Sultan of protection of the Christian religion and the conferring of a special right on Russia in regard to a new church at Constantinople. But the interpretation was developed by usage. Metternich admitted a certain right of interference. Canning qualified it by saying that Russia had a special right of friendly advice on behalf of Christians of the Turkish Empire, but he doubted whether this 'right extended to interference on behalf of subjects of the Porte who had thrown off their allegiance.' This was in 1824 (*vide my Foreign Policy of Canning* [1925], 325). In 1849 Palmerston's attitude was similar. He argued that Russia had the right of making complaints on behalf of Christian subjects, but that the Sultan was not compelled to meet them. Brunnow contested this interpretation to Palmerston, but admitted to Nesselrode that it was right (Brunnow, October 5, 1849. Martens, *Traité conclus par la Russie*, XII, 256). Martens usually requires confirmation, but an admission so damaging to Brunnow is probably correct. The interview with Palmerston was on October 2, but Palmerston's own note of it (*vide F.O.* 65/374) does not confirm the interpretation ascribed to him.

(b) *Brunnow's interpretation in 1853.*

The appeal to Kutchuk Kainardji was introduced in a sudden, sinister manner into the Holy Places' Dispute. But it was not introduced until the quarrel had lasted over two years, *i.e.* till December 1852. The suggestion that the claims of Kutchuk Kainardji should form the basis of a Convention was made in the autumn of 1852. It came from Reschid, who was then secretly in communication with the Russian government.\* His proposal was strange and new, and it might be said that Reschid was the man who made the war by this sinister suggestion. But it was improbable that Reschid saw as far as this, or meant to do anything more than suggest the best method of furthering the Russian case. What is quite certain, however, is that both the Czar and Nesselrode took up the question, without knowing anything much about the terms or implications. When Seymour pressed the Czar on the subject he was referred to Nesselrode, and Nesselrode, also being pressed, said that he did not know much about it, but that Brunnow did and had expounded it all to Aberdeen (*vide my article in E.H.R.*, April 1934, 284-5). On the face of it, the bearing of Kutchuk Kainardji on the dispute is not evident.

Brunnow's private views in April (if we may trust Martens, *Traité*, XII,

\* Zaiončovskii, I, 353. Nesselrode of December 13, 1852. Reschid's connexion was already established in November 1852, and probably began much earlier. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Aberdeen to Clarendon, May 19, 1853, has the following : 'I have learnt [obviously from Brunnow] that he (Reschid) was the person who suggested the plan of a Convention.' *Vide also infra*, nn. 458 and 467.

311-2) were that 'an article, more or less long, more or less severe, will add nothing to the reality of our influence. It consists *in facts, not words*. Russia is strong, Turkey is weak; that is the preamble of all our treaties. . . . This epitaph is already inscribed on the tomb of the Ottoman Empire.' This was a simple interpretation. But a month later he expounded his views at length to Aberdeen.\* 'It is said that it would be derogatory to the independance [*sic*] and dignity of the Sultan to enter with a foreign power into a formal engagement—in virtue of which the Porte would *promise to Russia* the protection to be granted by the Sultan to the church placed under his own dominion. Now, it appears that those who pretend that such a promise would be an encroachment upon the Sultan's independance [*sic*], entirely forget that *this promise actually exists*, since the treaty of 1774 between Russia and Turkey. The 7th Article of the Treaty of Kainardji contains the following provision. "La Sublime Porte promet de protéger constamment la religion Chrétienne et ses églises."

'Therefore *the promise* has already been made, and the pledge given—whether the Porte was right or wrong in entering into such a compact at the time, is not the question. Russia has undoubtedly the right of insisting upon its fulfilment. The 14th Article of the same Treaty contains a further promise of a similar description; the 16th, S. 2 and 3,

[Art. XVI, s. 2. De n'empêcher aucunement l'exercice libre de la religion Chrétienne et de ne mettre aucun obstacle à la construction de nouvelles églises et à la réparation des anciennes, ainsi que cela a été précédemment. S. 3. De restituer aux couvents et aux autres particuliers les terres et possessions ci-devant à eux appartenantes, qui leur ont été prises contre toute justice (*details follow*).]

refers to the above-stated protection on behalf of the Christian religion; as also Article 17, S. 2. If all these provisions are considered as derogatory to the character of Independance [*sic*] of the Ottoman Empire, then indeed we ought to undo our Treaties with Turkey and obliterate the history of the Russian Empire since 1774.

'In referring to these facts I cannot refrain from alluding also to the Imperial Manifest, by which the Treaty of Kainardji was promulgated under the reign of the Empress Catherine. Permit me to lay before you a copy of this document. In the S. 4 of this manifest you will find the following. "Notre religion orthodoxe elle-même dans les lieux où elle a pris naissance, y est mise pour l'avenir à l'abri de toute gêne et de toute violence, sous notre protection Impériale."

[Art. XVII, s. 2. Que la religion Chrétienne ne sera point exposée à la moindre oppression, non plus que les églises, et qu'il ne sera mis aucun empêchement à leur construction ou réparation, pareillement ceux qui les desservent ne seront ni opprimés ni outragés.]

'It may be said that this was an *ex parte* statement, which has no binding force upon Turkey. But on the other hand it must be admitted that this manifest published officially at the time, never protested against, to the best of my belief, neither by the Porte, nor by other foreign Power, stands on record among the other public law of Russia; and, in fairness, it cannot be denied that the nation at large has a right to expect that the religious feeling proclaimed by the Empress Catherine, in behalf of the Greek Church, should be taken by the Emperor Nicholas with serious consideration.

\* *Pte. Aber. MSS., Add. MSS. 43144, ff. 377-9.* Brunnow to Aberdeen. The date added in another hand (and later) is June 24, 1853, but in fact that of May 27 is suggested by internal evidence.



'So much for the Treaty of Kainardji. It is at least worth as much as the French capitulation of 1740!'

Brunnow's statement seems an *ex parte* one. An Imperial manifest, even if it were not contradicted by the Turks, would certainly not be accepted by other powers as an authoritative exposition of the Treaty. And Brunnow's appeal to force in private shows his difficulty. Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation' of the 'Vienna Note' was an absurd straining of Kutchuk Kainardji (*vide* my article in *E.H.R.*, April 1934, pp. 284-5). It is a true development of interpretations on the Brunnow line of force—'Russia is strong, Turkey is weak.'

(c) *British interpretations in 1853, Lord John Russell's, Palmerston's, Aberdeen's, the Prince Consort's.*

It is obvious from Lord John Russell's letter of May 28 that he regarded the stipulations of Kutchuk Kainardji as not very onerous, and his memo of June 19 declares that they 'placed the Christian subjects of the Sultan in general terms under the protection of Russia.' He regarded the demands of Menšikov as enormously extending the provisions of the Treaty. Palmerston expressed himself still more vigorously. 'The Kainardji treaty contains indeed a promise to protect the Christian religion generally and to attend to Russian representations as to the Greek Church at Constantinople, but that is very different from giving Russia a right of interference in all matters spiritual and temporal in which the Greek subjects of the Sultan are concerned. This would practically transfer to the Emperor the civil administration of the Greeks in Turkey.'\* Aberdeen and Clarendon also regarded Menšikov's demands as going beyond any possible interpretation of Kutchuk Kainardji.

Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation' of the 'Vienna Note' was based on Article VII of Kutchuk Kainardji. It was condemned by Clarendon (September 30) (*E.P.* II, No. 117, p. 556) as establishing 'a religious protectorate.' 'The Prince' [Consort] said 'Nobody can think of yielding to such pretensions,' and Lord John Russell added, 'in this I believe we all agree.'†

(d) *The Czar's admission in 1854.*

The Russian attitude, as already indicated, seems to have been hastily assumed towards the end of 1852, without really examining the clauses of the Treaty. Dr. G. B. Henderson has brought to my notice an admission by Nicholas of great importance. It is reported by Seymour 'on the most certain authority' as having been made by the Czar to Orlov, and in all probability the information came from Orlov himself. Nicholas said, 'His conduct would have been different [in 1853] but for the error into which he had been led'‡ [as to the rights secured to him by the Treaty of Kainardji]. I believe this to be the truth. No doubt informed Russian diplomats, like Brunnow, had always known the weakness of the Kutchuk Kainardji clause, and wanted to get more precision into it. The question was raised in a hasty manner in December 1852, and Brunnow does not appear to have been consulted. Thus Russians began arguing on vague and unsound bases, and became more and more vehement as the argument proceeded. Hence Menšikov's demands in the *Sened* and Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation.'

<sup>446</sup> P. 296. *F.O.* 78/894. From Rose, No. 89 of September 27, 1853.

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Lord John Russell, May 28, 1853; Lord Palmerston, June 20.

† *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Lord John Russell, September 29, 1853.

‡ *F.O.* 65/445. From Seymour, No. 176 of February 21, 1854.



<sup>447</sup> P. 297. *F.O.* 78 913. From Finn, No. 16 of December 28, 1852; passages quoted are suppressed in *E.P.* I, No. 63.

<sup>448</sup> P. 297. *A.E.F.* Russie, 208. From Castelbajac, No. 5 of January 6, 1853.

<sup>449</sup> P. 297. *F.O.* 65 424. From Seymour, No. 25 of January 22, 1853.

<sup>450</sup> P. 298. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 73 of November 29, 1852, pp. 277-8.

<sup>451</sup> P. 299. Brunnov to Nesselrode, February 21, 1853; *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 102, p. 308.

<sup>452</sup> P. 300. *Pte. Clar.* MSS. Palmerston to Clarendon, August 22, 1854; cp. *E.H.R.*, April 1934, 237; cp. H. E. Howard, *Camb. Hist. Journ.*, October 1934, 321.

## CHAPTER XII

### HOW COUNT LEININGEN SUCCEEDED AND WHY PRINCE MENŠIKOV FAILED

<sup>453</sup> P. 302. *F.O.* 195 385. From Rose, No. 51 of February 21, 1853.

<sup>454</sup> P. 302. *W.S.A.* Weisungen nach London an Colloredo, No. 2 res. of February 10, 1853; *vide* also No. 3 of February 11.

<sup>455</sup> P. 303. *How Count Leiningen succeeded and why Prince Menšikov failed.*

*The Leiningen Mission. His instructions and reports.* (While there is a good deal of information in the text based on *W.S.A.* and *F.O.*, the papers of Count Leiningen-Westerburg were not then in my hands. They have since been consulted and the results are given herewith.)

[*W.S.A.* Leiningen MSS. Constantinople and Trieste. To Leiningen, January 22, 1853. From Leiningen, No. 2 of February 3, unnumbered, Trieste, February 26; No. 9 of March 1, Vienna.]

#### (a) *Instructions of Buol*, January 1853.

Instruction No. 1 of January 22, 1853, states that the situation on the border is dangerous owing to the ill-treatment of Christians in Bosnia by Omer pasha. Russia and Austria are agreed not to allow Montenegro to be crushed. If Montenegro is conquered by the time of your arrival you are to insist upon its being evacuated and restored. The Klek and Sutorina question must be arranged. Compensation must be paid to private individuals. There must be a speedy settlement of all claims. The real point is contained in the postscript to Instruction No. 1 of January 22, 1853, which states that the Polish and Hungarian refugees have incited the Turks to a holy war against Montenegro, and a continuance of it might lead to a revolution in Europe. This seems to be the real reason for Austrian excitement. The other instructions are not particularly notable, except for hints as to the incompetence of the Internuncio (Stürmer), and for insistence on clearing up the situation at Klek and Sutorina.

#### (b) *Reports of Count Leiningen*, February-March 1853.

In his audience with the Sultan on February 3 Count Leiningen dwelt not only on these points but on the increasing war preparations of Turkey. Altogether it was a pretty strong speech to make to a crowned head. On the 14th he settled all outstanding points with Fuad and took formal leave of the Sultan next day. On the 26th he claimed 'an outstanding success for his mission,' and on March 1 he summed up its results. He states, contrary to the usual impression, that Russian aid had been given too late in the day to be useful. But this evidence partly depends

on the assertions of Fuad, who was anxious to deprive Russia of all credit. Leiningen's last point is that he received a certain amount of help from England and that it was because of her attitude that he abandoned his demands with reference to Sutorina.

<sup>456</sup> P. 303. *E.P.* I, No. 72. Nesselrode to Brunnow, January 14, 1853.

<sup>457</sup> P. 304. *A.E.F.* Russie, 208. From Castelbajac, No. 17 of January 13, 1853, and No. 8 of January 14.

<sup>458</sup> P. 304. Nesselrode, December 13, 1852; Zaiončovskii, I, 353.

<sup>459</sup> P. 305. *A.E.F.* Russie, 208. From Castelbajac, No. 17 of March 30, 1853, and Cte. de Reisel of July 2.

<sup>460</sup> P. 305. *F.O.* 65/431. From Seymour, No. 540 of October 18, 1853.

<sup>461</sup> P. 306. *F.O.* 352/36. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* Clarendon to Stratford, April 5, 1853, transmitting a secret report he thinks tolerably correct.

<sup>462</sup> P. 306. Zaiončovskii, I, Nos. 105-9, January 28, 1853; Schiemann, IV, 282 and n.

<sup>463</sup> P. 307. The text of the Czar's letter of January 24, 1853, is in *F.O.* 78/934 and also in Zaiončovskii.

<sup>464</sup> P. 309. *F.O.* 78/895. From Rose, No. 164 of December 18, 1852.

<sup>465</sup> P. 309. *E.P.* I, No. 123.

<sup>466</sup> P. 310. *N.R.A.* From Mollerus, No. 48 of May 23/4, 1853.

<sup>467</sup> P. 310. *The Menšikov Mission and Reschid.* The problems of the Menšikov Mission seem to me to have been solved partly by Menšikov's own admissions in his despatches in Zaiončovskii, partly by the evidence of *N.R.A.* and *pte. Clar.* and *pte. Strat. MSS.* quoted by me in *E.H.R.*, October 1933, April and October 1934.

The main points disclosed by Zaiončovskii are that Reschid was negotiating secretly with Russia in the autumn of 1852 and suggested the pushing of claims under the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, and that Reschid was nominated for the Foreign Office by Menšikov himself. The evidence from *N.R.A.* and other sources (*vide* self in *E.H.R.*, October 1933, pp. 613-17) entirely confirms all this.

Menšikov, though warned against Reschid, decided to employ him. But once in office Reschid found himself helpless and resorted to Stratford for aid. In order to get out of his complications with Menšikov, he subsequently put all the blame on Stratford. But the facts (*vide E.H.R.*, October 1933, pp. 609-17, *passim*) show that the Turkish Ministry and Grand Council were opposed to real concession, and that Stratford's part was almost a passive one. It is certain that he did not know of the deposition of Mehemet Ali and appointment of Reschid till after they had taken place, and was much astonished at both. At his interview with Reschid on the 14th he did not know all. On the 18th he had regained most of his old ascendancy, but even on the 20th Reschid did not take his advice about negotiating so as to keep Menšikov in Constantinople. It is also to be remembered (*vide E.H.R.*, October 1933, 609, n. 2) that Stratford did not know the text of Menšikov's violent demands of March 16 until the end of May 1853. In general the Turks had kept him in the dark as to their manœuvres as long as they could, and hence his inability to comprehend the situation as clearly as usual. It seems to me pretty certain that, if Reschid had been able to sway the majority of the ministry in his favour, Stratford would have been overborne. What defeated Menšikov was that Reschid failed to influence the other ministers, and hence turned to Stratford to help him out of the difficulty. It was thus the resistance of the majority of the Turkish ministers which proved the decisive factor in the defeat of the Russian proposals. One other point

should be made. The evidence of Mehemet Ali, another principal actor, is prejudiced and not to be trusted (*vide* my article, *E.H.R.*, October 1933, 615, n. 1).

<sup>468</sup> P. 310. *F.O.* 195/385. From Rose, No. 75 of March 7, 1853.

<sup>469</sup> P. 311. *F.O.* 27/964. From Cowley, No. 161 of March 19, 1853.

<sup>470</sup> P. 311. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Cowley to Clarendon, March 21, 1853, and correspondence with Drouyn de Lhuys of March 22.

<sup>471</sup> P. 311. *Rose's summons of the fleet.* There is a good deal of mystery as to when Clarendon received the news. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* shows that Cowley on March 16 sent Clarendon two telegraphic despatches indicating that Rose had summoned the fleet. These were not authentic evidence, though Clarendon got them on the 18th. He seems to have received official French intelligence on the 19th, and on that day he certainly received Dundas' query from the Admiralty. Rose's despatch did not reach London (*F.O.* 78/930. From Rose, No. 73 of March 6) till midnight on March 19-20, by *H.M.S. Swan*. It was on this intelligence that the meeting of the four efficient ministers acted on the 20th.

There is a strange story, referred to in the *Times* of April 10, 1935, that Mr. Drury Wake rode from Constantinople to Belgrade in six days and seven nights, with a despatch from Rose to Clarendon asking him to call up the fleet. In all he took eleven days. Clarendon replied 'Nonsense, young man, there will be no war,' and relied on 'Sir Stratford Canning's' views. This is alleged to have taken place in April 1854 (1853?). But Stratford was not in London in April 1853, and was no longer 'Sir Stratford' but a peer. It cannot refer to 1854, for Rose was no longer in authority. It may refer to some unknown episode in March 1853. One thing is certain. Drury Wake really went this ride, for he was injured for some years after it (*vide Mem. of Lady Charlotte Wake*, by Lucy Wake [1909], ch. xix).

<sup>472</sup> P. 312. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Russell to Clarendon, March 20, 1853.

<sup>473</sup> P. 312. *W.S.A. Berichte aus England.* From Colloredo, No. 17B of March 1, 1853.

<sup>474</sup> P. 312. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Aberdeen to Clarendon, March 21, 1853.

<sup>475</sup> P. 313. *F.O.* 352/36. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* Clarendon to Stratford, April 18, 1853.

<sup>476</sup> P. 314. Self in *E.H.R.*, October 1933, p. 607.

<sup>477</sup> P. 315. *E.P.* I, enclo. to No. 160.

<sup>478</sup> P. 316. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 115, p. 392. From Menšikov of March 24, 1853.

<sup>479</sup> P. 316. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 119, p. 398. From Argyropoulo (the intermediary) to Menšikov, March 29, 1853.

<sup>480</sup> P. 317. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Lord John Russell to Clarendon, May 28, 1853.

<sup>481</sup> P. 318. *F.O.* 195/411. From Doria, April 1, 1853. The Turkish preparations for naval defence of the Bosphorus were nearly complete before Stratford's arrival (*vide F.O.* 78/932. From Stratford, No. 70 of May 28, 1853, enclosing report of Capt. Slade of May 12).

<sup>482</sup> P. 319. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 125, p. 405. From Menšikov, pte. of April 26, 1853.

<sup>483</sup> P. 319. *Pte.* From Stratford of April 27. Poole, *Life*, II, 260.

<sup>484</sup> P. 320. *E.P.* I, No. 179, enclo. No. 1.

<sup>485</sup> P. 320. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 121, p. 399. Menšikov to Nesselrode, April 10, 1853.

<sup>486</sup> P. 320. *Zaiončovskii*, I, No. 105, p. 372; No. 108, pp. 377-8. From Nesselrode, January 28, 1853.

- <sup>487</sup> P. 321. *N.R.A.* From Mollerus (Constantinople), No. 46 of May 16, 1853.
- <sup>488</sup> P. 322. Zaiončovskii, I. From Menšikov, No. 13 of May 6, 1853, p. 414, reporting Ozérov.
- <sup>489</sup> P. 323. *F.O.* 78/932. From Stratford, No. 43 of May 10, 1853. The first quotation is omitted in *E.P.* I, No. 203.
- <sup>490</sup> P. 324. This detail is given only by Alison, pte. to Layard, May 20, 1853, pte. *Lay. MSS.* *Add. MSS.* 38981, f. 333.
- <sup>491</sup> P. 324. *N.R.A.* From Mollerus, No. 46 of May 16, 1853; No. 48 of May 23-4.
- <sup>492</sup> P. 325. *F.O.* 78/932. From Stratford, No. 47A of May 14, 1853; passage suppressed in *E.P.* I, No. 205.
- <sup>493</sup> P. 325. *F.O.* 78/932. From Stratford, No. 50 of May 15, 1853.
- <sup>494</sup> P. 326. *E.P.* I, enclos. 2 and 3 to No. 196.
- <sup>495</sup> P. 326. Zaiončovskii. From Menšikov, No. 141 of May 16, 1853, p. 427.
- <sup>496</sup> P. 326. *F.O.* 195/406. Reschid to Musurus [London] of July 5, 1853.
- <sup>497</sup> P. 328. *Vide E.P.* I, No. 196; *vide* also No. 209.
- <sup>498</sup> P. 329. *F.O.* 352/64. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* Stratford to Reschid (May 20), 1853.
- <sup>499</sup> P. 329. *E.P.* I, Nos. 239, 244.
- <sup>500</sup> P. 330. Zuylen de Nyevelt, quoted in self, *E.H.R.*, October 1933, p. 616.
- <sup>501</sup> P. 331. *E.P.* I, No. 322, enclo. Nos. 2 and 3.

## CHAPTER XIII

## HOW PEACE ENDED

- <sup>502</sup> P. 334. *N.R.A.* From Mollerus, No. 65 of July 11, 1853; cp. self in *E.H.R.*, October 1934.
- <sup>503</sup> P. 335. *Pte. Aber. MSS.*, *Add. MSS.* 43144, f. 358, Brunnow to Aberdeen of May 16, 1853; *ibid.*, 43188, f. 111, Clarendon to Aberdeen of May 18.
- <sup>504</sup> P. 335. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Lord John Russell to Clarendon, May 28 and 29, 1853. Cp. Kingsley Martin, *Triumph of Lord Palmerston* [1924], 125, 128. His whole survey of the press and opinion is excellent.
- <sup>505</sup> P. 336. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* *F.O.* 352/36. Clarendon to Stratford, June 1, 1853.
- <sup>506</sup> P. 336. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* *F.O.* 352/36. Clarendon to Stratford, June 8, 1853.
- <sup>507</sup> P. 336. *Pte. Russ. MSS.* *G.D.* 22/11. Aberdeen to Russell, June 21, 1853; *vide* also *Grev. Journ.*, June 22, both referring to this cabinet of the 18th.
- <sup>508</sup> P. 337. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, June 19, 1853.
- <sup>509</sup> P. 337. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, June 28, 1853.
- <sup>510</sup> P. 337. Palmerston to Aberdeen, July 4, 1853, and to Russell, July 7; Ashley, *Life* [1876], II, 26-31.
- <sup>511</sup> P. 338. *N.R.A.* From Mollerus, No. 67 of July 14, 1853; for Derby and Malmesbury, *vide* self, *E.H.R.*, October 1933, p. 621 and nn.; for Clarendon, *ibid.*, April 1934, p. 291.
- <sup>512</sup> P. 338. Queen Victoria, *Letters*, 3rd Ser. I, 195.
- <sup>513</sup> P. 338. *Grev. unpublished Journ.*, March 24, 1853. Gladstone confirmed this.

<sup>514</sup> P. 339. *Pte. Strat. MSS. F.O. 352/36.* Report of Capt. T. A. Blakely, April 23, 1853; *F.O. 78/934*, reports of Capt. Drummond and Admiral Slade of June 30.

<sup>515</sup> P. 340. *E.P. I, No. 323.*

<sup>516</sup> P. 340. *Pte. Strat. MSS. F.O. 352/36.* Pisani to Stratford, June 11, 1853.

<sup>517</sup> P. 342. *Vide self in E.H.R., April 1934, 267, n. 3.*

<sup>518</sup> P. 342. *W.S.A. Weisungen nach Frankreich* Buol à Apponyi partre of June 21, 1853.

<sup>519</sup> P. 342. *Self in E.H.R., April 1934, p. 267.* Alison expressed the same opinion in private at this time.

<sup>520</sup> P. 343. *Pte. Glad. MSS.* Gladstone to Aberdeen, August 12, 1853.

<sup>521</sup> P. 344. *F.O. 352/36. Pte. Strat. MSS.* Clarendon to Stratford, June 24, 1853.

<sup>522</sup> P. 344. *Pte. Strat. MSS. F.O. 352/36.* Clarendon to Stratford, July 8, 1853.

<sup>523</sup> P. 345. *Grev. Journ., September 20, 1853. Vide also W.S.A. Berichte aus England.* From Colloredo, No. 68 of June 30, 1853.

<sup>524</sup> P. 347. *Stratford and the rejection of the Vienna Note.* Having examined this whole question more fully in *E.H.R., April 1934*, I may perhaps be allowed to quote the following passage summing up the conclusions (p. 275).

'At the time, suffering from very natural annoyance, Clarendon blamed Stratford for the failure. Aberdeen charged Stratford with "dishonesty", and continued his denunciations until war broke out. Most other statesmen, at any rate abroad, condemned him. To anyone not knowing the local conditions at Constantinople, it appeared at the time that the "Vienna Note" was preferable to the "Turkish ultimatum", and Stratford's reputation suffered accordingly. Even the publication of the Nesselrode ["violent"] "interpretation" did not rehabilitate him. But it is not usually recognized that Clarendon at least and at last recognized the error of this judgment. In an article, revised by himself ten years later, Clarendon refers to the "Vienna Note" and to the great responsibility undertaken by Stratford in causing its rejection. He adds: "The interpretation, afterwards put upon that Note by Count Nesselrode, showed that he [Stratford] was right." \* This is a very remarkable admission, for Clarendon confesses that Stratford was right in thus disobeying.'

Thus, it will be seen, Clarendon, while continuing to think Stratford dishonest, thought Stratford's rejection of the 'Note' right. The evidence does not seem to me to justify the charge of dishonesty against Stratford, and one or two new points (e.g. *supra*, pp. 345-7) seem to me to favour giving him the benefit of the doubt.

<sup>525</sup> P. 347. *F.O. 146/489.* From Cowley, No. 640 of August 29, 1853.

<sup>526</sup> P. 348. *Pte. Aber. MSS., Add. MSS. 43188, f. 223.* Clarendon to Aberdeen, August 20, 1853.

<sup>527</sup> P. 348. *Pte. Strat. MSS. F.O. 352/36.* Clarendon to Stratford, August 26, 1853.

<sup>528</sup> P. 348. *Grev. Journ., August 28, 1853; September 4. Corres. of Henry Reeve, I, 309.* Clarendon to Reeve, September 9, 1853.

<sup>529</sup> P. 350. *N.R.A.* From Mollerus, No. 90 of September 21, 1853. This confidence was made to the Dutch dragoman by the first Turkish dragoman very secretly.

\* *Edinburgh Review* of April 1863, p. 331. For Clarendon's connexion with this article, see Sir H. Maxwell, *Life of Clarendon* [1913], II, 278, and *pte. Clar. MSS., Correspondence with Reeve.*



<sup>530</sup> P. 350. *F.O.* 78/938. From Neale (Varna), September 7, 1853.

<sup>531</sup> P. 351. *Vide* self in *E.H.R.*, April 1934, 277-8; Puryear, 445.

<sup>532</sup> P. 352. *Stratford and the Fleet*. This question has been fully examined by me in *E.H.R.*, October 1934. The results of the examination are summed up by me *infra*, p. 506, at the end of App. IV.

<sup>533</sup> P. 352. *Pte. Glad. MSS.* Aberdeen to Gladstone, September 2, 1853.

<sup>534</sup> P. 353. *Aberdeen, Clarendon, and the instruction to the fleet of September 23, 1853*. The decision to summon the fleet on this day was taken, according to Aberdeen, to protect life and property in Constantinople, and was not anti-Russian. According to Clarendon it was not due to French pressure but 'because of the act of Russia,' i.e. Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation.' If the last statement be true then the decision was anti-Russian and due to fear of the British public.

This is probably true, though it is a little difficult to establish. The facts are these. British Ministers first heard of the 'violent interpretation' on September 16. But its text was not in the British press until the 23rd, and then only in late editions. It is plain, however, that the press knew the substance of it on the 21st and 22nd. *The Times*, the 'Brunnow organ,' remained moderate, but its leader shows distinct knowledge of Nesselrode's claim on the 22nd. So did other organs. *The Morning Chronicle*, Palmerston's organ, only got the text late on the 23rd, and it was not till the 24th that either this organ or the *Morning Post* really unloosed the furies. But on the 23rd, the day of decision, Clarendon knew well enough that the secret was either out or on the point of being disclosed, and was influenced accordingly.

<sup>535</sup> P. 353. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, September 12, 1853. Lord John Russell, September 22. Lord John's refusal of responsibility was on the 17th.

<sup>536</sup> P. 354. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Aberdeen to Clarendon, September 23, 1853. The joint utterance of the two men is in *E.P.* II., No. 108.

<sup>537</sup> P. 354. *Edinburgh Review*, April 1863, 326, and *E.H.R.*, April 1934, 275, n. 2.

<sup>538</sup> P. 355. *W.S.A.* Buol nach Frankreich und England, September 23, 1853. The note as ultimately drawn up (*vide E.P.* II, enclo. No. 126) substantially followed these lines.

<sup>539</sup> P. 355. *W.S.A.* Weisungen nach Frankreich, September 23, 1853; nach England, September 28; Konstantinopel, October 3.

<sup>540</sup> P. 355. *Vide* Hübner, *Neuf Ans*, Paris [1904], I, 156-7, *ap.*, October 3 and 5, 1853.

<sup>541</sup> P. 356. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Lord John Russell to Clarendon, October 4, 1853. Clarendon's letter to his wife, October 3, in Maxwell's *Life*, II, 25.

<sup>542</sup> P. 357. *W.S.A.* Berichte aus England. From Colloredo, No. 102D of October 8, 1853.

<sup>543</sup> P. 357. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* *F.O.* 352/36. Clarendon to Stratford, October 8, 1853.

<sup>544</sup> P. 358. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Aberdeen to Clarendon, December 21, 1853; February 12, 1854.

<sup>545</sup> P. 358. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Sidney Herbert to Clarendon, October 8, 1853.

<sup>546</sup> P. 358. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* *F.O.* 352/36. Palmerston to Stratford, October 30, 1853.

<sup>547</sup> P. 359. *F.O.* 78/938. From Stratford, No. 255 of September 1, 1853, reporting interview of Alison with Reschid.

<sup>648</sup> P. 360. *Ptc. Strat. MSS. P.O. 352, 36.* Clarendon to Stratford, October 8, 1853.

<sup>649</sup> P. 360. *P.O. 78, 938.* From Stratford, No. 281 of September 27, 1853. Very little notice has been taken of this point.

<sup>650</sup> P. 362. *Vide* references in my article in *E.H.R.*, April 1934, p. 283, nn. 1 and 2.

<sup>651</sup> P. 363. *Ger. Journ.*, September 26, 1853 (conversation with Clarendon of the 22nd); *pte. Clar. MSS.* Russell, September 22; Palmerston, October 4.

<sup>652</sup> P. 364. *P.O. 78, 939.* Col. E. L. Neale (Shumla), October 7-8, 1853; encl. in Stratford's No. 207 of October 15.

<sup>653</sup> P. 365. *P.O. 78, 940.* Report of Selim pasha, October 28, 1853; encl. in Stratford's No. 329 of November 5.

<sup>654</sup> P. 365. *P.O. 195, 385.* Memo of Lord Pevensey, October 19, 1853.

<sup>655</sup> P. 365. *Long rides.* Stratford based his accusation against Omer on the idea that a Turkish officer could in a single day have reached Shumla from Varna and then got on to Tutrakhan, after delivering his despatch. The distance traversed in 24 hours, not allowing for the stop, is 120 miles. A Tartar messenger might have done it. But it was unreasonable of Stratford to demand 120 miles, including a stop for fresh orders, from a Turkish officer who was usually a bad rider. That was the limit of the best Tartar couriers. Omer's excuse may therefore be a good one.

The reader must be warned against the truly oriental inaccuracy of some of the details given as to Balkan rides. Gibbon himself (ch. ii) gives details of a ride by Caesarius in Asia Minor which seems to be inaccurate. In another case he is certainly so. In ch. xiv he speaks of the Emperor Maximin, after a defeat at Heraclea (Eregli) arriving 'pale, trembling, and without the imperial ornaments' at Nicomedia (Ismid), having in twenty-four hours traversed 160 miles! In ch. xiv he gives the distance between Eregli and Constantinople at 60 miles (it is really 58). But the distance from Constantinople to Ismid is 92 kilometres, or about 55 miles, which makes the total mileage about 113-115 miles, allowing for the sea passage, or 45 less than Gibbon assumes. This is well within the Tartar record for 24 hours.

The details of Captain Townley's famous ride (carrying Palmerston's despatch of October 6-7, 1849; *vide supra*, p. 264) are also absurdly misstated by himself (Major Byng-Hall, *The Queen's Messenger* [1865], ch. v). He claims to have ridden 820 miles in 5 days and 11 hours. The mistake is extraordinary and was not corrected in the second edition of the book [1870], though quotation is professedly made from a letter of Townley's in 1849. In reality the distance from Belgrade to Constantinople is not 820 but 592 miles! Townley thus rode an average of 106 miles a day during a period of 5 days and 11 hours, and this magnificent feat exceeds any authentic record known to me.

If a sober English courier exaggerates his claims, Balkan writers are much more remarkable. The distance is claimed to have been once ridden by a Serb in five days and by a Tartar normally in four days! Unfortunately a specific instance is quoted of Tartar Bogdan, who rode from Constantinople to Kragujevac in 1830, *i.e.* 537 miles in 5½ days, or not quite 100 miles a day. This particular ride was clearly regarded as extraordinary, and I think we may discount the others. For a single day's ride by a Tartar the limit of 120 miles was rarely, if ever, exceeded, and the only authentic case of a ride lasting several days exceeding the average rate of 100 is that of Townley, who got up to 106.

As regards camel rides in the desert, Lawrence (*Seven Pillars* [1935], 338) says an armed force could do 80 miles easily in 24 hours, and 110 miles in emergency. He claims himself to have done 143 miles in 24 hours on two separate occasions. I have no check on these figures.

## CHAPTER XIV

## HOW WAR BEGAN

<sup>556</sup> P. 366. *Grev. unpublished Journ.*, October 18, 1853, speaking 'a day or two before.' The information about Lady Palmerston was from Henry Greville.

<sup>557</sup> P. 366. Stanmore, *Aberdeen* [1893], 232-5; *pte. Glad. MSS.* To Gladstone, October 17, 20, 1853.

<sup>558</sup> P. 367. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Aberdeen to Clarendon, October 23, 1853.

<sup>559</sup> P. 367. *Grev. Journ.*, November 2, 1853. The despatch is in *E.P.* II, No. 164, and comments in *pte. Clar. MSS.* (Graham to Clarendon, October 25), and *pte. Aber. MSS., Add. MSS.* 43188, f. 301, Clarendon to Aberdeen of November 4.

<sup>560</sup> P. 372. Slade, *Turkey and the Crimean War*, 152-5.

<sup>561</sup> P. 373. Meyendorff, III, 100. To Nesselrode, December 11, 1853.

<sup>562</sup> P. 374. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston, December 11, 1853; Aberdeen, December 14.

<sup>563</sup> P. 375. *Pte. Aber. MSS., Add. MSS.* 43188, f. 358. Clarendon to Aberdeen, December 18, 1853, quoted by Kingsley Martin, *Triumph of Lord Palmerston*, 170-1; who also gives most of the press quotations.

<sup>564</sup> P. 377. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Lord John Russell, December 19, 1853; Lord Aberdeen, December 21; Walewski to Lord Clarendon, December 21; Cowley to Clarendon, December 20; cp. App. VII.

<sup>565</sup> P. 377. *F.O.* 27/978. From Cowley, No. 975 of December 21, 1853, recd. 1.15 P.M. ackng. *pte. letter* of Clarendon.

<sup>566</sup> P. 378. The Franco-British squadron was prepared to prevent the Turkish one from being aggressive. The communications went to Constantinople on the 24th. But Napoleon had already agreed by telegraph to the cabinet's decision. *Vide pte. Clar. MSS.* Walewski to Clarendon, December 23, 1853.

<sup>567</sup> P. 380. Some touches are here incorporated from a private letter of Alison to Cowley of December 21, 1853, in *pte. Clar. MSS.*

<sup>568</sup> P. 381. *Russia's attitude towards the entrance of the Franco-British fleet into the Black Sea.* It seems to be quite clear that, after Sinope, Nesselrode was prepared to see the Franco-British fleet in the Black Sea, and was not prepared to go to war over that alone. His attitude on December 30, 1853, in conversation with Seymour (*E.P.* II, No. 391), seems to indicate that. On the other hand Seymour was quite certain that the communication he made on January 12, 1854 (*E.P.* II, No. 412) would produce war. This was the despatch of December 24, 'the wine with the water left out,' and intimated that Russian ships would be forcibly turned back and made to re-enter Russian ports. It may be argued that the Czar would have considered the mere entry of allied ships into the Black Sea a *casus belli*. His own words can be quoted to that effect. 'Are your fleets moving?' (*i.e.* into the Black Sea) he asked Castelbajac. 'I shall be forced to consider an act of that kind as an act of war [on the part] of your government.' \*

\* *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Letter from Castelbajac of December 13, 1853, reporting an interview of the 12th.

But this was on December 12. The Czar always talked like a dictator, but did not always act as one. He had shown great moderation under stress, as *e.g.* at Olmütz. It is possible that he would have accepted the fact of entry a month later, and at this suggestion Nesselrode seemed to hint. But it was impossible for the Czar to accept the despatch of the 24th accompanying the entry, and it is surprising that anyone thought he could do so.

<sup>569</sup> P. 382. *Pte. Clar. MSS.* Palmerston to Clarendon, January 19, 1854.

<sup>570</sup> P. 383. *E.P.* II, No. 412. From Seymour, No. 36 of January 13, 1854. The interview was on the 12th. I have given a few details, suppressed in *E.P.* II, No. 412, from *F.O.* 65 415.

<sup>571</sup> P. 385. Stanmore, *Life of Aberdeen* [1903], 302-3. The quotation differs in some respects from the authorised version, but no doubt Aberdeen wrote out the text from memory.

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## APPENDIX I

### MEMORANDUM BY CONSUL WOOD ON HIS SERVICES IN SYRIA, LEBANON, ETC. (1831-45) \*

[The enclosed document gives more authentic details of the instructions and work of this secret agent of Ponsonby than I have found elsewhere. It should be read in connexion with the inquiry into Ponsonby's probity. *Vide supra*, ch. iii, n. 148.]

'In 1831 I first went to Syria with Mr. Mandeville's authority to watch the events consequent on the invasion of that country by the Viceroy of Egypt, pursuant to a previous agreement between him and the reigning prince of the Lebanon [Emir Beshir].

'At the close of the war, and after an absence of two years and a half, I rejoined the Embassy but almost immediately after my return, an insurrection broke out, and Lord Ponsonby directed me to revisit Syria to observe and report on the state of affairs and the real feeling of the people, and to state the means possessed by Ibrahim Pasha to carry on the war against the Porte and what the Syrians could do against him [Ibrahim].

'Pursuant to His Lordship's instructions, I repaired to the Emir Beshir, who was vacillating but inclined to favour the Egyptians in consequence of the influence the French possessed over him.

'The Emir, after having been made to perceive his own danger from the Egyptians and the true posture of affairs, and the probable ultimate restoration to the Sultan of Syria, promised to support the Sultan with 40,000 men if he perceived that the measures taken by the Porte were such as to secure victory, but he used this expression "that before the Turks could retain Syria they would find nothing but stones"—an expression from which I adduced his real feelings and which gave rise to a protracted and difficult negotiation.' †

[Wood then relates how during his absence 'to the North of Syria,' Ibrahim moved suddenly to the south by the advice of his agents, with 13,000 men, 'filled the Lebanon with his troops, and with the aid of the Emir [Beshir], disarmed it, after which he enrolled the Druses in his army and banished all the chiefs who were obnoxious to his coadjutor.'](On my return) 'I found myself surrounded in a convent in the heart of the mountains by 4000 Egyptians and natives, headed by one of the Emir's sons

\* F.O. 78/961. [Cp. Wood's record in *Foreign Office List* [1893], 221-2.]

† The date is 1835. The Emir Beshir means that he will stick to Ibrahim.

whose only occupation appeared to be to hang the poor peasants on the trees within sight of my temporary residence.

‘These events (the result of pre-concerted measures in Egypt,) calculated to confirm the authority of the Viceroy in his newly acquired provinces, were speedily turned by me to the advantage of the Porte.

‘The treachery of the Emir [Beshir] rendering it necessary to find another of nearly equal power and influence with himself, but of pure loyal intentions, I consulted with Emir Beshir-el-Kassim, who immediately promised that, whenever His Majesty’s government decided on expelling the Egyptians, he would willingly co-operate, provided he was furnished with 14,000 stand of arms, a promise which he afterwards fulfilled with the utmost courage and devotion. The Maronites of Kesrouan were at the same time withdrawn from French influence, and the Druses, who had suffered from Mehemet Ali’s conscription, were made to feel the heavy penalty they had paid for their disloyalty to their sovereign (the Sultan).

‘On communicating these events to Lord Ponsonby I was ordered by His Lordship to proceed to the Turkish army, which was supposed to be in Mesopotamia but which I found engaged in hostilities in the heart of Kurdistan, in order to ascertain its force and position, and, above all, the loyalty of its commander Reschid [Mehemet] Pasha respecting whom serious doubts were entertained, as well as to report on the encroachment of the Egyptians on the left bank of the Euphrates towards Bagdad, in pursuance of the then plan of Mehemet Ali, encouraged by France, to erect the Peninsula of Arabia into an Independent Empire.’

[Details about travels and negotiation with Reschid Pasha, and subsequent journey to Bagdad—and to Rowanduz.]

‘After the battle of Nezib (1839) and the insurrection which ensued in the Lebanon, Lord Ponsonby was pleased to direct me to proceed again to Syria to watch the events that were passing there, but to communicate previously with the acting admiral Sir John Louis at Smyrna, in order to acquaint him with the circumstance and with the arrival at Beyruth of the Turkish Squadron, which had treacherously fled to Alexandria under Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, with 4000 Turkish marines sent by the Viceroy to suppress the rebellion, but which, in virtue of his former instructions not to permit the Turkish fleet to approach Syria, he might intercept with propriety.

‘Having failed to persuade the Admiral to follow a suggestion which might have lessened the obstinacy which the Viceroy afterwards evinced in refusing the terms offered him for the amicable settlement of the Syrian question, I repaired forthwith to the district of Kesrouan (where I was known on account of my former residence) to concert measures in anticipation of the Treaty of July [1840]. In the meantime, a force of 18,000 Egyptians and Turks headed by the sons of the Emirs had penetrated into Lebanon and had put down the insurrection except in the district

of B'Sherry [Besharré] where I had proceeded on board H.M.S. the *Edinburgh*.

'The subsequent simultaneous arrival of the British fleet and the 5000 Turks which the Embassy had caused to be instantly despatched under Captain Walker from Constantinople with arms for the mountaineers, enabled me to distribute the *firman*s with which I was furnished and to call upon the inhabitants to arm themselves in support of their sovereign, a call which they obeyed with alacrity in the presence of an overwhelming force in spite of the Emir [Beshir] whose influence over them had been undermined as early as 1835, and in disregard to [of ?] the threats or entreaties of the French agents of missionaries. As the details of this short but eventful campaign would extend beyond all reasonable limits, I may be permitted to allude to such occurrences only as relate to some of my acts in reference thereto.

'On the third day after the landing of the combined forces at Djuni, it was intimated to me by Sir C[harles] Napier that, as the mountaineers did not come to be armed, as I had led the Ambassador to believe, the Admiral was thinking of embarking the troops and taking them back to Cyprus to be drilled during the winter, I replied that as the roads had not been cleared of the enemy, it was unreasonable to expect that unarmed peasants could penetrate to us, and I left on the same day for Gazir with 200 Turks and 100 marines to open the communications (notwithstanding the large sum which the Emir had offered for my head, and the standing order of Ibrahim Pasha to shoot me), and which was effected with little trouble and less fighting. This preliminary step brought, on the second day, the whole of the population of Kesrouan with their Emir to Djuni, to be armed. The campaign thus opened, the demand for arms continued until 84,000 muskets were distributed.

'The Emir Beshir-el-Kassim, faithful to the promise he had made some years before, through my medium, now joined (on being summoned home) the combined forces, and his first exploit was the defeat of Osman Pasha on his way with 6000 troops to reinforce Ibrahim and Suleiman Pasha who were preparing to dislodge us from Djuni. For this important service and as a stimulus to further exertions I put him in possession of the *firman* of Investiture which conferred upon him the government of the Lebanon and which I had obtained in anticipation of the Ex-Emir's treachery.

'In order to give it him Sir Baldwin Walker and I had to penetrate seven leagues into the mountains and to cross and recross the enemy's lines at night. The surrender of Beyrouth and the capture of Sidon and Acre (in which actions I assisted in the capacity in which Lord Ponsonby placed me under general Sir Charles Smith) put a stop for nearly two months to any further military operations. In obedience to the wishes of the Porte I employed the interval in giving a temporary form of administration to the places that had acknowledged Her authority.

' Ibrahim Pasha, availing himself of this respite, was concentrating the remainder of his forces in Damascus, to the number of 62,000 men, where he was perfectly well aware we had not the means of molesting him. In this dilemma, and in virtue of the powers I held from the Sultan, I quitted the headquarters of the combined forces at Beyrouth for Cioele-Syria, 16 leagues only from the Egyptian camp, and from thence with the 4000 armed peasants I had subsidized, I not only supported the surrounding population to cut off the Egyptian troops that were on their way to their headquarters, but I was also able to drive back their foraging parties, with the view of compelling them for want of provisions to commence their retreat.

' Difficult as it may appear of belief, it is no less a fact that Ibrahim Pasha suffered so much from his guerilla warfare, that he marched and attacked in person a detachment of peasants that was operating against him eight leagues from the former city. The natives whom I had formed into armed bands were the only troops that acted in the interior, or did the duty of Videttes [*sic*].

' The intercepted letters of Ibrahim Pasha proved beyond a doubt that he was in communication with the Chiefs of the mountains of Nabluz, and betrayed his plan of falling back upon that district with the object of recommencing his offensive operations. It became therefore absolutely necessary that he should be defeated in his plan, and in order to effect this and in consequence of the orders to the Turkish troops not to leave the Coast, I had only the option of following him in his retreat, with the 4000 peasants mentioned above, until he had halted at Keis, and I myself at Tiberias, within sight of each other for three consecutive days and in danger of being swept off by his 42,000 men, still in a state to take the field. The headquarters of the combined army were at this time at Jaffa on the coast, 42 leagues from Tiberias. The subsequent possession by the peasants of the passes of Nabluz left Ibrahim no choice but to continue his retreat through the desert where he lost 28,000 of his men,\* whereby Syria was gained to the Sultan without further trouble.

' The peremptory orders that I received in the interval from Lord Ponsonby to continue the war until such time as peace was established on a firmer basis between the belligerents, occasioned me to proceed to Ramitd [Rameth?] where an opinion prevailed that there was no further necessity for offensive operations, etc. The production of his Lordship's instructions having decided the course that was to be pursued, General Jochmus marched with 12,000 men on Gaza where a large force had been sent by the Viceroy, which attacked us at Heydel, notwithstanding that peace had been concluded at Alexandria. In this action the only cavalry possessed by the combined forces had been collected by me in the interior and brought into the field.

\* Cp., however, *supra*, ch. iv, n. 193, p. 429, where his losses are estimated at 18-19,000.



‘The exhausted state in which Ibrahim Pasha reached Gaza, the heavy losses he had sustained in his disastrous retreat through the desert into which he had been forced by the armed peasants, the defeat of his plan to reach Nabluz, and the rising *en masse* of the population compelled him to submit to the terms offered to him. It is now known that he had the intention of renewing the campaign the moment he could occupy Gaza, re-open his communications with Egypt and recruit his army.

‘In assuming the duties of Her Majesty’s Consulate in Damascus, I was likewise directed by the Turkish Government to report to it on the state of Syria, and to assist its officers in establishing a regular form of administration, in regulating the system in the Lebanon, in proclaiming and establishing the Tanzimat and in fixing the taxes, etc. Much labour and time were required to carry out these different objects in a newly conquered country, the inhabitants of which were armed and disposed to resist a new order of things.

‘In 1841 the Turks having secretly fomented a civil war between the Christians and Druses with the culpable object of weakening and destroying these rival sects I was mainly instrumental in dissuading the Porte’s functionaries from persisting in so cruel a policy and of bringing about a purification which put a stop to the threatened armed intervention of France on behalf of Her co-religionists.

‘These disorders having encouraged the Mussulman population of Damascus to concert measures for pillaging the Christians, it was through my influence with their ulemas that I deterred them from it. In this instance I saved some thousands of families from ruin.

‘About this period I had also the satisfaction to obtain the emancipation of the black slaves belonging to the Christians and Jews.

‘In 1842 \* the Druse[s] revolted against the government. After being dislodged from their positions in the Lebanon, they repaired to the Hauran from whence they defied the Turkish authorities who did not possess the means of subjugating them. Under these circumstances they appealed to His Majesty’s Consulate and I was able not without some difficulty to obtain their surrender and subsequently their pardon.

‘Their submission gave me the opportunity of inducing the Turkish authorities to make several important concessions to the Syrians in general whereby their disaffection to the Sultan was diminished.

‘The conversion of some *rayas* to Protestantism led to their persecution both by the Turkish and ecclesiastical authorities, which furnished me with the pretext of forcing them to admit the principle of religious toleration, and which principle was afterwards confirmed by Imperial *firman*s issued by the Porte

[\* Should be 1841.]

in consequence of the energetic remonstrances of Her Majesty's Ambassadors.

' In 1845 while a Civil War had broken out in the Anti-Lebanon between the Christians and Druses, the Emirs of the House of Harfoush conjointly with the Mutualis rebelled against the Sultan's rule. The Christians after losing 280 men were pillaged and driven out of their district, and the insurgent Emirs attacked and discomfited the Turkish Troops. Again the local authorities had recourse to Her Majesty's consulate for assistance; and while I reconciled the Druses and Christians, and restored the latter to their homes, I procured the surrender and submission of the Emirs and their partizans the Mutualis thus putting an end to a civil war and a rebellion at the same time.

' The admission of the Christians and Israelites into the Municipal Councils, affected [*sic*] through my means, was a recognition in part by the Mohammedans that the *raya* subjects of the Porte were entitled to the same privileges as themselves. The subsequent acknowledgement of their civil, religious and political rights has substantially improved their condition.

' Four years ago, after a great deal of opposition I succeeded in forming a Commercial Tribunal, composed of natives and foreign delegates, for the better administration of the affairs of the merchants and for the protection and development of the import and export trade.

' The accomplishment of the above measures together with the direct part that I have taken in restoring, in many instances, tranquillity to the country, in obtaining material concessions for the people, in interceding for them when exposed to cruel treatment and oppression, and, in short, in assisting both of them and their rulers in a variety of ways, I have caused the name of England to be respected by all, and to enjoy a greater amount of influence in this country than any other of the Foreign Powers.

' RICHARD WOOD.

' Damascus, March 28th, 1853.'

## APPENDIX II

TEXT OF CABINET MINUTE TO THE QUEEN, WITH RECORD OF  
DISSENT BY LORDS CLARENDON AND HOLLAND (JULY 8-9, 1840)

[Greville in his *Journal*, under September 10, 1840, states that he read the Cabinet Minute, 'submitting to the Queen the expediency of making the Treaty, to which was appended the dissent of Clarendon and Holland.' The recording of the dissent of individual ministers in a Cabinet Minute to the Crown is rare. I can only recollect one instance, that of the Duke of Argyll in 1739. Hence the full text is here reproduced. It will be noticed

that Lord (then Mr.) Macaulay, the historian, was a member of the Cabinet.]

Foreign Office, 8 July, 1840.\*

*Present*

Viscount Melbourne  
Lord Cottenham  
The Marquess of Lansdowne  
The Earl of Clarendon  
The Marquess of Normanby  
The Earl of Minto  
Lord John Russell  
Viscount Palmerston

Viscount Duncannon  
Lord Holland  
Viscount Morpeth  
Sir John Hobhouse  
Mr. Baring  
Mr. Labouchere  
Mr. Macaulay

‘Your Majesty’s confidential Servants most humbly submit to Your Majesty, that after a Negotiation of several Months, the Governments of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have been unable to prevail upon the Government of France to unite with the Four Powers above mentioned and with the Porte, in carrying into effect Such an arrangement of the Differences between The Sultan and Mehemet Ali, as, in the opinion of those Governments, would be consistent with the Principle upon which the Collective Note of the 27 July 1839 was founded, or with the Spirit of the Negotiations which have Since taken Place; and under these Circumstances, Your Majesty’s Confidential Servants, with the Exception of the Earl of Clarendon and Lord Holland are humbly of opinion that it is expedient that Viscount Palmerston Should prepare for Consideration a Draft of a Convention between the Four Powers and the Porte, founded upon the Principle of the Collective Note, and in accordance with the Spirit of the Subsequent Negotiations.

---

‘The Earl of Clarendon and Lord Holland in fulfilment of those Duties which Your Majesty’s Gracious appointment imposes upon every Confidential Servant of Your Crown, feel themselves painfully compelled to acknowledge that they cannot concur in the Minute which is this Day submitted to the Consideration of Your Majesty.

‘Your Majesty is therein advised to accede to a Treaty which has for it’s [*sic*] object the Expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Syria and Candia, & of his Son from the Pachalick of Arabia conferred upon him by the late Sultan.—Such Interference appears to Lord Clarendon and Lord Holland to be questionable in Policy, and neither necessary to the Honor of Your Majesty’s Crown in satisfaction of the Obligations contracted in the Collective Note of July 1839, nor directly or obviously advantageous to Your Majesty’s Subjects.

‘The means by which it is proposed that these Objects, in the event of Resistance, should be attained seem to them insufficient and yet onerous, and, above all, hazardous in the extreme.—Your

Majesty in no remote or improbable Contingency may be required in virtue of the Stipulation of such a Treaty to wage War on the Coasts, and to sanction the Introduction of other Foreign and European Troops into the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey.

‘Such Operations, in themselves humiliating to the Mussulman Powers, and ominous of the dismemberment of the Sultan’s Dominions, even if they should be eminently successful cannot in the actual State of those Provinces be expected to enlarge the Resources or to consolidate the Strength of the Ottoman Empire.—They must in the first instance interrupt the Commerce of Your Majesty’s Subjects with Countries now occupied by Mehemet Ali or his Son.—They must also interrupt or suspend the convenient Intercourse recently established through Egypt with Your Majesty’s Eastern Possessions.—These Sacrifices would in the Apprehension of Lord Clarendon and Lord Holland be of no inconsiderable Importance, but the more remote and indirect, tho’ it is feared not less undeniable tendency of the Treaty and of the Measures of Coercion arising therefrom threatens Consequences far more extensive and disastrous.—They may lead to a disturbance of that System of Policy and Alliances in Europe which under the happy auspices of Your Majesty and Your Predecessor has succeeded in preserving the Peace of the World, and has redounded to the Glory of Your Majesty’s Crown by increasing the Prosperity of Your People and enabling their Enterprize and Industry to extend the Intercourse and improve the condition of Mankind in every Quarter of the Globe.—’

‘Apprehensive of Consequences so alarming should any Coercion be resorted to for effecting the Purposes of the Treaty, Lord Clarendon and Lord Holland could not but refrain from becoming the Advisers of such a Step ; And although earnestly solicitous to prevent all appearance as well as reality of Difference in Your Majesty’s Councils, they yet feel it incumbent upon them to explain without Reserve, but they trust without Impropriety, the fact and grounds of their withholding their Assent to the Advice this Day submitted to the Consideration of Your Majesty.’

[*Note.*—This minute is enclosed in a covering letter from Lord Melbourne to the Queen, with a date almost impossible to read, but which looks like 19 July 1840, probably a slip for 9 July.]

### APPENDIX III

THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF 1840. STOPFORD, NAPIER AND PALMERSTON. THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR EXECUTION

[In this Appendix fuller details of the whole campaign are given and the limits of naval, military and civilian control indicated.]

Palmerston’s instruction of July 16 authorised Sir Robert Stopford ‘To take without delay the measures provided for therein,’ and added that he would be supported by an Austrian squadron.\*

\* *Ady.* I, 5503. Palmerston to Admiralty, July 16.

‘ Much latitude of discretion must necessarily be left to Sir Robert Stopford with respect to the particular measures, which should be taken with a view to carry into effect the intentions of the Allies ; and it would be inexpedient to fetter him by any precise instructions.

‘ It is the intention of the Allies to protect and support the Syrian subjects of the Sultan, in their endeavours to expel the troops and authorities of Mehemet Ali ; and in furtherance of this object, as well as for the accomplishment of the ulterior purposes of the Convention, the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria should be cut off.

‘ There are various ways in which the Syrians might be supported and assisted. In the first place, they should be immediately informed of the intention of the Allied Powers to support them ; it being explained to them at the same time, that the support of the Allies is given to them on the understanding that they remain faithful to the Sultan ; but that the Allies will recommend to the Sultan to grant to his Syrian subjects such future arrangements as may make their condition happy and prosperous.

‘ Secondly, arms and ammunition might be furnished to the Syrians, and a communication has been made to the Turkish and Austrian Governments, with a view to obtain for them supplies of this kind.

‘ Thirdly, military and naval assistance might be afforded them, by the landing of troops on the Syrian coast to occupy positions in which those troops might hold communication with the Syrians, and might cut off the communication between the different corps and detachments of Ibrahim's army. For this purpose, the Turkish Government has been strongly recommended to send a Body of five or six thousand men to Famagosta in Cyprus, to be ready to make a landing at any point on the Syrian coast, which Sir Robert Stopford and the Turkish officer in command of those troops, may think suitable for such a purpose ; and Sir Robert Stopford should place himself in communication with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in order to make arrangements for the safe conduct of such an expedition if it should be sent. If such an expedition should be sent, and should effect a landing on the coast, Sir R[obert] S[topford] should be authorized to occupy for a time any point in the Syrian coast, where he might be able to post a few hundred men in a strong position, so as to be in connection and co-operation with the Turkish force and at the same time to be protected and supported by British ships of war, and thus to be secure from any mischance. It is possible that such a landing of a Turkish and British force on some strong and tenable position on the coast, might afford useful encouragement and support to the Syrians, and might greatly embarrass the operations of Mehemet Ali's troops.

‘ The Porte has been advised to offer to pay up the arrears due to Mehemet Ali's troops in Syria, on condition of their returning to their allegiance to the Sultan, and Sir Robert Stopford should



give any encouragement and protection in his power to any portion of Mehemet Ali's troops, who may for such, or for any other reasons, manifest a disposition to return to their lawful allegiance to their sovereign.

'With respect to the cutting off all military and naval communications by sea between Egypt and the Ports of Syria, Sir Robert Stopford should be left to execute that measure in the manner and degree which circumstances may permit, or render advisable.

'In the uncertainty in which Her Majesty's Government must necessarily be, as to what may in this respect be the state of things when these instructions reach Sir Robert Stopford, all that can be said to Sir Robert Stopford is, that he will find in the documents sent to him the intentions and engagements of Her Majesty's Government, and that he must use his own discretion according to circumstances, and with reference to the means at his disposal, in carrying the proper measures into effect. He should cut off the communications as far as he can, using persuasion as far as possible, but employing force if that should at last become necessary.'

Stopford had sent Napier with the *Powerful* and the *Edinburgh* to lend a moral support to the insurrection in the Lebanon. On July 26 he recalled Napier and his two ships and also summoned the *Hastings* from Athens. This concentration at Mitylene was obviously right, and brought his squadron up to eight sail of the line. This was the same number as the French squadron in the Aegean. On August 3, owing to most unusual celerity, Stopford received the Convention of July 15, along with some accompanying documents, but not Palmerston's instruction of the 16th.\* He considered the situation to be 'entirely changed.' Concentration of his fleet seemed the right thing now. 'I cannot unman the ships, by landing any part of the marines.' He also disapproved of breaking his force up into small detachments in order to interrupt commerce from Egypt to Syria. The only practicable way of doing that was to blockade Alexandria, and that step he did not feel he wanted to take, as it was 'tantamount to a declaration of war.'†

On August 5 Ponsonby remonstrated with his usual vigour, stating to Stopford that his duty was 'positively to cut communications' and to 'employ force.'‡ Ponsonby declared the suppression of the insurrection in no way affected the issue. At this stage his reluctance to 'unman the ships' was due to two

\* *Ady.* I, 5503. Palmerston's instruction of July 16 only reached Malta on August 6.

† *Ady.* I, 5503. From Stopford, August 3, 1840. Palmerston, on learning Stopford's views on September 7, pronounced them to be 'erroneous.' He declined to issue further instructions, as he thought Stopford would already have acted.

‡ *Ady.* I, 5503. Ponsonby to Stopford, August 5, 1840.

reasons. He was first hampered by the fact that Ibrahim had crushed the Lebanon insurrection, but he still contemplated landing Turkish troops and interrupting Egyptian communications. The second reason was his fear of the French fleet. This was a real danger, and increased by despatches which reached him a little later. A collection of despatches sent him on July 24 warned him against the possible consequences of French irritation. Stopford spoke of a 'threatened French interference' so late as August 26, and was clearly justified in doing so. A somewhat contradictory instruction of July 25 told Stopford that 'there seemed to be no intention on the part of France to oppose by force the measures which the Allies have resolved to execute.' But this information only arrived in the first days of September. By that time the menaces of the French press at Paris, and of Pontois at Constantinople, had become so alarming that Palmerston had to write a new instruction to reassure Stopford 'notwithstanding hostile communications.' This was on September 7, but it did not reach him in time to affect action.

On August 10 Stopford heard news that the insurrection, supposed to have been crushed in the Lebanon, was raising its head again. He therefore sent back Napier with two ships to Beyrouth to support the insurrection but not to engage in actual hostilities. Napier issued various wild proclamations but did not use force. Stopford still thought he might have to send three or four sail of the line to Constantinople, but none the less prepared for the transport of arms to the mountaineers of Lebanon and for the carriage of 5,000 Turkish troops from Cyprus. These were to be landed in Syria as soon as Mehemet Ali was known to have rejected the second offer. On August 20 he recalled his last big vessel from the Dardanelles and moved to the heights of Beyrouth. On August 26 he himself proceeded to Alexandria, hoping that his arrival with a force might impress Mehemet Ali. He there satisfied himself by the time he left (September 6) that Mehemet Ali, by rejecting the second offer, justified him in using force. He also seems to have satisfied himself that the Egyptian fleet could be contained by the two ships of the line he had left outside the harbour of Alexandria. The French squadron was still off the Dardanelles and Stopford, having the interior lines, was secure against sudden attack and could not be overwhelmed in detail.\* He sailed back promptly to Beyrouth and began active operations on the 9th, the day after he arrived. He there made junction with the Austrian squadron and with the 25 Turkish transports, carrying 5,000 men, with one Turkish man-of-war, commanded by Admiral Walker. He had himself seven sail of the line, so that it was a respectable force.

Palmerston's idea of the strategy to be employed is best seen in this instruction to Sir Charles Smith: 'You will take care not to

\* *Ady.* I, 5503. From Stopford, September 20, 1840. An Admiralty minute of August 20 ordered Stopford to watch and, if possible, separate the Turkish and Egyptian fleets in the harbour of Alexandria.

allow the Turkish force to expose itself to defeat, or to advance recklessly into the interior.' \* On September 9 Stopford subjected Beyrouth to bombardment and under its cover landed Napier and the marines at Djuni the next day. They built a fort and armed the mountaineers in the Lebanon. Stopford's instructions also justified him in allowing descents on various parts of the coast. These were made successfully, as at Djebail (September 12) and Batroun (the 15th), unsuccessfully at Tortosa (the 25th), finally ending in Napier's triumphant capture of Sidon (the 26th). Napier claims, and it may be true, that he persuaded Stopford to let him attack Sidon.

The inland advance began on September 24 and was successful. But such enterprises were of much more doubtful policy than assaults on coast towns. This fact became more evident when the Emir Beshir Kassim advanced up the Dog river on October 4, and when Napier approached the Ardali heights on the 9th. Stopford had sent orders to recall him before the fight began. Napier, having his forces involved, was perhaps justified in disobeying them. Brilliant success followed on October 10. Thereupon Stopford heartily congratulated Napier on his 'splendid operations' but forbade further enterprises into the interior. This prohibition was in strict accordance with his instructions. In addition, Stopford felt it necessary on October 15 to detach two more ships to support the two sail of the line already in front of Alexandria.

Sir Charles Smith succeeded to the command on land immediately after Napier's victory. Joehmus states that the Napier period from September 9 till October 11 was offensive in character, while the Smith period, which lasted till December 15, was defensive. This is true, but Stopford's instructions forbade adventure in the interior, and the mere fact that brilliant success had been gained once, in no way justified a repetition of the experiment. Napier states that, after the victory of the Ardali heights on October 10, he advocated an advance into the interior. Ibrahim had taken refuge at Zahle with a few thousand men and could easily be finished off there. Napier proposed a doubtful and dangerous enterprise. In all the battles between Druse and Maronite the fortress of Zahle had remained virgin. Even to-day the roads to it are very difficult and they were then practically impassable. Ibrahim, perched on an eagle's nest among almost inaccessible rocks, was likely to repulse every assault. He had thirteen field pieces in position and the Allies could bring up no guns along the mountain roads. He had ten thousand men. An attack on him was contrary to the instruction about 'avoiding exposure to defeat.' A victory of Ibrahim's would have had the worst effects, and a retreat was in fact forced on him because of disaffection in the interior. Napier is careful to say in his later account that he meant only to go to Zahle, but his ambitions

\* *Ady.* I, 5503. To Col. Sir C. F. Smith, September 10, 1840, less evident in his instruction to the Admiralty of July 16.

probably reached to Damascus.\* Operations in the plains of the Bekaa and the gorges of Anti-Lebanon would have involved even graver difficulties and dangers in the face of Ibrahim's trained cavalry.

Sir Charles Smith assumed command of the land forces on October 11, and inaugurated a period of relative peace. He had an unworthy jealousy of Napier, and this fact perhaps induced him to pursue an opposite policy. But there were sound reasons for his attitude. There were 10,000 prisoners and very few persons to guard them. There was much sickness, especially among the European troops; many of the other battalions were without pay, and shoeless, having to make sandals out of raw oxhide. The great exertions of September and the first half of October had exhausted the troops and time was needed for recovery. The force was deficient in transport because the muleteers were not paid and therefore deserted. The medical and commissariat arrangements were deplorable. In addition Izzet Mehemet, the Turkish plenipotentiary, caused all sorts of difficulties. According to Jochmus, 'The Porte may be certain that her greatest enemy in Syria at present is not Ibrahim but certainly Izzet Pasha.' † In any case Stopford was clearly right in forbidding further enterprises into the interior until a decision was reached as to the assault upon Acre. Palmerston did not improve matters by an instruction that Sir Charles Smith 'should be independent of Sir Robert Stopford.' ‡ In fact, however, Smith, and his successor Jochmus, recognised Stopford as 'Supreme commander by land and sea,' and acted accordingly.

The decision to assault Acre was the most important in the campaign. Colonel Chesney, the military expert who knew most about it from previous knowledge, said that 'success would probably be attained at a cost of life beyond its real value.' § This may be taken as the normal view, and it appears to have been held till the end by Stopford's colleague, the Austrian Admiral, Bandiera. Stopford's original instructions fully justified him in not attacking Acre and, until October 11, he appears to have thought that he was positively forbidden to do so. The partisans of Napier, intelligibly enough, claim the credit for their hero in the decision to assault Acre. He was not the first to make the suggestion. Walker, Redhouse and Izzet Pasha proposed the attack to Stopford on September 27 or just after. 'The admiral flatly refused his assent to attacking there, alleging in the first place his want of instructions, next on account of being obliged to send down some ships down [*sic*] to Alexandria, his inadequate force, and thirdly the necessity he was under of preserving his whole force in an efficient state for

\* *War in Syria*, II, 98-9. *Ady.* I, 5503. From Stopford, November 18, 1840, gives the details about Zahle.

† Jochmus, *Memoirs*, I, 47, December 8, 1840, to Ponsonby.

‡ *Ady.* I, 5503. Palmerston, October 23, 1840.

§ *F.O.* 195/164. From Chesney, October 30, 1840. Col. Alderson's (*F.O.* 195/171) report of June 10, 1841, declared that Acre was 'peculiarly assailable by sea' owing to the depth of water. But this was after the event.



service in order to be able to cope with the French fleet.' The Austrian Admiral, Banchiera, also 'objected strongly.' \* The three conspirators withdrew and agreed to try to put on pressure later in conjunction with Napier. But this pressure, though doubtless applied, was ineffectual.† More effectual pressure came from Sir Charles Smith, who was very jealous of Napier. He writes to Ponsonby : '29 October evening. On the receipt of your note of the 22nd instant I this afternoon went off to the Flagship and finally prevailed on Sir Robert Stopford to proceed against Acre.'‡ But Smith might not have prevailed without orders from home. Stopford, by his own admission, was 'deliberating' when Palmerston's instruction arrived on the 29th direct from England, and took the decision soon after receiving the despatch.

Here is what Palmerston wrote on October 5 : 'the full accomplishment of the objects of that Treaty would be greatly accelerated, by the restoration of the fortress of Acre to the direct authority of the Sultan.

'I have therefore to signify to your Lordships the Queen's pleasure that instructions should immediately be sent to Sir Robert Stopford, directing him to consider whether the naval means at his disposal, and the land force which the Turkish government has by this time sent to the coast of Syria, and which will have amounted to fourteen or fifteen thousand men, are sufficient to afford a fair prospect that by a vigorous application of them the Fortress of Acre might be recovered for the Sultan ; and if the result of such deliberation should be that the enterprise would be likely to succeed, Sir Robert Stopford should proceed to carry it into execution.

'Sir Robert Stopford should however be directed to bear in mind that a failure in such an attempt would be attended with much evil ; and he should not resolve upon it, unless the prospect of success should be sufficient to justify the undertaking. The Egyptian commander of the fortress would of course be summoned to surrender it, before the attack was commenced.

'Sir Robert Stopford should however be informed, that Her Majesty's Government do not wish the fortress of Acre to be attacked, if in order to assemble a force sufficient for that purpose, it would become necessary to abandon positions, or to suspend operations, of greater or more immediate importance.'§

\* *Lev. II*, encls. to No. 240, Redhouse's journal, September 27. The above omitted part is to be found in *F.O.* 78/397. *The Letters of Sir H. Codrington* [1830], 177-8, assert, however, that Banchiera wished to assault Acre. But this seems incorrect and hearsay evidence.

† Codrington (*Letters*, 184) says that he was present on the 29th when Stopford informed Napier of his decision. So Napier had no direct influence on it.

‡ *F.O.* 78/398. From Sir Charles Smith to Ponsonby, October 29, evening, 1840.

§ *F.O.* 195/164, encls. to Ponsonby. To Admiralty of October 5, 1840. This was sent to Constantinople and received there on October 28, but as Ponsonby says (*Lev. II*, Nos. 41-2) it was not forwarded till October 31 to Beyrouth, and did not affect the issue. A note to the copy sent to the Admiralty, *Ady. I*, 5503, says, 'This was sent by a messenger to Constantinople on the 5th and (also) by the *Vesuvius*, which ship sailed the 8th and by which it was received at Beyrouth on the 29th by Sir Robert Stopford.'



It is plain that Palmerston's reservations left all the responsibility on the Admiral. They were such as he could have used to justify a refusal. On other occasions in this campaign the Admiral may have wavered, but on this, the greatest, occasion he came to a right decision and deserves credit for so doing.

During the third phase of the campaign, from the taking of Acre until the end, Stopford remained relatively inactive. He stated officially that, from the naval point of view, 'there is nothing more to accomplish.' \* Jochmus says that an attack on Jaffa, immediately after the capture of Acre, would have made prisoners of some of Ibrahim's best troops. No such assault was made. Jaffa was quietly evacuated by the Egyptians, Jerusalem deposed its governor and welcomed the Allies. Smith on November 24 regarded 'the military part of the question as determined,' i.e. that Ibrahim must evacuate Syria. Meanwhile the extent of the coastline to be defended, and the occupation of Jaffa and Jerusalem, compelled him to remain on the defensive. Palmerston seems to have heard Napier's criticisms of Smith. At any rate he wrote to Smith on November 9, telling him not to suspend operations in the winter. On November 15, after receiving Smith's criticisms of Napier, he decided to recall him. On December 10 Smith replied indignantly that he had 'no intention' of not fighting during the winter, and on December 15 he sorrowfully acknowledged the letter of recall and disappeared from the scene.†

Jochmus, now Chief of Staff of the Turkish army, in fact became Commander-in-Chief on Smith's retirement. General Michell controlled the British artillery and engineer officers. Both acknowledged Stopford's authority. Jochmus, who was a disciple of Napier and 'the Portugal style,' showed great energy. He decreed a *levée en masse* of the mountaineers of the Lebanon, in order to harass Ibrahim's retreat. He dreamed of storming Gaza and annihilating Ibrahim's army as it emerged from the desert. But he was hampered by two considerations, one political and one naval.

From December 1 onwards political considerations affected all naval and military action. It was on that day that Stopford heard of Napier's Convention with Mehemet Ali. He did not approve of it from any point of view and refused to ratify it. He did not even accept Napier's argument that Mehemet Ali had ordered Ibrahim to retreat, and that the latter must not be molested in his withdrawal. Stopford commented (December 5), 'Being already on their retreat I cannot consider this as a concession from Mehemet Ali but a consequence of their late discomfiture.' ‡ But he had to

\* *Ady.* I, 5503. From Stopford, November 18, 1840.

† *F.O.* 78/415. Palmerston to Sir C. F. Smith, No. 11, November 9, 1840. From Smith, No. 19, December 10. *Ady.* I, 5503. Palmerston to Smith, November 15. From Smith, December 15.

‡ *Ady.* I, 5504. From Stopford, December 5, 1840, recd. January 5, 1841.

take naval measures which prevented any such attack. On December 10 Stopford found the weather so bad that it was absolutely impossible to keep the sea. He withdrew all his big ships from the coast and sent them into winter quarters at Marmorice. The frigates and steamers remained to patrol the coast and ensured the defence of the coast towns. But they were quite useless for bombarding a strong fortress like Gaza.

Jochmus advanced to Jerusalem in the first week of December and made it his headquarters. With a true soldier's eye he had discerned the point where he could meet Ibrahim. That general was conducting a mysterious retreat by the desert road east of Jordan, harassed from the rear by Lebanon mountaineers and in the front by Arab raiders. Jochmus knew that Ibrahim must emerge from the desert some time and that Gaza would be his objective. For from Gaza he could retreat by the desert road to El Arish and Suez. But Gaza was held by a strong Egyptian garrison. On the last day of December, writes Michell, 'Jochmus urged me to attack Gaza where, he thinks, Ibrahim will retreat.' Michell refused because the Admiral 'did not wish it.' \* Stopford refused naval support. Frigates could have made no impression on forts, and Palmerston had already ordered him to occupy the island of Crete.† It seems quite clear also that Stopford knew before the end of the year that Mehemet Ali was not likely to refuse the terms he would offer. Jochmus knew little or nothing of these naval and political considerations, and merely saw the loss of a military opportunity. It was a bitter disappointment to him that Ibrahim made good his escape and brought one hundred and fifty guns in his train. But this was a detail, since Stopford's tactics had already secured the surrender of the Turkish fleet and the submission of Mehemet Ali.

During the first phase of the campaign, from the landing at Djuni to the battle of Ardali and the capture of Beyrouth, Stopford made no mistakes. He gave a wide discretion to Napier and perhaps yielded to him in deciding to attack Sidon. But he took command himself in the most important operation of all, the capture of Beyrouth. This was the real success, compared with which Napier's victory over Ibrahim was but a theatrical gesture.

During the second phase Stopford enjoined a passive attitude on land, until he moved forward to the capture of Acre. He commanded there in person, and the success was the result of his decision, for which he must have the credit. During the third phase Stopford was hampered by the conditions of the weather, but the criticism that he did not attack Jaffa at once or infuse activity into the military movements, is probably a just one. His refusal to attack Gaza at the end of December was sound. It was due partly to difficulties in the weather and partly to political complications, of which the ardent Jochmus knew little. Moreover he had still to consider the danger from the French, and had to avoid

\* *F.O.* 78/415. From Michell, No. 3 of December 31, 1840.

† *Ady.* I, 5504. From Stopford, November 27, 1840, recd. January 5, 1841.

all possibility of disaster. Even Palmerston's famous despatch (October 5), in which he insisted on the capture of Acre, states that it should not be attempted 'unless the prospect of success should be sufficient to justify the undertaking.'\* When success is a preliminary condition of an enterprise, no risks can safely be run. Such orders are fatal to vigorous action, and account for a good deal of Stopford's hesitation.

Civilian influences certainly did some good in this campaign. Ponsonby's energy had its effect in fixing the Turkish decision and in speeding up their military preparations. It was due to him also that Izzet Mehemet, sent as the Sultan's representative in Syria, was recalled before he was able to do much harm. Some share of credit is due to Ponsonby for inducing Stopford to attack Acre. On the other hand, his judgment was greatly at fault when he urged Napier to go to Alexandria and attack it. Napier, in reply, pointed out that the Convention (which he had obtained) was a possible and practical result, but that the project of attacking Alexandria was an absurdity, in the military or naval sense. It was also clearly most improper for Ponsonby to suggest such an enterprise to a subordinate.

Palmerston's record is both good and bad. It was directly due to him that the Polish General, Chrzanowski, was appointed the chief military adviser at Constantinople, and that the Hanoverian General, Jochmus, was sent out to Syria. Both were excellent choices and, but for the latter, the Turkish troops would hardly have been so successful. Palmerston also did much good by sending artillery and engineer officers to Syria and in persuading Austria to follow his example in this respect. On the other hand, Palmerston was not fair to Sir Charles Smith and recalled him on insufficient grounds. His partiality to Napier is doubtless the true explanation, as it is of his failure to appreciate Stopford. At certain points Palmerston seems not to have properly understood the situation. Thus his approval of Napier's exploits in the Lebanon conflicted with his own instructions to Smith about not venturing into the interior. His stimulation of Napier to action by private letters was questionable.† His rebuke of Smith for regretting the evacuation of Adana, Tripoli, etc., was based on a complete military misapprehension. Smith very properly regretted the release of troops to reinforce Ibrahim, and Palmerston rebuked him for not 'rejoicing' at the fall of an enemy town. This suggestion was absurd, for the more Ibrahim shut his men up in fortresses, the fewer he would bring into the field. Similarly Palmerston's official instruction of October 23 to Smith, making him 'independent' of Stopford, was unfortunate, for it was destruc-

\* *Ady.* I, 5503. To Admiralty, October 5, 1840.

† Some of them went through Ponsonby, for Napier writes to him, December 14, 1840 (*F.O.* 78/398, encl. in No. 301, December 6. From Ponsonby), 'I was led to believe from your correspondence that France had ordered us not even to think of Egypt (your exact expression) and that Lord Palmerston was anxious to finish everything.' *Vide* also *Ady.* I, 5504. From Napier, March 23, 1841, and *Lev.* III, No. 122 encl.

tive of all co-operation between naval and military arms. Only the good sense of Smith, and subsequently of Jochmus, in recognising Stopford as supreme commander, averted mischief. All these blunders are surprising in Palmerston, a former Secretary at War with pronounced military leanings. But they do not outweigh the merit of his energy and vigour.

Stopford's difficulties have thus been pointed out. His critics have not treated him fairly, for they did not know his instructions from the Home Government. They did not know the restraint on him from the Austrian, Bandiera. Napier and Jochmus, who were so anxious for an advance into the interior, recognised neither its dangers nor the limits imposed by Stopford's instructions. They were also quite regardless of the French danger, and few persons except Stopford recognised the difficulties of weather conditions. Stopford, however, may be criticised on other grounds. He seems to have doubted of the success of the expedition, and, most unfortunately, to have allowed these doubts to become known to his subordinates. At times he certainly wavered and thus affronted men like Jochmus, Napier and Smith by his hesitations. More serious still was his slowness in enforcing his authority. Codrington, the son of the Admiral of Navarino, is decisive on this point. He tells of the 'altercation' as to the right way of attacking Acre, which took place on November 3. Several captains were present and Napier, as usual, was 'very warm.' The 'altercation' took place 'in the admiral's presence,' records Codrington, and was 'contrary to all my ideas of service.' Ultimately the Admiral intervened 'very decidedly,' silencing Napier himself. But this was the kind of discussion which a great Admiral would not have allowed in his presence at all. 'It was not so in 1827,'\* wrote Codrington, thinking of Navarino and his father.

Another judgment of Stopford is made by Codrington, who was certainly not a hostile critic and still less an admirer of Napier. 'There was no general order or given-out plan of action. . . . There seemed somehow a want of the supreme commanding mind.' Such is his criticism of the operations at Acre. But his words equally apply to the whole campaign. Stopford had done wisely in entrusting Napier with large powers at the beginning of the campaign, but he ought to have maintained his authority and held him in with a tighter rein towards the close. None the less, Codrington was very far from thinking that no credit was due to the Admiral. Admitting some irresolution and some overcaution in execution, Stopford's conception of the campaign in the larger sense was sound. Few commanders, who have waged so successful a campaign, have borne the brunt of so much criticism. And some of it is certainly undeserved. Palmerston's interference over Acre, for instance, did not shift the responsibility from Stopford's shoulders, and the Admiral is entitled to the lion's share of the credit.

\* *Letters of Sir Henry Codrington* [1880], 186-9. Letter to Capt. Spencer of January 28, 1841.



## APPENDIX IV

### STRATFORD AND THE STRAITS IN 1849 AND IN 1853

*Waiting for His Sublimity's firman  
Which Everybody does without, who can.*

BYRON.

#### (a) *The Straits in 1849.*

The charge made by Dr. Puryear as to Stratford in 1849 is that he engineered an advance of the British naval squadron to the Inner Castles of the Dardanelles, with the view of influencing the Russians and Austrians, who had made strong demands on Turkey to surrender the Hungarian refugees, and that he did this in flagrant breach of the Straits Convention of 1841.\* The facts, if studied, do not seem to bear out this conclusion. They show that Stratford was not the prime mover in the affair and that no breach of the Convention was attempted. What took place was an evasion of the Convention, which was repudiated by Palmerston.

After 1841, as before, the Dardanelles was closed to all ships—and especially merchant ships at night. The merchant ships of all nations, however, defied the Turkish codes, and habitually passed the Dardanelles after sunset. Accordingly on February 14, 1842, the Turkish Government issued a circular forbidding the practice, and saying that ships must not pass the so-called outer castles at Kum-Kalessi and Sedil Bahr after sunset.† Stratford then applied for permission for vessels to be admitted 'at any hour under stress of weather . . . within the entrance of the Straits,' i.e. passing the outer castles to the inner ones up to Nagara. The Porte agreed, but the pasha at the Dardanelles informed the British consul there that the old rule still applied to steamers, 'vessels of all nations not being allowed to pass these Upper castles after sunset.' He added that, in the case of bad weather, any light vessels involved (under Article II of the Convention of 1841) might be considered specially, 'he would take them into consideration.'‡ He subsequently stated that all steamers of war—even Turkish ones—would have to have a special *firman* if they wished to pass up after sunset.

There is abundant evidence that the war steamers of some nations passed up after sunset, without waiting for a *firman*. The British Archives show one French steam frigate, the *Frondeur*, of eight guns, and 'an American brig of war' doing this without permission.§ It was also asserted, without contradiction, that

\* Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits Question*, U.S.A. [1931], 153-77.

† N.R.A. From Testa, No. 261 of June 26, 1842, quoting Turkish circular.

‡ F.O. 195/174. From Lander, No. 20 of May 7, 1842.

§ F.O. 195/174. From Lander, No. 22 of July 6, 1843; No. 44 of September 25; No. 46 of September 27. In July 1843 the British steam frigate, H.M.S. *Devastation* (6 guns), was allowed to go up without showing its *firman*. But that is very different from going up without permission.



Austrian war steamers also did this. In fact, so far as France, America and Austria were concerned it was not a case 'of waiting for His Sublimity's *firman*,' but of 'everybody does without who can.' Stratford noted that the precedent of other war steamers, passing up without permission, might be useful in case of need. But for British war steamers a more regular and courteous procedure was adopted. Stratford obtained and sent to his consul at the Dardanelles a number of blank *firman*s. If there was any delay in obtaining the *firman* for a particular steamer the consul filled in the name on a blank *firman* and sent it up. There was nothing irregular in this procedure, as the number of blanks issued was limited, and the use of blanks for British war steamers was, in any case, a much more regular procedure than the methods by which American, Austrian and French war steamers or frigates passed up without permission.

It is important to emphasise here that Article II of the Straits Convention permitted light vessels, i.e. war steamers, to pass up to Constantinople if properly provided with a *firman*. These were used as despatch boats and, as I have pointed out elsewhere on high technical authority, were with their light guns quite incapable of acting offensively.\* Dr. Puryear's suggestions (155 n., 167 n.) that the *Dragon* and the *Odin* were sent up to Constantinople in October 1849 as 'warships . . . sufficient to control the situation at the Turkish capital ; or to block the Bosphorus against Russia in event of a surprise attack' are quite unfounded. The *Dragon* carried six guns and the *Odin* sixteen. Neither was sufficient even to defend the Embassy. In 1853 the *Retribution* (28 guns) was reinforced by the *Furious* and the *Niger* (each of 16 guns). They were supported by the French steamers the *Gomer* (of 20 guns) and the *Mogador* (of 8). Yet Slade, the British admiral in the 'Turkish service, then expressed the opinion that they were 'a mockery' if expected to defend the Sultan or the Embassy.† Admiral Richmond, the naval historian, says that even a frigate of 28 guns 'could not take part in any fleet action against ships of the line.' The suggestion that the two light steamers of 6 and 16 guns could either overawe the capital, or block the Bosphorus, is ridiculous. Light vessels did not matter and (as elsewhere pointed out) there is no restriction on their numbers in the Article of the Convention. All the Convention says is that they must have *firman*s. The multiplying of despatch boats was quite justified when, as in the case of England, they went through on special *firman*s or on blank ones filled up *ad hoc*.

Merchant vessels of all nations continued to pass the Straits at night without permission. Two prohibitions by Turkish circular, respectively on October 27, 1843, and on February 22, 1845, were issued.‡ On March 1 this prohibition was extended to war steamers. Stratford then secured that 'any British vessel, whether

\* *E.H.R.*, October 1934, 671.

† *Vide* my article, *E.H.R.*, April 1934, 278.

‡ *N.R.A.* From Testa, October 27, 1843 ; March 12, 1845.

it be a merchant vessel or a vessel of war, is allowed to come within the outer castles of the Dardanelles at once, as far as the anchorage of Kefe Burnu or Barber's Point by night as well as by day.' \* This permission, though secured for England, in fact applied to foreign vessels whether of war or of commerce. Ultimately the range of anchorage was also extended. The original limit was 'between the outer castles of Sedil Bahr and Kum Kale and the inner castles of Sultanieh Kalessi and Kilid Bahar.' It was soon explained by the pasha that 'an exception will be made in favour of such vessels, whether of war or of the Merchant Service, when by stress of weather any danger might be apprehended from their having to return during the night against a heavy gale to reach an anchorage which they may have already passed. In such cases vessels will be allowed to proceed on as far as Point Nagara, where there is a safe anchorage—but under no plea or circumstance whatsoever will they be permitted to go beyond it.' †

Chekib's Memorandum of February 27, 1845, mentions 'bâtiments de guerre, grands ou petits' as being included in the prohibition of entry, and they stand in the subsequent concession. Permission to advance as far as Nagara after sunset could consequently be applied to a man-of-war (*i.e.* three-decker) as well as to a war steamer. It is reasonable to assume, however, that a war steamer might go up to as far as Nagara on a blank *firman*, but that a special *firman* would be needed for a three-decker. The point here is that the passage of war steamers could be regarded as habitual, whereas that of a three-decker was very exceptional. It was, however, not impossible.‡

The above data enable us to understand the situation in October 1849. It was obvious that the dispute over the Hungarian refugees might induce both Russia and Austria to send their troops into Turkey. The only way of meeting that was to get the British fleet on the scene. On September 17 Stratford wrote to Vice-Admiral Parker asking publicly for 'a part at least of Her Majesty's Mediterranean squadron' to 'be available for any purpose of demonstration in the Archipelago,' and saying privately, 'our position is suddenly become very ticklish.' § Parker answered by cruising 'between the Ionian waters and Athens.' Subsequently, in accordance with Admiralty instructions of October 8, he proceeded to the Dardanelles and lay at Besika Bay, just outside the outer castles. Stratford therefore had a weapon near at hand. How was he to use it? Calvert—the British consul at the Dardanelles—wrote a private letter to Stratford, pointing out the

\* *Hung. Ref.* II, A. & P. [1851], LVIII, encl. 3 to No. 105. Stratford to Lander, March 22, 1845.

† *F.O.* 195/238. From Lander, No. 22 of March 31, 1845. This is the only omission of importance in the documents given in *Hung. Ref.* II, enclos. 1-7 to No. 105, pp. 514-23.

‡ Palmerston to Bloomfield, *F.O.* 356/29, *pte. Blo. MSS.*, November 25, 1849, admits that the passage of a heavy ship might be allowed under 'the letter' of regulation, but argues that it is against 'the spirit' of 1841. Cp. *supra*, n. 216.

§ *Pte. Strat. MSS.* *F.O.* 352/32. Stratford to Parker, September 17, 1849.

regulations of 1845 as allowing the 'safer anchorage off the White Cliffs within these straits,' and as 'having often and even recently been availed of by foreign vessels of war. Were it deemed expedient for a British Fleet to anchor within these straits no opposition could be offered on the part of the authorities here.' \* Calvert's testimony is of importance, for he had been twelve years secretary to Lander, who had preceded him as consul at the Dardanelles. He knew all about the negotiations of 1845. Stratford had not himself devised this ingenious scheme about getting the fleet up as far as Nagara, though there was an evident advantage in shortening the distance. On October 25 he privately acknowledged Calvert's letter of the 3rd, and told him to apprise Parker of the regulations and show him this private letter. 'I reckon on your discretion' and 'it is important to prevent any misapprehension.' Next day Stratford seems to have felt graver doubts, and he expressed them in a new private letter to Calvert. 'On looking at the Treaty of 1841 I feel so much doubt . . . that I have sent the Admiral the first article [of 1841] and the regulations of 1845.' In a private letter to Parker of the same date he added, 'P.S. Much as I wish you to anchor comfortably within the limits of the Dardanelles, I have a doubt as to the Treaty of 1841 and the consequences of being exposed to the chance of breaking it, which makes me hesitate.' † Stratford therefore cautioned Parker against an advance to Nagara, unless he was satisfied that the terms absolutely permitted it. He also thought that there should be a genuine plea of bad weather before entering the Straits. Stratford thus hesitated, but, as we shall see, Parker and Calvert did not.

On the 26th Calvert, after receiving Stratford's first letter, interviewed the pasha and persuaded him not only to admit the 'squadron by night as well as by day,' but 'in a case of urgency to allow the squadron to proceed on to Constantinople.' ‡ Stratford had insisted that such an advance should not take place 'without special invitation from the Embassy.' Parker replied that 'It had not entered my contemplation to pass the inner castles of the Dardanelles without previous communication with your Excellency, although Mr. Calvert's letter, a duplicate of which I enclose, informs me that I am perfectly at liberty to do [so].' § Here again we see Calvert pushing forward beyond what either Parker or Stratford intended.

On the 26th Calvert had informed Parker that he was perfectly at liberty to move the whole squadron up to Nagara. On the 27th he wrote an even stronger letter. The effect is seen in Parker's

\* *F.O.* 195/300, pte. Calvert to Stratford, October 3, 1849.

† *F.O.* 352/32. *Pte. Strat. MSS.* Stratford to Calvert, October 25-6, 1849; to Parker, October 26.

‡ *F.O.* 195/300, pte. From Calvert, October 26, 1849.

§ *Hung. Ref.* II, A. & P. [1851], LVIII. Encl. 1 to No. 70, p. 478, omits this important sentence. *Vide F.O.* 78/781. From Parker, No. 21 of October 28, 1849.

letter to Stratford of the 28th. 'There appears to be no doubt' of the regularity of thus moving up to Nagara, but he had not yet decided to do so. On the 29th Calvert paid Parker a visit, and finding him still hesitating, sent a new letter on the 30th, giving the definition of *Détroits* as 'the narrowest passages,' and stating that vessels of other nations had 'at all times' advanced to Nagara.\* This last missive convinced Parker completely. Like Nelson, of whose captains he was the last representative, he had a blind eye. He had not perceived the difference between admitting individual vessels of war and admitting a whole squadron. On October 31 the pasha, who had sent specially to Constantinople for instructions, received 'full approbation . . . for what he had done' [*i.e.* his agreement to admit the British squadron up to Nagara]. So the Turks entirely favoured the proceeding. On the same day Stratford wrote urging Parker to go 'within the outer castles,' adding, 'although some cavil might possibly be raised or jealousy excited by your reception there, I conceive that no such grounds of objection can be expected to outweigh the advantages, essential as they are, of a sheltered anchorage and an easy approach to Constantinople. The Turkish Government itself recommends the anchorage of Haraizkar situated, I understand, somewhere on the Asiatic side between the outer and inner castles.' Parker acknowledged this communication on November 2, but it came too late to influence his decision. On the 1st, two of his ships being in bad condition, and 'as the wind set in very strong from the south yesterday, making Besika Bay a doubtful anchorage in such weather, I availed myself of the permission which has been intimated to me by Her Majesty's Consul, to pass the outer castles of the Dardanelles with Her Majesty's squadron under my command between the inner castles and Barber's Point.' †

No sooner was Parker inside the Dardanelles than Stratford wished him out again. On November 4, perceiving that Russian and Austrian demands on the Porte had abated, Stratford warned Parker that his continuance at this 'present anchorage can no longer be a matter of immediate urgency,' and said he would probably soon recommend him to move out. ‡ On November 7 he did actually order him out. Parker obeyed and sailed out on the 13th, anchoring temporarily at Besika Bay, but eventually moving farther out.

At this stage we may determine the attitude of Parker. He was in Stopford's squadron in September 1839, when there was a question of its advancing from Besika Bay and anchoring at Nagara. Ponsonby then gave the Machiavellian advice, 'it would

\* *Hung. Ref.* II, A. & P. [1851], LVIII, 498, 502, 546, encl. 2 to No. 65, p. 474; encl. 1 to No. 70, pp. 478-9; encl. 14 to No. 105, pp. 522-3.

† *Hung. Ref.* II, A. & P. [1851], LVIII, encl. 1 to No. 72, p. 480. Parker to Stratford, No. 65, November 2, 1849.

‡ *F.O.* 78/781. Stratford to Parker, November 4, 1849; passage suppressed in *Hung. Ref.* II, A. & P. [1851], LVIII, encl. to No. 79, p. 485.



be much better to make the movement if a real necessity for it should arise, than to talk of it beforehand.' \* It might be tempting to suppose that Parker profited by this counsel ten years later. The French solved the matter simply, '*on prétextait une tempête.*' But consideration of the evidence leads me to the same conclusion as my friend Charles Sproston.† 'A sailor's consideration for the safety of his ships in the teeth of an actual formidable gale was the real reason why the squadron entered the Straits. Of that no reader of the correspondence in Phillimore's biography can entertain the slightest doubt. Fictitious winds do not cause ships to run foul of each other, nor do anchors drag in tranquil summer seas.'

A lengthy argument in favour of Parker's advance to Nagara was sent by Stratford to Palmerston on the 7th. With this we need not concern ourselves, for it was the argument of Calvert, which Stratford had himself originally doubted. In the unpublished part of this despatch ‡ Stratford says, 'I was unwilling to add my official sanction without the further inducement of hazard to the ships from remaining longer in an exposed situation.' He also explains that Titov, the Russian Minister, 'had protested to him about the passage and that he had argued that the difference between a squadron and single ships of war . . . was not one of principle but of consideration to the Porte in point of security.' § Palmerston refused to accept this argument and made the *amende honorable* to Russia and to Turkey.

In this same despatch Stratford stated that the Austrian Minister 'so far as I know has taken no part in M. Titov's susceptibility about the Dardanelles.' But in point of fact Stürmer remonstrated to Aali pasha in the first instance and with very singular results. Aali said, 'permission is only allowed to merchant ships to go without formality to the last anchoring station of the British Fleet [Nagara], but this in my judgment does not apply to ships of war [i.e. big ships], least of all to whole Fleets.' This statement was false, as Chekib's circular proves that the advance of single big ships up to Nagara was conceivable. Aali added the even falser statement that the British squadron on this occasion had moved in without the Turkish consent.|| If lies like these were told, it is easy to understand why England's reputation suffered.

One argument of Aali's is, however, good. The Convention of 1841 may have allowed individual big ships to move to Nagara; it was not intended to apply to 'whole fleets.' This is borne out ultimately by Palmerston, who agreed 'that it would be a forced construction . . . to apply them [the regulations] to a squadron

\* F.O. 78/358. From Ponsonby, No. 256 of September 22, 1839, encls. of September 19. To Stopford.

† *Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution* [1919], 140; Sir A. Phillimore, *Life of Parker* [1876], III, 579-84.

‡ F.O. 78/781. From Stratford, No. 330 of November 7, 1849.

§ W.S.A. *Berichte aus Konstantinopel*, XII, 70. From Stürmer, No. 52A of November 5, 1849.

|| This discrepancy was noticed. W.S.A. XII, 70. From Stürmer, No. 53B of November 7, 1849.



of line-of-battleships.' \* It is a mistake, however, to suppose that permission (whether to individual ships or to squadrons) to advance to Nagara meant permission to go up to Constantinople. It meant exactly the contrary. The question was where the Straits might be considered to begin. Between Bokhali and Nagara is not the narrowest part of the Strait, that is between Kilid Bahr and Chanak. But Bokhali and Nagara are at the end of 'the Narrows.' It is the old Sestos where Hero watched for Leander when he swam across from Abydos. Calvert (and ultimately Stratford) argued that, so long as 'the Narrows' were not passed, the Dardanelles had not been entered. Stürmer (and the unreliable Aali) argued in 1849 that the outermost castles were the limit of the Straits. This latter argument is not borne out by the facts, for it is clear that shelter in Barber's Bay, at any rate, was sought habitually by both steamers of war and merchant ships of all nations with Turkish consent.

It is certainly incorrect to say, as Puryear does (168), that 'Canning personally was not concerned about the Treaty.' In his private letters to both Calvert and Parker he was more concerned about it than either, and in the unpublished part of his despatch of November 7 he expressed his genuine scruples about the validity of the move to Nagara. Parker certainly acted *bona fide* in waiting until it was really bad weather before moving in, and he did not move until he was completely persuaded of the regularity of his action. The evidence proves that the persuasion was really due to Calvert. This obscure consul at the Dardanelles seems to have burned with a zeal to distinguish himself. He suffered from the same disease which afflicts British officers on the north-west frontier of India, and is known there as 'K.C.B. mania.' Thus he was willing to assume and did assume a responsibility from which a minor official might well have shrunk. Once the fleet was inside the Dardanelles Stratford covered him with his responsibility. He could do nothing else, for he had allowed Calvert 'discretion.' But the initiative in inviting the fleet was not due to Stratford and he took an early opportunity of ordering it back again.

An interesting incident occurred in connexion with Calvert. Not only was he the British Consul, but also Vice-Consul to Belgium and also to the Netherlands. Baron Mollerus, the Dutch Minister, wrote to him on November 5 expressing surprise that he had not learned of the British fleet move. Calvert replied (November 6) that he had 'reserved the privilege of not corresponding on political subjects,' when he became Dutch Vice-Consul, and asked Mollerus to excuse him from replying. Mollerus replied tartly, 'I asked for no reasoning on the *cause* or goal of the English squadron's arrival,' † but that he was entitled to know the numbers

\* Palmerston's private letter, November 25, 1849, in *pte. Blo. MSS.* (*vide supra*, n. 216) is stronger than his public utterance. To Lord Bloomfield, No. 105 of January 1, 1850. *Hung. Ref. II, A. & P.* [1851], LVIII, No. 105, pp. 513-4.

† *N.R.A.* From Mollerus, No. 264 of November 5, 1849; November 13. From Calvert, November 6, November 20.

and station of the fleet. November 13. Even then Calvert waited a week before he gave the information. Mollerus, who was a very sound diplomat, clearly thought Calvert had acted wrongly. This correspondence gives proof, from an unexceptionable source, that Calvert's conscience was uneasy. But it does not reflect upon Stratford. The latter certainly desired the move to take place, on the ground that it would shorten the distance for the squadron to Constantinople. This was an evident advantage, as the Bosphorus is only eighteen miles in length and very much less than the distance to the Dardanelles. But the evidence does not justify the suggestion that Stratford was regardless of the Treaty obligation. On the contrary he was a great deal more regardful of it than Calvert or even than Parker, and was fully aware of the dangers of 'misapprehension.' None the less, the interpretation of the Convention, as first devised by Calvert, then practised by Parker, and ultimately accepted and defended by Stratford, was strained and unsound. Palmerston was clearly right in rejecting it and giving pledges against a similar misconstruction in the future.

(b) *The Straits in 1853.*

I have written an article in *E.H.R.*, October 1934, on *The alleged violations of the Straits Convention by Stratford de Redcliffe between June and September 1853*, which should be compared with the above as similar problems arise. My conclusions (670-1) are that:—

(1) There was no violation of the Straits Convention by British ships between April and mid-September 1853, for the increase of despatch-carriers in no way affected that question.

(2) There was a violation of the Convention by the French liner *Friedland* in August, but the circumstances were very exceptional, and Stratford de Redcliffe had nothing to do with the incident. On two occasions the French government endeavoured to pass ships up in violation of the rule, and in spite of Stratford's known views.

(3) The mid-September incident was an evasion, but not a violation of the Convention; it was solely due to Stratford that a larger naval force was not then summoned, which would have been a breach of the Convention.

(4) On October 4, 1853, Stratford received instructions from Clarendon to order the British squadron to pass the Dardanelles, but he delayed execution until October 20, only then yielding to French pressure.

(5) Stratford throughout showed a greater respect for the Straits Convention than did his own government, or the French government.

I take this opportunity of saying that the enumeration of the boats going up to Constantinople in September 1853 in *E.H.R.* (October 1934, 671) is wrong. It is correct in *E.H.R.* (April 1934, 278). The *Niger* and *Furious* went up, not the *Tiger*, and it is their Logs which establish the facts.


# Straits of the and DARDANELLES

of 1833, 1840-1, 1849 and 1853

English Miles



by shaded, thus . . .





## APPENDIX V

### RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CRIMEAN WAR

It may be convenient to sum up here the responsibilities of each government.

#### (1) *Turkey.*

The Turks had failed properly to reform their administration, and the final failure of Reform under Reschid in 1852 (combined with his secret overtures when out of office) helped to induce Russia to intervene. The dispute about the Holy Places was greatly aggravated by the deliberate duplicity of Mehemet Ali and Fuad in regard to the award as to the Keys in December 1852. Some excuse must, however, be made for them as they had twice been coerced by France in 1852, once by the threat to bombard Tripoli, and again by the arrival of the *Charlemagne* on the Bosphorus. On the other hand, Omer pasha's invasion of Montenegro appears to have been a provocative act which went far to justify Russia's military preparations in December 1852.

During 1853 the Porte were for a time studiously moderate, giving way to Count Leiningen, and putting up with a good deal of rudeness from Prince Menšikov. Their attitude in refusing to consider the invasion of the Principalities a *casus belli* must also be put to their credit. The diplomats of Europe do not appear to have recognised, however, that the 'Turkish ultimatum' represented the extreme limit of their concessions. The transaction relating to the 'Vienna Note' was undertaken by men who did not understand the Turkish temper, or that religious feeling and Turkish nationalism had really been aroused. Even without Stratford, the 'Vienna Note' would probably have been rejected.

After July 1, 1853, the situation was out of hand in Constantinople. The arrival of the Egyptian contingent on August 12 made it certain that Stratford would be unable adequately to control it. The threat of disturbances in mid-September caused him to order up the British and the French steamers to overawe the Turkish religious element. His victory on that occasion was a Pyrrhic one. The Sultan very soon recognised that the mob must be gratified by a declaration of war, and this took place, in spite of desperate efforts by Stratford to avert it. The Sultan's hand was perhaps forced by Omer pasha beginning hostilities on his own, though the Porte were not sorry he had done so. During October and November Stratford fought to prevent hostilities from assuming serious proportions, but the 'massacre of Sinope' rendered that more difficult. A last moment effort by Stratford in December actually succeeded with the Turks, but was rendered useless by the appearance of the Franco-British squadron in the Black Sea.

The chief Turkish responsibility is therefore the rejection of the 'Vienna Note,' and that seems to me to have been inevitable



in view of the outraged religious feelings and newly awakened patriotism of the Turks.

(2) *Austria.*

Austria's intervention seems to have been confined to the Leiningen Mission. She then acted vigorously, but successfully, to stop the Montenegrin war. Her action was intended to check Nicholas in his demands on Turkey, but unfortunately the success of the mission encouraged him to make further claims. Buol incurs a certain responsibility for preferring the 'Vienna Note' and rejecting the 'Turkish ultimatum.'

(3) *France.*

The initial French blunder was to create a dispute about the Holy Places. This seems to have been due to a desire to please the clericals in France, and there is evidence that Napoleon bitterly regretted having raised the question. The measures taken by Napoleon were, however, dangerous just because he had to conciliate public opinion in France by striking and dramatic strokes in all he undertook. Any of the three steps—the sending of the squadron to Tripoli, or of the *Charlemagne* to Constantinople, or of the French Mediterranean squadron to Salamis (March 1853)—might have produced war. Thereafter French policy rather waited on British, but Napoleon and Drouyn de Lhuys made two separate attempts to get the French fleet through the Dardanelles, while nominally professing a desire for peace. That was between July and September, 1853. Both of these were dangerous moves and not fully considered. In December the final decision to send the fleet into the Black Sea seems to have been due to Napoleon rather than to England. But there does not seem any justification for Kinglake's theory that Napoleon deliberately promoted or desired war. Napoleon certainly wished to accept the Olmütz overture in October. Cowley reports an important piece of evidence as to November. 'Almost the last words Baraguay d'Hilliers said to me . . . were "I am employed to carry out instructions which I disapprove. I am convinced that the Eastern question cannot be terminated without war and I am ordered to preach peace"' (Cowley to Clarendon, *pte. Clar. MSS.*, January 4, 1854). But Napoleon's need for winning political support in *coups de théâtre* made it difficult for him to avoid war. Nevertheless war could not have come about unless England had agreed with him in policy, and united with him in action against Russia. At the last moment in December (*vide supra*, pp. 376-7) Napoleon's views greatly influenced the British Cabinet, but were misinterpreted (App. VII), perhaps by the Machiavellian intention of his ministers.

(4) *Great Britain* really had two policies :

(a) *The policy of Stratford at Constantinople* might have succeeded had he been left to himself. That he desired strictly to remain with the letter of the Convention of 1841 is evident, and the

allegations of his violating the Straits, etc., are groundless. Nor can he be blamed for separating the Holy Places dispute from the other questions, and thereby getting it settled. In so doing he was following instructions and was commended by Clarendon for his action. His plan, 'the Turkish ultimatum,' was in his view the maximum concession to which Turkey would submit. He proved right and the Turks rejected the 'Vienna Note' when the Powers offered it in substitution for the 'ultimatum.' On the other hand, he had been accused of secretly causing the Turks to reject it. Personally I should give him the benefit of the doubt in this, as in other disputed questions. His conduct in mid-September 1853 in summoning four steamers, while his French colleague wanted a substantial part of the squadron, is much in his favour. It is true that he refused to try an interview with the Sultan after the *fetva* for war had been issued, but this fact only shows that he understood Turkish political, or rather religious, motives better than his critics do. After the *fetva* nobody could have stopped a Turkish declaration of war, but it was still possible either to prevent hostilities from breaking out or to negative their effects. Stratford made both attempts, but vainly. Also, though ordered to send the fleet through the Dardanelles on October 4, he delayed it until the 20th to allow the Olmütz overture time to succeed. In December, after 'the massacre of Sinope,' he refused to allow the fleet to move into the Black Sea and did not ultimately send it until he received direct orders from home on January 3, 1853. This delay was clearly due to a desire to allow the peace negotiations to succeed. Sinister interpretations of his actions are possible, but, on the whole, his actions were not bellicose. The fact is, what he really wanted Turkey to do was to execute internal reforms, and he feared that the effect of war would destroy both these and Turkey together. This imperious man used smooth language to Russia in public and violently denounced her in private. But a strong rough man is not necessarily a bellicose one. On the whole, I think, he fought for peace and might have achieved it, if left to himself (*vide* especially *supra*, pp. 340 and n., 362 and n.).

(b) *The policy of the Cabinet in London.* The policy in London was never determined. (i) There was a 'peace at any price' policy pursued by Aberdeen. This was probably hopeless, for Brunnow and the Czar thought it possible both to persuade Aberdeen of their moderation and to get him to hoodwink the cabinet. Their confidence, if not misplaced in the first instance, was woefully at fault in the second. When the news of the failure of the Menšikov mission trickled through to London at the end of May, even Aberdeen thought the demands were 'unreasonable.' Thereafter he fought a losing battle, but his vain efforts and genuine regrets greatly misled Brunnow as to the realities of British policy. (ii) Clarendon represented the moderates of the cabinet and tried to mediate between Aberdeen on the one hand and (iii) the Palmerston policy on the other. Strong measures from the start were the programme of Palmerston, who was supported inter-

mutually, and sometimes outbreak in violence, by Lord John Russell. Palmerston really wished the fleet to pass the Dardanelles and tear up the Straits Convention at the end of May, and strongly recommended that course in July, when the Russian troops occupied the Principalities; holding that it was a *casus belli*. On June 2 Clarendon, and even Aberdeen, had agreed to send the fleet to Beaba Bay, just outside the Dardanelles. This action, though provocative, was not a breach of treaty. Early in July, when the Russians invaded the Principalities, the 'peace party' in the cabinet united with the moderates in rejecting Palmerston's advice to send the fleet to Constantinople. It is true that Palmerston's advice, if taken in July, would have brought either peace or war at once and finally. But it was a policy which no British cabinet was likely to adopt, just because it did bring matters to a head. Public opinion was not ready in July for so bold a step. Clarendon worked hard at the 'Vienna Note' and was much annoyed at the Turkish refusal, for which he blamed Stratford.

During August public opinion veered in the direction of Palmerston, as was seen in the Commons' debates. The disturbances at Constantinople in mid-September therefore greatly affected Aberdeen and Clarendon. On the top of that came Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation' of the 'Vienna Note.' On the critical day of the 23rd of that month Clarendon and Aberdeen decided to send the fleet to Constantinople on their own responsibility. They knew, however, that Palmerston and Russell, as well as the public, would approve. They arrived at their decision for different reasons, Aberdeen saying that the motive was to protect the Sultan and British residents, Clarendon admitting that the move was anti-Russian. This was the greatest single step taken by the British government in the direction of war, and taken by the most pacific of British statesmen and by a fairly moderate one. It is worthy of note that both thought that Stratford had already ordered up the fleet. Hence both were, in fact, less moderate than he in their action at this juncture.

The Olmütz overture was refused, because only Aberdeen really wanted it to be accepted. Clarendon could, however, allege that 'the beastly Turks' had declared war, though his distrust of Russia seems to have been very great. None the less, the cabinet was a little hasty in their action. In October and November the pressure of Palmerston and Russell and the desire for co-operation with France became greater. Further, both Clarendon and Aberdeen recognised that Stratford was striving vehemently for peace. All signs of that really disappeared when the news of the 'massacre of Sinope' arrived. In October the proposal to send the fleet into the Black Sea was defeated in the cabinet by the insistence of Aberdeen. In December after 'the massacre' Clarendon rallied to the other side, and Palmerston's resignation only emphasised the need of pursuing a vigorous policy of uniting with France. At the last moment the decisive cabinet of

December 22 (*vide supra*, pp. 376-7) was greatly influenced by the news that Napoleon would act alone if they did not send the fleet into the Black Sea. Napoleon afterwards denied that he had used any language justifying such a threat. But it seems to have been the decisive argument.

To sum up: in the main the old contention that England 'drifted' into war is correct. The sending of the fleet to Constantinople was decided in September by Clarendon and Aberdeen in deference to public opinion. They acted from different motives, and Aberdeen certainly did not think the result would be war. The despatch of the fleet into the Black Sea in December (and the provocative form the instructions assumed) was decided by the cabinet, partly in deference to public opinion, partly to fear of separating from Napoleon. But in the latter case the fear was at least exaggerated. Neither of these grave decisions was taken from clear motives or on the basis of an agreed policy. Both were influenced by the misconceptions of the moment.

(5) *Russia.*

Recent research has made Russian policy much more clear. Nesselrode seems to have been throughout for peace, but to have had difficulties in controlling the Czar. The Czar's anger at the French claims in respect to the Holy Places was to some extent justified. The deliberate disingenuousness of the Turks increased his wrath, and the insidious suggestion of Reschid to seek redress under the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji was most unfortunate. Nicholas and Nesselrode both seem to have imagined (without examining the facts) that the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji gave them much more of a religious control in Turkey than Russia actually exercised.

Under these circumstances their action becomes intelligible. It is also quite clear that the Czar was enraged at the Bosnian rebellion and the Turkish war on Montenegro. Excuses may be pleaded for the former, but not to any serious extent for the latter. It strengthened the Czar's resolve to teach Turkey a lesson, and the success of Leiningen's mission only made him the more determined. What he did not understand was that the Turks, having yielded twice to Napoleon in 1852 and once to Austria in 1853, could not yield to Russia or to anyone else a fourth time.

That Nicholas meant war either by his military and naval preparations or by sending Menšikov on his mission is improbable and seems to be contradicted by the most authentic evidence. But that war might be a result was seen even from the first. None the less, it was a risk which Nicholas thought might be run. It is clear that he thought that what was in essence a 'bluff' would be supported by England, at least to the extent of advising the Turks to yield. He was confirmed in this view by Aberdeen's accession to power, by his conversations with Seymour, and by his receiving the news from Brunnow that even Stratford himself favoured Russian claims as against French in the Holy Places. As it turned



out Menšikov delayed forcing matters till Stratford had arrived at Constantinople and till after the settlement of the Holy Places' dispute. The reliance upon Aberdeen just failed to secure its end before the departure of Menšikov. Clarendon had become alarmed at the nature of his demands, and Aberdeen later acknowledged that they were unreasonable.

The question of how far Menšikov exceeded his instructions can be inferred from the summary of them (quoted *supra*, pp. 304-8), but hardly decided. It is clear that he had a good deal of latitude. The claims under Kutchuk Kainardji were undoubtedly intended to be defined and extended so as to make Turkey grant Russia certain special rights of religious interference. As an alliance was also suggested, it seems legitimate to infer that the general aim was to make Turkey dependent on Russia and to exclude other influences, particularly England's. But Menšikov seems to have gone rather farther than his vague instructions justified, especially in demanding the appointment of patriarchs for life. A curious suggestion was put by Lord Clowley at the time. It was that Menšikov was carrying out the policy of the extreme Orthodox party and forcing the Czar's hand. As Clowley had experience at Constantinople his opinion is worth something. It seems certain that, being an extremist of the Orthodox party, Menšikov was a great deal more insistent than Nesselrode would have been. His violence was at once extreme and yet misplaced. Also, contrary to the old opinions, he undoubtedly expelled Mehemet Ali and put in Reschid to be Russia's instrument. Reschid's subsequent refusal to carry out the bargain was unexpected by Menšikov, and only illustrates his egregious miscalculations. On the whole, Orlov was probably right in thinking that, if he had been sent on the mission, he would have got most of what Menšikov sought and all that Russia desired.

The Czar's decision to invade the Principalities was the measure which, beyond all others, led to war. The Russian contention that it was justified by the advance of the Franco-British squadron to Besika Bay had no basis in fact. In the first place the move was decided before there was any knowledge in St. Petersburg of the fleet movement. In the second place the fleet movement did not violate the Straits Convention, whereas the Russian crossing of the Moldavian boundary did. The Russian attempts to justify their action were clumsy and unconvincing and were avowedly put forward as a means of inducing Turkey to accept the Czar's demands. None the less, it is important to note that Nicholas did not intend to produce war by this action. It was only an extension of the unfortunate 'bluff' methods which he had begun when he made his military preparations and sent Menšikov on his mission.

Setting aside the occupation of the Principalities the Czar behaved well during the period of the 'Vienna Note.' He was indeed privately consulted beforehand, but his *acceptation pure et simple* of the 'Note' implied a good deal of concession from the



public point of view. On the other hand, Nesselrode's 'violent interpretation' of the 'Vienna Note' was not only unfortunate, but its revelation to the public justified almost every suspicion as to Russia's designs on Turkey. As it was it caused both France and England to drop any idea of forcing Turkey to accept the 'Note.' It also convinced Clarendon of the need of sending the British fleet to Constantinople. Yet this 'violent interpretation' may be too hardly judged. It was not actually official and may be considered as one of those 'interpretations' on which no nation insists save in extremity. However that may be, there can be no doubt that not only Nesselrode, but the Czar himself, disavowed any such interpretation at the meeting with Franz Joseph at Olmütz, and showed an extreme anxiety for peace. Clarendon's refusal of this overture lays a heavy responsibility upon England, especially in view of the fact that Austria accepted it, and that France thought of doing so.

The Czar's attitude towards Turkey after the declaration of war was certainly a moderate one and showed a desire, if possible, to avoid extremities. Like every Russian statesman he was unsparing in his criticism of Stratford, at the time that statesman was making his last effort for peace. But it is evident that the Czar's armies were kept strictly on the defensive. The 'massacre of Sinope' was a perfectly legitimate operation of war and, in view of the previous attacks by the Turks and of their open declaration of war, one which they had no right to resent. The fact that they and their allies did so does not mean that the Czar at this stage precipitated matters. Accustomed to command and irresistible in authority at home, he had come to think that high-handed methods would equally succeed abroad. They probably would have done, had they not driven England and France into partnership against him. It was here that Aberdeen's methods proved so unfortunate. Nicholas thought that he could rely upon Aberdeen first to induce the British cabinet, next to acquiesce in Russia's demands, next to prevent any working arrangement with France, and at any rate to keep England out of war. Nicholas found reason to believe that Aberdeen might fail in the first two aims. But he never believed, until too late, that he could possibly fail in the last. So, in a rather tragic sense, Aberdeen was responsible for the war and it seems that he felt the responsibility.

## APPENDIX VI

### ABERDEEN'S LETTER TO THE QUEEN JUSTIFYING THE DESPATCH OF THE FLEET INTO THE BLACK SEA (DECEMBER 22, 1853)

#### *Aberdeen to the Queen*

'Lord Aberdeen presents his humble duty to Your Majesty. He begs to inform Your Majesty that the Cabinet took into con-

sideration to-day the last proposal made by the French Government for a joint action of the English and French fleets in the Black Sea. In addition to the protection of the Turkish territory, it was also proposed to protect the Turkish flag, by which means the dominion of the Sea would be exclusively possessed by the Allied Fleets. This proceeding is founded on the affair of Sinope, and if carried into execution, will doubtless very effectually check all military operations of the Russians. It is to be accompanied by a proposal that France should join this country in making it a condition with the Turks that they should refer the terms of peace to the discretion of England and France, in consideration of so great a service.

\* It is possible, and even probable, that this decision may so far provoke the resentment of the Russian Government, as either to lead to a declaration of war, or to acts of retaliation ; but Lord Aberdeen believes that the accidental collisions, which under the present state of things would inevitably have taken place, render the proposed instructions not more dangerous. Lord Aberdeen would have hesitated to agree to this proposal, had it not been evident that the continuance of the French Alliance depended upon its adoption. It was stated very unequivocally that the Emperor of the French would either execute the project alone, or that he would withdraw his fleet to Toulon ; and the whole tone of the French communications was exacting and peremptory. This appeared to be mainly owing to the present state of feeling in France, in consequence of the Sinope affair ; and unfortunately, public opinion in this country would not permit the risk of dissolving the Alliance at this juncture by the assertion of a little more independance [*sic*]. It is a proof, however, that little reliance can be placed upon such a connection.

\* The Cabinet subsequently proceeded to consider the situation of Lord Palmerston in his relation to the Government. Lord Aberdeen was deeply impressed with the cogency and force of the considerations stated in the letters which he had the honour of receiving from Your Majesty this morning ; but he felt that he could not personally place himself in opposition to the general wish of the Cabinet upon such a subject. It appears that Lord Palmerston has expressed himself in various quarters, and in the strongest terms, as being sensible of the hasty step he had taken, and of having acted under a misconception. He declares his readiness to reconsider his objections to the Reform Bill, and to do his best to come to an understanding with his colleagues. Under the circumstances, it was resolved that no concession of any important portion of the measure should be made ; but that, if Lord Palmerston could be satisfied by submitting certain details to fair discussion, it might be permitted. It was also resolved that the first overture for a reconciliation should come from Lord Palmerston himself. All these considerations were greatly promoted by the reluctance of Sir George Grey to take office, as well as by the effect which, in the opinion of many members of the Cabinet, would be produced in

the House of Commons to the safety of the Government by the secession of Lord Palmerston.

‘ Lord Aberdeen doubts very much whether this attempt can succeed, as Lord Palmerston must be prepared to make sacrifices of opinions, principles, and consistency scarcely to be expected. At all events, it may be considered a matter of necessity to effect this reconciliation, if possible ; but it is a little like what has already been done to secure the French Alliance.

‘ London. Dec[ember] 22, 1853.’ \*

## APPENDIX VII

### NAPOLEON III’S EXPLANATION OF HIS THREAT TO ACT ALONE

[There does not seem to be much doubt that the strong French demand of December 19, 1853 (*vide supra*, pp. 376–7), produced the British consent to enter the Black Sea. That is admitted by Aberdeen in his letter of December 22 to the Queen (*vide* App. VI). The demand would not have been accepted but for a private letter from Cowley of December 20 to Clarendon. ‘ The Emperor is so convinced of its necessity that he is prepared, should it become necessary to carry it out alone.’ This clinched the matter, but the information came from Drouyn de Lhuys, not from the Emperor, and it appears that it was either not true or an exaggeration.]

*Pte. Clar. MSS.* Cowley to Clarendon, December 20, 1853.

Cowley to Clarendon, December 23, 1853, refers to ‘ my conversation with the Emperor yesterday evening ’ (22nd).

‘ He [Napoleon] had blamed the style of the despatch [of 19th] which Drouyn [de Lhuys] had sent Walewski.’ Napoleon then complains that he cannot oversee everything. ‘ . . . In the present case for instance Drouyn came to me on Monday [19th] after his conversation with you [Cowley] I agreed with him that, notwithstanding the objection made by your government to our proposition we should persist in it, and if the worst came to the worst that we should undertake it alone. Drouyn asks whether he may write to Walewski in this sense. I gave my permission to him and he goes home and, without any further reference to me, sends off the despatch of which you complain. As soon as I saw it, I told Drouyn that he had acted inadvisedly and foolishly and that I could not approve of his despatch which contained a useless menace.’ [Cowley then describes how he criticised the Emperor himself.] ‘ I [Cowley] did not spare him [Napoleon], he did not for one moment attempt to justify Drouyn’s proceeding.’

\* *Roy. Arch.* This has been reproduced from the original by gracious permission of His late Majesty, and compared with the draft in *pte. Aber. MSS., Add. MSS.* 43048, pp. 99–100. Part of this has already been quoted by Kingsley Martin, *Triumph of Lord Palmerston*, 169–90.

To complete the picture add this. Cowley to Clarendon, December 25, 1853.\* "There is unfortunately no accounting for French policy. It depends on so many things we can neither see nor control. I know that at the moment when Drouyn was making his ridiculous menace about acting alone with the French fleet if we would not go with him, the Emperor in a confidential conversation with a person who repeated it to me, said "I can have but one policy, whether it is peace or war, it is direct intimacy with England."'

\* *Pic. Clm. MSS.*

# INDEX TO PRINCIPAL QUOTATIONS FROM UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

[NOTE.—An asterisk \* precedes a quotation from an unpublished document, partly printed elsewhere. Where a quotation is made in text and the reference is in the note both are given, e.g. 91, n. 131. Where the quotation is in the note alone, the note is given followed by the page, e.g. n. 275, 443.]

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